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When the trade in slaves was abolished in 1807, 
British merchants who wished to continue commercial relations 
with the Gold Coast sought for substitute commodities. After 
some years the merchants found it impossible to carry on 
"legitimate trade" unless the British Government helped them 
by controlling refractory middlemen tribes and so enabling 
Europeans to penetrate Ashanti and its hinterland. 
Accordingly, the British Government began its 
administration of the Gold Coast forts in 1843. The local 
Government was handicapped by lack of funds and by bad 
climatic conditions. Moreover, it owned no territory on 
the Gold Coast, and attempts to assume authority over the 
inhabitants met with resolute opposition. One such attempt 
was the imposition of the Poll Tax and its failure was 
symbolic of the Africans' refusal to recognize British 
sovereignty. 
In the Eastern Districts, Government was slight. 
There traders wanted to deal in palm oil but found themselves 
baulked by middlemen tribes and by the reaction of producers 
to unfavourable prices. At length, in 1869, the Government 
yielded to pressure and lent its support to the merchants in 
opening up the River Volta for British trade. 
-2- 
Similar resistance by middlemen tribes was offered to 
European traders in the Western Districts where the Chiefs 
were reinforced by educated Africans. Together they tried 
to achieve their ambitions - the educated community wanted 
self-government, and the Chiefs wanted to maintain their 
positibn as middlemen between Ashanti and the sea. The 
movement towards self-government had been encouraged by 
the decision of the Select Committee of Parliament in 1865 
that Britain should withdraw from West Africa. 
In 1872, the retirement of the Dutch Government from 
the Coast precipitated a war with Ashanti in which the 
British Government played the decisive part. Africans 
refused to help in this war because they realized its 
import, but their conduct provided a justification for the 
establishment of firm control over the coastal region. 
Thenceforth, European enterprise became more vigorous 
and widespread, and the disintetgration of the Ashanti 
Kingdom enabled traders to reach the interior. At the 
same time, the Government, confident after its success in 
the war, assumed wider powers over the people. 
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PREFACE. 
This thesis sets out to examine official British 
relations with the Gold Coast. from 1843 to 1880, and is 
therefore a study of policy and administration. 
The starting point, 1843, was the year in which the 
Colonial, Office-assumed control of the Forts and Settlements 
along the seaboard; and 1880 seemed, a convenient point to 
stop because in the period after the war with Ashanti in 1874, 
the now trend in policy becomes sufficiently clear. With 
this decisive war, which aimed at-consolidating the British 
position' onr-the =Gold -Coast and preparing the way for expansion, 
the first,: w. hesitant -phase of British administration ended. 
Untouchedt'by the earlier humanitarian sentiments which laid 
stress on the welfare' of. the inhabitants, the post-war 
policy. was. plainly designed to promote European enterprise 
in the territory. 
A close study of the Colonial Office records show 
that-though a part of a large Empire, the Gold Coast formed 
an isolated administrative unit. Two attempts to link it 
with- the . other West African Settlements failed, as the 
Sierra Leone-files reveal. Only military and naval resources 
were. drawn from a-common pool; but here, as elsewhere, 
iv 
Imperial policy severely limited its extent. 
Before 1873, financial policy towards the Gold 
Coast was also in keeping with Imperial policy. Parliament 
and Treasury both frowned at expenditure on colonial possessions, 
Consequently, despite its constant difficulties, the Gold 
Coast could not hope for Imperial aid and was kept in an 
impoverished state. Until the prosperity which followed the 
Ashanti war, the Gold Coast was under Treasury restraint, but 
the Treasury records do not throw more light on financial 
questions than appears in correspondence with the Colonial 
Office. 
Apart from the Treasury, no other department of 
State hindered the Colonial Office in its control. Neither 
the Foreign Office nor the Board of Trade exercised much 
supervision over the Gold Coast, though the Colonial Office 
frequently asked their opinions on various topics. Relations 
with Ashanti, for instance, were handled by the Governor, 
and those with the Netherlands were conducted by the Foreign 
Office on the advice of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. Again, the consuls who played so important a part 
in affairs further south, in Lagos and the Oil Rivers, had 
no influence on the Gold Coast. When the last few miles of 
coastline were added to the colony in 1879, the Gold Coast 
reached its present extent on the seaboard, and it was not 
C 
V 
until after the period under consideration that foreign 
rivalry became intense. From 1880, indeed, the Gold Coast 
seems to enter the wider arena of international trade and 
politics. 
I have therefore thought it worthwhile to take 
the Gold Coast alone, and within its compass to study in 
detail the problems of everyday administration and the 
formation of British policy. Principles first applied here 
were later extended to other parts of West Africa, to East 
Africa, and to the Pacific. From this point of view, the 
Gold Coast provides an important experimental ground. In 
f 
addition, a detailed study of the records has brought to 
light much unpublished material on the history of relations 
with Britain. 
Another problem, that dealing with the movements 
in African society caused by the more intensive economic 
development after the slave trade ended, is also important, 
but I have not been able to deal with it as fully as I could 
have wished. Material on this question is very limited. 
Research on the Gold Coast was fruitful, but only for the 
late nineteenth century; and Liverpool, the centre for West 
African trade, failed to yield anything which might give 
additional information from the traders' viewpoint. 
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The Gold Coast was the name given to the seaboard 
lying just north of the equator between 1o east and 3° west of 
the Greenwich meridian. The Slave Coast lay to the east and 
the Ivory Coast to the west. Although it was known to be 
rich in gold, the hinterland of the Gold Coast was virtually 
closed to Europeans until the nineteenth century. Impenetrable 
and forbidding, the interior of this disease-ridden coast did 
not invite close inspection. Even the coast itself was 
unfriendly, having no natural harbours, "and a stormy surf which 
prevented ships from approaching near to the shore. The 
modern political divisions coincide roughly with the four 
main historical and physical regions of the territory. 
Extending about 30 miles inland from the seaboard is 
the coastal region, now known as the Gold Coast Colony. It 
is low-lying, undulating country, not rising much more than 
200 feet above sea level. The extreme west, with a high 
rainfall of over 60 inches annually, is covered with forest. 
East of Axim, the rainfall gradually diminishes to 25 inches at 
Accra. Correspondingly, the forest gives way first to luriant 
bush, then to open grassland and scrub on the Accra plains, 
and finally to barren sands in the south-east. All along the 
coastline, in ponds or lagoons, are to be found almost the 
1 
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(1) only salt deposits in this part of West Africa. In 
addition, a thriving fishing industry is carried on in the 
numerous seaboard villages/ after it has been smoked and 
dried, the fish is carried inland for sale, and the constant 
demand for this foodstuff makes it a most profitable article 
of trade. Hence commercial relations developed between the 
interior and the coast even before trade with Europeans 
became attractive. 
The River Fra and its tributary the Ofin divide the 
Colony from Ashanti, the second region, which lies on a 
plateau varying in height from 500 to 1,500 feet above the 
sea. Owing to a considerable annual rainfall, Ashanti is 
covered with forest, and some of the timber is commercially 
valuable. There are hard woods like mahogany; softer woods 
are used to make canoes for the fishing villages on the coast. 
and for river transport. Kola trees grow well in the forest 
country, and though neither the Ashantis nor the people of the 
Colony have much liking for kola nuts, they are almost a 
necessity for the tribes in the north. The habit of chewing 
kola nuts was common among the Muslim traders who crossed the 
Sahara desert in camel or donkey caravans along century-old i 
(2) 
trade routes from North Africa and Egypt to West Africa. 
(1) When on the Gold Coast I learnt that salt also occurs at 
Daboya, West of Tamale in the Northern Territories. This 
appears to be the sole inland deposit, 
(2) Bovill, E. W: Caravans of the Old Sahara, esp. Ch. XXII. 
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The astringent qualities of the nut alleviated hunger and 
thirst over this long and hazardous journey* Muslims also 
(1) 
prized the nut for fast-days and as a ceremonial gift. 
Ashantis conducted a flourishing trade in kola at the great 
markets of Bonduku, Kintampo, Salaga and Atebubu, the first 
three of which were the terminal points of the caravan routes 
to this port. 
The third region, the Northern Territories, is 
separated from Ashanti by the Black Volta. Strikingly 
different in appearance from the two southern regions, the 
Northern Territories consist of grassy, low-lying plains, with 
a much smaller and more uncertain rainfall. Only in the 
extreme north does the rainfall become more regular, and 
there the country is higher, rising to 1,500 feet. This 
narrow area alone is free from the tsetse fly, and is 
therefore the one part of the Gold Coast where cattle-rearing 
is carried ono The soil is also more cultivable, and mixed 
farming is practised. Shea butter trees grow well throughout 
the Northern Territories. The butter is remarkable for its. 
keeping qualities, and has always been a popular commodity in 
local trade. Today it is used commercially in the 
manufacture of chocolate creams. 
(1) Nadel, 5. F: A Black Byzantium, pp. 61,129-30,285 and 
309. The importance of the kola, trade was made very 
clear to me in a number of conversations I had with Gold Coast and Nigerian traders in the Northern Territories. 
, 
I, x -. X 
Everywhere on the Gold Coast the rainfall is 
monsoonal, the heaviest rains falling about June and July, 
During the heavy rains, paths and tracks become overgrown and 
impassable. These were the only "roads" until this century. 
The marked dry season lasts from November to February in the 
Colony and Ashanti, while in the more arid north, it lasts 
longer. During this time, a hot, dry wind, called the 
Harmattah, blows south from the Sahara desert. Temperatures 
seldom fall below 750F. at any time of the year, though it is 
only in the north that they rise above 90°F. The heat is 
always accompanied, except during the Harmattan, by a high 
humidity. It is the humid atmosphere which makes the greater 
part of Ashanti and the Colony, especially in the forest country, 
suitable for cacao cultivation, today the major occupation in 
these parts. 
The River Volta, in its course from north to south, 
provides another political boundary, that between the Gold 
Coast and British Mandated Togoland to the east. Grassland 
on the left bank of the river is dominated by several'peaks of 
over x, 000 feet, and on these hills the air is cool and 
invigorating. Both the climate and the appearance of the 
country here is more pleasing to Europeans than the monotonous 
C1) Vide Fitzgerald, W: Africa, A Social, Economic and 
Political Geography, ppo36 et seq., an pp. 348 et seq. 
GmewlwReels'MaFV. r ý'l- ": tnp,. +i, "ý. , 1. " ... 1 
xi 
green, thick bush and forest of the Gold Coast, and explains 
why Europeans who visited this part in the nineteenth century 
wore so enthusiastic about it. Wild cotton occurs here in 
fairly large quantities. 
Because it is the only river of any size on the 
Gold Coast, the Volta is important. Full of snags and 
rapids, and barred at the mouth, the river can only be 
navigated by launches of very shallow draught, and for a short 
distance of its course. Yet from the time that its 
possibilities first became known to Europeans in the 1880's, 
until the advent of railways at the beginning of this 
century, the Volta was regarded as an important highway to the 
interior. Animal-drawn traffic was everywhere precluded by 
the tsetse fly, and water trensport was a welcome alternative 
to human porterage, the only other means of transport. 
Africans had long been accustomed to river travel. People 
living at Ada, for instance, paddled canoes up the Volta from 
its mouth as far as Yeji in the Northern Territories in order 
to trade at Salaga, once the largest market in the north. 
The Gold Coast would appear to have been populated 
in a series of migratory waves, one main current coming from 
the north, and the other from the east. The principal 
language divisions today indicate broadly the common origins 
of the various tribal groups: the Akan in the north and west, 
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xii 
the Ga-Adangme and Ewe in the east. These divisions also 
correspond to differences in social evolution but everywhere 
larger units were formed, with the family as the model of 
the tribal organization. 
Among the Akan, the most numerous and widespread 
group, one of the most striking features of the social 
organization was the clan system. Every person belonged to 
(1) 
one of the eight clans, each of which was said to be 
descended from a common ancestress and ultimately from an 
animal totem. From these totems the clans took their names. 
Clanship implied a blood tie, passed on in the female line, 
and this was the only tie which commanded obedience and 
(2) 
conferred the right of inheritance to property or office. 
Tending in an opposite direction to this personal relationship 
was the family unit, a territorial group. No one might marry 
a member of the same blood or clan, so that a household would 
consist of individuals be`onging to two or more clans, the 
society being polygamous. The head of the family would not 
(1) Rattray, R. S: Ashanti Law and Constitution, p. 63. According to Sarbah, J, MS an Customary ws, pp. 5-6 and 33, there are seven clans among the Fan s. 
I have drawn almost entirely from Rattrayts works in describing Akan structure. They have not been superseded and are still the standard reference. 
(2) Rattray, op. cit.., p. 62. 
(3) Ibid., pp. 22 et seq. 
xi ii 
have absolute authority over the members of his household 
unless they were of his own clan. Such members would include 
his mother, her children, her brothers and sisters by the same 
mother, his own sisters' children, and other similar 
matrilineal relations in an extended family group. But his 
wives and their children would belong to different clans, and 
though they lived in his compound, they would be more under the 
control of the mother's matrilineal relations, such as her 
uncles or brothers. Even over those of his own blood, however, 
the head of the family did not have despotic authority. He 
was always subject to the-advice and control of the family 
elders who elected him to his position. 
To be eligible for election, candidates had to be of 
the right blood, but the eldest among them was not necessarily 
chosen. Nor, when he was elected, did the new head of the 
family succeed so much to rights and tangible assets as to 
duties and obligations. His principal function was to mediate 
between the living and their ancestral spirits which pervaded 
everything. The sacred . stool, 
the symbol of headship, was 
believed to be the repository of the souls of the departed 
members of the family, and when the head succeeded to the stool, 
his person became sacrosanct, the family regarding him with awe 
and reverence. In spite of this, he was bound by distinct 
rules of conduct, and the principal of these was that he might 
never act without the advice and concurrence of the, elders of 
ýn 
xiv 
the family. If he deviated too noticeably from this standard, 
the people who elected him were able to deprive him of his 
(1) 
authority by de-stooling him. 
Only over slaves was his power autocratic. The 
institution of slavery seems to have been of very long 
standing. Certainly it existed before the transatlantic 
slave trade began. But domestic slavery, as compared with 
the export of slaves, was much more benign. It has been said 
that one of the reasons for the prevalence of domestic 
slavery was the fact that it enabled the head of a household 
to increase at will the number of people Qver whom he could 
(2) 
wield autocratic powers. Since slaves were his own 
personal property, and since the very term slave implied that 
these individuals had no family or clan to protect them, they 
were subject to the caprice of their master, but slaves were 
usually well treated. They could acquire property, including 
v 
slaves, of their own, and could even inherit that of their 
master, who often adopted them into his own clan. Moreover, 
it was an advantage for the head to marry slave women, because 
both they and their children became his property, so adding 
to the number of people under his direct authority. The 
worst feature of this system of slavery was that a slave was 
liable at any time to be sacrificed. Human sacrifices conuonly 
(1) Ibid., Chapter I, passim. "Esstool", "destool", and "succeed to the stool" are terms in common use on the Gold 
Coast. 
(2) Ibid., p. 43. Another major reason was the necessity for human porterage. 
t 
xiv a# 
took place on the death of an important person so that his 
spirit might be accompanied into the next world by attendant 
spirits`in the same way that he was served by slaves in this 
world. Slaves were for the most part imported from the 
north. The Akan themselves were seldom degraded into slavery. 
They were all protected by their families, and only when the 
family repudiated one of its members for a serious crime did 
(1) 
he lose its protection. Sometimes a member would stand 
security for a debt incurred by the family. In this case he 
was called a pawn. On the debt being paid, the pawn was 
redeemed. But in dire necessity, families could sell one of 
their number into slavery to wipe out the debt. The 
individual pawned or sold was not necessarily the one who had 
(2) 
incurred the debt. 
The family unit was never regarded as a collection 
of individuals. In all things it acted as a corporate body, 
and as such was responsible for the actions, and even the 
thoughts, of its members. Just as the individual owed loyalty 
and respect to the family, so it protected him and gave him 
sustenance in time of need. There were no paupers or destitute 
widows and orphans in this society, since everyone was 
automatically entitled to the help of the family. 
(1) Ibid., Chapter V. - 
By the same 
(2) Ibid., Chapter Vi. 
ACV 
rule, offences of all kinds were the responsibility of the 
family. The fact that the crime or misdemeanour of an 
individual was regarded as an offence against the whole family 
and its ancestral spirits was the greatest force making for 
(1) 
law and order in the community. 
A number of families living in the same area came 
to form village communities, which were governed in exactly 
the same way as individual families. The heads of families 
agreed to defer to the authority of one of their number, chosen 
by themselves and subject to their control. A group of 
village headmen similarly elected a Chief headman to preside 
over the affairs of the larger territorial area, and he, top, (2) 
was subject to control and guidance from below. 
Councillors in each level of the hierarchy acted as 
a judiciary; that is, they were the guardians of tribal (3) 
religion and morals, since law and religion were synonymous. 
Councillors of lower levels were expected to sit with their 
superior leaders, so that elders would sit with the headman, 
headmen with the Chief, and Chiefs with the Head Chief. If 
he misconducted himself, or acted contrary to the general 
interest, a community leader might be arraigned by his own 
(4) 
councillors. The revenue of the territorial division was 
(1) Ibid., Chapter VIII. 
(2) Ibid., pp. 63 and 69. 
(3) Ibid., p. 2. 
(4) Ibid.., p. 93. 
_'ý 
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derived from fees and fines of court, from trade, and from 
gold-mining if the area happened to be auriferous. It was 
also common for revenue to be raised for specific purposes, as 
might happen in the case of a war or a customary celebration 
or feast. A Chief, however, was expected to disburse as much 
wealth as he received, and the office was not regarded as a 
(1) 
means of amassing personal wealth. 
A number of these larger territorial divisions had 
evolved among the Akan by the seventeenth century, each one 
forming a tribe or state. Among these were Kumasi, Juaben 
and Kokofu. Some of the states had grown so large that 
migrations had taken place and new divisions formed, Mampong, 
(2) 
Nsuta and Kumawu originating in this way. Adansi, another 
state, gave rise to several branches, notably Denkera, Akwamu 
and Akim Abuakwa, of which Akwapim was an eighteenth century 
(3) 
offshoot. Probably the Fanti states and others in the 
coastal belt were formed in the same fashion. 
In the seventeenth century, Denkera was the most 
powerful of the Akan states, and most of the others had become 
tributary to it. Denkera had contact with Europeans on the 
(1) Ibid., Chapter XIV. 
(2) Ibid., Chapter IX. 
(3) Crowther, F: Note on the History of the New Juaben 
Settlements, in the District Record Book, Ko oridua. 
:; s 
xvii 
coast and traded with them in slaves and gold. receiving in 
return arms, spirits and cloth. Through the Denkeras, the 
Akan states in the interior gained access to guns and gunpowder, 
and with the aid of these superior weapons, some of the 
larger divisions were able to induce smaller communities to 
amalgamate with them. At the end of the seventeenth century, 
Osei Tutu, Chief of the Kumasi division, united all the other 
divisions under his leadership, and after organizing them on 
(1) 
a military basis, attacked and conquered Denkera. When 
this was achieved, the divisions acknowledged Osei Tutu as their 
King, and he'proceeded to weld the Ashanti Confederacy out of 
these tribal units. All the great Chiefs were required to 
take an oath of allegiance to him, thus cutting across the 
clanship tie which before was the only warrant for obedience. 
Each of the great Chiefs was given a military title according 
to his position in battle array, so that one was Chief of the 
Right Wing, another of the Left Wing, a third of the Vanguard, 
and so on. These Chiefs therefore came to have a military 
in addition to their religious function. While he held a 
subordinate position in the national army, each Chief became a 
King in his own division, and organized his state on exactly 
the same lines as that of the central government, with his own 
army in which subordinate Chiefs acted as military leaders. 
The pattern of the central government was repeated throughout 
(1) BoSma;,, : .. 
Description of the Gold Coast, pp. 74-6. 
xviii 
the hierarchy. A Golden Stool was made and became the symbol 
of the King's authority; every division and sub-division had 
already acquired its own stool. The land in the neighbourhood 
of - each tribe came to be vested in the stool and was inalienable! 
Oaths of allegiance were required by superior leaders from 
those below them, and every able-bodied man served in the 
(1) 
national or divisional army. Slaves of the first 
generation were not allowed to carry guns, though they accomp- 
anted their masters to war. Slaves born in Ashanti, however, 
(2) 
were entitled to take part in battle. 
Once formed, the Ashanti Kingdom embarked on a 
career of conquest, and succeeded in subduing most of the 
surrounding states either by force of arms or by diplomatic 
pressure. Subject states were left to govern themselves once 
they were brought under Ashanti sway, though nominally they 
were placed under the supervision of one or other of the great 
Chiefs. But annually Lhey were required to pay tribute in 
(3) 
produce, in gold, or, more usually, in slaves. 
There was continual unrest in the Kingdom. The 
great Chiefs were Kings in their own right and they frequently 
rebelled for greater power for themselves, or in protest against 
too great a presumption by the King; and among the tributary 
(1) Rattray, op. cit., Chapter X. 
(2) Ibid. , p. 124. 
(3) Bowdich, T. E: Mission to Ashantee, p. 235, note, 
(4) Rattray, op. cit., p. 105. 
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states smouldered the desire to break free. Nevertheless, 
the Confederacy was maintained intact until the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. The key-note of Ashanti 
organization was its decentralization. Each division remained 
practically autonomous, except for the oath of allegiance to 
the King, and the small amount of interference from the central 
authority made for the smooth running of the parts of the 
(1) 
Confederacy. 
All the Akan states copied the Ashanti pattern of 
organization, though no others formed such a &werful confederacy. 
The Fanti states, one of the largest groups in the coastal belt, 
joined in time of war with some of their neighbours to form a 
loose confederacy under the King of Mankesim, but he had little 
(2) 
authority over the member states. They clung to their 
independence, and nothing but the most urgent necessity made 
them subordinate their jealousy to the common cause. - In this 
jnlregion, there were a large number of fragmentary groups of 
migrants who had arrived earlier than the Akan, including some 
of the aboriginal inhabitants. These fragments were for the 
most part absorbed by the Akan states, but pockets of alien 
communities retained their identity. Among these were the 
Ahanta and Nzima in the west, and the Efutu round Winneba. 
(1) Ibid., pp. 811-8* 
(2) Bowdich, op. cit., p. 250, note. 
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The people of Cape Coast, for instance, were not completely 
moulded toitthe Akan pattern until well into the nineteenth 
(1) 
century. ' 
Among the immigrants from the east, a different 
social system prevailed. There was no clanship and succession 
was patrilineal. The Ga-speaking people were grouped in 
tiny village communities, and only under stress of war in the 
eighteenth century did they combine to form towns for mutual 
(2) 
protection. Each portion of a town was made up of 
different families or houses, as they were called, and these 
remained autonomous except in matters of war. In these 
communities, the office of military leader was not combined 
with that of religious leader, since the military head was 
created for a particular purpose and did not become an integral 
part of the social organization. In military matters the Ga 
looked to their Akan neighbours for a pattern, and copied the 
Akan military customs, even ordering stools to be made for 
their war leaders, because it appeared that these symbols made 
the Ashantis so successful in battle. Stools, however, were 
not otherwise significant in the Ga community. The military 
leader was also the person generally chosen to negotiate with 
(1) John Aggery succeeded his father as King of Cape Coast in 
1865. Vide Chapter III, in rya. Later, matrilineal 
succession was adopted. 
(2) Field, M. J: Social Organization of the Ga People, pp. 32 
and 46. 
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the Europeans who dispensed guns and gunpowder, and by the 
white traders he was wrongly thought to be the Chief or King, 
as-was his Akan counterpart. Accra was one of the first 
towns to be formed, and it was looked upon as the leader of 
the surrounding people in war, both because it had more 
experience of warfare, and because it was the principal seat 
(1) 
of; . European trade in the district. 
< European observers seldom failed to notice the 
essentially democratic nature of the social system of the 
(2) 
Gold=Coast people, to whatever group they belonged. 
Willem Bosnian, a Dutch factor writing at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, even referred contemptuously to 
African rulers who bore none of the traditional marks of 
royalty, and were, indeed, only called Kings by the Europeans 
themselves. He spoke as a trader and a Dutchman. But it 
was true that no man would have been tolerated as leader of 
the community if he assumed authority over his people which 
did not spring directly from them; and they never gave him 
an' excess of it. 
(1) Ibid., pp. 71 at seq: I myself have used these terms indiscriminately, partly because they were so used in the 
period concerned, but chiefly to avoid African titles, which differ from place to place and would confuse the reader 
with their infinite variety. 




Yet it happened that Europeans, whether traders or 
often sought despotic rulers among the Africans 
with whom they dealt, because such rulers would have been able 
(1) 
to carry out the white man's wishes. It was true that 
many Chiefs, tempted by the rewards offered them by Europeans, 
would try to set themselves above their people, who at once 
repudiated leaders with these pretensions. But if despots 
were not forthcoming, Europeans protested that Chiefs had 
"lost their power". When the British Government came to rule- 
the Gold Coast, officials believed that ordinances or other 
(2) 
Government decrees were necessary to "restore" that lost power. 
The fact was, however, that no Chief could lose what he did 
not have, and Chiefs never possessed powers other than those 
conferred on them from below by their own people, in return for 
the services they rendered to the community. Indirect rule 
was regarded by Government officials as the ideal form of 
administration because it was cheap and made use of the existing 
institutions. This type of administration meant direct rule 
through African agents who were intended to carry out the 
wishes of the European Government, and therefore made for 
(1) Not all Europeans believed African rulers to be 
despotic: cf. Robertson, G. A. Notes on Africa, pp. 107 
and 198. 
(2) of. CO/96/120, no. 4245, Freeling to Carnarvon, 
13th March, 1877. 
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disruption of the indigenous machinery of government. Although 
indirect rule could not be successfully applied on the Gold 
Coast, the attempts to put this system into practice, and the 
underlying notion that African rulers should be autocrats had 
a most disturbing influence on the social structure. 
Europeans began to exercise influence on African 
institutions from the time of their arrival on the West Coast 
in the second half of the fifteenth century. The Portuguese 
were first in the field, seeking gold, ivory and slaves, the 
last in order to augment the labour force in Portugal. With 
the turn of the century, a demand for slaves grew up in the 
West Indies, which remained insatiable for the next 300 years. 
Dutch, French and English merchants followed in the wake of 
the Portuguese, competing with them fOr the valuable 
transatlantic market, and finally ousting them. Swedes, Danes 
and Prussians appeared on the Coast in the seventeenth century, 
and the fierce rivalry between the merchants of these 
countries was the counterpart of the struggle for dominance 
(1) 
in B. irope. 
At first Europeans traded in their ships, anchoring 
beyond the surf to await canoes from the seaboard villages. 
As the volume of trade and the competition for it increased, it 
became necessary to build headquarters on the shore for storage 
and for protection. The Portuguese erected the first 
(1) Blake, J. W: European Be innings in West Africa. 
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(1) permanent European building at Elmina in 1482, and by the 
end of the seventeent» century, the coast was dotted with 
fortifications which varied in size and importance from great 
castles such as those at Elmina, Cape Coast and Christiansborg, 
near Accra, to mere factories at other places. These forts 
had to withstand naval attack from European rivals, and land 
attack from Africans. A regular and judicious distribution 
of presents among the Chiefs in the nearby villages generally 
secured their goodwill. Chiefs also received dues from ships 
(2) 
trading with their towns, 
(3) 
and rent for the ground on which 
stood the European forts. 
European traders, then, had no rights and owned no 
land on the Coast. Attempts to exercise authority over the 
surrounding people met with open hostility, while Africans 
could always put pressure on overbearing Europeans. Bosman 
wrote with feeling on the exasperation which traders could be 
made to suffer: 
"For when these villanous people are enclined to it, they 
shut up all the Passes so close that not one Merchant can 
possibly come from the In-land Country to trade with us, and 
sometimes not content with (this) they prevent the brin ing 
Provisions to us, till we have made Peace with them". (4) 
Since Europeans came to the Gold Coast for purposes 
(1) Ibid.., p. 98. 
(2) Bosman, op. cit., p. b9. 
(3) Cruickshank, op. cit., vol. I, p. 28. 
(4) Bosman, op. cit., p. b9. 
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of trade only, they were content for a long time to remain on 
the seaboard. The unpleasant climate combined with a variety 
of endemic and epidemic diseases to make the Gold Coast 
unattractive to Europeans. Ignorance of the cause of the most 
common illness, malaria, made it the more formidable. Right 
up to the end of the nineteenth century, when it was at last 
connected with the mosquito, this fever was believed to result 
il) 
from "noxious effluvia". There were certainly a number of 
offensive exhalations from slimy swamps and fishing villages 
which might well have been thought harmful. Thick mists 
during the rainy season, which was known to be the most 
(2) 
unhealthy time of the year, seemed to bear out this belief. 
Apart from the enervating effect of malaria, the Gold Coast 
(3) 
was periodically ravaged by epidemics of smallpox. Africans 
as well as Europeans suffered from tropical infections like 
(4) 
malaria and dysentery, but the toll of Europeans lives was 
, (1) of. Meredith, op. cit., p. 121. 
(2) of. Bosman, o. cit. , p. 105, on "this odious Mixture of noysome Stenches,; 
cit., 
, and Hutchison, T. J: Narrative, cc. VIII and IX. for a long discussion of malaria and, its effects. 
(3) It is impossible to estimate accurately the size of the African population. Guesses varied from 200,000 to 400,000 inhabitants of the coastal region.. Cape Coast 
town had anything from 6,000 to 10,000 inhabitants in the 
earlier part of the nineteenth century. Vide Kuczynski. R. R: A Demographic Survey, vol. I, chapter IV. 
(4) Many Europeans, believing themselves condemned to death 
in any case when they went to the Gold Coast, indulged in 
riotous living which caused almost as much mortality as 
disease and certainly hastened its effects. 
. ý:. ý. -....:. _ _ ,. r.,... _ _. ý_. J 
xxv1$0 
(1) 
so heavy that white settlement, which took place in South 
and later in East Africa, was out of the question on the 
West Coast. This accident of climate was of the greatest 
importance for the inhabitants of the territory. 
The European merchants were usually grouped in 
companies, most of which seem to have had state support from 
, 
the countries they represented. The English connection with 
the Gold Coast startet, in the sixteenth century. Trade was 
, at 
first in the hands of private merchants and freebooters, 
but they were unable to stand up to the competition of the 
powerful Dutch West India Company, formed in 1621, and in ltie2ý) 
a Chartered Company was sot up, called the "Company of Royal 
Adventurers of England Trading to Africa". Dutch rivalry 
ruined this Company and threatened to do the same to its 
successor, the "Royal African Company", established ten years 
later. These had neither the capital nor the organization to 
compete on favourable terms with the Dutch Company, and their 
own attempts to set up a rival monopoly were subverted by 
(1) Vide Kuczynski, op. cit., p. 443 for numbers of Europeans 
on the Coast - about 40 was the average number (including 
officials, traders and missionaries) until the end of 
the century. Rates of mortality varied, e. g. between 
1823 and 1825,111 Europeans arrived on the Coast. Of 
these 55 died, 4 were killed and 1 shot himself. 2b of 
. the remainder left the Coast. In 1849, of 19 cases of illness, there were 6 deaths. In 1855, it was said at 
Anomabu that "the people are dying here somewhat like flies`. 
Vide Kuczynski, pp. 532-541. 
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(1) 
interlopers. Monopoly, however, was held to be contrary 
to'the true commercial interests of England, and in the middle 
of' the eighteenth century, Parliament intervened by revoking 
t ur ' 
the Charter and declaring the trade with Africa free to all. 
I-C, 
An Act of Parliament in 1750 placed the regulation of this free 
commerce in the hands of a "Company of, Merchants Trading to 
Africa", and the forts and settlements belonging to the Royal 
(2) 
African Company were transferred to the new body. The 
Royal African Company had been subsidized by Parliament during 
the latter part ofd its existence, and the tradition was carried 
on after 1750. The management of the forts became the 
responsibility of a Committee of Merchants in England who 
appointed a President and Council of Merchants on the Coast to 
(3) 
carry out their instructions. The cycles of competition 
and monopoly, which began with the inception of West African trade 
were to continue throughout the nineteenth century, and have 
lasted up to the present day. 
English trade was still in the hands of the Company of 
Merchants at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The only 
other European traders left on the Coast by. that time were the 
(1) Bosnian, op. cit., pp. 89-92, stated that English interlopers 
handled more trade than the Company itself in the years 
around 1700. The Dutch Company had also to contend with interlopers. 
(2) Meredith, op. cit., pp. 246 of seq. 
(S) Martin, E. C: British West African Settlements, pp. 1-56. 
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Danes and the Dutch. The forts of the European traders were 
so interspersed that there were no clearly defined spheres of 
(1) 
influence. Cape Coast was the English headquarters, Elmina, 
a few miles away, the Dutch. The other Dutch and English 
forts were spaced unevenly along the coast. Begin in the 
extreme west was English, Axim was Dutch, and Sekondi had both 
an English and a Dutch fort. Dixcove and Komenda were English, 
but Shama and Boutry were Dutch. East of Cape Coast, Mouri 
and Apam belonged to the Dutch, Anomabu and Winneba to the 
English. In the eastern half of the Gold Coast, English and 
Dutch had only one fort each, James Fort and Fort Crbve Coeur 
respectively, both at Accra. A short distance to leeward, 
the Danes had their headquarters at Christiansborg, and they 
also owned forts along the coast as far east as Keta, across 
the Volta. Danish influence was slight in the surrounding 
districts, but it came to be recognized that the area west of 
Elmina was generally Dutch in-, attachment., and the territory 
north and east of Cape Coast mainly English. 
The importance of these vague spheres of influence 
became apparent in the course of the nineteenth century. The 
Dutch had an agreement with Ashanti, dating back to the seven- 
teenth century, to promote the slave trade between that Kingdom 
and Elmina, and the effect of this arrangement was to 
(1) By this time, too, many of the forts were in ruins. 
Cessation of rivalry only necessitated the upkeep of the 
principal trading posts. 
(2) P. P. LXX, 1872, (C. -o70), no. 5, encl. 3, p. 4. 
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encourage alliance and friendship between the Dutch-influenced 
Windward Districts and Ashanti. But the Fantis and their 
allies were bitterly opposed to Ashanti, not only because they 
feared'its power, but also because they valued their position 
as middlemen between Ashanti and the Europeans on the coast. 
European trade was virtually controlled by the 
middlemen tribes, who levied tolls on all goods passing to and 
(l) 
from the coast. The system of trading which obtained was 
this: each merchant contracted with the Chief in the town 
near-the fort to act as broker between the Europeans and the 
inland Chiefs for slaves and gold. Ath anti traders, who came 
south in large bands, were assigned by their own Chiefs to 
those on the coast, and these latter were given a proportion (2) 
of the proceeds of the sales carried on under their auspices. 
The European goods in greatest demand were guns, gunpowder, clo 
and spirits. Hence these middlemen tribes were in a coveted 
position; they could impose restraints on trade in either 
direction at will, To the Ashantis, the middlemen were a 
source of annoyance. They molested traders and caused prices 
to be raised considerably above the coast price, The reason 
for the Ashantis' desire to conquer the tribes of the coastal 
belt was obvious. Europeans tolerated the middlemen tribes 
(1) Bosman, op. cit., p. 191. 
(2) Meredith, op. cit., pp. 96 and 104-5. 
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because they had no choice, though they chafed under the 
enforced rise in prices which the middlemen could 'effect. 
There was also another class of middlemen which was 
beginning to appear in the coastal towns. These were Africans', 
ij 
many of them the offspring of the European merchants, who 
acted as intermediaries between the white traders and the 
Chiefs. Bosman singled out one such agent for particular 
notice; 
I- I- `' "Under the English Fort (at Cape Coast) you may observe 
a' House, not unlike a small Fort...; this is inhabited by an 
English Mulatto, by Name Edward Barter, who bath a greater 
Power on tH_eToast2 than all the three English Agents together 
, 
(in whom the chief Command of the Coast is vested jointly; ) 
who, _by 
Reason of their short stay here, are so little 
acquainted with the Affairs of this Coast, that they suffer 
themselves to be guided by him, who very well knows how to 
make his Advantage of them: He is become so considerable that 
he can raise a large number of Armed Men; some whereof are his own Slaves, and the rest Free-Men, that adhere to him: 
So. that his Interest is at present so great that he is very 
much respected, honoured and served by the principal People 
about him; and whoever designs to Trade with the English must stand well with him before he can succeed. This Mulatto 
pretends to be a Christian; and by his Knowledge of that 
Religion, which he bath acquired by the Advantage he bath of Reading and Writing, might very well pass for one ... " (l) 
In another passage, Bosman mentioned that agents 
like these were 
(1) Bosnian, op. cit.,, pp. 51-2. By the 1840's, these traders were common all along the coast. cf. P. P. X3,1842, evidence of G. C. Redman, qq. 3352-3. 
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... neither true to the Negroes nor us, nor indeed 
dare 
they trust one another; so that you very rarely see them 
agree together". (1) 
Once again, this writer observed closely, for these were the 
first-members of the new society of individualists that was 
beginning to develop into an African middle class, Perhaps 
the greatest single force making for the evolution from a 
corporate to an individualistic society was the introduction 
(2) 
of the European money economy, With money a man could 
make himself independent of the protection of his family and 
group, and so dissociate himself `from its sanctions. On the 
other hand, European ideas on money were foreign, and touched 
too narrow a circle of people for the process of dissociation 
tobe general. A subsistence economy remained the rule 
rather than the exception, and many of those Africans who 











of individual trust. Money acquired by the individual was, in 
the customary way, usually destined for distribution among 
the group; and a number of people who handled the same sum 
of-money successively felt entitled, again in the customary way, (3) 
to deduct portions of it for themselves. But in adopting 
(1) -Bosman, op. cit., p. 141. 
(2) of. Cruickshank, op. cit.., p. 241, esp. 
(3) Rattray, op. cit., p. 113-116. Direct payment of wages for 
services was unknown, so that the custom of deducting sums 
when the opportunity occurred was perfectly legal. 
i iº 
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the economy of an individualistic society, Africans had to 
accustom themselves to its standards, and to alter their 
traditional mode of thinking and acting in terms of the 
ý ý.. (l) 
community. Since the new society was competitive, it 
demanded that each person go his own way. The extent of the 
adjustment involved, and the difficulties and prejudices to be 
overcome, made this social revolution a slow and painful 
r Fý 
process. 
Hardly less far-reaching in its effect, and tending 
in the same direction, was the teaching of Christianity. It 
aimed at individual morality, but its immediate consequence 
was to break down the superstitious beliefs and ancestral 
worship that guaranteed an ethical standard in the corporate 
community. Instead of the old order, a new disorder began, 
in which the behaviour of individuals was no longer deterred 
by the sanctions of the family. It was significant that tribal 
priests opposed both Christianity and trade with Europeans 
because both contained the elements of destruction of the (2) 
society in which religious sanctions played so prominent a part. 
(1) of. Ibid., p. 62; and Field, op. cit., pp. 217-18. 
For a modern imaginative version of this breakdown, vide 
Cary, J: Mr. Johnson. London: Gollancz, 1939. 
(2) of. CO/96/119, no. 2262, Messrs. Miller Bros., to 
Colonial Office, 24th Feb., 1876; and vide infra, Chapter II, 
p. 162. of. also the opposition from Ashanti to Methodist 
Missions. Vide Wesleyan Missionary Notices, esp. Vol. XXIV, 







The process of change in West African society 
began when Europeans first came to the Coast. But it was 
riot until the nineteenth century that the evolution gained 
momentum. Only then did the abolition of the slave trade 
by. Great Britain, and the efforts made by British traders to 
substitute "legitimate commerce", necessitate the intervention 
of--the British Government on the Gold Coast and ultimately 
lead Britain to assume the administration of the whole 
territory. The gradual extension of the European 
Government's influence, and the expansion of trade under its 
auspices, brought a far wider group of Africans within the 
scope of social change. 
In 1807 came the abolition of the slave trade. Just 
as it had arisen out of the commercial needs of Europe, so the 
trade that was to take its place sprang from the new demands 
created by the revolution in industry in England. The new 
trade meant the adoption of new trading methods by both 
Africans and British merchants, and it called for a relentless 
war against the competition of those who continued to trade in 
slaves, because the demand from North America and the West 
Indies did not end finally until the 1860's. For many years 
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attempts were made to find a substitute for slaves which 
promised the merchants anything like the same profits. At 
the time of abolition, it seemed that the Gold Coast had 
nothing else of great value to offer in exchange for English 
manufactures: ivory exports had dwindled, though gold dust 
was still brought to the coast from the interior. Looking 
to the English market, the merchants hoped to find a demand 
for some possible Gold Coast product with which they might 
carry on their lucrative African trade. It was natural that 
they should think first of cotton, used in England's premier 
(1) 
industry. If they succeeded in stimulating the growth 
of cotton on a commercial scale - it grew wild in parts of the 
Gold Coast - England would be free of the slave-grown product 
of the southern states of America, and the merchants themselves 
would be able to continue trading with Africans. Attempts to 
bring about this cultivation on the Gold Coast failed. But 
fortunately for the English merchants, and indeed for Africans, 
since they had no desire to end commercial relations with 
white men, industries in England created demands for other 
products from West Africa. 
(2) 
By far the most important of these was palm oil. 
(1) Meredith, op. cit., p. 212. A Gold Coast Cotton-growing 
Association was spoken of in 1850, vide C0/9b/21 no. e375. 
Vide also Chapter II, infra, paroi o -, and C0/9b%18, no. b352, Winniett to Grey, 22nd May, 1bi50. 
(2) In 1791,180 tons of palm oil were imported into England; 
in 1801,195 tons; in 1811,1,180 tons; in 1821 5,125 tons; 
in 1831 8.64 in 1841 19,850 tons; in 1851,30,430 tons. 
(round numbersI. Vide P. P. XLVI, 1845, (187), and 
Appendix III, infra, 
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Oil palms grew along the whole length of coastline, and 
particularly in the Volta districts. Towards the middle of 
the nineteenth century, palm oil came to be used in greatly 
increased quantities and in a variety of ways - as a constituentiH 
of soap, as a fuel, and as a lubricant for machines. Trade 
in palm oil had to withstand intense competition from rival 
products. Petroleum, discovered in lBoO in Pennsylvania, 
eclipsed palm oil as a fuel, and at about the same time, India 
entered the market as a producer of seed oils. To aggravate 
the position still further, Russian and later Australian tallow 
was exported to England in greater quantities. The damage 
to the palm oil trade was nevertheless offset by the great 
expansion of the tin-plate industry from the tbOts onwards, 
palm oil being essential because it prevented the iron sheets 
from oxidizing. Also in the TbOIs, the use of vegetable oil 
instead of animal fat in the manufacture of margarine was 
(1) 
discovered, and a flourishing trade in palm kernels began. 
In spite of these hopeful conditions, however, the Gold Coast 
was a poor producer. Its oil could not compete with the 
product of the Oil Rivers further south, bein inferior in (2) 
quality, small in amount, and more expensive. Indeed, not 
{1) McPhee, A: Economic Revolution in West Africa, pp. 30-36. 
Exports of tin-plate from Britain rose from 17,50b. 000 in 
1860 to over L6,000,000 in 1890. Ibid., p. 34, note 5. 
Germany bought the greater part of the palm kernel exports 
until 1914. 
(2) CO/96/4b, memo. in no. 2e33 by Sir B. Pine, 28th March, 18b9, 
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until the phenomenal rise of cacao cultivation at the 
beginning of the twentieth century may the Gold Coast be said 
to have provided a satisfactory product, on a sufficiently 
large scale, 'in order to carry on a reciprocal trade with 
Europe. 
Thus it was that after the abolition of the slave 
trade in 1807, those merchants who survived the severe 
dislocation had to review their position on the coast if they 
were to continue to trade there. The long experience of 
conditions they had g&ad made them unwilling to abandon West 
African commerce. An event of local importance in the same 
year as abolition helped them to decide their future course, 
The antagonism between Ashanti and the Fanti states had grown 
over the last half century. In 1807, it culminated in open 
conflict. The Ashantis, led by the King himself, overran the 
dniire coastal region, and ended their campaign by investing 
the British fort at Anomabu. The Governor of the Council of 
Merchants was obliged to treat with the King for peace on 
behalf of the Fantis who had sought protection from the 
(1) 
Europeans. 
The pomp and splendour of the King of Ashanti's 
retinue at Anomabu lent colour to the tales that the merchants 
had heard of the wealth of that Kingdom, and led them to believe 
(1) Meredith, op. cit., pp. 132 of seq. 
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(1) that great riches lay in the interior. Only after the 
Europeans reached their goal at the end of the century did they 
realize that the wealth of Ashanti was based largely on trade 
in kola nuts with the north, and that this commerce could not 
(2) 
be exploited by white men. At the beginning of the 
century, however, since there did not appear to be anything 
of commercial value in the coastal region, the merchants were 
persuaded that the substitute for the slave trade that they 
were seeking might be found in Ashanti, and that the best way 
of reaching it was to penetrate the interior and open up a 
"free intercourse" with that Kingdom. 
(3) 
They were aware that (4) 
the Ashantis also desired a "free intercourse" with the sea. 
Yet the middlemen tribes were determined to resist this free 
passage of trade. If they allowed it, they would be 
depriving themselves of an important source of revenue, and 
that at a time when the abolition of the trade in slaves, for 
reasons which they neither understood nor cared about, was 
already causing them hardship. 
Obviously the solution was to force these middlemen 
tribes to submit. The Ashantis had shown that they were well 
I 
(1) Ibid., pp. 36-7. 
(2) Freeman, R. A: Travels and Life in'Ashanti and Jaman, 
Chapter XVI, esp. p. 485. 
(3) Meredith, op. cit., pp. 185 and 206-7, and Robertson, op. cit., 
pp. 19 6-7. 
(4) Meredith, op. cit., p. 204, 
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able to achieve this surrender, and the merchants, if they 
chose, could allow the Ashantis to remain in possession of the 
coastal region. But this much the Europeans knew about the 
Ashantis: they were formidable in numbers, adept in warfare, 
and politically united. If they gained control of the seaboard, 
there would be little prospect of a handful of European traders 
being able to break their monopoly, and the way to the interior 
would be barred for ever. The merchants judged it better for 
their, own interests to befriend the weaker, more divided coastal 
tribes in order to keep the Ashantis away from the sea. 
But the merchants had no intention of acquiescing in 
the interruption to trade which these middlemen could cause. If 
they refused to listen to "mild and reasonable propositions", 
designed to further British trade, then the merchants would have 
(1) 
to seek other methods of imposing their will. Knowing that 
the Fantis were resolutely opposed to European attempts to 
influence them, an English merchant, Mr. Meredith, wrote in 
1812 that: 
"Men of such dispositions cannot be reclaimed by mild 
neasures; it is the hand of terror alone that will make -them 
tractable. " (2) 
Ono way of bringing pressure to bear on the Fantis was to make 
Brach of the Ashanti threat, and offer protection in return for (3) 
obedience. The other was, with the aid of the Home 
(1) Ibid.,, p. 210. 
(2) Ibid., p. 20b. 
(3) Ibid. 
, At. - xw/... 
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Government, to acquire such power as would enable the merchants 
to force the middlemen tribes of the coastal region to yield 
(1) 
to the wishes of the Europeans. Later in the century, 
when "national" movements among the Fanti states made for 
unity among them, it became an object of policy to keep them 
(2) 
divided. 
The opportunity to obtain help from the British 
Government was not long in coming. After the abolition of the 
slave trade, Parliament focused its attention on the Gold Coast 
forts for the use they might be put to in suppressing that 
(3) 
traffic. The forts could co-operate with the Navy by 
preventing the export of slaves and by providing bases for 
British ships. Moreover, the unrest on the Coast caused by 
the Ashanti invasion, was intensified by the effects of 
abolition and continued in the years following 1807. After 
1 
quarreling among themselves, the coastal tribes again became 
involved in a war against Ashanti in 1811, and no settlement 
could be reached. Six years later, a European delegation was 
sent to Ashanti to conclude peace. Bowdich, one of the 
members of the mission, published a careful account of all he 
saw and heard there, and so made available for the first time a 
(1) Ibid., passim, esp. p. 210. 
(2) Vide Chapter III, infra. 
(3) Martin, op. cit., p. 154. 
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description of the Kingdom, its political structure, its 
military power and its trade relations with the surrounding 
,, 
(1) 
peoples. His remarks confirmed the guess of the merchants 
that the interior was rich, and attracted notice in England. 
A measure of the importance attached to his findings was the 
dispatch., in the next year, of a representative from the 
King of England to the King of Ashanti. This consul, Dupuis, 
ri 
also published his observations, not only on Ashanti, but on 
the forts and their administration in the hands of the Council 
of the Company of Merchants. He showed that the Council was 
weak and unable to cope with the changed conditions on the 
(2) 
Coast. At the same time, Committees of Parliament heard 
evidence which emphasized that the forts could be useful in 
combatting the slave trade, but only if the Government 
controlled them. As a result of these investigations, 
Parliament decided in 1821 to abolish the Company of Merchants, 
(3) 
and the forts and settlements were vested in the Crown. 
Under-the new Government, the Gold Coast forts were 
made a dependency of Sierra Leone, but there was hardly time to 
draw up a formal scheme of administration before the Government 
was involved in a disastrous and costly war against Ashanti in 
(1) Bowdich, op. cit. 
(2)- Dupuis, J: Residence in Ashanti. Merchants on the Coast 
resented this consu s independent commission. Vide Cruickshank, op. cit., pp. 134 et seq., and the criticisms of Committee rule in Robertson, op. cit., pp. 133-143. 
(3) Martin, op. cit., pp. 163-166, 
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1824., Two years later this ignominious defeat was amply 
avenged. Nevertheless, the Government regretted its 
intervention on the Coast and decided to withdraw. It thought 
seriously of destroying the forts and putting an end to the 
British connection. But the traders were still loth to waste 
the valuable experience they had acquired on the Coast, and 
begged Parliament to allow them to control the forts once more, 
through a Committee of three of their number nominated by 
i (l) Parliament. This Committee began its administration in 
1829. It received an annual subsidy of £4,000 from Parliament,, 
and, chose a President and Council from the merchants resident 
on the Coast to carry out its instructions. The President, 
Captain of the Guard, and the surgeon, who lived at Cape Coast 
Castle, and the Commandant at Accra, received salaries. The 
other merchants on the Council, and the Commandants at Anomabu 
and Dixcove, gave their services gratuitously. The subsidy 
from the State was also intended to cover the pay of the 
(2) 
soldiers, the upkeep of the forts, and presents to the Chiefs. 
In 1830, the Committee appointed Captain George 
Maclean as President of the Council, and he held office until 
1843.; With a clear conception of the traders' policy, , and a 
(1) Cruickshank, op. cit., pp. 165-6. Vide also unpublished thesis by James, P. G: British Policy in Relation to the Gold 
Coast, 1815-1850, esp. äH. 11. (2) 
" Car ge, W. W: History of the Gold Coast, vol. I, pp. 402-3., 
(3) It was rumoured that Maclean was connected with the trading' house of. Forster and Smith. This was denied and never 
proved, though the suspicion lingered on, Vide James, 
op. cit., note on "Merchant Intrigue", pp. 145-9, for a full discussion. 
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forceful personality, Maclean acquired influence over a 
considerable area round Cape Coast. The very length of his 
stay - his was a rare case of survival - earned him deference 
and respect, and his statesmanlike policy provided a basis 
fo'r future British rule on the Gold Coast. 
One of his first tasks was to draw up satisfactory 
peace terms with Ashanti, and a treaty was concluded in 1831. 
These'terms bound the Ashantis and the coastal tribes to keep 
the peace and open all trade paths freely. The King of Ashanti 
was also required to renounce his claims to dominion over the 
Denkeras, Asins, Akims and others in the coastal region who 
had formerly been his subjects, the River Fra henceforth being 
(2) 
recognized as the southern boundary of the Ashanti Kingdom. 
These tribes had taken advantage of British intervention in the 
recent wars to declare themselves independent of Ashanti, and 
in doing so, they identified their interests with those of 
the middlemen tribes. 
Commenting on the settlement, the Committee of 
Merchants wrote to the British Government: 
"... By this treaty, the trade with the Ashantees is placed 
upon a more favourable footing than it has been at any former 
period, as they have a free communication secured to them with 
the sea, without interruption from the intermediate tribes, who 
have hitherto required that the trade of the interior should 
pass through their hands. The establishment of this free 
intercourse was for above half a century the great object both 
(1) For Maclean's administration I have drawn on James, op. cit., 
pp. 77-119. Though this thesis contains many inaccuracies, 
it gives a detailed and valuable account of the man and his 
work. Vide also Alexander, J. E: Narrative of a Voyaf 
Exploration, v. I, PP. 153-8 for a firs-Z and description O1 
ac can s methods of administration. (2) James, op. cit., pp. 77-80. 
xi. iv 
of the Kings of Ashantee and of the late African Committee. 
But they were always foiled in it by the neigbouring Chiefs". 
(1) 
The claim was extravagent, as the merchants realized in the 
following years. Only in the last quarter of the century, 
after the Imperial war in 1873, did the merchants win their 
battle against the middlemen tribes. Nevertheless, apart from 
alarms and occasional disturbances among the coastal tribes, 
Maclean kept the peace with Ashanti and with the people 
under his influence. 
Of greater and more lasting importance was Maclean's 
administration of the territory round the forts in*his 
thirteen years of office. There was no legal basis for his 
policy. Power was restored to the Committee of Merchants in 
1828 on condition that they exercised no jurisdiction outside 
the forts, and the commission appointing Maclean President 
gave him the same limited authority. But Africans had long 
been accustomed to bringing their disputes to Europeans for 
settlement, and in the six years of Crown rule in the 1820ts 
the practice had become widespread and popular. Maclean 
decided to continue this system of extra-territorial jurisdictvn. 
One reason was that impartial arbitration in local quarrels 
very often prevented them from developing into minor wars. 
(1) P. P. V, 1865, App. 3, no. 5 in Gold Coast correspondence, 
Messrs. Barnes, Brown and Forster to Colonial Office, 
25th July, 1831, 
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But more than this.. Maclean did not share the government view 
that the forts on the Gold Coast were more trading posts. 
Rather he regarded them as centres from which humanity and 
fair-dealing might radiate outwards, gradually influencing the 
. f. 
Chiefs and people and improving their habits and customs. A 
practical man as well as a far-sighted one, he made straight 
for the best method of carrying out his ideas. 
To extend his influence over a wide area he used 
men of the Gold Coast Corps and local militia as civil police, 
stationing them in small groups in different parts of the 
coastal region. When peaceful persuasion failed, Maclean 
did not hesitate to use force on refractory tribes, but he 
.F' 
used it seldom and judiciously; he was severe enough to 
command respect and clement enough to invite goodwill. It 
was also his habit to ask local Chiefs to act as assessors 
when hearing a case, in the hope that they would learn some of 
the principles of justice by precept. Widespread obedience 
to his wishes, and tribute paid him by men of many different 
. ý: 
(1) 
opinions, acclaimed his success. But there was another 
far-reaching effect of Maclean's policy. It provided a 
firmly-established system of judicial control which the 
Colonial office could adopt and develop. In this, the President 
(1) P. P. X2,1842, evid. of Rev. A. Riles, qq. 3255-58; of 




made-his most outstanding contribution on the Gold Coast. 
Though Maclean's administration was so successful, 
it was impossible for the British Government to remain aloof. 
It could not be denied that his methods were not in accordance 
with strict law. He himself had pointed out in 1836 that 
there was no alternative and asked the Colonial office to 
amend the 1828 agreement with the merchants. At the time that 
department was indifferent to any question but the slave trade 
(1) 
and took no action on the legal matter. When James Stephen 
turned his attention to West African affairs he at once 
realized the anomalies on the Gold Coast and resolved on reform. 
In addition to disliking irregular jurisdiction, he was strongly 
opposed to Committee rule. His views led the Colonial Office 
to decide that the Gold Coast should in future have an 
(2) 
independent development. 
Moreover, the leaders of the humanitarian movement 
continued to sway statesmen and public opinion even after the 
movement had reached its climax in the abolition of slavery 
itself. They again drew attention to the part West Africa 
might play in conjunction with the Navy to stop the export of 
slaves. In spite of the laws passed in England, slave trading 
was known to be conducted on a large scale, prohibition having 
I ,, 
(1) Ibid., avid. of W. M. Hutton, q. 3942 in which Maclean's 
policy is discussed and this correspondence quoted. 
(2) James, op. cit., pp. 129-133 and 141-3. 
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11ý1ý'f`pl', iE. ß (1) 
in reased its profits. In seeking to put an end to the 
tra Ific, the humanitarians joined forces with the traders; the 
remedy;, was to be legitimate and honourable commerce with Africa 
for, its agricultural products instead of its people. By 
stimulating the Africans to exchange produce for English manufac- 
tures,, Britain would not only be improving Africans. She 
would also add to her own prosperity by finding a far richer 
market for her goods than the slave trade had provided. The 
natural resources of West Africa were thought to be endless, and 
there would be no'limit to commercial expansion. But legitimate 
trade could only flourish with peace and security, and these 
conditions it was the duty of the Government to create. 
T. F. Buxton, one of the most influential of the humanitarians, 
published his work on "The Slave Trade" in 1839, and its 
supplement, "The Remedy" in the following year. He stressed 
England's moral obligation as a Christian country to make 
amends for the degrading trade in which she had had such a 
prominent share. He wrote thatt 
"Legitimate commerce .., might be the precursor, or rather the attendant, of civilization, peace, and Christianity ... In 
this view of the subject, the merchant, the philanthropist,, 
the patriot, and the Christian may unite; and ... the Goverment 
of this country (should) lend its powerful influence in organil- 
zing a commercial system of just, liberal and comprehensive 
principles - guarding the rights of the native on the one hand 
and securing protection to the honest trader on the other ... 
" 
(2) 
(1) According to Dr. Madden, profits of the trade had risen to 
180% in 1841. Vide P. P. XII, 1842, Report, p, 28, It was said 
that the volume of trade had also increased. Vide Buxton, T. F: 
The Slave Trade and' its Remedy., pp. 204-5. Buxton wrote that 
In 1792j, e num er of slaves exported annually was 80,000, 
and that in 1839 this number had doubled itself. 
(2) Ibid., pp. 305-6. 
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(1) 
The appeal did not pass unheeded. Lord John 
'Russell, the Prime Minister, had been disturbed to hear that 
British traders at the Gold Coast forts gave indirect aid to 
, slave' 'ships. Accordingly, he sent a Commissioner of Inquiry 
to'ýthe Gold Coast and the other British Settlements on the 
West'Coast... Dr. Madden, who went out in 1840, reported that 
the, President and Council of Merchants on the Gold Coast had 
no`legal authority to interfere with ships of friendly nations. 
As, aýresult, British merchants sold goods even to suspected 
slavers. - No slaves had been exported from Gold Coast ports 
as', 'far east as Accra since about 1830, though the trade was 
carried on to leeward. Madden found the administration of 
the, Committee weak, uncertain, and wanting in power. The 
people were "as desirous as ever of stealing and selling men, 
and'as little convinced of the ... injustice of it". In these 
circumstances, -though the country had great commercial 
possibiliti. es, legitimate trade could not prosper. The inter- 
vention of'the British Government was imperative, and the 
Commissioner strongly recommended that the Government resume 
(2) 
control of the forts. 
The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry which sat in 
(1) Ibid., Introduction. Buxton had discussed the remedy with 
members of the Cabinet early in 1838 and had had private 
copies of his text specially printed for them. At the end 
of that year, he was told that the Government had decided to 
adopt his suggebtions. The most spectacular result of 
Buxton's advocacy was the ill-fated Niger Expedition in 1841. 
(2) P. P. XII, 1842, App. 3, pp. 13 et seq. 
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London in 1842 heard his views on the need for Government 
authority endorsed by the merchants who traded with West Africa. 
Not that-the merchants admitted any shortcomings on the part - 
of their Committee; but all agreed on the practical advantages 
that would result from a change in the administration. The 
British Government would carry more weight than a more 
Committee, and it could always call on Imperial troops to 
enforce its decisions. In the interests of legitimate commerce, 
therefore, the Parliamentary Committee advised that the Crown 
should resume control of the Forts and Settlements through the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, that the new administration 
should have increased resources at its disposal, and that it 
(1) 
should be impartial and independent of trade. Accordingly, 
the Cormnittee of Merchants was dissolved, and in 1843 the 
Forts and Settlements on the Gold Coast reverted to the Crown. 
In addition to this change in the administration, 
reorganization took place among the merchants themselves. 
When the slave trade ended, English merchants continued for 
some years to trade on conventional lines. Trading houses in 
England bought goods which they sent in their own ships to 
their factories on the West Coast. There, European agents 
sold the goods, and the principal merchants received the 
proceeds in gold or ivory, which they disposed of in Englands 
Agents on the Coast were paid a fixed sum for their part in the 
a 
(1) P. P. X2,1842, Report and Evidence. 
L 
transaction, the English merchants retaining the profits or 
bearing the losses. After 1807, trade stagnated; partly 
because no substitute commodities for slaves offered themselves, 
and-partly because the agents had no incentive to individual 
(1) 
enterprise. About 1827, however, a new system of trading 
was introduced which soon came into general use. This was 
the commission system by which English firms sent goods to 
(2) 
agents on the Coast for credit, the invoice price including 
a comm;. ssion of at least 25% for the houses in England, and 
the cost of freight. The balance was retained by the agent, 
and while he had also to bear the losses, he had much more 
inducement than before to increase his turn-over by seeking an 
expansion of trade. As it happened, most of the agents on the 
Coast became indebted to the firms in En land, so that the (3) 
system operated unfairly on individuals. 
On their part European merchants complained of their 
disadvantage, since they had no means of redress against 
(1) McPhee, op. cit., p. 101. 
(2) P. P. XI, 1842, evid. of G. C. Redman, q. 3320., and 
James, op. cit., P. M. 
(3) McPhee, op. cit., p. 101. The only evidence I have found 
of the amount of commission is in a petition from an African 
Mr. Joseph Smith, agent from 1844-1859 of Messrs. Forster 
and Smith. Vide C0/96/58, in no. 12,016. Smith alleged 
that he had become indebted to Forster and Smith because 
they overcharged him by about 50%. The case was taken to 
court by Forster and Smith, who charged Joseph Smith with fraudulent practices and he had to declare himself 




Africans who had invested some of their goods or capital in 
(1) 
slaves, which British subjects could not touch. But the 
number of Africans who misused the trust was evidently 
(2) 
outweighed by those who acted prudently and with caution. 
The number of middlemen increased, the system becoming an 
integral part of West African trade still prevailing today. 
The individual middlemen sometimes sided against the Chiefs 
with the Europeans. But, if it suited their own interests, 
they often chose to sponsor the "national" interest., and 
became the leaders of movements directed against European 
domination in government and in trade. The education which 
(3) 
many of these African traders had acquired, through 
missionaries on the Coast, or in Europe, fitted them-to become 
the spokesmen of their illiterate fellows. 
Since a large capital was required to buy stocks in 
England, and to enable credit to be given, trade with the 
Gold Coast tended to become concentrated in the hands of two or 
" (4) three London houses. Their virtual monopoly continued 
(1) CO/96/19, no. 10,234, Grey to Winniett, 2nd Jan., 1851, 
being a reply to the Resolutions of Gold Coast magistrates (B. Cruickshank, F. Swanzy, T. Hutton, H. Smith and A. Swanzy) 
in C0/96/21, no. 4976. 
(2) Cruickshank, op. cit., pp. 37-8. 
(3) Ibid., pp. 60 et seq. 
(4) These were Messrs. Swanzy, Forster and Smith, and T. Hutton9 
The last-named firm disappeared soon after 1843. 
Vide also P. P. XI, 1842, evid. of G. C. Redman, qq. 3391-4. 
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until the formation of a steamship company in 1852, when 
smaller traders appeared to take advantage of the resulting 
(1) 
lower rates of transport, To fight this competition, the 
two 'largest firms, Messrs, Forster and Smith, and Messrs. 
Swanzy, apparently reached an agreement which enabled them to 
(2) i1 
continue to control the bulk of the trade for a number of years. 'i 
A second steamship company, founded in 1869, lowered freight 
rates still further, and allowed many more small firms to 
(3) 
take part in the trade. This, at a time of general 
commercial expansion, again swamped the monopolistic firms, and 
for the next two decades, 'unlimited competition was the rule. 
A number of these independent merchants established their 
headquarters on the Coast and so had a more direct contact with 
African trade. There were also some Africans among these 
(4) 
independent traders. It was a characteristic of West 
African trade that merchants on the coast never bought goods 
direct from manufacturers, but always through wholesalers in 
England. Produce from West Africa also passed first through 
(1) McPhee, op. cit., pp. 71-3. According to an ex-Director of 
this African steamship company the number of firms trading 
to West Africa increased from "very few" to "upwards of 200" 
in 1856. Vide CO/96/40, no. 4530, C. W. Gregory to Colonial 
Office, 19th May, 1856, 
(2) Vide Chapter II, infra, pp. 106 ©t seq. 
(3) McPhee, loc. cit, 




(1) agencies in England before it finally reached industry. 
The extension of trade through middlemen began in 
the 
, western 
half of the Gold Coast, and for some years it 
was most marked there. In the Eastern Districts, the 
development was slower, partly because British traders had 
less influence and partly because the slave trade lasted 
much longer. But when the system began, it had its own 
peculiarity. This was the introduction of cowrie shells as 
a medium of currency. These shells were imported to the 
Coast from India, and it was the general use of this 
currency which encouraged the trade in palm oil after 
the 1830's and raised the merchants' hopes of a legitimate 
trade with the Gold Coast. Cowrie shell currency served 
as an inducement to the African subsistence farmers to 
produce a cash crop - the palm oil so valuable to European 
traders. As a currency, cowries were eminently suitable for 
African trade. The value of the shells varied in terms of 
(1) McPhee, op. cit., pp. 101-2. 
(2) McPhog, op. cit... states that these shells were first 
imported in the nineteenth century, Vide p. 2340 
Meredith, op. cit., writing in 1812, referred to cowries as 
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European money, (1) but 100 shells were roughly equivalent to 
one penny, an indication of the minute subdivision of the trade 
that was carried on as goods or produce passed from one 
middleman to another. Cruickshank, writing in 1853, believed 
that without cowrie shells as currency, the palm oil trade 
would never have risen in importance: 
"The introduction of the cowrie-shell ... supplied the 
desideratum necessary for the prosecution of the trade in palm- 
oil, the supply of which is found to fluctuate according to the 
supply of the cowries. If these have been exhausted in the 
stores of the merchants, no oil is brought to the market unless 
in such small quantities as may be required fcr immediate 
consumption; and although the manufacture of oil may go on in 
the meantime, in the expectation of new importations of cowries, 
yet if these be long delayed, the activity of the labourer 
slackens and finally ceases; the object of his labour being 
to obtain what to him is tantamount to ready cash, which he 
can apply in any manner he thinks fit". (2) 
The producers could quite well stop expressing palm oil for 
sale, since they did not depend on the proceeds for their 
livelihood. But if they did trouble to sell the oil, they 
demanded what they considered to be a fair price for it, in 
terms of cowrie shells. Governor Connor's belief, in 185b, 
that having once received a higher price, the producers would 
refuse a lower one, and would not sell at all, was borne out 
(3) 
subsequently during the Krobo oil boycott, perhaps the 
(1) Cowries were reckoned as follows; 
40 shells .1 string 
5 strings. 1 bunch 
10 bunches. 1 head 
In 1812,1 head . 5s, but the value gradually fell. 
(2) Cruickshank, OP-cit., pp. 43-4. 
(3) Vide Chapter II, infra, pp. io6 sý,. 
ý. ý.,.: . 
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earliest, but not the only hold-up of produce on the Gold 
Coast. The cocoa hold-up in 1937 was the most recent and 
most spectacular example. This attitude of refusing to 
accept large price fluctuations has continued up to the present 
time, the majority of producers still being subsistence 
farmers, who, on the Gold Coast, consider that a cash crop is 
worth while only if it pays well. 
The circulation of cowries was restricted to the 
Eastern Districts and to the Northern Territories. Within 
the Kingdom of Ashanti, their use was forbidden, because it 
was thought that cowries would debase the existing form of 
currency, which, in Ashanti and in the Western Districts, was 
gold dust. Around the coastal towns, silver and copper coins, 
imported by the Europeans, were also in circulation. 
Cruickshank noted that the want of sufficient currency cramped 
the commercial activities of the people in the Western Districts, 
(1) 
and that their condition was therefore "much more stationary". 
Europeans frequently remarked that the people in the Eastern 
Districts were far more industrious and consequently believed 
them far more amenable to civilization through commerce, than 
the inhabitants of the Western Districts. 
Among the Ashantis a distinctive system of trading 
was carried on. Trade was largely the preserve of great 
(1) Cruickshank, op. cit.., p. 45., said that there was a strong 
prejudice against cowrie shells as a currency in the 
Western Districts. 
W 
Chiefs, who led parties of their retainers to the coast to 
purchase guns, gunpowder, spirits and cloth from the Europeans, 
and salt from the coastal people. 
exclusive use of the Ashantis; 
Arms were meant for the 
if their tributary states were 
equally armed, revolt from the Kingdom would be so much the 
easier. But a profitable trade was conducted in the northern 
markets of Kintampo, Bonduko, Atebubu and 3alaga in spirits 
and salt, and especially in kola nuts, which were the cash crop 
(1) 
of the Ashantis. These goods were first exchanged in the 
(2) 
markets for cowrie shells, and with these the Ashantis 
bought cattle and sheep, hand-woven cotton and woollen cloths, 
slaves, and trinkets from Europe which had been carried across 
the Sahara. Ashanti Chiefs also imposed customs dues at the 
frontiers of the Kingdom. 
The wealth of Asha ti was thus built up almost 
independently of the coast trade, though the lack of salt in the 
interior, and*the necessity to maintain the military strength 
of the Kingdom made contact with the coast essential. There 
was naturally a strong desire to overcome the obstructive 
middlemen tribes betwetin Ashanti and the sea. The alternative 
was to secure for themselves a free passage by negotiation. 
(1) Rattray, op. cit., pp. 109-110; and Bowdich, pp. 331 et seq. 
(ý) 2,000 kola nuts (1 load) were worth o, 000 to12,000 cowrie 
shells. 42 loads of kola bought 1 male slave, 7 loads 






Friendship with the Dutch at Elmina, and with the Akwamu and 
Awuna on the Volta held out the promise of a right of way either 
in the west or in the east. But intervention by the British 
in the Ashanti wars during the nineteenth century prevented 
the conquest of the coastal tribes. Nor was the peaceful 
alternative possible, after the departure of the Dutch 
Government in 1872, because there was the strong desire on the 
part of the remaining European traders and the African middlemen 
to reach the interior. The major war fought in 1874 finally 
settled the question both of the obstructive middlemen tribes 
and of an Ashanti outlet to the sea. Nevertheless, although 
Europeans were thereafter able to penetrate the interior they 
found it disappointing. It did not contain the Eldorado they 
had been seeking throughout the nineteenth century. Kola nuts 
were useless to Luropeans, and gold was not intensively 
exploited because conditions of health and transport made 
mining by European companies too costly. The cocoa industry, 
which was to make the Gold Coast a paying proposition at last, 
did not come into prominence until the twentieth century. 
In the nineteenth century, the problems which demanded 
attention on the Gold Coast were threefold. In the first place, 
the government, having taken control of the forts, had to 
evolve an administration that was in keeping with the current 
precepts. These limited the amount of responsibility and 
expense that the State was prepared to undertake in colonial 
ýýýýý_ý 
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territories. At the same time, the Government was bound to 
promote trade on the Coast, since that was its object in 
assuming control. For the European merchants, there was a 
problem of a different kind, namely, how to carry on a 
profitable commerce. They had to decide whether it was better 
to compete with each other or to form agreements which involved 
rigid price control, and they had also to reconcile costs with 
prices, credit with profit. Finally, for the Africans, the 
greatest problem was one of adjustment to the new economy and 
to a changing society. Their reaction was manifest in the 
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CHAPTER I. 
The Administration in the Western Districts, 
1843 - 1865. 
The machine of government set up on the Gold Coast 
in 1843 was characterized by its impotence. Without sovereign 
or territorial rights outside the forts, the administration 
was crippled by the climate, the want of money, and the 
incompetence of its officials. Moreover, Africans were jealous 
of their interests and independence, and every move by the 
Government was subject to the close scrutiny of the inhabitants 
in the vicinity of the British forts. To the Colonial Office, 
the Gold Coast was nothing but a worthless and troublesome 
place. Hence, after twenty years of experiment and failure 
under these unfavourable circumstances, the Home Government was 
ready to disregard mercantile ambitions and waive its 
responsibilities in that region. 
It was clearly understood by the British Government 
in 1843 that its possessions consisted only of the forts 
(1) 
themselves and the land on wflich they stood. There was no 
other British territory on the Gold Coast. But the object of 
(1) Claridge, op. cit., p. 391, states that the British stopped 
paying rent to the Cniefs for the ground on which the forts 
were built after 1826. 
-2- 
assuming control over the forts was to enable the British 
Government to extents, its influence over the people so that 
they would come to appreciate the advantages of legitimate 
commerce, and through its agency, be led gradually to 
(1) 
, Christianity and finally to civilization. In part, this 
would be achieved by the presence of the Government and the 
protection afforded to traders. To spread British influence 
more widely, the irregular jurisdiction exercised outside the 
(2) 
forts by Captain Maclean would be continued. In order that 
there could be no question of the legality of British officials 
exercising jurisdiction in non-British territory over people 
(3) 
who were not British subjects, the Foreign Jurisdiction -Act 
was specially passed to fulfil the need. It vested in the 
Queen the right to exercise such powers and jurisdiction as 
were established by custom and usage, in the same way as if she 
had acquired that right by cession or conquest in the territory 
concerned. 
The Foreign Jurisdiction Act was sufficient to 
remove doubts in England about British rights on the Gold Coast, 
and the first Governor sent out by the Colonial Office was 
(1) cf. Buxton, op. cit., passim; and CO/96/19, no. 10,234. 
Grey to Winniett, 2nd Jan., 1851: "The extension of commerce 
as I have frequently had occasion to observe is the most 
powerful agency which can be employed in the civilization 
of Africa.... 11 
(2) Vide Introduction, pp. xI'u - KI-ill . 
(3) 6 and 7 Vict., C. 94. 
3w 
instructed to make the nature and extent of British 
jurisdiction the subject of a distinct agreement with the 
(1) 
Chiefs in the neighbourhood of the . 
forts. The relation of 
the Chiefs to the Crown should be 
. 
"the deference of weaker powers to a stronger and more 
enlightened neighbour, whose protection and counsel they seek. " 
There was no question of allegiance. Even if the people of 
the Gold Coast were to offer themselves as subjects, it would 
an inconvenient responsibility which the Crown would refuse (2) 
to accept. 
The agreement was drawnjin March, 1844. It 
stated simply that the signatories acknowledged the jurisdiction 
of the British Government. Serious crimes and offences were 
to be brought before the Government ts judicial officers, so that 
the customs of the country might be moulded to conform with the 
principles of British law. The Chiefs also undertook to 
abolish human sacrifice and "other barbarous customs". Those 
who signed this document were the Kings of Denkera and Cape 
Coast, and the Chiefs of Asin, Abura, Donadi and Anomabu. 
In the course of the same ydar, other signatures were added 
to the Bond, as it was called: the Chiefs of Twifu, Ekumfi, 
Gömua Ajumako and Gomua Asin, Asikuma, Inchaban, Dixcove, 
(1) CO/96/2, Stanley to Hill, 16th Dec, 1843, under Drafts and Memoranda, in which Hill is referred to a letter from the 
Gold Coast Committee, 23rd March, 1843. 
(2) P. P. Xlý 184v., Se] of Committee on West Africa, p. vi. 
(3) C0/96/4, No. '188, Hill to Stanley, 6th March, 1844. 
Private and Confidential. 
-4- 
cl) 
Lastern Wasaw and Western Wasaw. All these towns and 
states were close to British forts or had sought British 
-protection in the Ashanti wars, and the area round Cape Coast 
, inýwhich tuey were situated became known as the Protectorate. 
There was no formal obligation binding the Government to 
protect these people, but it was tacitly assumed that the 
, _precedent 
of former wars would be acted upon, since both the 
: merchants and 
the people of the Protectorate wanted the Ashantis 
-to be kept on the far side of the River Pra. People wtno did 
not sign the Bond were nevertheless gradually brought within 
tts scope. When the Bb. tish Government bought the Danish 
(2) 
Sorts in 1850, the people in their vicinity came under 
British jurisdiction, and the Protectorate eventually included 
all the people of the coastal region between the Rivers Tano 
and Volta who were not actually under Dutch influence. Its 
precise boundaries, however, were not demarcated. 
The assumption of a Protectorate over territory in 
which the Crown had no sovereign rights was a new departure in 
Colonial policy. The vague, uncertain connection of the 
Government with the Protectorate reflected the extreme 
reluctance of the Colonial Office to extend British possessions 
anywhere in the world, and especially in a place like the 
(3) Gold Coast. Wotally unsuited to white colonization, it 
(1) CO/96/4, no. 1669, hill to Stanley, 5th Aug., 1844, enclosure 
(2) Vide Chapter II, p. 84. 
(3) of. Memoranda by Carnarvon and Lytton, Nov., 1858, in CO/96/44. 
-5- 
(1) 
contributed only a minute part of the volume of British trade. 
public pressure thrust upon the Colonial Office the burden of 
administration in the forts, and a moral obligation to do good 
in the surrounding territory was implied, but the Colonial Office 
was determined to accept only the minimum of responsibility. 
Parliament had intended that the new Government should 
be a distinct improvement on that of the Committee of Merchants* 
Actually, it was much the same. Not until 1850 *was the 
(2) 
Gold Coast made independent of Sierra Iaone. In 1843, a 
Lieutenant Governor, Commander Hill, was sent out to take the 
place of the President as head of the administration, and the 
Council of Merchants was dissolved. The other members of the 
new administration in Cape Coast Castle were a Secretary for 
the Lieutenant Governor, a Surgeon, a Chaplain, and a Judicial 
Assessor. This last office was the sole innovation, and it 
was created so that the judicial and executive functions of the 
(1) Vide App. III; and Stephen's comment in Dec., 1843, that 
the trade of all the forts was of less value, "present or 
prospective, than the Trade with the Isle of Skye". 
Memo., CO/96/2. 
(2) CO/96/18, Grey to Winniett, 25th Jan., 1850. The Select 
Committee of 1842 had recommended that this be done at once. 
From 1843 to 1850, however, the connection with Sierra 
Leone was nominal. Communication between the two territories 
was so uncertain that it was customary for the Gold Coast 
Government to write direct to London and ask the Colonial 
Office to send duplicate dispatches to Sierra Leone. 
Vide CO/96/6, no. 591. Even when steamships brought the 
two territories closer the connection remained nominal, 
and the second attempt at unity also failed. Vide infra, 
Ch. III. 
g_ 
administration might be separated. They had formerly been 
united in the President. The only other offices in the civil 
establishment were those of Civil Commandant at Accra, and 
clerk to the Judicial Assessor. The salaries of these officials (1) 
came out of the £4,000 grant voted annually by Parliament. 
This "miserable pittance" had been the amount of the subsidy to 
(2) 
the Committee of Merchants. They had paid their expenses 
in kind. Goods to the value of about £1,500 were bought in 
England and sent to the Coast where their value increased 
(3) 
three-fold, and the Committee managed comfortably. Lieutewit 
Governor Hill pointed out that the British Government would not 
be able to use the same method of augmenting its income, but the 
Treasury was unwilling to make a larger sum available; and the 
(4) 
Colonial Office had to abide by its decision. 
The duties of the judicial Assessor were not clearly 
defined. This officer was appointed to exercise the extra- 
territorial jurisdiction sanctioned by the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act. The first man to hold the post was Captain Maclean. 
(1) CO/96/3, C. O. to Treasury, 22nd Feb., 1843, Annual salaries 
were: Lt. Governor, £1,000; Judicial Assessor, £500 
(Maclean, vide infra, was given £120 extra as a special 
concession); Secretary, £200; Clerk, £100; Chaplain and 
Surgeon, £300 each; and Commandant, £100. 
(2) P. P. Xl, 1842, p. vi. 
(3) CO/96/2, no. 1522, 
(4) CO/96/3, Treaaury to 0.0., 3rd March 1843. 
#I 
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He had originated the system and knew more about it than 
anyone else, so that no instructions were necessary. On his 
death in 1847, his successor, Mr. Fitzpatrick, was merely told 
by the Colonial Office 
(1) 
"to administer justice of every description. " 
It was mainly through this officer that the Government hoped 
to extend British influence beyond the Lorts, for he was 
the only member of the administration legally entitled to 
,. (2) 
make decisions affecting the people of the Gold Coast. 
, 13.11 1 
In'the early years it was usual for him to hear cases in 
(3) 
conjunction with the Chiefs near Cape Coast but this (4) 
practice soon died out and the Assessor became the sole judge. 
The Governor reserved the right to try political cases 
between Chiefs, Chiefs and Government, and Chiefs and their 
(5) 
subjects. To give his decisions more weight, the 
(6) 
Governor normally sat with some neighbouring Chiefs. 
(1) P. P. XL115,1856,433, no. 24. 
(2) of. Carnarvon's view in C0/96/44, Memo., Nov.,, 18580 
(3) He was officially designated "Assessor to the Chiefs". 
Vide CO/96/38, no. 6807. 
(4) This caused dissatisfaction among the Chiefs. Vide 
CO/96/65, no. 8469, Report of Meeting, 9th Aug. y 1864. Also P. P. V91865. Evidence, q. 8343. Colonel Ord was under the 
impression that Chiefs had never been asked to sit with the 
Assessor. Ibid., q. 8473. 
(5) This regulation became formal in 1858, though it was 
practised before. Vide CO/96/43, no. 7912. 
(6) P. P. Vý1865, Select Committee on West Africa, Evidence, 
q. 8344" and CO/96/13, no. 2069, for a case in point. 
Vide also infra, p. 60. 
b 
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All other charges could be heard by the Assessor. The kind 
of law he used was a mixture of British law and tribal custom, 
and did not conform to any recognized system. The Colonial 
Office was sensitive about the peculiar methods of 
jurisdiction. James Stephen, Permanent Under-secretary, 
expressed this feeling when he wrote in 1845: 
"An English Officer in an adjacent barbarous country, (of 
which the queen is not sovereign) presides in courts held by 
the natives and administers to them a kind of Law, made up of 
Native Customs and of English forms and maxims -I think it 
likely enough that he does much good - But I could never find 
out by what Law he does it - If tl, e proceeding were allowed 
to pass silently one might rejoice, that the good was done, 
and waive any inquiry how far it was lawfully done - But these singular trials are all reported to the Head of this 
office, and by him those Reports are silently laid aside - 
This is, I believe, the only thing that can be done with them - 
still the mere receipt of such reports fastdns on the Head of 
this Office a responsibility, of which he cannot acquit 
himself by more silence and inaction -I cannot but doubt 
whether it would not be the best course to say frankly and 
plainly that the lawfulness of the proceeding is involved in so 
much obscurity and yet the inconvenience of abandoning it might 
be so great, that it is impossible to enter, for any practical 
purpose, into a discussion of particular cases:, and that it 
will hereafter be useless to report them unless some nerv and 
extraordinary question should arise, which might appear to the 
Governor to demand the interference of Her Majesty's 
Government. " (1) 
In effect the court of the Judicial Assessor was an 
appeal court, usually held in Cape Coast, though it sat in 
Accra from time to time. The Chiefs of Cape Coast, like their 
fellows elsewhere, held courts in the customary way, and if a 
litigant was displeased with the tribal court's decision, he 
could put his case before the Judicial Assessor. Serious 
(1) 00/96/9, no. 126, minute, 28th 1 an., 1845. 
9- 
cases, especially those involving murder, were supposed to be 
brought to him direct. 
Men holding this office were liable to criticism, 
especially from the merchants who thought longingly of the days 
of Committee rule when all decisions affecting them were made 
(1) 
in their favour. The Judicial Assessor, however, was a 
. Government official; 
he was "guided by the general policy of 
(2) 
, -. the Government in the exercise of his jurisdiction's, and 
(3) 
hia 3udgements were not always welcomed. In 1853, some of 
the-Cape Coast people complained that Fitzpatrick had offended 
(4) 
the dignity of their Criiefs. The Acting Governor, 
C (5) Mr. B. Cru3, kshank, was himself a trader, and, having also 
had, a violent personal quarrel with the Assessor a fear days 
(6) 
before,. took the opportunity of sending him back to England. 
The. Colonial Office upheld Fitzpatrick, who appeared to have 
(1) P. P. Xll, 1842, Report on Gold Coast, pp. 11-12. 
Under Committee rule, all European merchants on the 
Coast were vested with magisterial powers, and could form a 
court with cognisance over all cases arising out2ide the 
British forts. Vide 00/96/2, Stanley to Hill, 16th Dec 4843 
(2) CO/96/87, no. 2779. The particular Judicial Assessor to 
whom this remark applied was Mr. D. Chalmers, in office from 
1869 to 1872. 
(3) e. g. CO/96/19, no. 9221. Winniett to Grey, 21st Aug., 1850, 
and no. 10,234; vide also C0/96/21, Resolutions in 
no. 4976/F, Ist Dec., 1847. 
(4) 00/96/285 nos. 10,204 and 10,206. 
(5) Cru3-. kshank was the principal agent on the Coast of Messrs. Forster and Smith. 
(6) Loc, cit., minute by Merivale, 5th Nov., 1853 on nos. 10,1204p 10,383 and 10,385. 
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discharged his duties conscientiously; (1) and they were 
(2) 
wary of. -other complaints made about subsequent Assessors. 
The. court was a`w, ys busy, and this was taken to be a sign of 
its usefulness. 
Since the Assessor used a mixture of tribal and 
British law, he could not try Europeans, who, with one or two 
exceptions, were the only British subjects on the Gold Coast. 
So few Europeans 
. came to 
the Coast that the question did not 
arise; until 1851, when, a European at Accra was charged with (4) 
slave-dealing. It was then realir-ed that he would have to 
(5) 
be taken either. to Sierra Leone or to England for trial. 
0 
The inconvenience of such a proceeding led to the suggestion that 
a Supreme Court be set up with effect in British, territory, that 
is, in the forts, and operating like any similar court in (6) 
England. Herman Merivale, Stephen's successor as 
Permanent Under-secretary, was suspicious of the project. He 
regarded it as the first step in an attempt by the ambitious 
new Governor, Major Hill, to establish territorial dominion 
on the. Gold Coast. Unless the Colonial Office wished to be 
(1) C0/96/28, no. 10,204; and 00/96/31, minute on no. 1495 by Merivale, 29th Feb., 1855. 
(2) e. g. 00/96/33p nfs. 1506 and 2950, eap. minutes on former in C0/96 31, with no. 1495. 
() 00/96/4, no. 1669; and CO/96/1 , no. 4380. 
(4) CO/96/23, no. 760, 
(5) C0/96/25, no. 7398. 
(6) Loc. cit. no. 603. 
- U. - 
saddled with "a new and growing province in that quarter, " 
(1ý 
'the notion should be discountenanced at once. But the 
Secretary of State saw no such ulterior motive in the suggestion, 
one of the few occasions on which the opinion of the Permanent 
(2) 
Under-secretary was overruled, and a Supreme Court was set 
"up in 1853. The Judicial Assessor combined the office of (3) 
Chief Justice with his own, and trial by jury was introduced. 
(4) 
'A queen's Advocate was added to the Judicial staff in 1856. 
In the same year a" new Order-in-Council was issued defining the 
Assessor's powers in the administration of estates of non- 
British subjects who died intestate -a concession to English 
merchants - and requiring him to adhere to local customs in 
his judgements so long as they were not repugnant 
C5, 
to humanity. 
The system of extra-territorial jurisdiction appeared 
to work well, and one of the first requests of the Lieutenant 
Governor was for permission to extend it. The appointment of 
one-Judicial Assessor only affected Cape Coast. At other 
stations, people who wanted their cases tried by a European 
had to wait until a resident merchant found it convenient to 
turn from commerce to law, and in Cape Coast itself so many 
'(1) Ibid., minute, 23rd Jan., 1853. 
"(2) Ibid., minute by F. Peel, 25th Jan., 1853. 
(3) ' CO/96/27, no. 5935. 
(4) C0/96/38, no. 5641. 
(b) Loco cit., nos. 6806 and 6807. 
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cases were brought forward that delays were unavoidable. 
Lieutenant Governor Hill was anxious to appoint assistants to 
the Assessor, paid at sufficiently high salaries to make them 
quite independent of trade. He suggested one assistant for 
Cape Coast and one each at Accra, Anomabu, Dixcove, and Winneba 
(1) 
or Tantum, where they would also act as Civil Commandants. 
But-the plan was dismissed by the Colonial Office. James 
Stephen could not understand 
., whýr a place not really so important as many a second rate 
ZishiigTown in England should be governed at such an expense 
and-with such an apparatus of 'Public Offices. " (2) 
Officials in the Colonial Office were loth to concede that the 
Gold., Coast administration was faulty, and blamed till for 
(3) 
grumbling at everything simply because he disliked ttie place. 
Hill had therefore to be content with the unpaid services of 
Justices of the Peace. From 1845, a panel of eight or ten 
Europeans were commissioned to act as Justices of the Peace, 
all. of them merchants and most of them resident in Cape Coast 
(4) 
and 'Accra. (5) 
the panel. 
After 1851, African merchants were included in 
(1) 00/96/4, no. 1669, Hill to Stanley, 5th Aug., v1844. 
(2) Loc. cit., minute by Stephen on no. 1607,23rd Nov,,, 18449 
(3) Loc. cit., minute by Hope on no. 1669, Dec., 7 1843. 
(4) CO/96/6, no. 602; and C0/96/9,, no. 929. 
(5) CO/96/23, no. 357; C0/96/41, no. 6190; and C0/96/51, 
no. 4279. 
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In 1847, the Colonial office approved the appointment 
at nominal salaries of two merchants as Civil Commandants of 
(1) 
Anomabu and Dixcove. Both they and the Commandant at Accra 
carried on their commercial activities. Their official duties 
were to hear such cases as were brought before them, to collect 
any revenue in the district, and to correspond regularly with (2) 
the headquarters of the Government at Cape Coast Castle. 
But these duties were of secondary importance to the Commandants, 
'Who 
, 
were primarily merchants. Moreover, they had to 
communicate with Cape Coast by sea - for there were no roads - 
and ships were slow and irregular. The result was that Cape 
Coast Castle seldom knew what was happening at the outstations. 
, xhe employment of merchants in the administration 
was unsatisfactory because they naturally devoted far more time 
(3) 
to, commerce than to magisterial duties. But the practice 
was also undesirable because the Colonial Office had undertaken 
in 1843 to dissociate itself from trade. For the first few 
years of the new administration, the Government was obliged to 
(1) CO/96/9, no. 319; and CO/96/12, no. 399. These merchants 
were Messrs. A. Swanzy and B. Cru shank, and they received 
the token salaries of f, 25 p. a. eac . tithe system of placing forts under the supervision of resident merchants who were 
then called Civil Commandants began under Committee rule. 
Vide 00/96/2, no, 552. In 1848, F. Swanzy was appointed Civil Commandant at Dixcove. Vide 00/96/13, no. 210?. 
(2) 00/96/15, no. 10,591. 
(3) CO/96/4, no. 1669, Hill to Stanley, 5th Aug., 1844. 
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depend on resident merchants for part-time engagements, but 
after 1851, the military establishment was reorganized, and the 
Governor was able to use the European military officers in 
preference. 
In 1843, the military establishment consisted of a 
detachment of 200 troops from one of the West Indian Regiments 
and their Buropean officers. This garrison took the place of 
the militia of the Committee of Merchants, and it was maintained 
(1) 
by the War Office at a cost of £7,000 per annum. In 1851, 
however, it was decided do remove these troops and build up a 
force recruited locallp. Military discipline was said to be 
(2) 
9 good way of introducing civilization to barbarous people. 
The Gold Coast Corps, as the new force was called, was supplied 
with European officers on half-pay by the War Office* it 
numbered about 300 men, mostly runaway domestic slaves who took 




ill-disciplined and badly-paid body, the force never had a 
full complement of officers, and after a serious mutiny, it was 
disbanded in 1863 and regular troops were again stationed in the (5) 
Castle. Up to that time, however, the Governor was able to 
(1) 00/96/3,0.0. to Treasury, 22nd Feb., 1843; and 00/96/11, 
memo. by Barrow on no, 1516,4th Dec., 1847, 
(2) CO/96/11, no. 15,116, Grey to Winniett, 20th Jan., 1849. 
(3) CO/96/43, no. 3698; and minute by Meriväle, 10th Feb., 1858. 
(4) CO/96/44. Memo. by Carnarvon, Nov., 1858; and P. P. V, 1865. Evid., qq. 6197-6211. 
('J UU/bJb/63, no. 1999, W. O. to C. O., 23rd Feb., 1863. 
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make use of the three or four European officers of the Corps 
for civilian duties and so fill a few of the gaps in the civil 
establishment. In this way he was also able to circumvent ' 
some' of the financial difficulties of the Government. Salaries 
large enough to attract civilians could not be paid out of the 
grant-of Z4,000 a year, but the officers were glad to receive 
small additions to their military pay - the cost of the Corps 
vas borne by the War Office - and willing to serve in as many 
(1) 
civilian posts as the Governor wished. All the time the 
Corps was in existence, its officers acted as civil commandants, 
customs collectors, Secretary to the Governor, Assistants to the 
Judicial Assessor, Governor, and special envoys. In 1854, 
for instance, the only Europeans available for Government 
service apart from the Governor, were these officerp, and he (2) 
made full use of their services. 
Their employment gave rise to much discontent. The 
officers dealt with civil affairs by military metnods, and the 
people among whom they worked disliked them intensely for their 
(3) 
harshness. It was. also a criticism of the administration (4) 
that there was no civil police force; officials had to 
(1) C0/96 43, memo* by Sir B. Pine in no. 6723,27th July, 1858; 
and CO 96/44, memo. by Carnarvon, Nov., 1858. 
(2) CO/96/37, memo. by Hill in no. 6301,16th June, 1855. 
(3) CO/96/40, no. 4316, Ord to Labouchere (Report), 15th May, 
1856. 
(4) CO/96/41, no. 9322. 
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rely entirely on armed force to uphold civil authority, and 
this did not make them more popular. Nor did the military 
officers add to the efficiency of the administration. Their 
first duty was the Corps, which meant that they were moved 
about from place to place, and before an officer had time to 
becomö acquainted with one station and the surrounding people, 
he,. was sent away to another. 
Military officers in administrative posts were hardly 
an. improvement on merchants in the service. But the Colonial 
Office was determined to minimize the influence of the English 
merchants through their European and African agents on the 
(1) 
Coast. The majority of the merchants who traded on the 
Gold:, Coast were agents of one or other of the two big export 
houses in London - F. and A. Swanzy, and Forster and Smith. 
Both had a long connection with the Gold Coast and had had much 
influence with the Committee of Merchants. Between them, they 
held. a virtual monopoly of Gold Coast trade until the '50's, 
when the formation of a steamship company enabled smaller firms, 
and individuals, to take part. But the bulk of the trade 
(3) 
still passed through the hands of the two largest firms. 
(1) of. CO/96/31, minute by Merivale in no. 1495,29th Feb., 1855. 
(2) The African Steamship Company was formed in 1852. Four 
years later, merchants signing a memorandum included Messrs. 
Swanzy, Forster and Smith. Barmer Bros., Sewell Ross and Co., 
and R. and W. King of Bristol. Vide CO/96/39, no. 2473. 
(3) In 1861, Governor Andrews calculated that of the total 
volume of Gold Coast trade, 3wanzy's and Forster and Smith divided 50% between them, King's took 13%, about 6 smaller houses together, 13%, American traders, 21% French and Portuguese traders together, 7j%. Vide C0/96/51, no* 3185' 
- 17 - 
The Coast agents, in Cape Coast or Accra, both European and 
African, employed numerous African sub-agents throughout 
the 
(1) 
country. It was a curious fact that very few of the agents 
on the Coast remained free of debt to their principals in 
(2) 
England, 
The influence of the merchants on Gold Coast affairs 
did not end, with the dissolution of their Committee in 
1843, 
i3) 
Majhew Forster, senior partner in his firm, was a Member of 
Parliament, and members of the Swanzy family had such long 
residence on the Coast that their opinions were greatly 
(4) 
respected. Though these merchants had favoured government 
by the Crown, it was not their intention that their presence 
should be forgotten. The local government was hardly able to 
forget it. The merchants on the Coast comprised almost the 
entire English-speaking community. They lived in the main 
coast towns, and Government officials had close contact with 
them. Since they could communicate with the Government, they 
(1) Vide Kingsley, M: Travels in West Africa, for a delightful 
description of sub-agents act vt es, esp. cc. V111 and 1X. 
(2) 00/96/87, no. 1195; and 00/96/58, petition in no. 12,016, 
4th Nov., 1862, for a particular case - trat of Mr. Joseph 
Smith, an African agent. 
(3) Forster was M. P. for Berwick-on-Tweed from 1841 to 1855, 
when he was unseated on petition. His son John Forster, 
who succeeded him as head of the business, also succeeded 
him in this constituency, and sat until 1857. 
(4) Vide for example, C0/96/66, minute by Barrow on no. 10,573, 
17th Nov., 1864; C0/96 83, no. 12,310, Kennedy to C. O., 
4th Nov., 1869; and 00/96/117, minute by Fairfield on 
no. 6822/8,18th June, 1875. 
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claimed to be the best judges of the needs of the illiterate 
(1) 
Chiefs and people, and they did not hesitate to voice their 
own wants and grievances. Sometimes their opinions were sought, 
both by the local administration and by the Colonial Office. 
More often, they were tendered uninvited, and officials in 
charge of Gold Coast affairs were subjected to constant pressure 
from letters, petitions and personal calls. The Government 
was never allowed to forget that it had been called to the 
Gold Coast to promote trade. 
Not long after the assumption of control by the 
Colonial Office, the merchants on the Coast prevailed upon 
Lieutenant Governor Winniett to help them achieve an object they 
had long desired - the opening up of the Beyin district for 
British trade. This town was the site of the most westerly of 
(2) 
the British forts. The fort itself was in ruins and the 
(3) 
Committee of Merchants had abandoned it in 1833. Nominally 
the district remained under British jurisdiction, but from that 
time, the King of Beyin, Kweku Aka, kept such a strict monopoly 
of the trade that no white men were allowed in the vicinity. 
Kweku Aka was also known to take stern measures with the super- 
cargoes of merchant vessels whose conduct in dealing with people 
on the Coast was acknowledged to be "disgraceful". But the 
(1) But vide Alexander, op. cit., pp. 169-70 for an interesting 
comment on this claim. 
(2) CO/96/14, no. 1229. Hutton to Grey, 13th June, 1848; and 
CO/96/21, no, 4976/F, Resolutions, 
(3) CO/96/13 , no. 1216. 
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merchants feared that Kvveku Aka's defiant treatment of 
Europeans might be taken as an example by other Chiefs, to the 
detriment of British trade. Captain Maclean had led an 
expedition against Beyin in 1835 in an effort to break the 
King's monopoly. Its only result seemed to be a hardening of 
Kweku Aka's attitude, and Mr. Swanzy urged the Colonial Office 
to lend its support to another expedition in 1842, shortly 
before the transfer of the forts, but the Colonial Office 
(1) 
refused. Eventually, in 1848, Winniett agreed on behalf 
of the Gövernment to undertake the punishment of the King in 
order to achieve the merchants' aim, and arrange for suitable 
trading relations between the European merchants and the 
inhabitants of the district. The regular force of the 
garrison was augmented by some thousands of Africans mustered 
from Cape Coast and its environs, and the two principal 
4 each European merchants, A. Swanzy and B. Cruikkshank, /commanded a 
division of these levios. The expedition was completely 
successful. Winniett told the Secretary of State that British 
honour was vindicated, British influence re-established and 
`wa populous and fertile country wrested from the grasp of 
a Tyrant monopoliser ... and thrown open to the enterprise of the Merchant and the Christian philanthropist". (2) 
Earl Grey was unable to share this enthusiasm, and the personal 
(1) P. P. Xl + 1842, Evid* of F. Swanzy, qq. 898-957. 
(2) CO/96/13, no. 1485v Winniett to Grey, 24th May, 1848. 
Kweku Aka was imprisoned in Cape Coast Castle where he died 
in 1851. Vide CO/96/25, no. 3286. 
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explanation of Mr. Forster failed to convince him of the 
(1) 
propriety of the expedition. He commented drily that 
Mdr.. Forster, like all other merchants, had no objection to 
encouraging warlike operations in their own interests so long 
as they did not have to bear the cost. In this case, the good 
(2) 
results soothed his indignation. But he warned Winniett 
that the Government could not be expected to maintain "order" 
among barbarous inhabitants wherever the merchants wished. 
The expense would be too great. The administration should 
confine its activities to the forts actually occupied by 
British officials and their immediate neighbourhood. It was 
most. undesirable to extend Government responsibility so far 
(3) (4) 
from Cape Coast) Castle, The requests of Winniett and of 
the, merchants to allow the rebuilding and reoccupation of 
(6) 
Fort, Apollonia in Beyin were accordingly refused. 
The merchants asserted themselves in other ways, too. 
prom 1847, they began to express dissatisfaction with the local 
(1) Loc. cit. ", minutes on no. 1216 by Grey, 14th June, 
-:;.: B. Hawes, 16/17th June, and Grey, 17th June, 1848, 
(2). » Loc. cit., minute on no. 1485,20th July, 1848. The news 
that the cost of the expedition would be paid by a fine levie 
on Kweku Aka was particularly welcome. 
(3) Loc. cit., minute on no. 1216 by Grey, 17th June, 1848. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 2077. 
(b): 00/96/14 nos. 1441/F, 1503/f, and 1229/H. 
(6) 00/96/13, minute by Merivale on no. 2077,12th March, 1849. 
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Government, in wbich they were not represented. To improve 
it, they suggested that a Legislative Council be set up with a 
majority of mercantile members who could be elected by the (1) 
trading community. The proposal meant in effect a reversion 
to the old mercantile government and received scant attention (2) 
from tree Colonial Office. 
Yet the truth of some of their criticisms had to be 
admitted. Officials appointed by the Colonial Office went to 
the Coast without any previous knowledge of the place or its 
people, and seldom stayed there long ehough to learn much about 
the country. Their incompetence was notorious. Many of 
them had no qualification or experience in the work they were 
supposed to do, and no one would think of going to the Gold 
Coast if he could possibly find some other means of livelihood. 
Low pay and a disease-ridden country combined to keep the 
standard down. In 1847, for instance, Lieutenant Governor 
Winniett complained to the Secretary of State about the new 
s rct f rom 
E n9ýýrvri" 
Colonial Secretary; ` He had just left school, wrote Winniett, 
and did not have the slightest knowledge of the duties he was 
supposed to perform. At best, he could be employed as a 
copying clerk. Winni ett requested that another and more 
experienced person be appointed. The Colonial Office was 
(1) CO/96/12, nos. 282/F and 570/F; and CO/96/1?, nos. 8295/8 
and 10,, 60/3, 
(2ý Minutes on above letters. 
- 22 - 
unsympathetic, In the first place, the young ma n had been 
recommended by a member of the peerage. In the second, the 
salary offered for the post was so small that Winniett could 
not expect a competent applicant. If the only ground of 
complaint against the Colonial Secretary was his lack of 
qualification and experience, replied Lord Grey, 
"I do not consider it a sufficient reason for his removal, 11 
but I should hope that with diligence on his part and a little 
indulgence on yours, he might soon gain sufficient practical 
knowledge of the duties he is called Upon to perform. " (1) 
At first, however, the Colonial Office preferred to 
concentrate all the power and responsibility in the hands of 
(2) 
he Governor, though this was contrary to the merchants' wishes. { 
The Gold Coast was a territory where everything depended on the 
personality of the Governor - Maclean's success had proved that 
beyond doubt. But the search for able and energetic Governors 
was rarely attended with success. Sir Benjamin Pine was one 
of the few Governors with energy and ideas. He had acquitted 
himself well in Natal and the Colonial Office persuaded him to 
go to the Gold Coast in 1867. But from the moment he arrived 
there his one ambition was to l4ave. Everything about the 
place oppressed him - the country, the climate, the people and 
their institutions. His hatred became obsessional and he 
(1) CO/96/11, no. 249, Winniett to Grey, 4th Dec., 1847; 
and draft reply, 21st Feb., 1848. 
(2) Ibid. 
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(1) returned to England after just over a year's stay. 
Lieutenant Governor Winniett showed more enterprise than many 
men on the Coast, and was knighted in 1849 as a reward. But 
he, died in office the following year. His successor, Major 
Hill, was too ambitious to stay in such an obscure and 
pestilential place. Most of the others who held the office 
J 
were undistinguished, unless by their inefficiency. Governor 
Andrews, in office from 1860 to 1862 because no one else could 
be found to take his place, was seriously ill nearly all the 
time, and tried the patience of the Colonial Office with his 
rambling and incomprehensible dispatches about trivialities 
(2) 
until they felt unable to believe anything he wrote. 
Pine', s forthright criticisms had made officials in the Colonial 
(3) 
Office more aware of conditions on the Coast, but they did 
not really know what the place was like. They could not 
trust Government officers to give tham a true picture, and they 
were unwilling to lean- too much on the merchants for (4) 
information. Often on minor administrative details, as well 
as-on major issues, they hesitated to take a decision, preferring 
to wait until local officials came home on leave to discuss 
(1) CO/96/41, minute on no. 10,219 by Barrow, 13th Nov., and 
Merivale, leth Nov., 1857. 
(2) CO/96/51, minute by Elliot on no. 3185,12th April, 1861. 
(3) CO/96/43, minute by Sargeant on no. 7895,10th Aug., )1858. 
(4) e. g. CO/96/33, minutes by J. Ball on no. 4621,31st May, 
and on no. 6757,7th Aug., 185b. 
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matters in the Office. Major, later Colonel, Ord, twice 
acted as Special Commissioner to the Gold Coast, in 1855 and 
1865, and his advice was asked for months after each visit on 
questions that arose. The Colonial Office never quite gave 
up the hope of securing a good Governor for the Gold Coast, 
but it had to resign itself to a rapid succession of nonentities. 
The office changed hands twenty-one times from 1843 to 1865. 
Nevertheless, it was with great reluctance that the 
Secretary of State sanctioned mercantile representation on the 
Legislative Council whicn was set up in 1850 when the Gold 
Coast was separated from Sierra Leone. The Council was to 
consist of three official and two European merchants as 
(1) 
unofficial members, appointed by the Colonial Office. But 
still the merchants complained that they were not adequately 
represented. One of their number who had been appointed, 
Mr. J. Bannerman, lived in Accra and Council meetings were 
always held in Cape Coast; and the other, Mr. B. Cruickshank, 
(2) 
left the Coast for good in 1854. Both Major Ord and 
3ir, Benjamin Pine advised the Secretary of State to give the 
traders of Cape Coast and Accra representation more in 
proportion to their influence over the 
t3, 
people, But Merivals 
(1)mä0/9615, minute by Grey on no. 10,592,14th Dec., 1849; CO 96/18s no. 6350 Winniett to Grey, ý 30th April, 1850. 
(2) 00/96/40, no. 4316/0, Report. 
(3) Ibid; and CO/96/41, no. 6209. Pine to Labouchere, 
12th June, 1857. 
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still feared this would mean a restoration of the powers of 
(l) 
government that Parliament had taken away. Pine's scheme 
.:; 
(2) 
for ' an elected majority of merchants was given due consideration, 
but 'at- length the Colonial Office decided to maintain a clear 
official majority. In 1861, two merchants were appointed to 
the Legislative Council and the official members were increased 
to four. Both these merchants were Africans and agents of 
the 'principal firms. One of them, Mr. R. Hutchison, agent 
for'Swanzy's, died in 1863. The other, Mr. G. Blankson, 
agent for Forster and Smith, remained on the Council until 
. :. 
(4) 
18`13. On Governor R. Pine's assurance that all the 
members of the Council were never together at the same time and 
place', ' the Colonial Office sanctioned the appointment of three 
more merchants: Messrs. A. B. McIntyre and N. Irvine, European 
agents of Forster and Smith and Swaney re4)ectively; and 
P. C. . Grant, an independent African merchant. To counter- 
balance these additions, two more officials were also 
(5) 
appointed. 
(1) Ibid., minute, 11th July, 1857; and CO/96/42, minute 
on no. 7246,8th Aug., 1857. 
(2) 00/96/41, no. 6209 and minutes; and 00/96/51, no. 1298v 
Andrews to Newcastle, 9tn Jan., 1861 and minutes. 
(3) Ibid., minute by Sir F. Rogers, 6th March, 1861, 
(4) Blankson was reappointed to the Council in 1866. 
Vide Chapter III, p. 167. 
(5) CO/96/60, no. 5575v Pine to Newcastle, 11th May, 1863. 
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. 'The constant grumbling of the merchants could 
be 
explained partly by their own lack of success. The two 
I. L 
N&-iet firms resented the entry of rivals into their 
pro Iserve in the '50's, and lower profits resulted from excessive 
competition; 
(1) 
as a market for British goods and a source of 
raw materials, the Gold Coast was disappointin ; and such (2) 
trade-as there was did not always flow easily. But it 
could-not be said that government by the Colonial office was 
notable for any great achievement in its objects of fostering 
commerce and thereby civilizing the inhabitants. The 
administration was weak and inefficient and its influence did 
not-extend far beyond Cape Coast Castle and two or three of the 
lesser forts. Administration confined within narrow limits 
suited the temper of the age because expansion of the Empire 
was regarded with extreme disfavour. Imperial expansion 
entailed Imperial expense, and parsimony was the keynote of 
British policy. Even the smallest estimate was so severely 
(3) 
criticised by the Treasury that a Colonial possession had to 
(1) J CO/96/39, n®. 2473. In Board of Trade to coo., 18th March, 
1856. 
-(2) Because of disturbances in the Protectorate or Ashanti. 
of, Krobo oil boycott, Chapter II, pp. 103-118. 
(s) e. g. Corr, about a pension of £25 p. ae to the aged King of 
. 
Cape Coast in 1849: 00/96/15, no. 8649; in 1850: 
CO/96/20, no. 779/Treasury, and minutes; and 1853: 
00/96/29, no. 7862/Treasury and minute. Vide also 
CO/96/32, no. 9357/Treasury and minutes, for objection to 
Governors travelling in the interior because of expense. 
i 
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be in very dire need before the Colonial office would venture 
to ask the senior partner in the Government to sanction any 
(1) 
additional expenditure. When the Treasury admonished the 
Colonial office in 1843 to practi*e every possible economy on 
(2) 
the Gold Coast, it was a warning not to be taken lightly. 
Clearly, however, the administration could not be 
properly conducted on the grant of £4,000 a year. This sum was 
Supplemented on the Coast by a few hundred pounds from fees and 
(3) (4) 
-fines of court, small light and harbour dues, and a trifling 
(5) 
duty, indifferently collected, of J% on all goods landed. 
It was difficult enough to pay salaries and current expenses 
(6) 
out of this amount. Items like repairs to forts were 
(7) 
neglected, education was practically ignored, and the 
reoccupation of outlying forts for the protection of trade such 
(1) CO/96/62, minute on no. 8793 by Unwin, 16th Sept., 1863. 
(2) CO/96/S, no. 430/Treasury. 
(3) Ranging from £300 to £700 p. a., depending on the number 
of cases heard. 
(4) Less than £100 p. a. up to 1853. Thereafter about £200. 
Vide C0/96/25, no. 597 for rise in charges. 
(b) About £300 p. a. up to 1855. Vide C0/96/11, no. 1513 
for mode of collection. 
(6) Sometimes salaries could not be paid. Vide 00/96/22, 
no. 2455; and 00/96/19, no-x. 053/Treasury. 
(7) £63 estimated in 1843 for education, vide CO/96/2, no. 1522; and £99.10.0d. in 1850, vide C0/96/18, no. 4380. Actual 
amounts spent on education were not listed separately before 1875. 
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as Beyin in the extreme west 
(1) 
were out of the question. 
The want of money was, next to the climate, the greatest 
handicap of the local government. 
The most obvious way for any government to raise a 
revenue was Lhrough customs duties, and in 1847, Lieutenant 
Governor Winniett suggested that a small duty should be 
charged on spirits. An enormous quantity was annually 
(2) 
imported and the revenue would be greatly increased. But 
(3) 
the Ordinance passed in 1849 to this effect had to be 
suspended. The Lieutenant Governor realized that the British 
could not impose duties while the Dutch and Danish forts 
(4) 
allowed free entry. The Danes left the Coast soon after, 
and the Dutch were asked to co-operate in applying equal 
(5) 
duties. After some months, however, the Government at the 
(6) 
Hague announced their resolution not to impose any duties. 
(1) Vide supra, p. 20. 
(2) CO/96/11, no. 1512. He proposed 3d a gallon on the 
2,, 000.. 000 gallons of rum wriich he said were annually 
imported. This, was probably a gross exaggeration. 
Vide 00/96/21, no. e375/F and Trade and Navigation Reports. 
In 1858, for example, about 200,000 gallons were imported. 
(3) CO/96/l5, minute by Chapman on no, b600. An example of 
the slow working machinery of government while the Gold 
Coast was a dependency of Sierra Leone. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 10,120, Fitzpatrick to Grey, 20th Aug., 1849. 
(b) CO/9e/17, no. 10,778/FO; and CO/9b/20, corr. with F. O. 
and minutes on nos. e3,599,1157,2311,4235 and 83b5. 
(6) Loc. cit., no. 9050, F. O. to C. O., Nov., 1850. 
{. 





The fear that British trade would flow into Dutch ports 
prevented the British Government from doing so on its own. 
The Dutch Government was consistent in its refusal. 
it was approached again in 1856, but the protracted discussions 
finally came to notning two years later, for the same reasons. 
Unlike the British system, under which the Colonial Office 
could make decisions for British possessions without 
Parliament, all measures affecting Dutch possessions had to 
pass through the Stares General, where the party in power at 
the, time was weak. The leader of the opposition had the 
monopoly of Dutch West African trade and the Government did not 
want to bring about its s downfall by provoking him on such an 
unimportant matter. This was the main difficulty in the 
way of an agreement with the British, but 
points at issue. The Dutch disliked spe 
had the largest trade in spirits with the 
objected to a tax on their staple export. 
placed equally on all articles would they 
there were also other 
cific duties. They 
Gold Coast and 
Only if duties were 
entertain the 
proposal. On their part, the British traders disapproved 
of ad valorem dutids. Duties on all articles would include 
manchester goods - their staple export - and cowrie shells, the 
(1) CO/96/20, no. 83b5/FO. 
(2) CO/96/42, no. 3675/FO. The Dutch monopolist was M. Rykievorsel. Vide also nos. 3171 and 3675. 
(3) CO/96/20, no. 599/FO. 
I 
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currency-of'the Eastern Districts. Since this was the 
chief palm oil. area, a tax on currency would be a hidden tax 
on'! -the: oil itself; and on no account could the palm oil 
trade 
(2) 
be hampered. After a great deal of fruitless argument, 
the-. 'Dutch promised to agree to specific duties if the French 
Government did so, too. The French had trading stations at 
Assini'and Grand Bassam on the extreme west of the Gold Coast, 
ands there was little danger of competition from them, but one 
of-their monopolists had an agency at Accra which imported all 
wines and liqueurs into the Gold Coast. The French Government 
(3) 
gavelan unqualified refusal, and negotiations between the 
Dutch-and British Governments were suspended. The Colonial 
office was annoyed that the Gold Coast Government should have 
(4) 
tobe-deprived of a legitimate source of revenue. There 
was much acrimony over the Dutch attitude; it was said that 
their-sole object on the Coast was the purchase of slaves as 
(5) 
recruits for the army in their Eastern possessions* if 
the Bzi tish Government had considered that the welfare of the 4 




CO/96/40, no. 8706/D, draft to Governor. 
(2) CO/96/45, memo, in no. 2633 by Sir B. Pine, 28th March, 1859, 
(3) CO/96/42, no. 7372/FO. 
(4) e. g. CO/96/49, minute on no. 9720 by Fortescue, 26th Oct., 
1860. 
(5) P. P. Xl, 1842. Evid. qq. 1542-56; and C0/96/59, no. 12,320 
/R. 
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been asked to put severe political pressure on the Dutch to 
force : ax agreement. But so insignificant a place as the 
(l) 
Gold''Coast was not worth the trouble. 
One solution to the problem was an exchange of fortq 
between the two Governments, so that all those west of Cape 
(2) 
Coast: -would be Dutch and all those on the east British. 
Thia`, would enable the British to impose customs duties without 
reference to the Dutch. It would also put an end to numerous 
disputes that arose between the two Governments over the limits 
(3) 
of-their respective spheres of influence. The local 
government did not favour this plan. The British would have 
to give up their rights of protection over the Wasaws, whose 
country was rich in gold; and the Governor was not sure that 
tr itLes under British protection would be willing to come under 
(4) 1 
Dutch influence, on account of the Dutch alliance with Ashanti. I 
But the two Governments on the Coast could not agree upon the (5) 
boundary line, tnat was to divide them. The Dutch insistence 
(1 ), C0/96/46, minute on no. 1922 by Carnarvon, 5th March, 18,999 
(2) C0/96/46, mbmo. tin no. 4322/FO by Sir B. Pine, 20th May, 1859. 
(3) e. g. CO/96/28, no. 11,569 for dispute between British and 
Dutch Sekondi in Sept. 9,1853. Corr. on this subject dragged 
on until Jan., 1856., Vide also 00/96/45, no. 6893 for 
another such argument, this time over the territory round 
Impohaw, near Sekondi. 
(4) C0/96 45, no. 12,269, Bird to Newcastle, 12th Nov., 1859; 
and CO 96/49, no. 9720, Andrews to Newcastle, 8th Aug., 1860, 
and no. 11,465. 
(5) C0/96/46, memo, on no. 4322 by Pine; and CO/9e/45, 
no. 12,269. 
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that the forts ceded to them should carry rights of 
sovereignty made it impossible to carry on with the plan. 
The British, having only a Protectorate, could not cede what they 
(2) 
did not have. The exchange proposal was put aside in 1861. 
Unable to derive a revenue from customs, the 
Government had to find some other means of supporting itself. 
The Colonial Office thought that a direct tax might be more 
productive. It was not a simple alternative. Customs duties, 
a matter of trade, depended on an arrangement between the two 
European governments, whereas direct taxation would affect the 
Gold Coast people. Almost the only knowledge that the 
Colonial Office had of them was that they were not British 
subjects. The question was how to draw a tax from these 
people without claiming dominion over the territory and so 
accepting responsibility for it. 
The first man to attempt a practical solution was 
Earl Grey. He was Secretary of State from 1846 to 1852 and 
had a genuine interest in the colonial possessions. A sincere 
humanitarian, he believed in the prevailing philosophic 
(1) CO/96/46 , minutes by Merivale on no. 1922,19th Feb., and 
on no. 4322,21st May, 1859. But Fortescue was willing to 
set aside these technical objections in case of agreement 
on the boundary. Vide 00/96/49, minute on no. 11,465, 19th Dec., 1860. 
(2) L, oc. cit., minute by Newcastle, 4th Jan., 1861, 
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conception of the progress of societies from barbarism to 
civilization. Grey was also an able administrator and he 
heldccthe current views on the function of the State in society. 
, If-individuals were left to themselves, they and their society 
would ultimately progress by their own efforts. In a 
e 
., rr _. 
P rimitive society, provided that the people were roused from 
V111- 
the indolence common to all savages, their labours would 
increase the productivity of their country and their improvement 
would be assured. Legitimate commerce would play an important 
part in stimulating the people to work so that they could 
exchange the products of the soil for British manufactures. 
If they could also be made to work for money by the imposition 
of a direct tax, their wants would grow, a revenue could be 
collected, an efficient administration set up, and sonools and 
il) 
hospitals established for their betterment. With these 
objects, a direct tax in the form of a gut Tax, was imposed in 
Natal in 1849 and promised to operate successfully. Both 
Natal and the Gold Coast had indigenous populations, and Grey 
considered that what was good for one territory was good for ) 
the other. In the same year, he instructed Lieutenant 
(1), CO/96/11, no. 1516, Grey to Winniett, 20th Jan., 1849. 
(2) Grey did not realize the vast differences between Natal md 
,.. the Gold Coast. The Zulus in Natal were cowed and scattered 
by recent wars, and their indigenous tribal structure was 
-=-. severely damaged in their dispersion. Moreover, the Natal 
administration had in Theophilus Shepstone a man who knew 
"; "the people, their language and customs, and the country, and 
,,,. was well able to carry out the taxation scheme. In Natal, '"''too, every white man acted as an unofficial magistrate. 
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Governor°Winniett to levy a Hut Tax on the Gold Coast 
41 , "u in order that the inhabitants of the district who 
have the advantage of British protection may be subject to the 
corresponding obligation of contributing to the expense of the 
establishment maintained for their benefit... " (1) 
Grey realized that it would be difficult to collect 
aax. in the Protectorate while its boundaries were undefined 
and while the Government did not have sovereignty over the Yv 
-r 
people. So urgent was the need to raise a revenue that Grey 
xas.. prepared to sanction territorial expansion. He told 
Winniett that before the tax was imposed the Chiefs in the 
Protectorate should be asked to cede their territory to the 
(2) 
Government. Winniett however had the practical experience 
of the country that Grey lacked. Any move by the Government 
to; acquire rights of dominion, he replied, would arouse the # (3) 
deepest suspicion among the Chiefs and people,. Only. eight 
year's before, the King of Cape Coast had told Dr. Madden that 
... we are the allies of England but we do not want to be; made its subjects; the fort belongs to you, but the country 
is ours. " (4) 
A willing deference was paid to the British Government by the 
numerous states between Cape Coast and the Fra River, because 
they valued its protection against the Ashantis. But if they 
once began to distrust its intentions, the position of the 
(1) 00/96/11, no. 1516. 
(2) Ibid, 
(3) 00/96/19, memo. in no. 9223 by Sir W. Winniett, ist Aug., 184Q 
(4) P. P. Xlj 1842. Report, p. 13. 
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(1) Government on the Coast would be gravely endangered. 
As for collecting a direct tax, the obstacles were insurmountable. 
The very nature of the country would prevent an efficient 
collection. Those who did not wish to pay could easily evade 
the collector by escaping into the bush. There was also the 
likelihood of arousing opposition among the Chiefs. Even if 
they were induced to help the Government, their people would 
disobey ahem and troops would be needed to enforce the payment 
(2) 
of the tax. 
Grey was not easily diverted fran his favourite 
scheme, but he was willing to modify it. Sovereign rights were 
in any case burdensome, and direct authorit in the Protectorate 
(3) 
should continue to be that of the Chiefs. A tax could be 
levied with the existing type of government of the tribes by 
their Chiefs as the pivot of the scheme. Grey suggested that 
. the Chiefs be called together to 
form a Committee with the 
Governor as Chairman, and asked to collect a poll tax or a hut 
tax from their people, on the understanding that they would keep 
a portion of the proceeds. The Governor could give the 
Committee a share in the management of the fund by showing 
members the annual accounts and estimates. Health and education 
should be the main heads of expenditure. The improvement of 
(1) 00/96/15, no. 7406, Winniett to Grey, 20th Aug., 1849. 
(2) 00/96/19, memo. in no. 9223. 
(3) 00/96/18, minute on no. 6352 by Grey, 5th Aug., 1850. 
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the people, however, called for serious consideration, and 
should be undertaken cautiously. Grey explained: 
I would carefully preserve whatever is capable of 
being rendered useful in the existing customs and institutions 
of the people, and aim rather at improving the existing system 
than of substituting another. I would accordingly endeavour 
to render the meetings of the Caboceers (Chiefs) ... more 
regular and frequent, and by degrees to invest them with 
greater. authority, and I would also try to give the Caboceers 
the character rdther of responsible Public Officers than of 
absolute chiefs. This might be accomplitied by assignin to 
them moderate stipends (when the Revenue will admit of it) and 
of gradually establishing a right on the part of the People to 
appeal to tree Lieutenant Governor against any abuse of authority 
on the part of the chief, such abuse on being proved might be 
followed at first by depriving him only of part of his stipend, 
` 
but ultimately I should look to acquiring the power of deposing 
a Caboceer who should misconduct himself, and of exercising 
some considerable influence at least in the choice of a new one". (1) 
Winniett agreed with Grey that theoretically his 
plan was excellent, but he doubted whether it could be carried 
out for many years to come. Meanwhile it would be as well for 
the Government in Cape Coast Castle to communicate more 
frequently with the Chiefs and impress upon them the advantages 
they derived from its presence. By a "judicious and steadily 
continued course of proceeding" in this manner, the Chiefs 
might be brought to make some regular contribution to the 
revenue for a specific purpose. They might also be trained 
to accept British rule in the future. At the time, however, 
(2) 
Winniett maintained that Grey's scheme was quite impracticable. 
(1) CO/96/19, in no. 9223, Grey to Winniett, 6th Aug., 1849. 
Private. 
(2) CO/96/15, no. 7406, Winniett to Grey, 20th Aug., 1849. 
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Subsequent events showed him to be right. Indirect 
rule as foreshadowed by Grey was eminently suitable for the 
Gold Coast in this respect, that it would have enabled Britain 
as the dominant power to guide and control the affairs of the 
people without assuming unwelcome responsibility. But it 
: required that Britain be clothed with substantial authority; 
and in this essential the Gold Coast Government was lacking. 
Not realizing the importance of this point, Grey 
pressed for the adoption of his scheme, The financial situationi,, 
'was so desperate that a revenue had to be raised somehow. 
Anxious to win Grey's approbation, Winniettis successor, 
Major Hill, determined to initiate a tax on the lines sketched 
out by the Secretary of State. Hill hesitated to call a 
general meeting of Chiefs who invariably moved with a large 
number of armed attendants, if they all gathered together 
the superiority of their own physical power over that of the 
Government would at once be demonstrated, and the whole object 
of the meeting - to place the Chiefs under the direction of the 
(1) 
Governor - would be defeated. Yet he could not legislate 
for them without their consent, for the Ordinances of the 
Legislative Council were only effective within the forts and 
over British subjects* 
(2) 
In April, 1852, however, Hill 
(1) CO/96/23,, no. 356, Hill to Grey, 27th Oct., 1851. ConfidenU 
(2) Ibid., minute by Grey, 19th Jan., 1852; and no. 6320, Hill to Grey, 23rd April, Vide also 00/96/27, no. 11,489, in 
which Hill explains that the Canoe and Hammockjnen, Ordinance 
was passed with the consent of the people concerned. 
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announced that he had found a way out of these difficulties. 
He summoned a few of the Chiefs from Cape Coast, the nearby 
British towns and the Fanti country beyond, and constituted 
these people into a Legislative Assembly with himself at the 
head. After much persuasion, and the promise of a 
percentage of the money collected, they agreed to an annual 
Poll Tax. Then, to give their acceptance of the Tax a 
strictly legal form, Hill drew up a series of resolutions 
wich the Assembly passed, and he proclaimed it in the British 
(1) 
Protectorate as "The Poll Tax Ordinance". 
The Ordinance staffed that in return for the benefits 
off. British protection, every person would contribute one 
shilling a year to the Government. After the payment of 
collection expenses and stipends to the Chiefs, the sum 
realized would be 
"... devoted to the public good, in the education of the 
people, in the general improvement and extension of the 
judicial system, in affording greater facilities of internal 
communication, increased medical aid, and in such other measures 
of improvement and utility as the state of the social progress 
may render necessary,.; ' 
The Legislative Assembly of Chiefs was to be convened and 
I 
dismissed at the Governor's pleasure, but it was to be infozmed 
of the mode of expenditure so that the Chiefs might offer (2) 
suggestions on this point. Hill proposed to appoint a 
{1) CO/96/25, no. 6320, Hill to Newcastle, 23rd April, 1852. 
Proclamation in no. 7402. 




Collector-in-Chief and to divide the Protectorate into 
(1) 
twelve districts, each with a sub-collector. In addition 
to stipends Chiefs would receive half the amount of fines 
(2) 
levied on defaulters by British magistrates. To bring the 
whole of the Protectorate into the scheme, Hill sent agents 
later in the year to obtain the signatures of Chiefs in the 
Western Districts who had not attended the April meeting, and 
(3) 
in the Eastern Districts. 
Hill calculated that the first collection would 
yield about £20,000. A full Treasury Chest was such an 
attractive prospect that before the collection began, he made 
several new appointments to the administrative staff, and 
engaged to raise the salaries of existing members, among them 
(4) 
his, own. The Colonial Office did not wholly approve this 
programme. In the Poll Tax Ordinance was the guarantee that 
the money would be used for the welfare of the people, and the 
deduction of nearly 40% under the head of expenses seemed to 
imply a breach of faith. Yet it could be argued that an 
efficient administration must precede any improvements in the 
country. Remonstrance was deemed unnecessary until the results 
of the collection were known. Like the Governor, the Colonial 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 6321. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 6320. 
(3) Loc. cit., nos. ll, 1b9 and 11,183. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 6323. 
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Office hoped that the financial problems of the Gold Coast 
would be solved at last, and in itself that would be a worthy 
(1) 
achievement. 
The Department which so often obstructed Colonial 
Office plans took a different view. After a leisurely 
consideration of the Colonial Office papers on the Poll Tax, 
the Treasury informed the Duke of Newcastle in February, 1853, 
Grey had since left the Office - that the whole proceeding 
should be stopped immediately. The revenue was precarious, 
the methods of collection among an illiterate population liable 
(2) 
to corruption, and large sums were to be taken off. for 
salaries and expenses. Above all, the very fact that the 
British Government collected a tax there coniitted it 
irrevocably to the protection of a large number of people in a 
distant and unknown country against the powerful kingdom of 
Ashanti. Revenue so collected would certainly not compensate 
(3) 
for a tedious and expensive war in that quarter. 
The Colonial Office refused to be browbeaten. On 
principle, the Treasury had no right to dictate policy. Its 
function was to approve or reise expenditure for particular 
purposes. Officials in the Colonial Office were certainly 
uneasy about the Poll Tax, but they did not want to submit 
(1) Loc. cit., minute on no. 6317 by Barrow, 10th July, and Merivale, 13th. July, 1852, 
(2) There was corruption. Vide CO/96/27, no. 5928 and C0/96/33, no. 4621. 
(3) CO/96/29, no. 1186, Treasury to C. O., 5th Feb., 1853. 
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meekly to the Treasury's orders without giving the Tax a fair 
(1) 
trial. The Treasury reluctantly acquiesced, but it was 
determined to have the last word. As a guide for the future, 
it suggested that the Colonial Office try 
the Tax was paid voluntarily or under the 
force;: and demanded to be told about a; 
contemplated or in progress affecting the 
(2) 
Colonial possessions. Merivale could 
to find out whether 
pressure of military 
11 measures 
finances of the 
not hide his chagrin 
when he commented tartly in the privacy of a minute: 
"Every great measure of policy which any Secretary of 
State undertakes involves some financial consideration. If 
therefore every such decision is to be referred to the Treasury 
for sanction - and is to wait five months without notice while 
the Treasury are doubting about it -I do not think much 
vigour and promptitude are to be expected in our proceedings. ' 
(3) 
Despite its scruples, however, the Treasury refused to approve 
any new appointments in the next few years unless the salaries 
. (4) 
attached to them were paid out of the Poll Tag. 
The fears of the Colonial Office and the expectations 
of the Treasury were fully justified. Instead of the 
£20,000 which had been estimated, the collection realized just 
" (1) Ibid., minutes by Merivale, 7th Feb., and Newcastle, 
17th Feb., 1853. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 3071, Treasury to C. O., 8th March, 1853. 
(3) Ibid., minute, 11th March, 1853. 
(4) e. g. 00/96/29, no. 12,205/Treasury. Yet in Sept,, 1854, 
the Treasury reminded the 0.0. that the Poll Tax should be devoted not to the payment of salaries, but to its proper 
objects. Vide 00/96/32, no. 8063. 
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over £6,500 by the end of 1853. The first calls on this 
amount were for salaries and expenses, which left practically 
(1) 
nothing for the improvement of the country. The 
similarity between Natal and the Gold Coast was again remarked 
in the Colonial Office; in both the Tax collected from 
Africans was applied to the general wants of the Government 
(2) 
on the grounds that the Africans benefited indirectly. 
Governor Connor, indeed, put forward the "ingenious theory" 
that the more visit of the tax-gatherer advanced civilization 
(3) 
in the bush. Also disquieting were reports of opposition 
to. the Tax. In Cape Coast, Hill had to threaten the Chiefs 
{ 
(1) C0/96/30, in no. 6747, Statement of Receipts and 
Disbursements, 31st Dec., 1853. 
Disbursements (ma-^ minas, '-° J 
Salaries of collectors; £ 978 
Incidental expenses: £ 430 
Stipends to Chiefs: £1,172 
Salaries to Administrative officers: £2,773 
(additional payments and new appointments) 
Schools: £ 46 
Roads (the salary of a European super- 
visor of works at the basic rate of 
£140 p. a. included) :"£ 196 
Tools, material etc. (unspecified); £ 274 
Balance: £ 1187 
Total receipts : £6,656 
(2) Ibid., minute by Barrow, 8th Aug., 1854; and 90/96/29, his minute on no. 12j, 205., 23rd Dec., 1853. 
(3) C0/96/33, no. 6757, Connor to Herbert, 4th May, 1855, 
and minute by Merivale, 28th July. 
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cl) 
with force if they did not pay; in Accra and nearby towns 
(2) 
force was actually used. The cost of quelling these riots, 
caused in part at least by the collection, was paid out of the 
Poll Tax revenue, a very proper charge upon it, in Merivale's 
opinion: 
if ... Though the Secretary of State recognizes the 
great importance as well as justice of devoting this Fund to 
native objects, the first of those objects is the protection 
without which their advance in civilization cannot be secured 
at all... " (3) 
(4) 
In 1854 the Tax did not reach £4,000 and it was difficult 
(5) 
to meet expenses even though salaries were reduced. Soon 
the posts which had been created on the strength of the Tax 
(6) 
had to be abolished. Unrest led the Governor to abandon 
the idea of calling meetings for the Legislative Assembly of 
(7) 
Chiefs, the Poll Tax Ordinance being its only product. 
(8) 
From the beginning of 1855, petitions and letters 
(1) CO/96/30, no. 6747, Hill to Newcastle, 31st May, 1854. 
(2) Vide Chapter II, pp. 90-91. 
(3) CO/96/31, minute on no. 1495 by Merivale, 29th Feb., 1855. 
(4) C0/96/33, in no. 6757. Statement of Receipts and 
Expenditure, 31st Dec., 1854. 
(5) C0/96/30, in no. 6747, Estimates for 1854. 
(6) e. g. 00/96/38, nos. 2485 and 3929; and C0/96/41, no. 7325. 
(7)C9/96/33, no. 6757, Connor to Herbert, 4th May, 1855; and 
CO/ 6/3'1, memo. in no. 6301 by Major Hill, 16th June, 1855. 
(8) of. 00/96/34, in no. 9572, Mrs. Catherine Swanzy to 
Connor, 17th Aug,, and 8th Sept., 1855 for thEseparticularly 
interesting examples. Mrs. Swanzy was a trader and was 
one of the very few African women who were prominent at the time. 
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began to pour into the Colonial office asking for the 
abolition of the Tax. The mercantile community on the Gold 
Coast and their principals in rzngland were unanimous in their 
denunciation. To go on with the collection, they averred, 
was to court disaster both for the Government and for trade. 
Unless the Government was on friendly terms with the people, 
its position would become untenable. Moreover, trade was 
continually interrupted by the disturbances the Tax occasioned. 
k. 
So anxious were the merchants for the Tax to be stopped that 
some of them rashly offered to pay customs duties rather than 
see their trade ruined by further outbreaks. 
(2) 
The Governor 
took them at their word. He raised the duty on all goods (3) 
from 2% to 3%. Though imposed without reference to the 
Dutch, he hoped the duty would bring in sufficient revenue to 
compensate for the loss in the Poll Tax. The clamour of the 
traders grew louder. Obviously, they declared, the Colonial 
Office cared nothing for their interests. 't'hey were sure that 
trade would vanish from British ports. Worse still, the duty 
was not even high enough to be transferred from the importer 
(4) 
to the consumer. In response to their outcry, it was 
(1) CO/96/34, passim; and CO/96/37, nos. 4526/S and 4927/F i. a. 
(2) 00/96/33, no. 6759, Connor to Russell, 16th May, 1855, and 
enclosures. 
(3) 00/96/34, no, 8096, Connor to Russell, 2nd July, 18b5. 
(4) Loc. cit., nos. 9570, -1 and -4; and C0/96/37, nos. 9122/S and 9205/F; and 00/96/38, no. 5640. 
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lowered to 2%, but the Colonial office refused to reduce it 
(1) 
further. 
Desperately the local government tried to reassure 
the Colonial Office that the complaints were exaggerated, that 
a show of firmness would silence them. Officials in the 
Colonial Office were bound to support the Governor as the 
chief representative of British authority on the Coast. Yet (2) 
it was plain that the tax was actively disliked and that 
such amounts as were paid in were diverted to purposes other 
than those named in the compact with the Chiefs. Moreover, 
opinions of merchants could not be ignored in a territory 
Where the administration existed for the protection of 
(3) 
commerce. A reliable and impartial account of the position 
was not to be expected either from the traders or from the 
Governor. In 1855 the Colonial Office resolved to send out 
a Special Commissioner, Major Ord, to tell them of the true 
(4) 
state of affairs. Ord's report showed beyond doubt that 
(1) CO/96/38, no. 3940, Connor to Labouchere, 4th April, 1856. 
The duty was first lowered at Jamestown, Accra, which was so 
close to the Dutch fort there. But in June the duty was 
lowered at all British ports. Vide no. 6804. There was 
not much gain to the revenue, about 2/3 of the goods landed escaping the duty. Vide CO/96/51, no. 3185, Andrews to 
Newcastle, 2nd March, 1861. Of the sum collected - about 
V 
£3,000 p. a. - nearly half went to pay expenses of collection. Vide CO/96/43, no. 7895, Pine to Labouchere, 31st March, 1858. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) CO/96/33, minute on no. 4621 by J. Ball, 31st May, 1855. 
(4) CO/96/37, minutes on no. 4262 by J. Ball, 18th and 19th Maya 1855. Vide also no. 9642 for Draft Instructions to 
Major Ord, 31st Oct., 1855. 
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the Poll Tax would have to be abandoned as a source of 
(1) 
revenue. Both he and Sir Benjamin Pine tried to devise 
(2) 
ways of bolstering up the system, but the amount collected 
(3) 
diminished every year until the Tax finally lapsed in 1861. 
The Poll Tax failed because the inhabitants of the 
Gold Coast were not accustomed to paying a regular taxe They 
were especially unwilling to make contributions to an alien 
body like the British Government for objects which they did not 
understand, and for which there were no visible rewards. 
Many Africans on the other hand, were aware that by paying the 
Tax they would be acknowledging the sovereignty of the 
British Government. This they flatly refused to do, and they 
would neither pay the Tax themselves nor encourage their 
i4) 
countrymen to pay it. Consequently, the Tax failed no less 
(1) X0/96/40., no. 4316/0. 
(2) Ibid. Ord introduced reforms such as exemptions and 
receipts to prevent hardship and corruption. Pine institute 
three District Councils, designed to draw Chiefs into the 
management of the proceeds and to make the expenditure more 
equitable. Vide C0/96/410 no. 160, Pine to Labouchere, 
4th Dec., 1857; and CO/96/43,, -. 7895,31st March, 18b8. 
"(3) Receipts in 1856 totalled 93,300, vide C0/96/41, no. 6204; 
and-U,, 600 in 1860, vide 00/96/52, Do. 5294. The Poll Tax 
Ordinance was not repealed. In 1877, the Chief Just ice, 
engaged in revising Gold Coast Ordinances, asked particularly that this one be retained on the Statute books because it was not much importance in the history of the rogress of English 
authority in the Protectorate". Vide C0/96/122, no. &8Y 6, report in no. 12,610 by Sir D. Chalmers, 19th May, 1877. 
(4) cf. Chapter II, pp. 90-91; and CO/96/37, no. 4526, A. Swanzy to C. O., 14th May, 1855, and CO/96/33, in no. 1506, People of Cape Coast to Sir G. Grey, 5th Jan., 1855. 
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because the machinery of Government was too weak to collect it. 
Unable to overcome the physical barriers, the administration 
was also powerless to enforce its will on people over whom it 
had no authority. Summing up the defects in the British 
position, Governor Connor remarked; 
"I 
... fully recognize the distinction between Territorial 
possession and Protecting Power, but I am greatly mistaken if 
the National Connection of krotector and Protected can exist 
for any practical purpose without Imperial Sovereignty attaching 
to the Protectors so that Treason can be committed by the 
Protected against the Protectors. " (1) 
When the Tax failed so also did the hope of carrying into 
operation the indirect rule envisaged by Lord Grey. Without 
the necessary power, it was impossible to bring the Chiefs into 
any formal system so that they could be controlled by the 
Government. 
There were many discussions about the practical and 
moral value of Grey's scheme. Sir Benjamin Pine condemned 
any interference in the affairs of a slave-owning people. 
While domestic slavery existed on the Gold Coast, he maintained, 
it was useless to pretend that Christianity and civilization 
(2) 
could be spread among the inhabitants. Yet Grey himself 
had recognized that domestic slavery, as distinct from the 
export trade, was not-an unmitigated evil, and that it was better ii 
to condone it than to disrupt the whole social structure by 
(1) Ibid., Connor to Sir G. Grey, 6th Jan., 1855. 
(2) CO/96/41, no. 10,218, Pine to Labouchere, ist Oct., Confidential; and no. 10,219,10th Oct., 1857, Confidential. 
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(1) attempting to sweep the institution away. Merivald 
considered that the activities of the missionaries could be 
taken as evidence that Christianity would gradually take root 
(2) 
among the people. Against this cam# Pine's blunt 
statement that one need only go to the Coast to see that the (3) 
good effects of the Government had been greatly exaggerated; 
and Lord Stanley, Secretary of State in February and March, 1858, 
believed that since Britain's purpose on tine Gold Coast was 
essentially commercial, the Government was in no way bound 
(4) 
to, worry about civilizing the inhabitants. But many 
officials maintained that Britain had duties and obligations 
as well as a commercial object, and that, having come to the 
Coast., sire could not neglect these duties simply because the 
' (5) 
task was too exacting. The general opinion was that though 
Greyts scheme had bden unsuccessful in a practical way, it was 
still desirable to keep his moral objects in view. Without 
any effort or expense, it was assumed that the benign influence 
of the Government would gradually extend from the people near 
(1) CO/96/41, minute by Fortescue, 19th Dec., 1857; and 
00/96/4*, memo. by Carnarvon, Nov., 1858. Vide also minute 
on no. 2089 by Merificale, 5th March, 1858, in w4ich he says that 
the Secretary of State, Mr. LaboucXiere, inclined first to 
Pine's view, but was converted by Dr. Livingstone to Grey's 
opinion. 
(2) C0/96/31, minute on no. 1495,29th Feb., 1855. 
(3) CO/96/41, no. 9322, Pine to Labouchere, 31st Aug., 1857. 
(4) 00/96/44, minute on no. 2089,17th March, 1858. 
(5) Loc. cit., memoranda by Carnarvon and Lytton, Nov. 
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the forts to those in the interior. 
(1) 
The difficult question 
of sovereignty and dominion could conveniently be put aside. 
A Gold Coast official clinched the argument when he said: 
"So long as the Kings and Chiefs in an orderly way 
conduct their affairs to their own satisfaction, is it not 
better to leave them alone than attempt to bring into operation 
any system which is far too advanced for them and can only be 
successfully carried out when physical objections (presuming 
no others existed) can be surmounted(? ) Whilst we have but 
small means at our disposal(,, however much we may desire to 
improve the condition of the people we must be content to 
remain as it were exercising an 'appellate jurisdiction'. 
When dissatisfied with their own rule and they ask for 
interference, then and only then proffer it; at the same 
time be prompt in putting down aggression and crimes which 
require summary punishment ... My notions are to 
do great 
things, and at once; but I know the means must be first 
there, or a failure will follow any attempt to do more than 
maintain order. 11 (2) 
Even the preservation of peace, however, entailed 
interference with the tribes and their institutions, and made 
inevitable the slow disintegration of tribal government. 
Beyin afforded a striking example of the results that were to 
be expected when the European Government entered into tribal 
(3) 
politics. The expedition in 1848 ended with the deposition 
of the King and a rival was put in his place. One effect of 
(1) Ibid., memo. by Carnarvon. 
(2) CO/96/43, memo. in no. 5494 by Mr. E. B. Andrews, 23rd July, 
1859. He had been Colonial Secretary on the Gold Coast 
and was at this time on leave in England. He returned 
in 1860 as Governor. 
(3) Vide supra, pp. 19-20. 
- 50 - 
(1) this action was chronic warfare in the district. The 
other was that the new King lacked authority over the people. 
Regarding him a`2 the agent of the white man, they paid him 
little respect. Such drastic intervention far from Cape 
Coast was not usual. The public degradation of a Chief in 
(3) 
Western Wasaw in 1857 for committing human sacrifice, and 
the armed Government support for the King of Abura in. !a tribal (4) (5) 
- dispute were almost the only other instances. 
It was in the towns that the decay in the power of 
the Chiefs was most apparent. Europeans had been present 
there for generations, and by the time the Colonial Office took 
control of the Ports the process set in motion by the contact 
between Europeans and Africans had already started. An 
educated community had developed whose ties with tribal life 
were weak, and illiterate Chiefs could no longer control them. 
On the contrary it was they who commanded the respect of the 
Chiefs, for they could speak and write the language of the 
Europeans. A few Africans had been educated in 
(1) Vide infra, Chapter III, p. 2OG4.. iLZ d Chapter 1V, 
pp* x. 79 -L3oG; and C0/96f43, no. 9188, Bird to Lytton, 
2nd Au 1858. 
(2) C0/96/27, no. 3135, Hill to Pakington, 24th Jan., 1853. 
Hill noted this on one of the rare visits of inspection of 
outlying districts made by Government officials. 
(3) CO/96/41, no. 731'/, Pine to Labouchere, 4th July, 1857, 
(4) CO/96/45, no. 1436, Bird to Lytton, 11th Jan; no. 7974, 13th July, 1859; and no. 9178, Bird to Newcastle, 13th Aug., 
1859 
(5) Vide infra, pp. 60-1 for intervention in Asin Atandaso. 
(6) 00/96/43, no. 5498, Pine to Stanley, 7th May): 1858. 
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Europe, 
(1) 
but the greater number of this community were 
influenced by the early Christian movement in Cape Coast. 
The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel supported an 
African clergyman, Philip Quacoe, from 1775 until his death 
(2) 
in 1816. He had been trained in England. Then in 1831, some 
(3) 
of the leading men in Cape Coast formed a Christian Society 
which spread the Gospel among their own people until the 
Wesleyan Society sent out missionaries, from 1835 onwards, to 
guide their efforts. European missionaries suffered badly 
from the tropical climate, and the Society relied largely on 
its African trainees for missionaries and teachers. Several 
elementary schools in and near Cape Coast were conducted under 
the Wesleyans' supervision. The first, and for a long time 
the only Government school, was opened in Cape Coast in 1824. 
In 1844, it had 200 scholars, though their attendance was 
(1ý e. g. Kin Dowuna of Christiansborg had been to Denmark, 
vide C0/96/41, no. 6206, Pine to tabouchere, 11th June, 1857. 
prince Osu Ansa was educated in England, vide Chapter III, 
p. 190. Many educated Africans were of European descent, and 
had links thereby with European culture. 
(2) Vide Hayford, M. C.: West Africa and Christianity, pp. 8 and 
38. 
(3) This Society, led by William de Graft, had as its first 
members most of the men prominent in later years,, among them 
George Blankson and John Aggery, later King of Cape Coast 
(vide Chapter III), H. Brew, - Neizer, etc. Some of them were 
imprisoned shortly after by Captain Maclean for "seditious 
preaching" - according to Joseph Smith, an African teacher whc! disapproved of their activities. This was probably the 
first time these men fell foul of the European Government. 
They were to do so frequently in the following years, 
Vide Southon, A. E.: Gold Coast Methodism. pp. 24-31, and 
Wesleyan Missionary Notices, v. XXIV, pp. 57-61. 
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(1) irregular. These schools taught through the medium of 
English, the Society spending about £5,000 annually on 
secular and religious education in the Western Districts and 
in Jamestown, Accra, The Wesleyans had many followers. 
At the first service held in the newly-built church at Cape 
Coast in 1838,600 of the 1,200 people present claimed to be 
Christian converts, including all the most prominent men in 
(2) 
the tovm. Among these converts, tribal ties were 
necessarily. loose, for Christianity implied a complete break 
with indigenous customs and traditions. 
Almost the entire educated community was engaged in 
trade, the members being agents or sub-agents of white traders 
and European firms, and occasionally traders in their own 
right. Acting as intermediaries between the Government and 
th4 Chiefs, and having family and trading connections in all 
parts of the country, this community exercised influence that 
(3) 
was out of all proportion to its numbers. All the minor 
offices in the British administration were open to them. 
(1) C0/9b/4, no. 92b, Hill to Stanley, 20th March, 1844 
Complete Figures are available only for the years 1850 to 1801. The number of schools of all kinds throughout the 
Protectorate rose from 21 in 1850 to 37 in 18bl, and the tota] 
number of scholars from 1,140 to 1,918. These figures, 
taken from the Statistical Tables Relating to the Colonies, 
do not appear to be very reliable. 
(2) Vide Southon, op. cit., for a very interesting account of Wesleyan activities on the Gold Coast. Of 32 missionaries 
sent out between 1835 and 1843,15 died within 8 months and 
all but 4 had to return to England broken in health after 2 years. The Wesleyans also had a station in Kumasi from 1841, though they had little success there. (3) cf. CO/96/40, no. 431b/O; and Chapter III, p. 222. 
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They were also employed in more responsible posts for which 
no Europeans were available - there were many - and as special (1) 
agents for the Government, though trade was more attractive 
(2) 
than the badly paid administrative service. After the 
establishment of the Supreme Court in 1853, a few educated 
(3) 
Africans began to practise as lawyers. For the most part, 
the educated community formed the nucleus of a new middle class 
on the Gold Coast which depended on a money rather than a 
subsistence economy. The members of the new community were 
individuals who were emerging from a tribal to a competitive 
society, a process that involved a tremendous change of 
values. Since most of them were connected with the London 
trading houses, the Colonial office did not want them to become 
(1) There are no exact figures available. In 1855, for 
instance, Governor Hill wrote that there were 2 African Civil 
Commandants; and the Resident at Kumasi, the Writer in 
the Colonial Secretary's office, landing waiters, Poll Tax 
collectors, and the Clerk to the Judicial Assessor were all 
Africans. Vide C0/9e/37, memo. 16th June. In 1850, 
Lord Grey thought Africans should be employed by the 
Government so that they could see the advantages of education. 
Vide C0/9o/19, minute on no. 8235,12th Oct., 1850. 
But this policy changed, and the C. O. was extremely chary 
of appointing Africans to responsible positions. Vide, 
for example, CO/9ti/b5, minute on no. 8471 by Elliot, 
19th Sept., l8b4. Vide also C0/96/55 for remarks of 
Govei"nor Andrews in nos. 311 and 314. For example of 
special agent, vide C0/96/28, no. 11,559, 
(; &) CO/9b/45, no. 6890, Bird to Lytton, 17th May, 1859, 
(3) Vide Chapter III, Po 183. 
t 
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(1) too powerful in the general administration. Unfortunately 
these people could not identify themselves completely either 
with the indigenous tribal system or with the European 
Government. Having no loyalties as a group, and not completely 
evolved from the old society, this community was unstable. 
Its members sought after individual power and advancement 
whenever the chance offered; and as the vanguard of the new 
society, they demanded recognition and responsibility. Try 
as the Government would to ignore them, they succeeded in 
making their presence felt. But they were disliked and 
distrusted by ixiropeans. The term "educated native" did not 
denote a creditable achievement in the progress from barbarism 
to civilization. It was a stigma. 
One of the earliest indications of the trouble this 
group would cause to the Government came in 1852 with the 
imposition of the Poll Tax. Major Hill told Lord Grey 
confidentially that it had been difficult to secure the support 
of the Chiefs for this measure. The "educated natives" had 
undermined the Governor's authority by trying to dissuade the 
(2) 
Chiefs from signing the agreement, Away from these evil 
counsellors, Hill said the Chiefs were "very docile and willing 
to listen to reason". He resolved to have nothing to do with 
(1) CO/96/31, minute on no. 1495 by Merivale, 29th Feb., 1855, 
in which he also states that Cape Coast had "always" been 
under the influence of these people. 
(2) Vide supra, p. 38. The Governor approached Chiefs in and 
near Cape Coast, where the educated community was most numerous In any case, Chiefs outside Cape Coast always took the lead from that town. 
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the "educated natives" who claimed to represent their 
illiterate countrymen; instead, he would bring the Chiefs 
(1) 
into direct communication with the Government. Once the 
Tax was imposed, much of the opposition to it appeared to 
(2) 
emanate from the same group. 
into their grievances, he found 
Yet, when Major Ord inquired 
"a general feeling of soreness and irritation, an 
impression that they (the people) were despised, and neglected" 
rather than particu4ar criticisms of the Tax itself. Many 
officials were contemptuous of coloured people, he reported; 
and the discontent first experienced by the educated community 
(3) 
had spread to all classes. 
Chary of attracting too much importance to the 
influence of the educated African merchants on the Coast, the 
Colonial Office preferred the local Government to regard the 
Chiefs as the only African authority. The Chiefs, and Africans 
in the tribal state, were commonly thought by Europeans to be 
sufficiently child-like to accept Government decisions without 
argument, and would therefore facilitate the task of 
(4) 
administration. The administration, however, had little 
(1) CO/96/25, no. 6317, Hill to Grey, 23rd April, 1852. 
Confidential. Vide also CO/96/34, no. 9572 for Hill's 
comments on the opposition bo the Government from educated 
Africans (quoted by Connor). 
(2) CO/96/27, no. 6'/47, Hill to Newcastle, 31st May, 1854. 
(3) CO/96/40, no. 4316/0. 
(4) of. C0/96/42, no. 7246, Ord to C. O., 3rd Aug., 1857; 
CO/96/76, Ussher to Kennedy, 6th April, 1868; and 
CO/96/117, minute on no. 5378 by Sir R. Herbert, 15th May, 
1875. 
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contact with the Chiefs. More than once, they complained 
that the Government only approached them to ask for money or 
(1) 
to solicit their help in 'ime of trouble. But the 
Colonial Office was determined to establish the superior 
authority of the British Government in principle, and in 
practice wherever it was possible to do so. An incident in 
18b4 presented an opportunity to make this attitude quite clear. 
A party of Capd Coast people, led by the educated African 
merchants, wanted to depose the King of that town on the grounds 
(2) 
that he was too subservient to the Governor. The Colonial 
Office approved Governor Connor's support of the King: 
It .. Her Majesty's Gpvernment will not allow the deposition of Kings or Chiefs to take place at Cape Coast Town 
or elsewhere vitnin the protected territory, except such measures 
be ratified by the British Governor, and ... it recognizes no 
claim or right in the persons who have put themselves forward 
as the representatives of the Cape Coast Town community ... 'I (3) 
Repeatedly, however, it was brought to the notice of the 
Colonial Office that the "educated natives" influenced the 
(4) 
illiterate townspeople against the Government. Well aware 
that Britain had no sovereignty in the country, they seized 
every opportunity of pointing out the irregularity of any 
(1) e. g. 00/96/41, no. 6206, Pine to Labouchere, 11th June, 1857; 
and 00/96/52, no. 5294, Andrews to Newcastle, 25th April, 1861. 
(2) CO/96/31, no. 1495, Connor to Grey, 18th Dec., 1854; and 
C0/96/33, petition in no. 1506,5th Jan., 1855. 
(3) Co/96/31, minute on no. 1495 by Merivalo, 2yth Feb., 1855. 
(4) e. g. C0/96/33, minute on no. 2950 by Merivale, 30th March, 




measure which affected non-British subjects outside the 
forts. 
One observor maintained that they opposed Gov©rnment measures 
(2) 
in order to draw attention to themselves. But most 
Governors pretended to ignore them. 
Sir Benjamin Pine was the first man to ro Beard the 
group as something more than a nuisance. He realized that 
the larger coastal towns would sink into complete anarchy 
unless a strong African govornment was built up to replace the 
(3) 
slowly-crumbling tribal structure there. Frequent rioting 
in Cape Coast showed how much the traditional mthority of 
(4) 
Chiefs and Headmen had weakened. He conceived that the 
three elements of urban society - Chiefs, educated merchants, 
and Government officials - must be drawn together. The best 
way of doing this would be to establish municipal councils. 
He began by forming a Council in May, 1858, in James Town, Accra,;:! 
composed of six merchants and one Chief, chosen by their ?º 
respective communities. The Council was to draw a revenue 
(1) e. g. CO/96/65, no. 11,38b,, Pine to Cardwell, 12th Nov., 1864, 
for protest against the Spirit Licence Ordinance of 1864. 
Vide also CO/96/65, no. 9310, Pine to Cardwell, 9th Sopty1864, [ 
in which the Governor states his reluctance to make a formal i, 
announcement of Britain's assumed rights in Cape Coast on 
account of the opposition it would arouse. 
(2) CO/96/38, no. b961, Connor to Labouchore, 4th Juno, 1856, 
Confidential, in which Major Ord's opinion is cited. 
(3) CO/96/43, no. 5498, Pine to Stanley, 7th May, 1858. 
(4) e. g. CO/96/49, no. 9727, Acting Colonial Secretary to C. O., 
12th Sept., 1860, Sir B. Pine's regulations of 1858 for Funeral Customs (custom celebrations nearly always precipiA- tated riots) were ineffectual. Vide CO/96/58, no. 5743, Ross to Newcastle, 10th May, 1862. 
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from a house rate, and the Government, though not directly 
represented, would teach it the duties of municipal 
(1) 
administration. Shortly after Pine left the Coast, a (2) 
similar body was set up in Cape Coast. Pine himself might 
have made a success of these experiments, but he did not stay 
long enough to foster the young institutions. His successors 
were apathetic about them. Governor Andrews could not 
understand why they had ever been started, and in January, 1861, 
(3) 
he abolished them. The Colonial Office was not surprised. 
(4) 
It had always expected the experiment to fail. 
Beset with physical, financial and legal difficulties, 
attempts at administration were piecemeal and unsustained. 
tithe Government had no definite rights in the Protectorate. 
But Britain's duties as a protecting power against Ashanti were 
more certain. The people of the Western Districts regarded 
this protection as her most important function on the Coast; 
yet even in this the Government could not claim any notable 
achievement. 
The treaty concluded with Ashanti in 1831 by Maclean 
(5) 
served as a guide to British relations with that country. 
(1) CO/9 6/43, no. 5498. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 9193, Bird to Lytton, 10th Aug., 1858. 
(3) 00/96/51, no. 1297, Andrews to Newcastle, 8th Jan., 1861. 
(4) Ibid., minute by Barrow, 13th Feb., 1861. Vide also 00/96/43, minutes on no. 5498. 
(5) Vide supra, Introduction, p. xLii. 
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As a military power Ashanti was feared and respected, and the 
Colonial Office was anxious to avoid a conflict. In 1843, the 
Secretary of State instructed Lieutenant Governor Hill to send 
presents to the King as a token of friendship from the new 
(1) 
Government at Cape Coast Castle. But the peace was uneasy. 
With the return present from the King came a complaint that the 
(2) 
Asins were interrupting trade. It was the first of many 
similar complaints. The Asins never neglected an opportunity 
of robbing and plundering Ashanti traders who passed through 
their country and sometimes murdering them. To retaliate, 
the Ashantis shut their trade paths, causing trade to stop 
(3) 
completely. At the end of 1844, open war was narrowly 
(4) 
averted. The stoppage 'of trade was such a frequent 
occurrence that European merchants called for protection to 
(5) 
their commerce. 
In an effort to reach some understanding with the 
King, Lieutenant Governor Winniett decided to visit him in 
(6) 
Kumasi in 1848, The King made it clear on this occasion, 
and in subsequent representations to Cape Coast Castle, that 
the Asins were the great obstacle to peaceful intercourse with 
(1) 00/96/2, Stanley to Hill, 16th Dec., 1843. 
(2) 00/96/4, no. 928, Hill to Stanley, 2nd April, 1844. 
(6) e. g. Loc. cit. , no. 174; and CO/96/11, no. 1507. 
(4) C0/96/4, no. 174. 
(5) C0/96/8, no. 177/F. 
(6) CO/96/13, no. 352, Winniett to Grey, 6th Nov., 1848; and 
C0/96/14, no. 3200, Winniett to Grey, 15th Nov., 1848, for 
report or visit. 
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the Coast, and if the British Government could not restrain 
tihem, he would try to win them back to the Ashanti kingdom and 
(1) 
control chew himself. The independence of the Asins was 
recognised in 1831, but they, relying on British protection, 
made no effort to abide by the provisions of trie treaty; nor 
on their part did the Ashantis consider themselves bound by 
the agreement. In 1852 the question came to a head, when 
Ashanti intrigues in Asin Atandasu were so successful that 
Kodjo Tsihu, the Chief there, announced his intention of 
(2) 
rejoining Ashanti. Since an alliance between any of the 
coastal tribes and Ashanti was contrary to British policy, 
Major Hill sent a body of troops to arrest him. Before a 
Court composed of the Governor and some Cape Coast Chiefs and 
(3) 
Magistrates, he was destooled and sentenced to life imprisonment. ] 
At the request of the Fanti Chiefs, he was released a few days 
(4) 
later, the Fantis undertaking to watch him closely. But 
in April, 1853, Kod jo Tsibu, with one of his subordinate Chiefs, 
again yielded to Ashanti pressure, and allowed a large number 
of armed Ashantis to cross the River Pra into his territory. 
Trade ceased, and the Governor began to prepare for a war that 
(5) 
seemed inevitable, He told the secretary of State that but 
1) Ibid., and 00/96/15, no. 4251, rritzpatrick to Grey, 25th FE 
1849. 
(2) 00/96/25, no. 11,186, Hill to Pakington, 23rd Oct., 1852. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 11,187. 
(b) 00/96/27, no. 5050, Hill to Newcastle, 8th April, 1853. 
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for the expense and the risk to European lives in that 
climate, he would welcome a contest with Ashanti in order to 
crush its power and open the interior to commerce and 
(1) 
Christianity. But the danger ended soon after with the 
(2) 
retirement of the Ashanti force. This time, however, 
Hill would not risk the disloyalty of the errant Chiefs. 
Following a trial by the Judicial Assessor sitting with some 
(3) 
Fanti Chiefs, they were executed. 
Trade did not show much improvement even though an 
outbreak had been avoided. To restore full confidence in the 
Protectorate, the Government wanted a guarantee that Ashanti 
had no warlike intentions. It was suggested that a public 
(4) 
renewal of the Treaty of 1831 would have the desired effect, 
and an African trader, Mr. G. Blankson, went to Kumasi to sound 
k5) 
the King; but he considered its renewal unnecessary. 
Another way of assuring friendly relations would be to station 
a British consul in Kumasi, and to this proposal the King sent 
(6) 
a favourable answer. Accordingly, in February, 1854, 
there being no suitable European, an African was sent to Kumasi 
(1) Loc. cit., no, 5053, Hill to Newcastle, 13th April, 1853. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 5054. Hill to Newcastle, 25th April, 1853. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 5931. Hill to Newcastle, 26th April, 1853. 
(4) C0/96/28, no. 9091, Fitzpatrick to Newcastle, 3rd Aug., 1853. 
(b) C0/96/28, no. 11,567, CruJ` shank to Newcastle, 4th Nov-1.853. 
(6) CO/96/30, no. 1298, Cruikshank to Newcastle, 12th Jan., 1854. 
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as British Consul. 
(1) 
To obviate any contradictions in 
policy, the Foreign Office agreed to allow him to come under (2) 
the direct supervision of the Government at Cape Coast Castle. 
Two years later, however, this man was recalled. He 
accomplished nothing during his stay in Kumasi, though he 
(3) 
managed to incur the severe displeasure of the King; and 
(4) 
no new appointment was made. 
Complaints fr= Ashanti, with the corresponding 
stoppages of trade and rumours of war were a constant 
(b) 
occurrence. By his regular appeals to Cape Coast Castle 
for the redress of his grievances, the King showed that he 
recognized the authority of the Government over the Protectorate, 
But the Government could not force distant tribes like the 
Denkeras, Asins and Akims to obey its wishes, and the unrest 
continued. Next to the depredations of these people, (6) 
runaways from Ashanti were the most fruitful source of irritatial 
t1) Loc. cit., no. 4708, Hill to Newcastle, 13th Feb., 1854. 
(2) C0/96 28, no, 289, Cruickshank to Newcastle, 29th Nov., 1854, 
and 00/96/32, no. 970, F. O. to C. O., 31st Jan., 1854. 
Cru4cshank was doubtless aware of the friction between 
Dupuis and the local Government in 1818. 
Vide supra, Introduction, p. xL. 
(3) 00/96/38, no. 9,45, Connor to Labouchere, 28th Aug., 1856. 
(4) C0/96/41, no. 6207, Pine to Labouchere, 12th June, 1857. 
(5) C0/96/35, nos. 11,614 and 11,625,11th Oct., and 13th Nov., 1855; 00/96/38, no. 11,067,29th Oct. 1856; CO/96 39, 
no. 198,10th Dec., 1856; 00/96/42, no. 555/F; 00/96/47, 
no. 6888,12th June, 1860; and 00/96/49, no. 8075,18th Aug, 
18 e0. 
(6) e. g. CO/96/43, no. 9194,11th Aug., 1858; and 00/96/58, no. 333,10th Dec., 1862. 
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If these refugees were harboured by one of the tribes of the 
Protectorate, the Government might support the Ashanti demand 
(1) 
for their restoration. Should they take shelter in 
Cape Coast, however, and beg for British protection, it was 
difficult for the Government to refuse it. Sir Frederick 
Rogers, Permanent Under-secretary from 1861, thought that their 
surrender would oe indefensible, and that the Government 
should rather face the consequences of an Ashanti war than 
incur the guilt of sending them back to their death at the 
(2) 
hands of a savage and bloodthirsty monarch. 
At last, in April, 1863, one of the rumours about 
(3) 
the Ashantis was confirmed, They were said to have 
invaded the t'rotectorate in Asin and Akim, and their immediate 
object was to recapture some of their former subjects in Akim. 
(5) 
Shortly before, the Gold Coast Corps had mutinied, intensifyirZ 
the insecurity of the Protectorate. Governor Richard Pine 
(1) C0/96/43, no. 10,379, Bird to Lytton, 27th Aug. -p1858. Newcastle nevertheless doubted the legality of such 
Government action. Vide C0/96/58, minute on no. 333, 14th Feb.,, 1863. 
(2) Ibid, minute, 27th Jan., 1863. Ashanti had an unenviable 
reputation for wholesale human sacrifice. Sir B. Pine (who 
had never been there) said that the very air of the country 
was "ever tainted with the scent of human blood". 
Vide C0/96/41, no. 6207. 
(3) C0/96/60, no. 2442, Pine to Newcastle, 13th Feb., 1863; 
and no. 4659,15th April, 18 63. 
(4). It was said that King Ajeman of Akim Koteku was their 
particular object. Vide C0/96/63, no. 4966/Admiralty, and 00/96/60, no. 6730. 
(5) C0/96/60, no. 3575, Pine to Newcastle, 10th March, 1863. 
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was able to obtain regular troops from the other West African 
(1) 
Settlements, but with a force of about 300 men he realized 
that the Government could not achieve any positive result in 
the war. Only a substantial army would overcome the Ashantis, 
and Pine told the Secretary of State that unless they were 
thoroughly beaten, the Protectorate would remain in constant 
dread of them. He pleaded for a large number of troops., who, 
Combined with the allies in the Protectorate, would be able 
(2) 
to march to Kumasi 'sand there plant the British Fla "". 
As it was, the small British Force was badly led, and after 
a few weeks of inaction in Denkera, the Commanding Officer 
(3) 
suddenly decided in June to withdraw the troops to the Coast. 
Pine was bitterly disappointed at the refusal of the Colonial 
(4) 
Office to allow him to conduct a vigorous campaign. In 
October, he emphasized his opinion that a counter-invasion of 
Ashanti was the only measure which would secure peace to the 
(5) 
Protectorate and prosperity to the traders. 
(1) Ibid. He detained 100 troops on their way to Ingos, and 
received 100 each from Sierra Leone and the Gambia. 
Vide no. 5579,13th May, 1863. 
(2) loc. cit., no. 5576, Fine to Newcastle, 12th May, 1863. 
of. the ambition of the first Methodist Missionary in 1835 
"to plant the standard of the cross in the very capital of 
(Ashanti)... ". Quoted in Findlay, G. G. and Holdsworth, 
W. W.: The History of the Methodist Missionary Society, v. 
IV, p. 152. 
(3) Ibid., and no. 6730, Pine to Newcastle, 10th June, 1863. 
(4) Loc. cit., minute on no. 5576 by Elliot, llth June, and 
Newcastle to Fine., 22nd Aug... 1863. 
(5) CO/96/62, no. 10,821, Pine to Newcastle, 12th Oct., 1863. 
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The invasion placed the Government in an uncomfortable 
position. By the failure of the British troops to support 
the Fantis against the enemy, the Government lost much respect 
(1) 
in the Protectorate. The Kings and Chiefs felt that they 
had been betrayed and their resentment increased when the 
(2) 
Ashantis retired unscathed in July. An unprecedented 
drought and consequent famine made the distress and confusion 
caused by the war more acute, and the people looked to the 
(3) 
Government for help which it was unable to give. 
As usual the expense worried the Colonial Office. 
Pinets requests for troops and food supplies were translated 
(4) 
into terms of . money. 
Part of a West Indian Regiment 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Conran was sent to the Gold 
(5) 
Coast in August, to replace the Gold Coast Corps. - With 
an additional Regiment, Pine was convinced that he would be 
able to defeat Ashanti and restore British prestige in the (6) 
Protectorate, and after much hesitation the Colonial Office 
(7) 
agreed to send the extra force. 
(1) Ibid. 0 and 00/96/60, no. 6730. 
(2) CO/96/61, no. 7941, Pine to Newcastle, 11th July, 1863, 
and minute by Unwin, 15th Aug. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 7942, Pine to Newcastle, 13th July, 1863; 
and CO/96/62.. no. 10.. 821* 
(4) Ibid.., minute by Elliot, 18th Nov., 1863; and CO/96/61, 
minute on no. 7942 by Fortescue, 18th Aug., 18o3. 
(b) C0/96/61, no. 9815. About 500 men arrived in Aug., 1863. 
(6) C0/96/6Z, no. 10,821. 
(7) C0/96/62, in no. 11,888, Sir. F. Rogers (in the absence of Newcastle) to Pine, 21st Dec. 91863. 
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This regiment was expected to reach the Coast early 
in March. in February of 1864, pine reported that the whole 
of the available force, about 900 men in all, were encamped 
(1) 
on the Pra under Colonel Conran. Since July, the Ashantis 
(2) 
had made no move to renew the war, and Conran was prepared 
to await the reinforcements before crossing into Ashanti 
(3) 
territory. But the additional regiment was late in coming. 
The heavy rains set in, and sickness took a heavy toll of the 
(4) 
officers and men on the Pra. On the 3rd April, it was 
(5) 
decided to withdraw the force to the Coast. Four days 
later the reinforcements arrived, but the weather and the bad 
health of the troops made an expßdition to Ashanti impossible, 
(6) 
. and it was not attempted. The stores left on the Pra were 
(1) CO/96/64, no. 2264, tine to Newcastle, 12th . eb., 1864. 
(2) Ibid. 
(S) The reason for this was the transport used by the Admiralty, 
A sailing ship was cheaper than a steamship, even though it 
was much slower, and the sailing ship was chosen. 
Vide Hansard, CLXXV., 1864,2004-6. 
(4) 1; 0/96/64, no. 6419, encl., Conran to iiaskett, 30th May, 1864: 
180 West Indian soldiers out of 1,000 men were in hospital 
by this time. 75 were convalescent and sickness was on the 
increase. There was a high casualty rate, among the 
European officers - 10 out of about 50 had died, and more 
than half the remainder had been invalided back to England. 
(5) C0/96/64, no. 3785, Pine to Newcastle, 11th March; and 
no. 4316,5th April, 1864. 
(6) Loc. cit., no, 4322, and minute by Barrow, 12th May, 1864. 
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destroyed, and by August all the troops were withdrawn, with (1) 
the exception of a small garrison for the forts. 
The costly experience of this war decided the 
Colonial Office against any further intervention in Ashanti 
quarrels. In June, 1864, Mr. Cardwell, then Secretary of 
State, told the Governor that in future, the Kings and Chiefs 
of the Protectorate must unite for their own defence. 
British troops could not be used on the Gold Coast without 
exposure 
!:. to the risks of a deadly climate, and to the hazard of 
being virtually defeated by the disastrous consequences of 
that climate". 
The Government would therefore afford assistance to the 
inhabitants of the Protectorate in the way$ of military stores, 
but Her Majesty's forces could only be employed in the 
protection of the forts themselves. Cardwell impressed upon 
the Governor the necessity for keeping the peace with Ashanti 
and the danger of taking sides in disputes between that power ( 2) 
and the tribes of the Protectorate. 
After the withdrawal from the Pra, the Government 
deliberated about the arrangement of a permanent peace with 
Ashanti. The military and civil officers on the Coast could 
not agree about the best way of approaching A t-i without 
(1) CO/96/65, no. 8461, Pine to Cardwell, 9th Aug., 
(2) P. P. XLIX, 1873,266-1, App. no. 2, p. 392, Cardwell to Pine, 
23rd June, 1864. 
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(1) loss of dignity. In the end, the Government decided to 
(2) 
wait for the preliminary advances to come from Ashanti. 
There: remained the difficult task of explaining the Government's 
failure to the people of the Protectorate. The Kings and 
Chiefs did not hide their discontent, and Pine feared that 
(3) 
the position of the Government might be jeopardized. He 
held meetings at Cape Coast in Augist, which were attended by 
all the Chiefs of the Western Districts or their representatives. 
They expressed great dissatisfaction about the conduct of the 
war and the needless destruction of stores at the end of it; 
and with these complaints were mingled their general grievances 
against the Government. Too little attention was paid to 
them, and they blamed the Government for loss of power over 
(4) 
their people. They did not seem to be completely 
convinced by Pine's answering statements, though they signified 
(b) 
their willingness to continue under British protection. 
The failure of the war prompted the first 
Parliamentary debate on Gold Coast affairs since 1850. The 
(1) CO/96/64, nos. 6419,7457 and 7643; and 00/96/65, no-9302, 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 9313, Pine to Cardwell, 13th Sept., and 
no. 10,330,11th Oct., 1864. 
(3) 00/96/64, no. 7643, Pine to Cardwell, 13th July, 1864. 
(4) 00/96/65, no. 8469, Pine to Cardwell, 12th Aug., 1864, 
and Reports of Meetings. 
(5) Loc. cit. , no. 245, Pine to Cardwell, 13th Dec., l8 64. 
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subject might not have been brought before the House had not 
Sir John Hay chargdd the Liberal Government with gross 
incompetence. in its handling of a useless expedition in which (1) 
so many Englishmen were lost, among them his own brother, 
The debate on its negligence developed into a vote of censure 
in June, 1864, the Government escaping defeat by a small 
(2) 
majority. 
Despite its customary reluctance to discuss Colonial 
(3) 
problems in Parliament, the Colonial Office was glad of 
the opportunity to have the whole question of the administration 
on the Gold Coast brought before the public. The financial 
difficulties of the local Government had grown steadily, and 
no solution could be found. The annual expenditure of 
(4) 
£5,000 in 1850 increased to nearly £12,000 in 1863, in 
spite of the constant exhortations to Governors to keep 
expenses low. In proportion to its revenue the Gold Coast 
was heavily in debt, and there was no way of increasing the 
revenue locally. The Colonial Office had to concede that the 
Settlements could no longer manage on £4,000 a year from 
(1) Hansard, CLXXV, question 
20th May, 546-552. 
(2) Loc. cit., debate on 17th 
(3) e. g. CO/96/36, minute on 
Meriiaale, 11th Aug., 1855; 
on 10th May, 1864; and debate 
June, 1950-2021. 
no. 7551 Law Officers by 
and CO 96/44, memo. by Lytton, 
Nov., 1858. 
(4) Statistical Tables, and vide App. III. 
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(1) 'ar liament. In 1862 the Treasury was asked to advance the 
sum of £3,000 to settle existing claims on the administration,. 
(2) 
and to sanction an annual grant of £5,000. By 1664, after 
the expense of the Ashanti invasion, the Colonial Office 
asked for £5,000 to pay the debts of the Government, and an 
(3) 
annual grant of £6,000. The Treasury, however, followed 
its usual course of refusing every request for aid, and 
(4) 
Colonial Office officials found the correspondence infuriating. 
T. F. Elliot, one of the Assistant Under-secretaries, did not 
restrain his feelings on the behaviour of the Treasury: 
"If the Treasury think that the measures of Great Britain 
for the suppression of the Slave Trade are unwise, or cost 
more than the object is worth, the issue ought to be raised in 
a different arena, and it should be ascertained whether 
Parliament and the country will reverse their policy. But so 
long as that policy is adhered to, it is purely vexatious to 
insist on treating these African Settlements as if they were 
flourishing and independent, and to try to stave off from one 
session to another items which we all see will be necessary, 
by useless demands upon the Government for further explanations it 
(5) 
(1) 00/96/58, minutes on no. 9943 by Barrow and Elliot, llth Oct 
1862. Only the year before, officials had a eed that to 
raise the grant was unthinkable, Vide 00/96/52, minutes on 
no, 5294 by Fortes cue , 24th June, and Newcastle.. 26th June.. 1861. 
(2) 00/96/59, minute on no. 1486 by Elliot, 18th Feb., 1862. 
(3) 00/96/62, minute on no. 11,889 by Elliot, 14th Dec., 1863; 
and C0/96/63, C. O. to Treasury, 22nd Feb., 1864, in no. 1150, 
(4) Corr, with Treasury for years 1862-64, passim; and 
especially CO/96/65, minutes by Elliot on nos. 8468 and 
11,388. Vide Bibliography, p. 4206D< for Treasury refer- 
ences. At this time, E. C. Buckland, one of the First Class 
Clerks, was responsible for drafts on Gold Coast affairs.. but 
G. A. Hamilton, the Assistant Secretary, and Frederick Peel, 
one of the Joint Secretaries to the Treasury, frequently 
amended the drafts. Gladstone was Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and he, Lord Palmerston, E. H. K. Hugessen and Sir 
VJm. Dunbar, were Lords Commissioners. 
(5) CO/96/59, minute on no. 1486,18th Feb., 1862. 
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it was inexpedient to mention money matters in Parliament 
(1) 
while feeling was so high about the Ashanti war. But 
towards the end of 1864 all patience with the Treasury came 
to an end. The Gold Coast debt had reached £6,000 and the 
(2) 
revenue was inadequate for current expenses. With great 
relief, the Colonial Office welcomed the projected Select 
(3) 
Committee of Inquiry. Colonel Ord was again appointed, 
in October of 1864, as Special Commissioner to West Africa, so 
that he could make .a preliminary report on the state of the 
Gold Coast and the three other West African Settlements. 
He was instructed to take special note of the relations between 
the Government and the tribes on the Coast; to report on 
how far Britain had attained her objects of encouraging 
legitimate commerce and suppressing the slave trade by 
maintaining Settlements; and to see how far the establishments 
%4) 
could be reduced without impairing their efficiency. 
The motion for the appointment of a Select-Committee 
was introduced in the House of Commons in February, 1865 by 
Mr. Adderley, a Liberal who was obstinately opposed to Imperial 
(1) CO/96/62, minutes on no. '11,889 by Fortescue, löth Dec., 
and Newcastle, 17th Dec., 1863. 
(2) CO/96/65, memo. on no. 11,338 by Barrow, 15th Dec., 1864. 
(3) Ibid., minute by Elliot, 20th Dec., 1864. 
(4) P. P. XXXVII,, 1865,170, p. 3: Instructions, Cardwell to Ord, 
25th Oct., 1864. 
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The Committee paid due regard to Colonel Ord's 
report. In it, he affirmed that the British Settlements had 
achieved their dual purpose of stopping the slave trade and 
replacing it with legitimate comrlerce. Moreover, the 
advantages of a civilized Government in the midst of a barbarous 
community were evident in the mitigation of some of their most 
brutal customs; and he had no doubt that complete retirement 
from the Coast would be followed by constant warfare, and a 
(1) 
revival of vile customs and the slave trade. The 
missionary body lent support to this view. Dr. Livingstone, 
though he had never been to the Gold Coast, assured the 
Committee chat without the protection afforded by a "civilized" 
government, the efforts of the missionaries and the traders 
(2) 
would be impaired. As one of the members of the Basle 
Missionary Society put it: 
"I do not like war, but still it is very good sometimes 
if the people see guns; they respect them". (3) 
Many of the problems of administration were discussed. 
A grave defect of British jurisdiction was its vagueness. 
One of the African representatives of the King of Cape Coast 
told the Committee that unless there was a more precise 
(1) P. P. XXXVI, 1865,170. Report, 9th March, 1865, pp. 16 at seq. 
(2) P. P. V, 1865,432. Evid., qq. 5604-5729. 
(S) Ibid., avid. by Rev. E. Schrenk, q. 3346, and his evidence, 
passim. 
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definition of its limits, the Government would clash with the 
(1) 
Chiefs over their respective powers. Evidence from officers; 
who had served on the Gold Coast was also important. 
Sir Benjamin Pine expressed the conviction that the object of' 
the administration should be to direct Africans to the proper 
exercise of their own institutions, not to disrupt them and 
(2) 
.. v CNY D aav vaa. asaý . raa vaavýa ý/.. Gavv" Yaa " aavuu, +.. ý ý. rr. ý i 
Colonial Secretary, concurred with Pine when he said: 
... The Chiefs on the Coast rely upon us, and we rely 
PIN 
upon them, and between the two there is no government at all, 
whereas in the interior the chiefs rely upon themselves". (3) 
The conclusion drawn by the Committee was that Africans were 
capable of running their own affairs without British 
interference. Any extension of responsibility was therefore 
(4) 
undesirable. 
Great interest was shown in the connection between 
the Government and the Protectorate on the Gold Coast. For 
the first time it was made clear that the obligation to protect 
the coastal tribes from each other or from the Ashantis had no 
documentary foundation. The Poll Tax agreement contained 
the only written reference to protection, but since the Tax 
(1) Ibid., avid. of J. Martin, gq. 8326-8457. 
(2) Ibid., avid. of Sir B. Pine, esp. gq. 3051-3057. 
(3) Ibid., avid. of W. A. Ross, esp. q. 3124. 
(4) Ibid., cf. avid. of Sir B. Pine, qq. 3016-3057. 
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was no longer paid, Britain was thereby freed from her part 
(1) 
of the bargain. By continuing to protect them, indeed, 
Britain was treating them as if they were subjects of the 
Crown, an unwarrantable assumption; and more than one 
witness testified that protection had an enervating effect on 
the people. It led them to lean too much on the Government 
(2) 
and to rely too little on their own efforts. 
All these opinions, with the added flavour of his own ' 
anti-expansionist, Free-trading prejudices, were used by 
(3) 
Mr. Adderley in his Chairman's report which formed the basis 
of the resolutions of the Couunittee subsequently adopted by 
(4) 
Parliament. The Committee resolved that though it was not 
possible for Britain to withdraw immediately from her commit- 
ments on the West Coast, retirement from all the Settlements, 
except perhaps Sierra Leone, should be her ultimate object. 
Extension of territory or responsibility was therefore 
undesirable, and Africans should be encouraged to manage their 
own affairs so that they would be ready for self-government. 
Meanwhile, every economy should be practised, and as a starting 
point, the Committee recommended the amalgamation of the 
(1) Ibid., evid. of T. F. Elliot, q. 124; and Ordts Report, 
9th March, 1865, supra. 
(2) P. P. $ 1865, evid. e. g. A. Swanzy, qq. 4731-4; and 
W. A. Ross, gq. 8140 and 8145. 
(3) Ibid., Report, pp. 10-15. 
(4) Ibid., hesolutions, p. 3. 
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administrations of Lagos, the Gold Coast, the Gambia and 
(1) 
Sierra Leone under a central government at Sierra Leone. 
The Committee intended that after 1865 a new era 
of retraction should begin, and for some years the Colonial 
Office used its findings as a guide to policy in West Africa. 
Applied to the territories concerned, however, the precepts 
of the Committee were at variance with the circumstances. 
Merchants on the Gold Coast, joined this time by the 
missionaries., still wanted the protection they had asked for 
in 1842. The only difference was that after 1865 they 
demanded more protection than before. Naval vigilance 
was largely responsible for ending the slave traffic across 
the Atlantic, and legitimate commerce at last came into its 
own. Trade, which had remained at almost the same level 
since 1850, suddenly began to expand towards the end of (2) 
the 160's. New firms were started on the Coast with the 
lowering of freight rates in 1869 when a second steamship 
(3) 
company entered the carrying trade, and parts of the 
(1) Amalgamation in the interests of economy had been under 
discussion in the Colonial Office for some years. The 
suggestion originated in 1857 with Sir B. Fine, vide 
CO, 96/41, no. 10,219; and Lord Carnarvon took it up enthu(- 
Si. astically, vide CO/96/44, memo, Nov., 1858. Both Air. 
Adderley and Colonel Ord favoured the idea, vide Reports, 
supra. 
(2) Vide App. III. 
(3) McPhee, op. cit., p. 71, note 1. 
ýýý 
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country were being opened to European enterprise for the 
first time. This increase in trade ran parallel to another 
movement; a group of Gold Coast people took the Committee's 
recommendation on their self-government more literally than 
the local administration could safely tolerate. The two 
developments combined to make it impossible for the British 
Government to withdraw. The policy of the Government was 
shaped on the Gold Coast, and it proved contrary to the 
recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee. 
A summary of the working of the administrative 
machine in the period 1843 to 1865 now follows: timing to 
encourage legitimate trade on the Gold Coast, the British 
Government was nevertheless reluctant to incur responsibility 
or expense in Colonial possessions, and particularly in this 
remote, unhealthy and commercially unimportant region. With 
the formation of a Protectorate, the administration set up in 
1843 was able to exercisb an irregular jurisdiction outside 
the forts. Although it did not possess territorial rights, 
therefore, the Government could influence the nearby people. 
The paltry allowance of £4,000 a year from Parliament limited 
the scope of the administration. So also did the prevalence 
of tropical diseases. Officials were few and incompetent, 
military officers and resident merchants being called upon to 
assist the Governor, although the Colonial Office wished to 
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sever all connection with commerce. In spite of this, the 
merchant body exerted constant pressure on the Government, 
both on the Coast and from England. Foremost among the 
merchants were Messrs. Forster and Smith and Messrs. Swanzy. 
These firms had a virtual monopoly until the 150fs, and even 
after the entry of competitors into the field, continued to 
handle the bulk of the trade. Merchants won representation 
on the Legislative Council when it was constituted, and 
demanded adequate protection for their commerce. Yet the 
Government was unable to increase its resources and so make 
its administration more effective. The levy of customs duties 
was obstructed by the Dutch Government. Direct taxation was 
equally difficult since Britain had no legal claim on the 
inhabitants. The imposition of the Poll Tax was combined with 
an experiment in indirect rule, but both failed for want of 
Government power and because of local discontent. Complaints 
about the tax and about the administration generally led to 
the appointment of a Special Commissioner of Inquiry. After 
his report in 1856, the Government resolved not to attempt any 
innovations in the administration, but simply to keep the 
peace. But the more presdnce of European officials and 
merchants had an effect on the neighbouring people. This was 
most evident in the coastal towns, which had for centuries been 
in contact with Europeans and their money economy. A distinct 
Middle class had emerged, composed of educated and Christianized 
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Africans, most of them engaged in trade. They were divorced 
from the tribal structure, but they had great influence over 
their countrymen. The administration disliked and feared 
these educated Africans as a group; they did not fit into the 
pattern of primitive society and they opposed Government 
attempts to usurp sovereign rights over them. The administrat iew4, 
sought to ignore this community, and the project of Municipal 
Councils, designed to absorb them into a European form of 
government was abortive. In helping the merchants to 
penetrate the interior, the Government undertook to keep the 
Ashantis away from the sea, and incidentally to protect the 
middle belt of tribes from Ashanti domination. In the contest 
with Ashanti in 1863, however, the Government failed to acquit 
itself creditably. This seemed a fitting moment for the 
British Government to decide on the abandonment of this 
troublesome region, so hedged with financial and legal difficul- 
vies. But the decision was contrary to the trend in favour 
of commercial expansion on the West Coast. More intense 
development of this area as a market and as a source of raw 
materials was about to begin, and Government protection was 
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CHAPTER II. 
The Eastern Districts, 1843-1872. 
In 1851, Governor Hill asked if he could transfer 
the headquarters of the British Government on the Gold Coast 
(1) 
from Cape Coast to Accra. There was only an irregular 
communication by sea between the two towns; and it was said 
that the people in the Eastern Districts were 
It... more than usually susceptible of civilization". (2) 
But the change was more desirable for this reason: palm oil 
and cotton were abundant in the Eastern Districts, yet the 
slave trade persisted, hampering the development of legitimate 
commerce in the very region where it was most likely to 
prosper. Until the conclusion of the major war between Great 
Britain and Ashanti in 1873, however, Cape Coast was the 
strategic centre of the Gold Coast Government, and the 
headquarters were not moved to Accra. Weak even in the 
Western Districts, British influence was therefore negligible 
in the east throughout this period. Only under severe 
pressure from merchants and missionaries did the local 
(1) 00/96/23, no. 761, Hill to Grey, 26th Nov., 1851. 
Confidential. 
(2) 00/96/89, no. 10,789, Kennedy to Kimberley, 13th Oct., 1871. 
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Government make sporadic attempts to establish its authority 
in the Eastern Districts. Having at first no clear 
=conception of the problems in this part of the Protectorate, 
the Colonial Office was unwilling to incur expense by 
extending responsibility. But eventually the Home Government 
'had no alternative but to accept the fact that Government 
control was necessary for peace and for the protection of 
British colmnerce. 
When Britain assumed control of the Forts and 
Settlements on the Gold Coast in 1843, only one fort in the 
Eastern Districts came under British jurisdiction. This was 
James Fort in Accra, where a merchant was appointed to act 
as Civil Commandant in Jamestown, or British Accra. About a 
mile to leeward was the Dutch Fort Crave Coeur, and some six 
miles to the east was the Danish Castle at Christiansborg. 
In addition, the Danes had forts at Tashi,, Nungwa, Ada, and, 
east of the Volta, at Keta. Pram Pram, between Nungwa and Ada, 
was the site of an English factory which had been abandoned in 
1816. Much further east, almost 100 miles from the Volta, 
British traders had occupied a factory at Wida, the port of 
the Kingdom of Dahomey. This station had been given up in 
1807, since it was maintained solely for the blave trade. 
Thirty years later, in the hope that the prospects of 
legitimate trade might have improved, a merchant resumed the 
qe 
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(1) English connection with Wida by reopening the factory. 
Thus British influence in the Eastern Districts was 
slight. It followed that no strong effort was made to 
substitute legitimate commerce for the slave trade. Unless a 
European power interested in the suppression of the slave 
trade controlled the West African seaboard - and Britain was 
the only power so interested - the export of slaves would 
continue despite the vigilance of the British Navy. For 
legitimate trade could not prosper while the average profits 
(2) 
of, the slave trade remained as high as 180%. - The sale of 
slaves was suspected at Dutch Accra and it was known to take 
place between Accra and Ada, 
(3) 
while east of the Volta the 
trade flourished. 
Having no incentive to seek markets or sources of 
raw materials, the Danish Government had allowed its trade to 
decline after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. 
Dr. Madden, the Commissioner of Inquiry sent to West Africa by 
the British Government in 1841, noted that the palm oil trade 
(1) C0/96/24, no. 6438/H. Mr. W. M. Hutton was the merchant 
in question. He had been one of the members of the 
Committee of Merchants and carried on a large trade with the Gold Coast up to the '50's, when his firm either disappeared or became insignificant. 
(2) P. P. XII, 1842. Report on the Gold Coast by Dr. Madden, 
p. 28. 
(3) Ibid., passim. 
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(1) 
was beginning to be important, especially at Accra. Yet 
the Danish forts had become a liability, and the Danish 
Government was anxious to sell them if a buyer could be found. 
Quick to see the advantage for legitimate trade if these 
possessions came under British control, British merchants asked 
(2) 
the Colonial Office in 1843 to buy the Danish forts. But 
additional forts meant more responsibility and increased 
expense. The Colonial Office therefore refused to entertain 
the proposal. 
Four years later, lieutenant Governor Winniett took 
(3) 
up the merchants' case. Adhering to the former opinion of 
the' Colonial Office, Lord Grey thought the purchase price - 
; 000 was suggested - far too high. local revenue, such £W 
ase it was, could not cover the cost, and he refused to put the 
(4) 
burden on the British taxpayer. Nevertheless, Mr. M. Forster, 
M. P., senior partner in the firm of Forster and Smith, resolving 
that the opportunity to acquire the Danish forts should not 
beN missed, began to treat privately with the Danish Government 
(1) Ibid., p. 33. 
(2) CO/96/2, no. 438/G. C. Committee. Hutton wrote to the 
Colonial Office on this occasion and stated that the question 
of purchase had been raised before. Vide James, op. cit., 
pp. 36 and 46. 
(3) CO/96/11, no. 499, Winniett to Grey, 31st Dec., 1847; 
and vide CO/96/13, in no. 500, in which the Danish Governor 
pressed Winniett to persuade the Colonial Office to 
purchase the forts. 
(4) Ibid., draft reply in no. 500, Grey to Wlnniett, 6th March, 
1848; and vide 00/96/14, minute by Grey on no. 2345/FO. 
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(1) for the lease of its Gold Coast possessions. But he 
preferred that they should be bought outright, and by the 
(2) 
British Government. Seeking an ally in the Foreign Office, 
where Lord Palmerston was a keen advocate of the suppression 
of the slave trade, Forster convinced the Foreign Secretary 
of the necessity for the purchase. Palmerston thereupon 
joined the local Government and the merchants in trying to 
(3) 
persuade the Colonial Office to agree. At length, on the 
assumption that possession of the Danish forts would enable 
the British administration to levy customs duties, collect 
-local revenue, and so-repay the Imperial Government., Lord 
Grey asked the Treasury in December, 1849, to vote £10,000, 
(4) 
the price finally agreed to. The Gold Coast Government (5) 
took formal possession of the Danish forts in March, 1850. 
This arrangement entitled Britain to jurisdiction 
over the seaboard of the Eastern Districts from Accra to Kota, 
with the exception of Dutch Accra. Attempts to bring the 
coastline further east under British control were unsuccessful. 
(1) 00/96/14, minute on no. 2211/H by Barrow, 7th Nov., 1848; 
00/96/15, no. 7739, Fitzpatrick to Grey, 10th June, 1849; 
and 00/96/17, no. 6154/FOe 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 3873/F. 
(3) 00/96/14, no. 2345/FO and 00/96/17, no. 6154/F0. 
(4) Ibid., draft C. O. to Treasury, 1st Dec., 1849. 




In 1843, Captain Maclean advised the Colonial Office to set 
up outposts at Wida, Grand Popo and Lagos in order to combat 
(1) 
the slave trade. But no action was taken until 1847. 
In that year, Lieutenant Governor Winniett visited Dahomey and 
invited the King to sign treaties for the encouragement of 
legitimate commerce and the suppression of the slave trade. 
Both the Colonial Office and the Foreign office agreed that 
once the treaties were signed, it would be desirable for the 
(2) 
Government to reoccupy Wida. The outlay seemed formidables 
£1,000 a year for the establishment, and £600 for repairs to 
the fort. In addition the Government proposed to pay an 
annual stipend of £416 to the King of Dahomey to recompense him 
for the loss of his revenue from the slave trade. 
(3) 
But the 
subsequent benefit to trade would be inestimable. 
The King of Dahomey, however, refused to accept 
these terms. In November, 1848, Winniett reported the 
failure of a second mission to Dahomey, conducted this time by 
c Mr. Cru4kshank, the principal European agent on the Gold Coast 
c 
of Messrs. Forster and Smith, Cru3kshank told of the 
enormous revenue - about £60,000 a year - drawn by the King 
from the slave trade. It was not surprising that he showed 
(1) CO/96/2, no. 1098, Maclean to 0.0., 20th May, 1843. Vide 
also 00/96/11, no. 1518/FO. Mr. Hutton made a similar 
suggestion in 1847. 
(2) In relation to the total sum allowed for the Gold Coast 
forts; vide Chapter I. 
(3) CO/96/1l, no. 1510, Winniett to Grey, 12th May., 1847; and CO/96/12, no. 1145/F0, and no. 2455/F0. 
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(1) no desire to end such a profitable commerce. But the 
British Government awaited an opportunity of gaining control 
of Wida. In 1849, the Foreign office appointed a vice-consul 
,, to Dahomey, with instructions to conclude a favourable treaty (2) 
, with 
the King whenever it should be possible. This 
official, Mr. Duncan, noticed a disposition among European. 
0 merchants along this coast to monopolize trade, despite the 
efforts of the British Government to persuade Africans to 
participate in legitimate commerce. He cited the example of 
a notorious slave dealer of Brazilian extraction who had at 
last taken to trading in palm oil on a large scale at Porto 
Novo, some thirty miles east of Wida. Jealous of his 
prosperity, European merchants demanded that the King of 
Porto Novo order his people to sell their oil only to 
(3) 
Europeans. A similar tendency was later noticeable at 
Gold Coast ports, especially in Awuna country, when these 
(4) 
people adopted legitimate trade. While such motives 
persisted, Duncan felt that there was little hope of a healthy 
growth of legitimate trade. On Duncan's death, a second 
(1) CO/96/14, no. 3208, Winniett to Grey, 29th Nov. 91846, 
and enclosed report. 
(2) CO/96/20, no. 59/FO, and minutes. 
(3) Loc. cit., in no. 1028/F0. Mr. Hutton had an agent at 
Porto Novo, and there was also a French factor there. 
(4) Vide this chapter, pp. 128 & 132, for the European 
merchants, dislike of competition from Giraldo, the ex-slave 
dealer, in the '60's. 
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(1) vice-consul was appointed.. in 1850, but it was not until 
1852 that the King concluded a treaty with a visiting naval 
officer. This treaty, however, with no means of enforcing it, 
(2) 
remained a more paper agreement. The export of slaves 
continued for years afterwards, according to the demand from 
the transatlantic market. But the activities of Dahomey fell 
more within the scope of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, 
and after 1861, of the Colony of Lagos, rather than the Gold 
Coast Government. After the purchase of the Danish forts, 
the eastern limit of jurisdiction on the Gold Coast was 
assumed to be Keta. 
In 1850, slave trading was still the main occupation 
of the people along the seaboard and in the hinterland of the 
Danish possessions, and the inhabitants showed no desire to 
alter their habits to suit the wishes of the new Government. 
It was Britain's task to stamp out this trade and foster 
legitimate commerce, and the local Government considered that 
obedience to its authority was an essential preliminary. Not 
many months after the transfer, the Governor reported that it 
had been necessary to punish the tribes in the vicinity of the 
(3) 
old Danish forts, In September, 1850, Winniett himself 
(1) 00/96/20, no. 9905/FO. 
(2) 00/96/32, no. 10,083/FO. 
(3) CO/96/19, no. 8234, Winniett to Grey, 24th. July, 1850. 
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led another expedition, this time against Ada, where the 
inhabitants had become rebellious at the injunction of the 
Government that they should stop the slave trade. In order 
to make them feel the weight of British authority, Wizmiett 
imposed a fine of £400 on the Adas, a sum which was also 
(1) ! 
calculated to cover the cost of the expedition. But as 
soon as Winniett left them, they continued their defiance, and 
only £40 of the fine was paid. In the following year, the 
Governor wished to know whether to send another expedition 
to extract the full amount. But, as Merivale remarked in the 
(2) 
Colonial Office, it was "like throwing good money after bad". 
At Kota,, a Civil Commandant was stationed in 1850 
to see that Government orders regarding the slave trade were 
(3) 
obeyed. This office was held by a Mr. Evans until 1853, 
when he was dismissed from the service for improper conduct; 
only for a consideration would he give information about slave 
(4) 
cargoes to the Navy. For the next two years, the post 
was held by military officers. Thereafter, it was allowed 
to lapse. To support the authority of the Civil Commandant, 
Governor Hill sent an officer and detachment of the Gold Coast 
(1) C0/96/19, no. 1558, Bannerman to Grey, 20th Dec. ) 1850; and C0/96/22, no. 6166, Bannerman to Grey, 30th April, 1851. 
(2) Ibid., and minute by Merivale, 18th July, 1851, 
(3) CO/96/15, no. 10,838, Winniett to Grey, 20th Dec., 1849. 
(4) CO/96/28, no. 10,9203s, Crui4kshank to Newcastle, lst Sept., 1853. 
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Corps to Keta in 1852. If he had had the funds, he would 
also have liked to repair and reoccupy the fort at Ada because 
(1) 
slave trading was so prevalent on the River Volta. Since 
the presence of troops did not have the desired effect of 
inducing subservience among the Awunas round Kota, Hill asked 
for permission to undertake military action against them. 
As usual with punitive expeditions on the Gold Coast, the cost 
was to be defrayed by a fine levied on the people concerned. 
The Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State at this time, gave 
provisional consent. But he made it quite clear that the 
British Government had no intention of acquiring territory 
or responsibility outside the forts on the Gold Coast even 
for the sake of suppressing the slave trade. Hill was 
warned not to contemplate the conquest or permanent occupation 
(2) 
of Awuna country. 
Hill did not avail himself of Newcastle's leave. 
None of the Chiefs in the Trans-Volta districts had signed 
(3) 
the Poll Tax agreement, and the Governor was too 
preoccupied with the operation of the tax elsewhere. West 
of the Volta many signatures were appended to the agreement, 
but the Chiefs had no intention of paying the Poll Tax. With 
(1) 00/96/25, no. 3281, Hill to Grey, 2nd Feb., 1852. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 11,180, Hill to Pakington, 18th Oct., 1852, 
and draft reply, Newcastle to Hill, 5th Jan., 1853. 
(3) Vide Chapter I, pp. 38-39. 
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its implication of sovereignty the levy was resented, and 
served to increase the hostility of the Eastern Districts to 
(1) 
the British Government. But the slave trade in*Awuna was 
not forgotten. An assault on a European officer in Atokaw 
near Keta, in November, 1853, provided the immediate excuse 
c for a military expedition; and Mr. Cruýkshank, acting as 
Governor while Hill was on leave, decided to undertake the 
(2) 
measures Hill had envisaged. When Hill returned to the 
Gold Coast in January, 1854, he found that Cruikshankts action 
against the Avtunas had aroused insurrection along the whole 
coast from Accra eastwards. The Danish flag was much in 
evidence; it was regarded by the inhabitants as the symbol 
(3) 
of their former freedom from unwelcome restrictions. 
By October of that year, the rebellion had grown to alarming 
proportions. Urged by the merchants in Accra, Hill 
therefore resolved that the coastal towns should be severely 
punished. One of Her Majesty's ships was detailed for the 
purpose, and the towns of Christiansborg, Labadi and Tashi 
(1) Loc. cit., pp. 42-44. 
c (2) CO/96/28, no. 291, Cruickshank to Newcastle, 30th Nov., 1853. 
(3) 00/96/30, no. 2009, Hill to Newcastle, 29th Jan., 1854. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 1038, Hill to Sir G. Grey, 1st Oct., 1854. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 10,859, Hill to Sir G. Grey, 1st Nov., 1854. 
Both Etropeans and Africans signed this letter to the 
Governor. 
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were bombarded from the sea and destroyed. Some hundreds of 
people lost their lives, the garrison in the Castle at 
Christiansborg also sustaining a few casualties. But only 
after the Governor had paraded all the force at his disposal, 
(l) 
would the rebels finally submit. 
After this, however, the collection of the Poll Tax 
in the Eastern Districts virtually ceased. At the meeting 
held in Accra in the following year by Major Ord, Special 
(2) 
Commissioner of Inquiry, 
his remarks on the Poll Tax. 
the Chiefs refused to listen to 
Before they could talk about 
paying the Government, they said, they wanted to hear about 
compensation for the loss of their property during the 
bombardment. Besides, 
". they did not like the Tax .... they could not understand 
why we should tax them, and on the contrary thought it was 
the duty of the 
It 
Queen to send them presents instead of taking 
their money ... (3) 
Annoyed by their attitude, Ord recommended that 
British protection be withdrawn altogether from these 
(4) 
ungrateful people. But the merchants were just beginning 
to appreciate the fact that Government protection might be 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 10,862, Hill to Sir G. Grey, 8th Nov., 1854. 
(2) Vide Chapter I, p. 45. 
(3) C0/96/40, no. 4316/0. 
(4) 00/96/38, no. 3934, Connor to Labouchere, 22nd March, 1856. 
i 
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useful to them. The Crimean war in Europe had cut off the 
supply of Russian tallow to the British market. In (1) 
consequence, trade in palm oil was stimulated in 1854. 
The price paid in England rose from about £36 to £46 a ton, 
and the amount exported from the Gold Coast, as from other 
(2) 
parts of West Africa, showed an increase. This fillip to 
the palm oil trade showed beyond doubt that the Gold Coast, 
and especially the 
well worth encoura, 
continued high for 
by the lowering of 
of steam transport 
Eastern Districts, had commercial prospects 
ging. The price of palm oil in England 
the next three years; it was enhanced 
freight rates which came with the introduction, 
(3) 
to the West Coast in 1852. The larger 
firms, Swanzy's and Forster and Smithts, continued to trade 
in their own sailing ships, and did not feel the benefit of 
these price changes. Smaller, independent traders, both 
European and African, however, were able to compete with these (4) 
monopolists on favourable terms. Nevertheless, it was 
important that the Government should not relax its efforts to 
(1) CO/96/34, no. 9652, Connor to Russell, 10th July, 1855. 
(2) Vide Appendix III. Presumably the price offered to 
producers on the Gold Coast rose correspondingly, but no 
figures are available. 
(3) Vide McPhee, op. cit., p. 71. 
There is, of course, a precise relationship between prices 
and freight rates, but I am unable at this stage to give 
details. 
(4) Loc. cit., pp. 72-3. 
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combat the slave trade. If the interest of the inhabitants in 
the palm oil trade could be sustained, the future of 
legitimate commerce would be assured. Hence, rather than 
see the Government withdraw, the merchants preferred it to 
extend and strengthen its influence. 
In this desire, the merchants were supported by the 
German missionaries who worked in this region. Most of them 
(1) 
belonged to the Basle Mission Society, but some, mainly 
(2) 
active on the Awuna coast, were attached to the Bremen Society. 
The German-Swiss Basle organization had its headquarters at 
Christiansborg, and set up several stations in the interiors 
Akropong in Akwapim, Akwamu, Odumasi in KrobO, Kibi in Akim 
(3) 
Abuakwa, and, after 1860, in Krepi. Th4 Basle Missionaries 
had reduced one of the Akan dialects, Twi, to writing, and 
(4) 
unlike the Wesleyans in the Western Districts, did not 
teach through the medium of English in their schools. Since 
they spoke English with difficulty themselves, they chose to 
teach in the vernacular. This was probably the reason for 
the dearth of "educated natives" in the Eastern Districts who 
(1) This Society started work on the Gold Coast in 1828. 
(2) First established in 1847. 
(3) P. P. V, 1865, avid. of Rev. 3chrenk, q. 3310. 
(4) Vide Chapter I, pp. 51-52. 
0 
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could plague the British Government, though in British Accra 
(1) 
there were a number of English-speaking Africans. To 
pay their way, and to gain the confidence of the people, the 
Basle missionaries, like those of the Bremen Society, combined 
trade with the spreading of the Gospel. If only for this 
reason, they valued the growth of legitimate commerce.. But 
to disseminate their religion, it was also necessary that there '. 
should be peace and order in the interior. For Africans to 
adopt Christianity involved a complete break-down of their 
indigenous social structure. This might lead to disorder, 
or the work of the missionaries might create suspicion which 
could easily turn to hostility. The missionaries therefore 
looked to the Government for protection, since the British 
professedly aimed at the suppression of "barbarous customs". 
Further, it was important that the Government should control 
the middle belt of tribes between the coast and Ashanti, because 
the missionaries, with the merchants, looked on Ashanti as 
their goal. Familiar with tribal politics, because they had 
numerous agents both European and African, throughout the 
Eastern districts, the Basle missionaries were always ready to 
help the Government with private information. In this way, 
they emphasized the need for Government authority and pointed 
to the advantages of timely intervention in affairs in the 
interior; and they never ceased to press for British 
(1) The Wesleyans had a station in Jamestown. Ibid. 
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protection. 
Exploiting the humanitarian sentiments of the 
British Government, one of the Basle missionaries reported 
a case of human sacrifice in 1856 at Akropong, the chief town 
of Akwapim. The Society begged the Governor to keep secret 
the source of this information but they expressed the wish 
that the Government would extend its influence inland in order 
(1) 
to stop such atrocities. Governor Connor, temporarily 
in office in that year, did nothing in the matter, but Sir 
Benjamin Pine, his successor, was more energetic. Aware that 
closer Government supervision in the Eastern Districts was 
necessary for trade, he agreed with the missionaries that 
British influence should be felt in the interior as well as 
on the coast. Pine began in 1857 by visiting Teshi and 
Nungwa where the missionaries had reported further cases of 
human sacrifice. With the aid of members of the Society, 
Pine persuaded these unruly inhabitants to promise obedience, 
(2) 
verbally at least, to the orders of the Government. In 
Accra itself, he appointed a new Civil Commandant, the 
Rev. T. B. Freeman, in place of the aged merchant, Mr. James 
Bannerman, who had by that time spent nearly 50 years on the 
(1) 00/96/39, no. 195, Connor to Labouchere, 4th Dec., 1856, 
and enclosure. 
(2) 00/96/41, nos. 11,298 and 161, Pine to Labouchere, 12th Nov., 
and 8th Dec., 1857; and nos. 1393 and 1398, Pine to 
Labouchere, 2nd and 27th Dec., 1857. 
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Gold Coast. Freeman, born and educated in England, was 
the son of a European woman and an African. He had worked 
for the Weslyan Mission, and was employed for some years 
in the Western Districts. In 1839, he had visited Ashanti, 
(2) 
and set up the first mission station in Kumasi. He made 
a willing agent of the Government, and was to play an 
important art in helping to carry out the Government's 
(3) 
policy. 0 
To enlarge the sphere of Government influence on 
the coast, Pine established a garrison at Pram Pram under 
Major Bird, who was also to act as Civil Commandant, and was 
instructed to visit the nearby towns from Nungwa to the Volta 
to see that British laws on slave trading and human sacrifice 
(4) 
were obeyed. There was another reason for choosing 
Pram Pram as an outpost. It was the main port for the palm 
oil trade, and had come to the notice of the Government 
(5) 
during the boom of 1854. In the following year, Governor 
Connor had asked permission to rebuild and reoccupy the old 
(6) 
English fort there, but the Colonial Office waited for the 
report of Major Ord before consenting. He was requested to 
(1) Loc. cit, , no. 11,298. 
(2) Vide South, on, Gold Coast Methodism, pp. 40 et seq. for 
a published account of Freeman's life and missionary 
activities on the Gold Coast from 1838 to his death in 
1890. 
(3) A collection of Freeman's letters which I saw on the 
Gold Coast show a man of boundless energy and great 
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ambition. He aimed at no less an office than 
than the Governorship, and in championing British 
interests at this time he might well have had this 
in view. Prejudice against him among the other 
officials, and his own ability to order his financial 
affairs according to the rules, prevented him from 
realizing his ambition. After 1861 (vide p. 123, infra), 
he went into retirement but resumed missionary work in 
the t70's. 
(4) CO/96/41, no. 1397, Pine to Labouchere, 26th Dec., 1857. 
(5) CO/96/34, no. 9562. 
(6) Loc. cit., no. 9569, Connor to Labouchere, 30th Aug., l8550 
over/.., 
4y 'y' 
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give his opinion on this question in the course of his 
inquiries on the Gold Coast. In 1856, Ord recommended the 
reoccupation of two forts in this area, Pram Pram and Nungwa. 
But the War Office thought it wasteful to have two forts so 
close together; and, since commercial considerations did 
not weigh with that Department, they could not decide which 
(1) 
would be the more useful. In the end, neither was chosen. 
Pine, however, did not want to neglect Pram Pram, and in 
December, 1857, he appointed Major Bird on his own initiative. 
Bird held this post until he became Acting Governor on Pine's 
departure in 1858. After January, 1860, no new appointment 
(2) 
at Pram Pram was made. 
Keta had also been neglected for the past two or 
three years. Early in 1858, Pine stationed a Civil Commandant 
there to bring it again under British influence. This 
official, an African, was told to confine himself to the 
suppression of the foreign slave trade and the protection of 
legitimate commerce. But, since the Awunas had never 
acknowledged British authority, he was not to assume any 
(3) 
jurisdiction over them. This post was not occupied after 
1859, though shortly afterwards the Navy established a 
(1) CO/96/39, no. 6952/War Dept. 
(2) CO/96/47, no. 2776, Bird to Newcastle, 16th Jan., 1860. 
(3) CO/96/43, no. 3979, Pine to Labouchere, 9th March, 1858. 
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victualling station at Dzelukofe, so that the Government was 
kept 'informed of developments in Awuna. 
To supplement his reinforcement of the Government 
position on the coast, Pine planned visits of officials to the 
interior to help spread British influence. Probably at the 
request of the Basle missionaries, Pine, accompanied by Freeman, 
set out for Akropong in December, 1857. There he met the 
Sing of Akwapim who seemed friendly to the Government, but 
complained of emulous Chiefs who threatened to usurp his power. 
Pine assured the King of British support if he in return 
promised to obey the Government, promote trade and suppress 
human sacrifice. A month later, Pine told the Colonial Office 
that his visit had been completely successful, and had 
(1} 
cemented the goodwill between Akwapim and the Government. 
While in Akropong, Pine heard that the two states 
of Akim were on the verge of civil war. Perhaps this 
information was transmitted through the Basle missionaries; 
they had stations both at Akropong and at Kibi, the capital 
of Akim Abuakwa. At any rate, Pine sent Freeman to mediate 
between Akim Abuakwa and Akim Kotoku, in order to avert a 
conflict if possible, and to show these distant and warlike 
Kingdoms that they were not beyond the reach of the Government. 
(1) CO/96/41, n6.161, Pine to Labouchere, 7th Dec., 1857; and 
CO/96/43, no. 1408, Pine to Labouchere, 5th Jan., 1858. 
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Freeman also reported the favourable issue of his mission. 
He had visited Kibi and Jedem, near Begoro, then the chief 
town of Akim Kotoku; and both Kings, each hoping no doubt 
to win Government support in their quarrel, assured Freeman 
(1) 
of their loyalty and friendship to the British. 
On his way back to the coast, Freeman received an 
invitation from the King of Akwamu to visit that district 
and settle a dispute between Akwamu and Poki. Freeman started 
(2) 
on this journey in May, 1858, and from his report the 
Government learnt something of the interior for the first time. 
Akwamu had absorbed Peki in the first half of the eighteenth 
Century when the Akwamus were driven across the Volta after 
a quarrel with Akim Abuakwa. But in the 1830's, Peki, under 
King Kujo Dei, broke away from Akwamu and declared itself 
independent. After that time, Peki had become closely 
allied with the Krepi divisions around Ho and Kpandu. When 
Freeman reached Akwamu in 1858, he found that Akwamu and Krepi 
had severed practically all communication with each other. 
Akwamu wanted Freeman to restore friendly relations between 
them, hoping perhaps that the Government officer might favour 
the assimilation of Peki by Akwamu. Both Krepi and Akwamu 
(1) C O/96/41, no. 161; and CO/96/43, no. 1407, Pine to 
Labouchere, 4th Jan., 1858, and enclosure. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 9190, Bird to Lytton, 5th Aug., 1858, 
and enclosure. 
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agreed to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the British 
Government, although, because of their distance from the sea, 
it was impossible to exercise such jurisdiction. Freeman 
was particularly pleased with his achievement in Akwamu. 
This state was closely related to Ashanti - Akwamu was one of 
the earliest offshoots of the Ashanti Kingdom - and might 
have called on it to settle Akwamu differences with Krepi 
had the British Government not been willing to extend its 
influence in that direction. 
Freeman observed that Krepi was well suited for 
cotton. Much of it grew wild, and he thought it might become 
a major export if it was encouraged by the Government. 
Returning to the coast through Krobo and Shai, Freeman was 
impressed with the quantity of oil palms to be found in that 
area, especially in Krobo. Palm oil was the main article 
of trade, and Kpong, on the River Volta, was the principal 
depot. This town came partly under the King of Manya Krobo, 
whose capital was Odumasi, and partly under Awuna. Salt 
brought up from the coastal lagoons was in great demand at 
Kpong, from which centre it was carried to the far interior 
by land or river. Pram Pram, being the nearest seaport from 
Kpong by lands, was therefore the most convenient place of 
export for palm oil, and Freeman strongly recommended that 
the Government build a good road between these two points. 
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Further, he advocated a Government outpost at Kpong, where 
a British officer could supervise land and river traffic, and 
exercise jurisdiction over the people in the vicinity. Even 
more important, in his view, was the necessity for cotton 
gins at Kpong. From here, bales of cotton could be sent down 
the Volta to Ada. `Water transport would keep down the cost 
of the cotton and make the Krepi product better able to stand 
up to world competition. 
These remarks on the commercial possibilities of the 
territory along the Volta were noted with great interest, both 
in England and on the Gold Coast. In 1857, an Agricultural 
Society had been formed on the Gold Coast. Composed of 
Government officials and merchants, the Society's object was 
to stimulate agricultural production, particularly of cotton. 
Shortly after Freeman's return from the interior, Governor 
Bird asked the Colonial office to give official recognition 
to the Society. He told the Secretary of State that cotton 
growing was not now to Africans. The plant grew wild and 
they had always woven their own cloths. Only recently had 
the extension of British commerce resulted in the replacement 
' (1) 
of handwoven cloths by Manchester goods. Supporting the 
(1) CO/96/43, no. 9191, Bird to Lytton, 5th Aug., 1858. 
The Society undertook to secure and guarantee a market and 
to establish factories to prepare the cotton for export. 
The members were convinced that once a market was assured, 
Africans would eagerly take to cotton-growing. T. B. Freeman 
was the leading light in this Society. From his letters, it 
appears that he kept it going by his own efforts and did what 
he could to promote the cotton industry by importing gins 
from England and by organising markets for the product. He 
also tendered for an agency with at least one English firm interested in cotton. Ha. d the project succeeded, he might 
well have thrown his energy and ability into commerce. 
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Gold Coast Society, the Manchester Cotton Growing Association 
suggestod that the British Government subsidize a scheme for 
the marketing of cotton. But the Board of Trade refused to 
do no on the grounds that public money could not be spent 
on mercantile speculations which fell within the 9copo of 
(1) 
private enterprise. 
Asked to comment on the cotton-growing project, 
mir Benjamin Pine, more realistic, was also less sanguine. 
(2) 
In a memorandum written in November, 1858, he said that 
agriculture of any kind on the Gold Coast was perfunctory. 
Even spontaneous productions like the oil palm were wastefully 
dealt with. Oil was extracted only from the outer covering 
(3) 
of the nut; the kernel, far richer in oil was thrown away. 
(1) CO/96/44, no. 9840/FO, and enclosures. The b: anchoiter 
Asaociation wanted the Government to subscribe a sum from 
which Africans would be paid for the cotton they produced 
at a fixed price, and the cotton shipped to England. When 
the producers became familiar with the idea of cotton as a 
cash crop, trade would flow into its "natural channels" and 
the subsidy would no longer be needed. 
(2) Loc. cit., in no. 11,527/M, morno., 19th Nov., 1856, 
(3) Nut-cracking started on a largo scale among the Krobos 
about 1868. Those people were more ontorprizing than other 
tribes and decided to dinrogard the taboo on nut-cracking 
an soon as merchants offered them a market. I hoard this 
from two independent sources on the Gold Coast. 
Palm kernels appear as an article of export for the first 
time in 1868, when 81,500 lbs. of kernels wore exported, to 
the value of £7,300. Two years later, the quantity jumped to 
3,500,000 lbs. , to the value of P22,000. In 1971 and 
1372, 
the quantity fell off cons id©rab1-, , probably because of disturbances in the }astern Districts, vid© infra. In 1875, 
13,500,000 lbs. of kernels were exported, valuod at £47,000. 
(Round numbers. Vido Statistical Tables Relating to 
Colonies). 
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For cotton to be grown economically, a large capital and a 
continuous supply of labour would be required. Neither 
condition existed on the Gold Coast. Moreover, cotton-growing 
presupposed capitalist owners, and overseers with gangs of 
slaves to work the plantations. The industry would thus 
tend to stimulate slavery rather than suppress it. The 
scheme was unlikely to succeed, Pine concluded, and its 
failure would make people even more neglectful of such 
agriculture as they practised. 
Pine's pessimism was justified; nothing came of 
the cotton-growing scheme. But palm oil was produced by the 
people without any disruption in their social organization. 
With the gradual decline in the slave trade, and the growing 
demand for palm oil in England, this product found a ready 
market. But the two largest firms in Gold Coast trade, 
Swanzy's and Forster and Smith's, resented the competition 
in their field which was encouraged by the advent of steam 
transport after 1852. These older and more conservative firms 
still used their own sailing ships and found that they could 
not lower their costs to meet new rivals, who could afford to 
offer higher prices to the African producers because of their 
correspondingly low rates of transport. The Iýrýcýt 
concerns determined to fight their competitors. In 1859, 
(1) Vide Introduction, p. x x%r. 
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their opportunity occurred. A rebellion in Krobo enabled 
them to bid for the monopoly of the entire Krobo oil supply. 
The rebellion began soon after Freeman had left 
Krobo. In September, 1858, Governor Bird reported that the 
two states of Manya and Yilo Krobo had come to blows. 
According to his information, Ologu Patu, King of Yilo Krobo, 
had conspired with Tenu, a Chief of Manya Krobo, to overthrow :, 
i 
Odonkor Azu, the King of Manya Krobo. In the course of his 
travels through Krobo, Freeman had remarked not only that 
Ologu Patu was the "less intelligent" of the two Krobo Kings, 
but also that Odonkor Azu was the more friendly towards the 
(1) 
British Government. Because the whole Krobo area 
contained more oil palms than any other part of the Gold Coast, 
Bird judged that the civil war in Krobo was a timely moment 
for the Government to assert its authority over this region; 
and, because of Freeman's observations on the relative 
disposition of the two Kings, Bird elected to support Manya 
Krobo. The matter was so important that Bird marched the 
whole strength of the Gold Coast corps to the assistance of 
Manya Krobo, together with levies raised from among the 
neighbouring tribes, These people, coveting the rich 
plantations in Krobo, were eager to join the Axpedition. 
Bird himself went to Pram Pram to watch events, and the Navy 
(1) CO/96/43, in no. 9190. 
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(1) was asked to send a gunboat to the vicinity. 
Officials in the Colonial Office showed no interest 
in the affair. Lord Carnarvon, Parliamentary Under-secretary, 
merely ascertained that 
«... the Cribboes are a mountain tribe - cowardly - but 
very rich, and that the expedition will pay itself. " (2) 
In October, however, Bird wrote of an unpleasant development. 
The King of Yilo Krobo refused to surrender, and part of the 
Government force which had been sent to arrest him had been 
ambushed and captured by adherents of Manya Krobo, who had 
(3) 
suddenly become antagonistic towards the Government. This 
reverse to British arms could not be ignored; a European 
officer was among those taken prisoner. Accordingly, further 
action was taken to deal with this rebellion, and in November, 
Bird was able to report that British honour had been 
successfully vindicated. Kings of both Krobo statds, and 
their rebel Chiefs, were arrested and taken to Accra, where 
they were tried by the Judicial Assessor. For punishment, 
(4) 
they were heavily fined; between them they were to pay £8,125. 
Bird expected that much good v uld result from this 
expedition. People would be discouraged from defiance. Even 
(1) CO/96/44, no. 10,381, Bird to Lytton, 9th Sept., 1858. 
(2) Ibid., minute by Carnarvon, 9th Se'pt., 1858. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 11,429, Bird to Lytton, 9th Oct.? 18,58- 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 12,546, Bird to Lytton, 10th Nov., 1858. 
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the unruly coastal towns of Labadi, Tashi and Nunßwa appeared 
more contrite after the Government action. Freeman, the 
prime mover in the affair, approved enthusiastically of its 
outcome. Had the Government not intervened, the whole of the 
Eastern Districts would have been drawn into the civil war 
in Krobo. Loss of prestige and power would naturally have 
followed. But, apart from these considerations, he considered 
that the Krobo district was so essential for British trade 
that its inhabitants "must necessarily be compelled to 
(1) 
observe complete subordination". 
This extension of British influence was indeed 
cause for congratulation. The effect of the expedition on 
trade was even more important. At the end of 1858, Bird 
A. 41% I. -. Ca,, %., d 
agreed to farm the Krobo fine to Mr. A Hutchison, b 8wanzy's 
principal agent. Under this arrangement, Hutchison would pay 
(2) 
the Government in cash, and the Krobos would pay him in oil. 
On his part, Hutchison contracted with the Krobo Kings and 
Chiefs to credit them with lOd, for every gallon of oil they 
paid in. This would make them liable for 195,000 gallons of 
(1) Ibid., enclosure 1. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 263, Bird to Lytton, 11th Dec., 1858. it 
would be interesting to know what Forster and Smith thought 
of the deal. There is no evidence of a "pool" between 
these two firms. But from the '60's onwards, they 
invariably wrote to the Colonial Office at the same time 
about the same subject, which shows that there was, at the least, friendly co-operation between them. It lasted 
until Forster and Smith disappeared in 1873. ýýI 
ý,. ýý 
, ýý 9jý 
- 107 - 
oil, or 600 tons, one third of the total amount of palm oil 
(1) 
exported from the Gold Coast in 1857. From the 
transaction, Hutchison hoped to reap a handsome profit on 










Swanzy's behalf. After crediting the Krobos with £13.10. Od. 
per ton, and paying costs of transport to England amounting 
(2) 
to £10., the oil could be sold to English buyers at £38 a 
ton, the price ruling in 1858. But still better than the 
immediate advantage, Swanzy's would have the opportunity, under 
Government auspices, of establishing agencies in the Krobo 
market, so that in future years their monopoly would be 
41 
assured. Moreover, the Krobos were bound to sell their produce 
to Swanzy's at the fixed price of lOd. a gallon. Possible 
competitors, who might offer higher prices to the Krobos, 
would be excluded from the Krobo market under the terms of the 
contract. It was only to be expected that the other merchants 
in Accra protested against this monopoly. Over the next 
three years, the price of palm oil in England was to rise to 
an average of £43 per ton. The contracts entered into by 
Hutchison were thought to be so valuable that French and 
(3) 
Spanish factors in Accra offered to take them over at a premium. 
(1) There were 320 gallons of oil to the ton. Vide App. III 
for figures. 
(2) 00/96/53, in no. 8144, minutes of Executive Council, 






(3) Ibid., * minutes of Exec. Co., 4O, and 8th June, 1861. 
T 
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Both. Hutchison and Bird reckoned without the Krobos 
themselves. Spontaneously, the majority of the people agreed 
to boycott Swanzy's agents. In 1857, the amount of oil 
exported from the Gold Coast was 1,870 tons; it fell to 
763 tons in 1858, and rose slightly to just over 800 tons in 
1859 and 1860, these quantities coming from the palm oil belt 
along the coastline from west to east. The reason for the 
boycott was, of course, the price offered to the Krobos for 
their oil. On the Gold Coast, the current price was is. a 
gallon, and Hutchison proposed to credit them with 10d. a 
(1) 
gallon. Although the best oil season came in February, 
Hutchison complained to the Governor that up to March, 1859, 
(2) 
only 100 gallons had been paid in. Bird himself went to 
Kpong to investigate the cause of the delay, and he left a 
. 
detachment of the Gold Coast Corps there, instructing the 
officer in charge to render Mr. Hutchison every assistance in 
(3) 
obtaining the oil, 
For two years, there was no news of progress in the 
(4) 
collection of the fine. Bird had thought that it would 
(1) Ibid., minutes of Exec. Co., 22nd March, 1861, 
(2) Ibid., minutes of Exec. Co., 19th April, 1861. 
(3) CO/96/45, no. 4732, Bird to Lytton, 31st March, 1859; and 
CO/96/47, no. 1487, Bird to Newcastle, 4th Jan., 1860. 
(4) The whole matter was only brought to light after the War 
Office, in Aug0.1860, inquired whether the fine had been paid 
because the expenses of the 1859 expeditions was to have been 
paid out of the proceeds. Vide CO/96/50, no. 7995/WO. 
The Colonial office itself had shown no interest in the 
matter after Jan., 1859. 
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take the Krobos six months to pay in full. By 1861, however, 
it was still not complete. Unable to bear the burden of 
payment to the Government alone, Hutchison had given £3,000 
an -; caw arnd 
of his contract to Mr Edwards, the principal agent of 
Forster and Smith, while a small proportion, to the value of 
(1) 
£750, was farmed to Mr. Addo, an independent African trader. 
By that time, the price paid by independent traders for oil 
to Gold Coast producers had risen to is. 3d. a gallon, but 
(2) 
the contract price remained 10d. Between them, the three 
sureties had paid £5,741 to the Government, but they asserted 
that they were heavily in debt over the transaction. They 
had spent an additional £3,800 in caskage and expenses, and 
had 
stated that most of the oil they/received over the past two 
years had gone to cover this cost. In January, 1861, Governor 
Andrews suggested to the Colonial Office that the remainder 
of the fine, just over £2,000, be remitted. The Krobos should 
merely be required to pay as much oil to the merchants as would 
cover their expenses. Already the levy had raised a spirit 
of insubordination in Krobo, and if the merchants persisted 
in trying to extract the full amount of the fine, the 
beneficial effect of the punishment which had led to the fine 
(1) C0/96 51, no. 1302, Andrews to Newcastle, 12th Jan. -j1861; and C0196/53, memo* on nos. 8144,8146 and 8143 by Rogers, 
21st Sept., 1861. Vide also C0/96/56, no. 8637/E and 
enclosure. 
(2) Ibid. 
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(1) in the first place would be nullified. 
The Colonial Office had not entirely approved when 
the Krobo fine was farmed out in 1858, but officials had been 
(2) 
content to caution the Governor. In 1861, however, when 
Andrews' report was received, Elliot, the Assistant Under- 
secretary, expressed great indignation at this "oppressive 
and unsatisfactory« method of dealing with the fine. He 
wrote in a minute: 
"To hand over a luckless tribe of Africans to the tender 
mercies of irresponsible Merchants armed with power to wring 
out of them all the produce they could, was not a proceeding 
fit for a Government which only exists on the coast of Africa 
on account of professed motives of philanthropy". (3) 
He agreed with Andrews that the original fine had been far 
too large, and approved the remission of the remaining sum. 
But the Government also existed on the Coast to protect 
British interests. Whatever the personal opinions of officials 
in the Colonial Office, the Krobos could not be allowed to 
defy traders whose engagements had been sanctioned by the 
Government. It was a matter of p--'astige that the Krobos obey 
the Government's orders, There was also an obligation to 
save the contractors from the loss they incurred. 
(1) CO/96/51, no. 1302. 
(2) CO/96/44, minute on no. 263 by Merivale, 13th Jan., 1859. 
(3) CO/96/51, minute on no. 130221 by Elliot, 16th Feb., 1861. 
) 
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In response to the repeated requests of the 
contractors, Governor Andrews decided in 1861 to inquire into 
their charge that the Krobos had not paid the required amount 
of oil. According to one statement, the merchants 
maintained that they had received 55,100 out of the total of 
(1) 
195,000 gallons. In another statement, Mr. Hutchison 
said that he had entered one amount twice, and the Krobos had 
(2) 
in fact only paid 32,500 gallons of oil. It was not 
clear whether the contractors had recovered the £3,800 laid 
out for expenses in oil. This would have meant the receipt 
of an additional 67,000 gallons. At any rate, Hutchison 
demanded that the Government should enforce the payment of the 
full contracted amount. Unable to ascertain the true 
position from these conflicting statements, Andrews told 
Captain do Ruvignes, Civil Commandant at Accra, to examine 
(3) 
the accounts. This officer fell ill and did not go to 
Krobo at once. When he did so, he did not trouble to inspect 
all the receipts held by the Krobos - receipts were issued 
(4) 
only after March, 1859, Nevertheless, he told Andrews that 
(1) 00/96/53, in no. 8144, minutes of Exec. Co., 22nd March, 18 
(2) Ibid., minutes of Exec. Co., 19th April, 1861, In a 
third statement Hutchison declared that he had received 
30,000 gals, at 2s ld. per gal. He did not make it clear 
whether tjis was the price realized in England or whether he had actually received 75,000 gals. at 10d. on the Coast. 
(3) Loc. cit., in no. 8146, encl. l, Col. Sec* to de Ruvign6s, 
28th March, 1861. 
(4) Ibid., encl. 3, do Ruvignes to Col. See., 12th April, 1861. 
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the merchants' accounts were substantially correct. Further, 
he strongly supported Hutchison in advising that forcible 
measures be taken against the Krobos to make them pay the fine. 
Another reason for a Government expedition, he said, was the 
(1) 
refractory behaviour of the Krobos during his visit. 
But the Krobos had no intention of continuing payment 
to the contractors. They were under the impression that the 
Government was responsible for the low price offered them. 
The appearance of Government troops in March, 1859, and of 
(2) 
this officer in 1861, confirmed their belief. Nevertheless, 
Mr. Hutchison insisted that the Government send a detachment 
to Krobo; he was convinced that a show of force would be 
sufficient to make the people pay. Undeterred by Andrews' 
objection that there was no money in the local treasury to 
pay for an expedition, Hutchison and Edwardes undertook to pay 
the expenses of the Government troops themselves. But the 
contractors wanted an assurance that the troops would be 
allowed to act if necessary; a moral demonstration alone 
might not answer. Andrews was uncertain of his position. 
(1) "Loc. cit., in no. 8144, minutes of Exec. Co., 18th May, 1861, 
and encl. 4 in no. 8146. 
(2) And since the Government had no intention of offering 
them a higher price than the contractors, the Krobos were 
quite right. Vide infra. 
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(1) 
He would have to consult the Colonial Office. Meanwhile, 
the Governor told the contractors to make their case against 
the Krobos strictly legal by serving the Chiefs concerned 
(2) 
with summonses for debt. In seeking permission to send 
troops to Krobo, Andrews explained to the Secretary of State 
that the force would only demand oil to the value of £5,741. 
This amount he proposed to sell to the merchants at the rate 
of is. 3d. a gallon, the current Gold Coast price. But he 
would still credit the Krobos with 10do a gallon, and the 
Government would use the surplus oil to pay the expenses of 
the expedition. This would mean a demand for 124,000 gallons 
(3) 
of oil or 390 tons. The Colonial office accepted 
Andrews' scheme. Sir Frederick Rogers, Permanent Under- 
secretary, held that it was the Government's duty to enforce 
the claim on the Krobos. If they were not made to pay, the 
(4) (5) 
Government would be discredited; and Elliot concurred. 
Active operations were not to begin until the oil 
I 
season in February, 1862. But in July, Hutchison and Edwardes 
obtained judgement by default in the Judicial Assessor's court 
(1) CO/96/53, no. 8146, Andrews to Newcastle, 9th Aug., 1861. 
(2) Ibid. , encl. 7. 
(3) Ibid., Andrews to Newcastle. 
(4) Loc. cit., memo. on nos. 8144,8146 and 8148 by Rogers, 
21st Sept., 1861. 
(5) Loc. cit., minute on no. 8146 by Elliot, 9th Oct., 1861. 
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(1) and called on the Government to enforce the decree. 
Andrews went to Accra himself to see whether he could speed 
up the payment of the fine. He found that most of the oil 
sent to the coast was being diverted from the Kpong-Pram Pram 
road to ports east of the Volta where no Government authority 




expense, in order to seize oil as it came down from the interior $' (2) 
were therefore of little use. Between August and December, (3) 
these troops managed to seize 11,000 gallons of oil. But (4) 
from January to mid-February, only 400 gallons were paid. 
In the next month, payment virtually ceased, the King of Yilo 
(5) 
Krobo sending a defiant message to the Government. Some 
of the debtors summonsed by Hutchison and Edwardes had given 
themselves up to the Government, Odonkor Azu, King of Manya 
Krobo, among them. These Chiefs had paid most of their fines 
(6) 
and had come to Accra because they feared Government action. 
Andrews' expedition did not take place; the 
Governor himself was very in at Cape Coast. As an alternative, 
(1) Ibid., encl. Hutchison to Col. Sec., 22nd July, 1861, 
(2) CO/96/55, no. 9107, Andrews to Newcastle, 13th Sept., 1861. 
(3) C0/96/57, no. 1357, Andrews to Newcastle, 8th Jan.., 1862. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 2527, Andrews to Newcastle, 13th Feb., 1862. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 3563, Andrews to Newcastle, 13th March, 1862. 
(6) Loc. cit., encl. in no. 1357. 
i 
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the contractors threatened to invoke "native law". When 
the contracts were drawn up, Hutchison had invited King Dowuna 
of Christiansborg to stand surety for the Krobos. Since they 
had not fulfilled their obligation, and the Government had 
not acted, Hutchison intended to call on this King to coerce 
the Krobos. In doing so, Dowuna would be certain of the 
willing co-operation of the many people surrounding Krobo who 
coveted its valuable lands. To prevent the widespread 
lawlessness that would result if Hutchison carried out his 
threat, Acting Governor Ross promised to send 100 Government 
(1) 
troops to Krobo to seize oil for the contractors. But 
Hutdiison warned him that it would be dangerous to send so 
few troops to Krobo at that stage. In May, Odonkor Azu and 
his fellow prisoners had escaped from Accra to rescue their 
lands from the Akwamus, who had invaded Krobo from the north. 
Adas and Awunas had also marched into Krobo, from the south, 
while the Akwapims and Accras were awaiting the signal from 
Dowuna in Christiansborg before joining in. 
(2) 
Four years had passed since the contracts were 
signed. The disorder in Krobo was ruining trade, and the 
Government was quite unable to command obedience. It seemed 
(1) CO/96/58, no. 5744, Ross to Newcastle, 12th May, 1862. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 6803, Ross to Newcastle, 12th June, 1862; 
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(1) 
also that Mr. Hutchison was heavily in debt to Swanzy's, 
and both he and Edwardes implored the Colonial Office to 
(2) 
authorize a settlement. In January, 1863, Governor Richard 
Pine came to terms with the contractors. They were willing 
to forego all claims to interest and expenses and to accept 
the sum they had paid to the Government, this amount to be 
recovered from the Krobos. Pine thereupon sent de RuvignEfs 
and 40 troops to Pram Pram, and about 100 troops to Krobo with 
the object of prohibiting all trade with Krobo until they 
had paid the fine. The Krobos also appeared anxious to end 
the quarrel. But they refused to pay in oil at lod, a gallon. 
Instead, they paid the fine levied on them in cowrie shells, 
(3) 
the currency of the Eastern Districts. Pine ordered them 
to pay the equivalent of £7,750, and by March, he reported 
that about half this amount had been paid. 
At this juncture, the. Ashanti invasion in the 
Western Districts diverted Pine's attention from the Eastern 
Districts, and the Krobo fine was left in abeyance for the 
next two yöars. By that time, the Officer Commanding the 
(1) Loc. cit., no. '1587/H. 
(2) Ibid., and no, ol43/E. 
(S) CO/9o/oO, no. 2441, Pine 
At this time cowrie shells 
of 2,9000 shells. The val- 
risen since 1853, when one 
Vide Hancock, W. K: Survey 
pt. II, p. 206, note 2. 
to Newcastle, 13th Feb., 1863. 
wire valued at 2s bd. per "head" 
ae of this currency had therefore 
head was worth ls. 9d. to 2s. 
of Commonwealth Affairs, Vol-II, 
(4) CO/9e/n0, no. 357o, Pine to Newcastle, 11th March, 18b3. 
- 117 - 
troops would not allow his men to be used for active service 
because of the outcry in England about exposing Imperial troops 
(1) 
to the effects of the climate in the Ashanti war. But the 
contractors, and their principals in England, were impatient 
(2) 
for the fine to be ended. Not until 1865, however, could 
the Government attend to the matter. Hutchison had died in 
A: ß. 
1863 and his liabilities were taken over by Mr. ^McIntyre, who 
succeeded him as Swanzy's chief agent on the Gold Coast. 
In April, the Lieutenant Governor, accompanied by the 
contractors, went in person to Krobo. He was also attended 
by messengers from Akwapim, Akwamu and Accra. All these 
tribes had ravaged the Krobo lands in 1862, and the presence 
of the messengers was intended to show the Krobos that the 
Government could call on the physical force of these states 
if necessary. The Krobos consented to pay the rest of the 
fine, and they made an immediate contribution in cowrie shells, 
together with a small quantity of oil at is 6d. a gallon, then 
(3) 
the current price. But as soon as the Lieutenant Governor 
left the area, payment stopped. 
(1) Vide Chapter I, pp. 63-67; and CO/96/67, no. 2305, Pine 
to Cardwell, 4th Feb., 1865, and enclosures. 
(2) CO/96/69, nos. 9355/E; 12,367/E; 12,361/E; 1854/F; 
4977/F; 1866/8. 
(3) CO/96/67, no. 4679, Pim to Cardwell, 8th April, 1865; and 
no. 5506, Jones to Cardwell, 9th May, 1865, 
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At this, the contractors decided to act on their 
own initiative. In September, they instituted a blockade of 
Krobo, carried out by levies in their pay. Their aim was to 
prevent oil which should rightly come to them from being sold 
(1) 
to other merchants. On their part, all the other merchants 
in Accra objected to the blockade and to the monopoly which 
was ruining trade. They begged the Government to give the 
contractors a sum in settlement so that trade, so long 
(2) 
disrupted, could at last be restored. 
By , 1866, the Government, the Colonial Office, the 
contractors, and, no doubt, the Krobos themselves, were 
thoroughly tired of the fine. At all costs, the Government 
determined to end it. In February, Governor Conran, successor 
to Richard Pine, assembled a board of arbitrators, composed of 
officials and merchants. They agreed that £3,500 was a 
(3) 
reasonable claim, and this amount, paid by the imperial 
Government, since there was no means of paying it locally, was (4) 
divided between Edwardes and McIntyre. Towards the end 
of that year, just when the Colonial Office Was preparing with 
(1) CO/96/68, no. 12,031, Conran to Cardwell, 23rd Oct., 1865. 
(2) Ibid., enclosed petition. Mr. W. Addo was one of the 
petitioners. 
(3) CO/96/70, no. 2374, Conran to Cardwell, 3rd Feb., 1866. 
The two merchants on the board were F. C. Grant and W. Cleaver, 
both creditors of the Hutchison estate. Cleaver was an 
agent of Swanzy. 
(4) CO/96/72, no. 10,688, Conran to Blackall, 1st Oct., 1866. 
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great relief to file away the documents and forget the 
affair, Mr. Addo requested his share of compensation. Addo 
had paid £568 to the Government in 1859, but because he was 
illiterate, he had been slow in making his claim. The 
prospect of reopening this wearisome question was intolerable. 
Addo was told in reply that it was too late; he would have 
(1) 
to forego his share. 
So ended the Krobo fine. The attempt by first one 
and then both large firms to corner the market at a low price 
did not succeed. Instead the fine gave rise to one of the 
earliest, perhaps even the first, of the Gold Coast "hold-ups". 
The most recent, and the largest, "hold-up" by Gold Coast 
(2) 
producers, this time of cocoa, took place in 1937, in 
both the earlier and the later boycotts, the same dominant 
features were present; the producers voluntarily combining 
to secure a fair price, the large firms striving to eliminate 
competition. In both, the producers won the day. By 1864, 
the price paid to the producers by independent merchants had 
increased, and production was accordingly stimulated. In 
1864, the amount of oil exported from the Gold Coast was double 
(1) CO/96/74, no. 10,17 6, enclosures in Yonge to Buckingham, 
28th Sept., 1867. Addo stated that hg ad only received 
£55 worth of oil from the Krobos, and`e Government had 
given its assistance exclusively to the larger contractors. 
(2) Vide Hancock, W. Kt Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs 
vol. II, pt. II, pp. 201- 3 or an analysis o the "hold-up" 
of 1937, and an examination of competition and monopoly, 
the regularly alternating characteristics of West African 
trade. 
- 120 - 
that of the previous year, and it subsequently showed a steady 
and rapid increase. The progress of legitimate trade was 
assured, not only because of the growing demand for produce in 
England, but also because of the collapse of the slave trade. 
Among those people who had taken to dealing in oil instead 
of in slaves were the Awunas and Adas. The tactics adopted 
by the Krobos during the boycott from 1859 to 1864 inadvertently 
encouraged this conversion. Instead of sending palm oil by 
road to Pram Prams the Krobos sent it by river to the seaboard 
beyond British control where independent traders, German and 
(1) 
African, _ gave 
them higher prices than the Government- 
sponsored monopolists. From 1861, the quantity of oil 
exported began to rise, although the merchants west of the 
Volta received hardly any of it. This diversion of produce 
to the Volta had important repercussions in the Eastern 
Districts. Pierce competition, leading to continual unrest, 
began between the middlemen tribes east and west of the river, 
and between the Adas and Accras on the seaboard to the west, 
and the Awunas to the east. Superimposed on these 
(1) In 1864, Messrs. Victor, a Breman firm were mentioned, 
with Mr. Rottman as their European agent, at Keta. This 
firm was said to be very unpopular with the Africans. 
John Tay was the name of one of the African traders. 
Vide C0/96/66, no. 6239/WO. He was refereed to as 
Headman of Dzelukofe in the Treaty of 1867. Vide infra, 
p. 137. The Ocansey papers which I saw on the Gold Coast 
indicate that the firm of-W. N. Ocansey and Sons, later so 
outstanding, was already flourishing on the Volta in the 
mid t60's. 
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rivalries was the competition among European merchants and 
their efforts to control the trade to the interior. At 
first, they tried to restrict trade to the western bank of 
the Volta. In doing so, they claimed Government protection 
against those middlemen who wished goods to be sent east of 
the river. Then, when this plan was seen to be fruitless, 
British merchants called on the Government to extend its 
authority, and therefore its protection. over their trade, 
to the river itself and territory east of it. 
The Government, however, was in no position to 
extend control or protection. By promoting the attempted 
monopoly in Krobo, the Government succeeded only in bringing 
discredit upon itself. Partly from its own weakness, and 
partly from the disrespect felt towards it, local officials 
were inclined to favour the abandonment of the Eastern 
Districts. Even Accra, the headquarters of the Government in 
(1) 
this area, continued unruly and defiant of Government orders. 
Further inland, Government authority was still more precarious. 
Scarcely two years after Sir Benjamin Pine claimed to have 
established British influence in Akwapim, a Government force 
under de Ruvignes encountered marked hostility from the 
inhabitants of Akropong, the King's town. The force had been 
sent to inquire into a complaint by Akim Kotoku against Akwapim, 
(1) CO/96/45, no. 9177, Bird to Newcastle, 13th Aug. 9,1859. 
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and it was with difficulty that the King was persuaded, in 
(1) 
December, 1859, to answer the summons of the Government. 
By this appeal for European arbitration, Akim Kotoku 
no doubt intended to ingratiate itself with the Government 
in preparation for a more important call. A few months later, 
this state again appealed for assistance, this time against 
its great rival, Akim Abuakwa. On Freeman's advice, the 
Government decided to protect Akim Kotoku, the weaker of the 
two. But, although Government troops were sent to Akim on 
two occasions, in March and May, 1860, the King of Akim Abuakwa 
was able to drive the Kotokus out of their territory as far 
west as Swedru. The victor was then astute enough to tender 
his submission to the Government and retire to his own capital 
(2) 
at Kibi. Some time after this quarrel, Akim Kotoku set 
up a new capital at Nsuaem, or Oda. This state was then known 
as Western Akim, and Akim Abuakwa as Eastern Akimo 
Weak in the districts west of the Volta, the 
administration ceased to be effective in the Trans-Volta area. 
In Aprils 1860, an outbreak was reported at Dzelukofe, the port 
of Keta. It had been caused over the attempted collection 
(1) 00/96/47, no. 1491, Bird to Newcastle, 13th Jan. 11860. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 4577, Bird to Newcastle, 2nd April, 1860; 
no. 5805, Andrews to Newcastle, 11th May, 1860, and 
enclosures; and no. 6886, Andrews to Newcastle, 9th June, 
1860* 
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of customs duties, levied at other Gold Coast ports since 
(1) 
1855. A visiting warship quietened the rebels, but they 
issued a statement that they did not intend to pay duties of 
(2) 
any kind. Governor Andrews had neither the energy nor 
the funds to cope with places so far from Cape Coast. He 
wrote to the Secretary of State that these people did as they 
pleased regardless of the Government. It would therefore 
be more dignified to withdraw jurisdiction and protection from 
(3) 
the Eastern Districts altogether. 
A quarrel in Krepi finally decided Andrews on this 
question. Freeman told him in June, 1860, that the death of 
the King of Krepi had led to a dispute over the succession, 
implying that the Government might mediate with advantage. 
But Andrews did not share Freeman's ideas on the benefits of 
extending British influence in the interior. He also refused 
to be drawn when Freeman reported a case of human sacrifice 
in Akwamu. Perversely, Andrews took the opposite course, and 
renounced all claims to British protection and jurisdiction 
(4) 
in the Trans-Volta districts. Freeman himself Andrews 
disliked, and in August, the Governor dismissed him from his 
(1) Vide Chapter Is p. 44. 
(2) Loc. cit., nos. 4877 and 4883, Bird to Newcastle, 2nd and 
13th April, 1860. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 6883, Andrews to Newcastle, 29th May, 1860. 
(4) CO/96/49, no. 8069, Andrews to Newcastle, 4th July, 1860. 
p. n 
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post as Civil Commandant in Accra. Several charges were 
made against Freeman in order to justify this step, but 
Andrews' chief grievance against him as a public officer was 
that he had too many grandiose schemes which Andrews had neither 
(1) 
the inclination nor the means to carry out. In the same 
year, the people of Labadi sent a note to Andrews to say that 
they could look after themselves and did not want British 
(2) 
protection. Ada adopted a similar attitude. Jurisdiction 
over the whole of the Eastern Districts therefore practically 
came to an end. 
Officials in the Colonial Office, rather bewildered 
by this recital of names and places, were disposed to acquiesce 
in the withdrawal of protection. As Elliot remarked: 
"... Gold Coast affairs are very perplexing. In order 
to form any confident opinion, one ought to have a knowledge 
which it is almost impossible to possess in London of the 
character of the numerous obscure tribes living in that Country. 
The result has been, I suspect, that in point of fact, our 
influence has varied from time to time with the qualifications 
of the individual who has happened to administer the 
Government ... ". (3) 
British influence over the Eastern Districts remained 
negligible for the next five years. Had it not been for the 
distraction of the Ashanti war in 1863, however, Governor 
Richard Pine would have liked to repair the fort at Keta and 
(1) 00/96/48, no. 9726, Andrews to Newcastle, 31st Aug., 1860. 
Vide also CO/96/54, no. 10,021, Andrews to Newcastle, 9th Oct.; 
1861. 
(2) 00/96/47, no. 8066, Andrews to Newcastle, 23rd June, 1860, 
(3) CO/96/49, minute on no. 8069 by Elliot, 25th Aug., 1860. 
ýý-: { 
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station troops there. He told the Secretary of State that 
some slave-trading was reputed to take place from Kota. 
It was also alleged that the Ashantis obtained supplies of 
arms from their friends the Awunas on the coast, and during 
the war this made it still more desirable that the Government 
resume control. But the district was unruly, and Pine would 
(1) 
not risk reoccupation with a force of less than 100 troops. 
In the same year, a body known as the "African Aid Society". 
with Lord Alfred Churchill, M. P. as chairman, also urged the 
Colonial Office to look to the protection of legitimate 
(2) 
commerce at Kota. Yet Gold Coast funds were too limited 
to allow for the cost of repairs to the fort. 'Moreover, 
such a large number of troops at one station presupposed a 
much greater force on the Gold Coast than the Imperial 
(3) 
Government was prepared to sanction. Even the Admiralty 
failed to persuade the Colonial Office that control of Kota 
(1) CO/96 60, no. 5574, Pine to Newcastle, 7th May, 1863; 
and CO 96/65, nos. 9309 and 10,335, Pine to Cardwell, 9th Sep% 
and 12th Oct., 1864. 
(2) CO/96/63, nos. 5552/A, 5553/A, 10,883/A and ll, 148A. 
The Colonial office was irritated by the "lofty tone' of 
this Society's communications and would have ignored them 
had they not been written under Lord A. Churchill's auspices. 
1 
(3) C0/96 60, minute on no. 5574 by Elliot, 13th June, 1863; 
and 00/96/63, minutes on no. 1999/WO by Fortescue and 
Newcastle, 26th and 28th Feb., 1863. There had recently 
been a Select Committee on military expenditure. 
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(1) was necessary. Elliot was sceptical of a measure that 
would involve so much expense: 
"When we have (occupied Keta) ... the slave dealers will doubtless move to some other place which it will then be 
represented as equally desirable that we should occupy... " (2) 
"We shall soon end by conquering all Africa, and holding 
all Africa, and converting all Africa to our views on the 
reorganization of labour". (3) 
The news that Lima, the principal slave dealer in Awuna, was 
dead provided an excuse to delay the occupation of Kota, and 
the Colonial Office was not moved by the report that one 
(4) 
Giraldo had taken Lima's placed 
sided with the Colonial Office. 
Obligingly, the War Office 
An officer sent to investigate 
in 1864 wrote that the slave trade and the smuggling of arms 
were greatly exaggerated, and that in äny case, the Navy was 
inna much better position to deal with these and other 
(5) 
practices which tended to interfere with legitimate trade. 
The export of slaves may be said to have ended just at this 
time with the collapse of the transatlantic market and the 
growth of the palm oil trade. 
Nevertheless, disturbances along the Volta and at 
(1) CO/96/66, in no. 450/Admiralty. 
(2) 00/96/64, minute on no. 1143, by Elliot, 13th Feb., 1864. 
(3) 00/96/66, minute by Elliot on no. 450/Admiralty, 18th Jan., 
18 64. 
(4) 00/96/64, no. 1143, Pine to Newcastle, 6th Jan., 1864, 
and enclosure. 
(5) CO/96/66, no. 6239/WVO. 
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its mouth continued. So also did the merchants' appeals 
for protection. In May, 1865, the Commander of one of 
Her Majesty's ships called at Ada in response to one such 
request. He noted that Ada was growing in importance, both 
for its salt which was carried north, and for the palm oil 
sent down the Volta from Kpong. But the Awunas on the 
opposite bank were rivals both in the salt and the palm oil 
trade. Giraldo the slave dealer had taken to legitimate trade, 
(1) 
and it was he whom the European merchants held chiefly 
responsible for the seizures of oil and interruptions of trade 
on the Volta, and the plundering of European factories at Keta. 
British authority was held in contempt by the Awunas. First 
professing ignorance of the existence of a European Government 
on the Gold Coast, they later admitted to the Naval officer 
that they had heard of the Government; but they recognized 
no restrictions which it might seek to impose on them. Out 
of convenience, the Adas, who had four years previously 
rejected British protection, were prepared to accept it in 1865. 
The reason for their change of heart was that the hostility 
between Adas and Awunas had come to open conflict. On their 
(1) The factories at Ada in 1865 were managed by: 
Mr. J. Ungar, European agent for Messrs. Victor, of Bremen" 
H. L. Rottman and Co., (formerly agent for the Bremen firmj; 
the agent of H. C. Mayer, of Accra; 
W. P. Gunnell, a European agent of Swanzy; 
J. L. Clayton, European agent of Forster and Smith; and 
W. G. Bruce, probably an African. 
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part, the merchants advised the Government to use force against 
the Awunas. Such action, followed by the capture of Giraldo, 
they recommended as the only means of restoring trade and 
(1) 
order, But the Ashanti war had'ended, and the Parliamentary 
Committee of Inquiry in 1865 had issued its report. The 
Secretary of State had accordingly forbidden interference in 
tribal quarrels, and Parliament had decided against any 
(2) 
extension of responsibility. 
This policy of non-intervention was also applied 
further inland. Merchants complained that trade was hampered 
in the interior and again the Awunas were said to be the 
culprits. The Awunas were ih alliance with the Akwamus. 
Between them, if left to themselves, these people could control 
the entire Volta trade. Colonel Ord had reported on the 
Volta disturbances in 1865, and he had confirmed the opinion 
of the Colonial office that it was inexpedient to worry about 
(3) 
distant parts of the Gold Coast. The Report of the 
parliamentary Committee in 1865 made the decision conclusive. 
But the Colonial Office was gradually to alter this rule on 
non-interference; not from choice, but because events on the 
Gold Coast resolved the issue in opposition to instructions 
(1) CO/96/67, no., 7691, Mockler to Cardwell, 12th July, 1865, 
and enclosures. 
(2) Vide Chapter I, pp. 67 and 75-76. 
(3) CO/96/69, in no. 7691/Admiralty. 
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from London. Locally, the Government could not resist the 
pressure from the merchants, who insisted on interference to 
guard British interests. Still objecting to. ýadditional 
responsibility, the Colonial Office was bound to acquiesce, 
and ultimately, in 1873, to take the lead in protecting 
British trade. 
The end of the period of withdrawal initiated by 
Andrews in 1861 came in 1866, when Colonel Conran reported a 
complaint from the Accra merchants that there was a complete 
stoppage of trade in the Eastern Districts. The Awunas had 
been at war for the last two years with the Adas and their 
allies the Accras, assisted by some Krobos and Akwapims. 
So successful were the xxxE Awunas that they were 
plundering traders throughout the Volta districts and diverting 
all produce from Accra and Pram Pram to their Volta base at (1) 
Mlefi, whence it was carried down the river to Awuna ports. 
Major Blackall, Governor-in-Chief of the West African 
Settlements after the reorganization of the administration in 
1866, wrote unsympathetically from Sierra Leone about the 
merchants who clamoured for protection. He maintained that: 
"These quarrels are generally caused by the jealousy of 
Traders who will go into the interior to 'get behind' each 
other. In places where we have no British Government as at 
whydah and the Bonny, produce is brought down by the Natives 
(1) CO/96/70, no. 3451, Conran to Cardwell, 10th March, 1866. 
(2) Vide Chapter III, lop. 167-168. 
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to the Shipping Port, and if plundered on the way, the loss 
is to the Natives, but at the Gold Coast, Gambia, and even 
here (Sierra Leone) the Merchants go into the interior and 
expect British protection in carrying their property through 
a hostile country". (1) 
Administrator Conran amplified the position. He explained 
that: 
"The Native traders employed by the larger Merchants in 
distant and out of the way parts, cause this kind of Invasion 
on the part of those who differ and dispute points of trade 
with them, which, as a natural result ends in the suspension 
of commerce altogether when the Government at last is expected 
to open it again, a rule that has been followed on this Coast 
for many years back, which has led many petty traders to think 
that wherever they may establish a grog shop there also should 
be a detachment of Soldiers to protect them", (2) 
Conran knew that the Colonial Office disapproved 
of interference. Yet he risked censure by yielding to the 
merchants' entreaties and undertaking an expedition to 
restore peace and protect their trade in the Eastern Districts. 
The Awunas had burnt Kpong at the beginning of 1866 and were 
about to attack Ada when Conran decided in February to act. 
He set off for Ada with four officers and 50 men, and a 
(5) 
warship was detailed to guard the town from the sea. Among 
those Accras who wished to assist him, he distributed arms 
and ammunition, paid for by the mercantile community, and 
N. 
Mr. 4Irvine, then principal agent of Forster and Smith, took 
(1) CO/96/71, no. 6585, Blackall to Cardwell, 20th June, 1866. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 4548, Conran to Cardwell, 10th April, 1866, 
(3) CO/96/70, no. 3451. 
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charge of a division of levies drawn from Accra, Krobo and 
(1) 
Akwapim. But the Awunas simply moved north to Mief 1, where, 
together with their Akwamu allies, they continued to seize 
(2) 
palm oil as it came down the river. Conran renewed his 
exertions to protect European interests, and in April, he 
reported that the enemy had been dispersed and that the Volta 
would soon be open for trade. Thereafter, the Administrator 
proposed to tell the merchants that they would receive no more 
protection from the Government. He could not help remarking 
on the lack of enthusiasm among the Africans for the 
Government cause: 
"It is my duty ... to bring to your Notice that in Wars 
of this kind, emanating between Merchants and Native traders 
on the Volta and other remote parts of the protectorate in 
petty quarrels about Palm oil, and the like - the natives to 
the extent of 9 to 10 have the greatest objection to take up 
arms in what they call the white mants palaver, in which 
reasoning I am open to confess that there is some truth". (3) 
But Conran's hope of peace for the Eastern Districts 
was not fulfilled. Although the Awunas had been driven across 
the river, and the Akwamus sent northwards, troubles continued. 
In May, the merchants again asked for help. At first Conran 
refused. He had been instructed not to take part in "traders' 
(4) 
quarrels". This quarrel arose from the resentment felt 
(1) CO/96/71, no. 4548. 
(2) CO/96/70, no. 3451. 
(3) CO/96/71, no. 4548. 
(4) Ibid., enclosure, Conran to Blackall, 9th June, 1866. 
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by the European merchants at Ada at Giraldo's success in the 
palm. -oil trade. Like their fellows at Porto Novo some years (1) 
before, Europeans wanted this trade to be in their hands 
Conran 
only. " But he could not resist the arguments advanced by 
the: merchants. Five months later he went to Dzelukofe to 
make terms with the Awunas. They declared that they wanted 
only to be left in peace, though they refused to listen to 
Conran's demands: that they should compensate the Adas for 
damage caused during the recent war, and that they should 
surrender Giraldo to the Government. For the moment, the 
Administrator was unable to take any action in the Eastern 
(2) 
Districts, and he took no notice of the merchants' cry, 
at the end of 1866, that they would be ruined completely 
unless the Government protected their trade. Though he could 
not act himself, Conran nevertheless proposed to ask one of 
Her Majesty's ships to bombard Awuna from the sea. This 
(3) 
might be punishment enough. 
When Lord Carnarvon, then Secretary of State, read 
the dispatch on the proposed punishment of Awuna, his 
confusion showed itself in displeasure. Neither he nor most 
of the other officials in the Colonial Office had a clear 
(1) Vide supra, p. 86. 
(2) Vide Chapter III, pp. 178-182. Conran was occupied with 
King Aggery. 
(3) 00/96/72, no. 989, Blackall to Carnarvon, 26th Dec., 1866 
and enclosure, Conran to Blackall, 3rd Dec., 1866, and 
enclosured petition. 
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conception of affairs in the Eastern Districts. The 
Committee of Parliament had lately recommended that the 
Government withdraw from its engagements. Yet, a year 
afterwards, the Administrator talked of a hostile movement 
against a tribe of whose very existence Carnarvon had been 
quite oblivious. Groping for an explanation, he asked: 
"Who are these Ahwooahs? at have been their relations 
with us? What shall we gain by attacking them? Are they 
known to have interfered with us, or is it only a quarrel 
between them and another equally barbarous tribe? " (1) 
(2) 
The memorandum of Sir George Barrow, Senior Clerk in the 
Colonial Office, recounting British relations with the Awunas 
since 1850, and stressing their unruliness, did not convince 
(3) 
him. Carnarvon ordered the Administrator to be told that 
there existed no justification for armed intervention. 
Further, he issued a "positive instruction" that no hostilities 
should be undertaken against the Awunas without the express i4) 
sanction of the Secretary of State. 
The merchants, however, persisted in calling for 
Government action. Visiting the Gold Coast in May, 1867, 
Governor Blackall found that they wanted the Government either 
to burn all the coastal towns east of the Volta, or to blockade 
(1) Ibid., minute by Carnarvon, 5th Feb., 1867. 
(2) Barrow entered the Colonial Office in 1825. He was 
appointed Senior Clerk in 1843, and Chief Clerk in 1870. 
He retired in 1872. 
(3) 
(4) 
Ibid., minute by Barrow, 8th Feb., 1871. 
Ibid., minute by Carnarvon, 9th Feb., 1871. 
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the whole coast from the Volta eastwards to Grand Popo, to 
ensure that the entire volume of trade from the hinterland 
came west of the river. Blackall called at Dzelukofe in the 
hope of obtaining a more balanced picture of the situation on 
the river. There the Awuna Chiefs gave quite a different (1) 
version of the Volta disputes from that of the Accra merchants. 
It was impossible for him to reach a satisfactory conclusion. 
He therefore cautioned the Awunas to stop interrupting trade, 
indicating that if they continued, Her Majesty's ships would 
bombard their towns. He told the merchants not to expect 
protection for their trade on the river, but he wrote to the 
Secretary of State that it might yet be necessary to punish 
(2) 
the Awunas as the merchants wished. 
At the beginning of 1867, trade began to improve. 
Large quantities of oil were brought to Accra for export, but 
the change seemed to have been brought about by an enforced 
rise in the price offered to the producers, because Accra (3) 
merchants complained of the high price of oil. They 
apparently come to realise that to raise the price was the 
only way of fighting the Trans-Volta competition. Mr. Ussher, 
who succeeded Conran as Administrator, was anxious to promote 
(1) Unfortunately Blackall does not say what the different 
versions were. 
(2) CO/96/74, no. 5402, Blackall to Buckingham, 6th May, 1867. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 6411, Ussher to Blackall, 4th June, 1867. 
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peace between the two rivals at the mouth of the Volta. This 
might induce more orderly commerce along the river for the 
benefit of the merchants at Ada, who might then trade without 
fear of plunder, He began by commanding the King of Jamestown, 
Kujo, and Taki, the King of Dutch Accra, to return to Accra 
immediately with their retainers. For a year, this force 
of Accras had been encamped at Ada, making reprisals against 
the Awanas. Ussher thought that peace could never be 
concluded while an enemy force menaced Awuna from the opposite 
bank of the river. He threatened to outlaw Kujo and to 
(l) 
suspend him from his duties as King in case of disobedience. 
But the Accras paid no attention to the Administrator. 
Although they were disinclined to take part in a "white man's 
palaver", they had their own scores to settle with the Awunas, 
and they intended to do so in their own time. The 
Administrator suspected that some Accra merchants were 
encouraging them in their defiant attitude; and, since the 
Accras refused to listen, he proclaimed Kujo an outlaw in 
June, 1867, The Dutch Governor co-operated by taking similar 
(2) 
action against Taki. 
(1) Ibid. This threat to Kujo is one of the earliest indicat- 
ions of the confusion among Europeans of the office of "King" 
among the Ga people with that of the Akans. Among the 
former, the military leader was quite distinct from the civil 
and religious leader, so that it was meaningless to talk of 
suspending Kujo from his duties as King. But the confusion 
has persisted. Vide Field, M. J: Social Organisation of 
the Ga People. 
(2) CO/96/74, nos. 6865 and 7523, Ussher to Blackall, 19th June, 
and Ussher to Yonge, lst July, 1867. 
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To restore British influence in the interior, 
" Ussher availed himself of the servic es of Mr. Freeman, (1) 
, restored to favour since his disgrace in 1860. In June, 
. 1867,: Freeman went on a mission through the Eastern Districts. 
One of his duties was to recognize the new King of Akwapim in 
the name of the Government. Mile he was in Akropong, 
Freeman persuaded the King to confirm the Christian headmen 
nominated by the Basle missionaries for mixed Christian and 
.. pagan communities. 
Another important task was to negotiate 
(3) 
a formal treaty of peace with the King of Akwamu. Two 
small communities on the Volta below Kpong, the Dofos and 
;. Volos, owed allegiance to Akwamu, though they themselves were (4) 
;: Krepis. These people were said to be mainly responsible 
for the disturbances leading to stoppage of trade on the 
upper reaches of the river, just as the Awunas, with whom they 
were allied, were the ringleaders on the lower reaches. It 
seemed that the Dofos and Volos were rivalled in their 
activities by an armed band of marauders, including some Accras, 
led by a Chief of Akim Kotoku, named Dompro. This band was 
(1) Vide supra, pp. 123-124. 
(2) cf. Similar policy in the Western Districts, Chapter III, 
pp" 1 33- 5. 
(3) CO/96/74, no. 7526, Ussher to Yonge, 6th July, 1867, 
(4) These people appear to have come to the Volta every year 
to fish, the rights being hired out to them by the 
Osuduku community on the right bank of the river. 
Vide Field, M. J: The Osuduku State Report, 3ept., 1939, 
in D. C. Is office, A kose. 
- 137 - 
lodged on the west bank of the river, and engaged in plunder in 
competition with the Dofos and Volos on the east bank. 
Freeman was to order Dompre to withdraw, and to bind the King 
(1) 
of Akwamu to restrain the Dofos and Volos. 
But funds in the Government treasury were low, and 
missions to the interior costly. Ussher could allow Freeman 
to stay inland only for 22 days. The merchants of Accra, 
however, seeing that their advantage lay in the success of the 
mission, generously subscribed enough money to enable Freeman 
to stay until his objects were accomplished. One European 
(2) 
merchant, Mr. Rottman, even accompanied him on his journey. 
After more than two months of travelling in the Eastern 
Districts, Freeman reported the attainment of his goal; a 
treaty of "Peace, Amity and Commerce" had been signed by the 
King of Akwamu. The Colonial Office declared itself satisfied 
with this result. Merely providing for British arbitration 
in African quarrels, the treaty did not involve an extension 
(3) 
of responsibility. In November, a similar treaty was 
concluded between the Awunas, Adas and the Government. 
(1) CO/96/74, no. 9682, Ussher to Yonge, 6th 3ept. ý 1867, 
and enclosures. 
(2) Ibid., enclosures. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 10,739, Ussher to Yonge, 25th Sept., 1867; 
and minute by Elliot, 11th Nov., 1867. 
(4) CO/96/76, no. 3732, Ussher to Kennedy, 22nd Feb., 1868. 
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These treaties were the first in a series of paper 
agreements. Three months later, Ussher wrote that disorder 
(1) 
on the Volta had not abated. Throughout 1868 Ussher could 
(2) 
not leave the Western Districts. But towards the end of 
that year, Sir Arthur Kennedy, Governor-in-Chief, paid a 
visit to the Gold Coast, and evolved a plan for establishing 
peace which would at the same time guarantee protection for 
British trade. He decided to see whether the River Volta 
was navigable for any distance by steam launch. If the river 
proved navigable,. the Government could keep it free of 
marauders, and Europeans could carry goods and produce up and 
down the river without fear of being molested, thus realizing 
their ambition to penetrate the interior. Cheap water 
(3) 
transport would also be an inestimable boon for trade. 
Indeed, some seven years earlier, Governor Andrews had 
(4) 
ascended the river in a steamer for the same purpose. 
There was much amusement in the Colonial Office at the thought 
of Andrews turned traveller, and particularly at his notion 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Vide Chapter III0 pp. 187-203. Ussher had to contend 
with the Fanti Confederacy, and its war against the Dutch 
which arose out of the exchange of forts. 
(3) CO/96/77, no. 13,625, Kennedy to Buckingham, i/i N-, j-, 186$" 
(4) CO/96/55, no. 11,087, Andrews to Newcastle, 11th Nov., 1861. 
The Agricultural Society was still in existence at this 
time, though Andrews said that it showed no interest in the 
possibilities of Volta trade. 
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that the Volta was a tributary of the Niger. As Andrews 
was hardly able to cope with the ordinary duties of 
administration, the Secretary of State forbade him to embark 
(1) 
on any further exploration. His achievement was 
subsequently forgotten. Witnesses before the 1865 Committee 
spoke of the river as totally unsuited for navigation except 
(2) 
by canoe. 
Kennedy's venture was therefore regarded as a 
pioneer attempt. The Governor took with him Captain John 
Glover, Administrator of Lagos, who had experience of river 
navigation. They crossed the bar of the Volta in the Lagos 
steamer towards the end of November and spent about 12 days 
on the river, though they did not go higher than Battor 
(or Battoh). As a fitting conclusion to his exploit, Kennedy 
managed to induce the Adas and Awunas to sign a second peace 
(3) 
treaty. In this, Kennedy was nearly foiled by the 
machinations of Giraldo. Instigated by other merchants along 
the Awuna coast, Giraldo endeavoured to bribe the Awuna Chiefs 
"with a villainous Hamburgh compound called 'Gin" to reject 
the a8reement, fearing that it would result in the imposition 
(1) Ibid., minutes. 
(2) of. P. P. V, 1865, avid. qq. 10,574 and 10,592. 
(3) 00/96/77, no. 27, Kennedy to Buckingham, 3rd Dec. ', 1868. 
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(1) of customs duties at Aivuna ports. The tariff at other 
Gold Coast ports had been raised in 1868 after the exchange 
(2) of forts between the Dutch and British Governments. The 
treaty, however, entailed no rights of jurisdiction for the 
British Government, and Kennedy hoped that his voyage up the 
river would lead to stricter observance of this engagement than 
that of 1867. 
But Kennedy's treaty was also disregarded. No 
vessel entered the river after his departure, and the Volta 
remained closed to European traders. Not until 1869 did the 
merchants find in the head of the local Government an agent 
to carry out a vigorous policy aimed at controlling the 
middlemen so that they themselves could reach the inland 
markets. This man was Mr. W. H. Simpson, who acted as 
Administrator while Ussher was on leave from October, 1868 to 
October, 1869. Simpson arrived at a crucial period in Gold 
Coast affairs. In itself, the knowledge that the river was 
navigable opened a new phase in the drive to establish Bii tish 
commerce in the interior. Again, trade was expanding rapidly. 
The formation of a second steamship company in 1869 led to 
(3) 
a further decrease in freight rates, and many new concerns, 
European(4)and African, entered the field. Intensified 
(1) CO/96/79, in no. 1824.. Lawson to Kennedy, 17th Dec., 1868. 
Lawson, an African from Little Popo, was Kennedy's interpreter. 
(2) Vide Chapter III, p. 187. 
(3) Vide McPhee, op. cit., p. 71 and note 1. 
(4) The best known and most long-lived was Miller Bros. 
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competition made for greater disorder and louder cries for 
protection; and the resistance of the middlemen to the 
encroachment of Europeans on their monopolies grew stronger. 
There was also another development at this time, which was 
more obvious in the Western Districts, though it might easily 
spread. This was the desire of many Africans, and 
particularly that of educated Africans, to shake off British 
(1) 
control, maintaining only trade relations with Europeans. 
Should this movement succeed, Africans would effectually bar 
the interior to British and other European merchants. 
Just at this moment, Ashanti entered the arena in 
the Eastern Districts. In the north, the Ashanti Kingdom 
had precisely the same desire as the European merchants on 
the coast - to eliminate the middlemen tribes between Ashanti 
and the sea. 'While the merchants wished the Government to 
control these middlemen, Ashanti aimed to conquer and absorb 
them. In 1868, the Ashantis were brought into a conflict 
which gave them a chance of realizing their ambition. Akwamu 
demanded that Peki again acknowledged Akwamu sovereignty. 
When the Pekis refused, Akwamu called on Ashanti to help 
subdue them. The King of Ashanti, Kofi Kakari, thereupon sent 
Adu Bofo, one of his generals, to conduct the war, with the 
object of acquiring dominion over Peki and Krepi and reaching 
(1) Vide Chapter III, pp. 187-199. 
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the sea through Awuna, which was friendly with Ashanti and 
Akwamu. Unable to resist the Ashantis and Akwamus alone, 
Peki and Krepi sought aid from Akim Kotoku, whose King was at 
loggerheads with Ashanti. This King accordingly delegated 
his Chief, Dompr 6, who had gone to the Volta region for trade, 
(1) 
to fight the enemy. 
The war in Krepi had started when Simpson reached 
the Eastern Districts early in 1869. At once he grasped the 
situation: if the Ashantis were not checked, they would 
overrun the whole of the Volta districts and the river would 
be lost for European trade. Moreover, Government influence 
was so weak in those parts, that even tribes within the 
British Protectorate might well transfer their allegiance to 
the victorious Ashantis. He determined to restore British 
authority. Simpson had a forceful personality, coupled with 
the ability to make a quick decision and the energy to carry 
it out. He was also sufficiently daring to take no heed of 
orders from Sierra Leone or from London; for he saw that if 
he did not make use of his opportunities as they occurred, 
his advantage would be lost. In March, he made a long 
journey from Accra northwards, meeting the principal Kings and 
Chiefs on the way, and exhorting them to stand firm with the 
Government against Ashanti. His end was Akwamu. There he 
(1) CO/96/79, nos. 3713 and 4979, Simpson to Kennedy, 
2nd March, and 22nd March, 1869. 
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hoped to conclude a treaty which would detach Akwamu from 
its Ashanti alliance. He spoke also of proceeding to Krepi 
to disentangle the quarrels there and help make peace with 
Ashanti. Then he intended to return to Ada, from which place, 
accompanied by as many merchants and their goods as he could 
muster, he proposed to ascend the river "in some state" as 
far asCKong, thus formally opening the Volta for European 
trade. 
But Simpson went no further than Akwamu. After a 
hostile reception, he was for three days virtually kept 
prisoner. He found that his arguments, designed to bring the 
Akwamus "to a sense of their real position", as conceived by 
the Government, left them unmoved. They did not agree that 
they were "sacrificing their own liberty to secure a paltry 
revenge- over the Crepees't; nor were the Akwamus disposed, 
at Simpson's behest, 
"to check at the outset the progress of a feeling of 
subservience to the Ashantis which could only result in 
handing over to them the whole District East of the Volta". 
As a gesture, they added their signatures to the treaty 
Simpson flourished before them. At the same time, they told 
him that they were merely awaiting the arrival of reinforcements 
from Ashanti before making a fresh attack on Krepi. The 
. 
Administrator also heard that several Awunas had come norti 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 3713. 
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to help their allies; and that, were it not for Dompre's 
efforts, the whole of Krepi would long since have been 
(1) 
subjected to Ashanti. 
Convinced that unless the Government took instant 
action against the Ashantis, they would conquer the Volta 
districts, Simpson hurriedly returned to the coast and began 
to execute his plans. That these were directly opposed to 
the declared policy of non-intervention laid down by the 
Colonial Office, did not deter him. It might soon be too 
late to retrieve the British posit-ion. He issued large 
quantities of arms and ammunition to Dompro and to the King of 
Akim Abuakwa, who had sent to Accra for supplies, and urged 
this King to join the Government against Ashanti. Then he 
sought to gain allies among the Accras. To King Taki he 
gave a handsome present. This was designed to demonstrate 
. 
'the willingness of the Government to afford substantial 
aid to those who render a loyal and faithful obedience to its 
requirements". (2) 
Writing to the King of Peki, Simpson urged him to continue 
the struggle. Couched in lyrical terms, his letter ran: 
"(The Ashantis) come but to plunder and enslave ... I to civilize and assist in the ways of peace and to encourage trade 
and industry and to promote without one selfish thought the 
unity, freedom, and prosperity of all who-care for and are 
entitled to the Protection of the British flag. 
Satisfied of your loyalty, you shall be first King in 
Crepee". (3) 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 4979. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid., enclosure, Simpson to Peki, 21st March, 1869. This 
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On the other hand, Simpson sent a peremptory message 
(1) 
to the Awunas, ordering their withdrawal to the coast; and 
for the Ashantis Simpson considered that nothing less than an 
ultimatum would suffice. Demanding the immediate retirement 
of all Ashantis from Krepi, Simpson told the King that the 
British Government intended to give the Krepis every assistance. 
He asserted, to the amazement of the Colonial Office, that 
aggression against Krepi was aggression against Britain also, 
since the Government not only had rights of protection over all 
the territory to the east of the Volta, but that this territory 
was actually British soil. Ashanti hostility would therefore 
be met with swift and decisive punishment. Unequivocally, 
ii 
he explained the concern of the Government over the Volta regionz 
"The Value of this River for Commercial purposes has only 
lately been brought into forcible notice and the interest taken 
and control exercised by my Government in the affairs of these 
Eastern Districts have in an equal measure revived and will not 
again be suffered to abate". (2) 
Should the Ashanti answer be unsatisfactory, Simpson proposed 
to order the advance of some thousands of allies, led by a 
British officer. Their object would be to clear the river of 
Dofos, Volos and Akwamus, and to repulse the Ashantis in Krepi. 
He wrote to Sir Arthur Kennedy: 
(1) Ibid., enclosure, Simpson to Awuna, 13th March, 1869. 
(2) Ibid., enclosure 5, Simpson to Ashanti, 8th March, 1869. 
sz 
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"I have not the slightest hesitation in stating my 
conviction that unless and until the Aquamoos, Dofoes and 
Voloes are driven away or destroyed or compelled by the display 
or exercise of force to submit to British authority, there will 
never be peace on the Volta, and that river will never be 
safe from the interruption of its navigation onýt the most 
paltry pretext and its trade embarrassed by the&, '-interminable 
and vexatious depredations". (1) 
But before he could take any further action, he was obliged to 
(2) 
return to Cape Coast, where he stayed until the end of May. 
News of Simpson's plans and actions caused much 
consternation in the Colonial Office. His bluster seemed 
unjustifiable and dangerous. Sir Frederick Rogers was 
puzzled by the Administrator's attitude towards Ashanti: 
"I cannot see why we should attempt to thwart the 
Ashantees in carrying out their traditional policy of reaching 
the sea by the Valley of the Volta. It seems to me a very 
sensible policy, just the thing which is most likely to 
civilize them and bring them under our influence, commercial 
and military". (3) 
Lord Granville, the Secretary of State, was annoyed as well as 
bewildered. He authorized a dispatch, sent in May, severely 
censuring Simpson. His communications to the Chiefs and to 
Ashanti were calculated to draw Britain into disputes in the 
interior; and, in case of war, Britain would have to bear 
the burden. Simpson was to withdraw his promises of aid to 
(1) Ibid., Simpson to Kennedy, 22nd March, 1869. 
(2) Vide Chapter III, pp. zo3 -5. 
(3) CO/96/79, minute on nos. 4979 and 4987 by Rogers, 
4th May, 1869, 
y 
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friendly tribes and to make them understand that 
a... the wars in which they engage themselves are their 
wars, not the wars of this country ... (and that) the British Government is unable to make itself responsible for their 
defence in case they should prove unable to defend themselves". 
Only Simpson's "zeal and intelligence" saved him from instant 
recall for his fla, rant disregard of British policy, But 
the dispatch added that there was no need to dispel any 
misapprehensions caused in the mind of the King of Ashanti 
(1) 
by Simpson's proceedings. 
On his return to Accra in May, Simpson reported the 
progress of events. Awuna had sent an uncompromising reply 
(2) 
to Simpson's letter, while the King of Ashanti had ignored 
the Government's ultimatum, and Ashanti troops continued to 
pour into Akwamu and Krepi. Some hundreds of Awunas were at 
Mlefi, assisting their friends the Dofos and Volos. But 
Simpson was heartened by Pekits expressed determination to 
resist the Ashantis, and by the knowledge that Government aid 
had made it possible for Dompre to assemble about four thousand 
men under arms. The Administrator therefore sent additional 
supplies to Dompr6 so that he could increase his force; and 
on his own account, Simpson issued arms to the Krobos, 
enjoining them to defend their lands. A small number of 
(1) 
(2) 
ibid., draft reply, Granville to Kennedy, 17th May, 1869. 
Loc. cit., in no. 4979, Awuna to Simpson, 18th March, 1869. 
-- 
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(1) Accras were also persuaded to join Dompre. 
Though the Colonial Office still viewed Simpson's 
policy with misgivings, Rogers admitted in July that having 
committed himself, the Administrator was uite right to follow (2) 
up the advantage of his previous actions. But Lord 
Granville made the laconic comment that the British Government 
was "clearly drifting into war" unless Simpsonºs "game of brag" 
succeeded; and again he forbade the local Government to use 
(3) 
any British troops in the event. 
Simpson hastened to explain, in reply to Granville's 
censure, that he had never meant to use British troopse it 
had been his intention to establish British paramountcy over 
the Eastern Districts so that all the tribes would oböy his 
call to rise against the Ashantis. He also wished to impress 
on these tribes that they could not take up arms against each 
other at will. Only when British authority was supreme would 
(4) 
disturbances on the Volta cease. Sir Arthur Kennedy, 
defending his subordinate, assured Granville that the "war" 
in the Eastern Districts was really a series of skirmishes 
carried on by marauding parties for the sake of plunder. He 
was convinced that peace would result if the Colonial Office 
(1) CO/96/80, no. 7332, Simpson to Kennedy, 20th May, 1869. 
(2) Ibid., minute by Rogers, 1st July, 1869, 
(3) Ibid., minute by Granville, 22nd July, 1869. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 8644, Simpson to Kennedy, 19th June, 1869, 
__ i' 
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placed a steamer permanently on the Volta to keep it open for 
(1) 
trade. This consent, however, the Colonial office refused. 
An Admiralty report gave no grounds for extending protection 
to the river or east of it, and pointed out that there was no 
danger to the Protectorate if the Ashantis kept to the east 
bank of the Volta. Moreover, there were as yet no British 
subjects at Keta; the Germans who were trading there had no 
(2) 
claim on Britain. 
Following Granville's disapproval, Simpson had to 
check his course, though it was contrary to his inclinations. 
As if silently reproachful of the restraint imposed on him by 
the Secretary of State, Simpson reported the results of his 
inactivity. Domprd wrote that he had been defeated, while 
the Basle missionaries feared that if he were not helped soon 
he would have to succumb. At the same time, they strongly 
advised the Administrator to lead the Krobos in an attack on 
the enemy, for they seemed reluctant to do so without Government 
support. In Accra, Kings Kojo and Taki were extremely 
unwilling to advance unless the Government subsisted them. 
Then, at the end of June, news came that the Ashantis had 




(2) CO/96/82, in no. 5254/Admiralty. The Bremen factory of 
Messrs. Victor was mentioned and also that of Messrs. Holland, 
Jacques and Co. Vide 00/96/79, in no. 4979, Paulus Dahse 
to Simpson, 16th March, 1869. There were at this time 
about 60-70 German subjects, (probably missionaries are 
included in this number) trading at Accra. Vide 00/96/80, 
in no. 9401, German Consul at Lagos to Glover, 17th July, 1869. 
- 150 - 
destroyed Anum across the Volta, and had captured some Swiss 
missionaries. These were the Rev. and Mrs. Ramseyer and 
their child, and Mr. Kühne. Shortly afterwards, a French 
(1) 
trader, M. Bonnat, was also taken by the Ashantis. Ho 
and Sokode were among the other towns which had fallen to 
the Ashantis in Krepi, Peki had surrendered, and Dompre himself 
(2) 
had been utterly routed. 
At this time, however, Simpson had to devote himself 
to the Western Districts, a circumstance which restricted his 
(3) 
activities as much as Granville's instructions. He 
affected nonchalance at the turn of events in the Eastern 
Districts. Not particularly concerned about the captive 
missionaries, he said that they could not expect British 
protection wherever they chose to work. Besides, it was 
unlikely that the King of Ashanti would listen to any 
representations on their behalf. For many months past he had 
ignored messages from the coast. As for the Krepis, they 
must simply suffer the consequences of defeat. To Dompro, 
Simpson wrote that he could not offer any more help; if he 
did, he would risk his own position. The Administrator even 
(1) Vide Ramseyer and Ki. hne: Four Years in Ashanti, in which ! 
the captives give their own account of e in As anti and 4iß 
-of their experiences. cý; 
(2) 00/96/80, no. 9400, Simpson to Kennedy, 8th June and 
8th July, 1869, and enclosures. 
(3) Vide Chapter III, po 202-205. 
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tried to prevent a force from Akim Abuakwa going to Dompreis 
(1) 
assistance. 
In view of the serious state of affairs on the 
Gold Coast, the Colonial Office relented sufficiently to ask 
the Admiralty for a warship to watch developments. Granville 
approved the permission given to Simpson by Kennedy to use 
the Lagos steamer if the Ashantis attempted to cross to the 
right bank of the Volta or approached too close to the sea in 
(2) 
Awuna territory. But the Secretary of State was displeased 
when Simpson interpreted this as consent for a permanent 
(3) 
Government vessel on the Volta. 
Meanwhile, merchants and missionaries had not 
ceased to ask for active Government protection. In August, 
Simpson judged that it was high time for him to take the lead 
in the Eastern Districts. Among the many applications from 
the merchants for Government help, one in particular arrested 
his attention. This letter came from the African merchants 
(4) 
in Accra. Simpson replied that the Government could only 
(1) CO/96/80, no. 9400, Kennedy to Simpson, 26th July, 1869; ' 
no. 9401, Kennedy to Granville, 30th July, 1869 and enclosure y 
and C0/96/81, no. 9907, Simpson to Kennedy, 7th and 8th Aug., hfl 
1869, and enclosures. 
(2) Ibid., draft, C. 0. to Admiralty, 20th Sept., 1869. 
(3) Loc. cit. , in no. 11,344, Granville to Kendall, 20th Oct., 18 69. 
(4) Ibid., Simpson to Kendall, 3rd Sept., 1869. The African 
merchants who signed the letter were: W. A. Lutterodt, 
L. Hesse, J. Bannerman, G. F. Cleland, W. Addo and J. E. Richter. 
It is not clear which of them were merchants on their own account, and which were agents. 
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give aid to Chiefs, not to "educated natives" and traders, and 
then onl if an Ashanti invasion of the Protectorate took 
UT place. Nevertheless, Simpson regarded their letter as an 
ominous sign. The Basle missionaries, asking the Government 
to assert its authority before it was too late, had first 
voiced the real issue in the Eastern Districts. If the 
Government did not help the tribes at war with Ashanti, they 
might be entirely overcome, and all hope of merchants or 
missionaries reaching the interior would be lost. But, 
should the tribes succeed resisting the Ashantis without 
Government aid, the need for protection would fall away, and 
Africans would no longer tolerate European interference in 
their affairs. In either case, the Government position was 
(2) 
in danger. 
Simpson was well aware of these alternatives. %bon 
he landed at Accra in September, he discovered his fears well 
founded. The Chiefs in the Eastern Districts, led by African 
traders and other "educated natives« who saw their chance, not 
only of seizing power, but also of retaining the profitable 
trade of the Eastern Districts in their own hands, had just 
begun to act on their own initiative. Since the Government 
(1) Ibid., enclosure. 
(2) 00/96/80, in no. 9400, Rev. Widmann to Civil Commandant, 
Accra, 29th June, 1869. of. similar situation in 
Western Districts. Vide Chapter III. 
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had refused to help them except where they could further its 
own ends, these educated Africans decided to help themselves. 
A "national war", wrote Simpson, "was not only determined on 
but was already in process of execution". Accras, Adas, 
Krobos and Akwapims had resolved to meet the Ashantis without 
Government aid or guidance. Simpson realized that be could 
no longer remain passive. In his own words: 
"It was in the face of these facts that I was called upon 
to determine what answer I should give to the repeated 
applications I had received for Government assistance. In 
forming the resolution I ultimately carried out, the 
considerations which chiefly weighed with me were these. The 
object of the natives was in my judgment justifiable, necessary 
and of sound policy and their ability to execute it was also 
apparent .. o 
The educated natives and traders, however, seeing their 
opportunity to usurp in their own interests the authority and 
control hitherto exercised by the Government over the natives, 
had succeeded in taking the initiative in raising the warlike 
spirit I had witnessed and had boldly subscribed a large sum 
by way of subsidy. If therefore the project should be carried 
to a successful issue they would undoubtedly attain the object 
of their ambition, and by so much as they gained, to that extent 
would the Government lose in local authority ... The Government 
also in refusing aid would be regarded not only as apathetic 
to the interests of the Country, but also as acting a part at 
once exacting and penurious, the charge of using the revenues 
for its own purposes rather than .. * for the public good 
amongst the people through whom it is raised, having been 
freely canvassed of late since the more prosperous state of the 
Colonial Chest has become known. The Missionaries and 
European traders had further as one man come forward to claim 
the assistance of the Government in the Crusade against the 
Ashantee invasion, expressing their belief that the time had 
arrived when, if ever, the country was to be ridded (sic) of 
the foes who had for years ruined their trade and disturbed the 
peace of the country". (1) 
(1) CO/96/81, no. 11,865, Simpson to Kendall, 3rd Oct., 1869. 
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Making a "virtue of n6cessitgll, Simpson decided to 
give as much Government assistance as possible to Dompro, the 
Krepis, and any other enemies of Ashanti who wanted it: 
providing always that they obeyed his orders implicitly. He 
also promised the merchants that their trade would be protected 
by a gunboat on the Volta. Accounting for his actions, he 
pleaded that he was not contravening Colonial Office 





'la general sanction ... so long as the British Government 
remained uncompromised, by being kept clear of all responsibility 
for the results which these (inter-tribal) wars might entail, 
so long as the cause was just in which they engaged themselves, 
and so long as the authority of the Government ... were 
maintained unimpaired ... 
" (1) 
But Simpson failed to relieve the anxiety of the 
Colonial Office about the results of his policy. Granville 
thought his jealousy of African traders quite unnecessary, 
and agreed with Rogers that his actions contradicted his 
statements. It was impossible for the Government to subsidize 
tribes and require absolute obedience from them, at the same 
time disclaiming all responsibility. Moreover, Simpson had no 
right to promise a warship on the Volta. The Admiralty had 
sent a ship to the Gold Coast, not to take part in African wars, 
but to protect British interests. Clearly, the Colonial office 
was not persuaded that Simpson had precisely this object in 
mind. On the contrary, Granville wished Ussher to return to 
(1) Ibid., and enclosures. 
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the Gold Coast before Simpson had time to go any further in 
(1) 
his warlike, and seemingly inexplicable, policy. 
Ussher resumed his duties as Administrator at the 
beginning of November. Simpson acted as Colonial Secretary 
on the Gold Coast for a short time and was then transferred 
elsewhere. Before he left, however, he was able to explain 
in detail both his policy and his aims to his successor. 
Ussher learnt from reports of the Basle missionaries that the 
spirit of enthusiasm for the 'national war's had abated. As 
soon as Simpson had turned it into a Government "Crusade", it 
had obviously become a "white man's palaver", to which people 
in the Eastern Districts had grown indifferent. Again, 
Ussher heard that the Ashantis and Akwamus appeared to be much 
weakened, and he hoped that peace would soon be restored 
(2) 
completely. He joined with Kennedy and the European 
merchants in trying to convince the Colonial Office that a 
steamer on the Volta was essential for peace. Many British 
merchants, Ussher wrote, were anxious to settle at Ada, which 
had become one of the most important centres for palm oil, but 
they could not risk their property unless they were sure of 
Government protection. There was no doubt that the Volta was 
valuable for trade; Sir Arthur Kennedy lamented that the 
(1) Ibid., minutes by Rogers, 27th Oct., and Granville, 28th Oct., j 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 14054, Kendall to Granville, 9th Nov., 1869, 
and enclosures; and no. 14,033, Kendall to Granville, 3rd Dec.,,, 
1869, and enclosures. f 
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Government's resources were too limited to develop trade and 
extend protection as widely and quickly as the merchants 
desired. 
In April, 1870, there was a renewal of warfare on 
the Volta. The Ashantis drove Dompre as far south as Battor, 
(2) 
while their allies in Awuna were threatening Ada. At 
this stage, in response to repeated requests, Kennedy at last 
authorized Ussher to ascend the Volta with Captain Glover in (3) 
the Lagos steamer, in order to open the river for trade. 
This appeared an excellent opportunity for carrying out 
Simpson's plan, formed in March, 1869, for clearing the Volta 
(4) 
of marauders. In preparation, Ussher conferred with 
Dompre and signed a Convention with him. In it, the 
Government undertook to subsidize him at the rate of £200 a 
year, and in return Dompro was to give the Government every 
assistance, particularly in the forthcoming expedition. On 
payment of Government subsidies, a number of Accras also 
volunteered to take part in the expedition, though Ussher 
suspected that they did so for their own ends, not out of 
(1) Loc. cit. , nos. 1929 and 1935, Ussher to Kennedy, 2nd Jan, 
ý. ' 
and 17th Jan., 1870; no. 5253, Kennedy to Granville, lath 
April, 1870, Ussher to Kennedy, 11th Feb. 1870, and 
enclosed petition from "Native Merchants, Chiefs and Residents, h 
of the Eastern Districts", signed by: W. A. Lutterodt, 
G. F. Cleland, J. Bannerman, W. Addo, T. Cheetham, R. Bruce, 
L. Hesse, R. Bannerman, J. E. Richter, W. J. Cleland, W. D. Briandt, 
J. Mills and J. H. Baddoo. 
(2) C0/96/84, no. 5258, Ussher to Kennedy, 6th April, 1870. 
. +o-1100 g (3) nKennedy to Granville, 11 
(4) Vide supra, pp. 145-146. 
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affection for the administration. Led by Dompro, the Accras 
and any other allies willing to take part were to proceed by 
land and wait for Ussher at a point below Kpong. Ussher and 
Glover proposed to sail up the river to meet the land forces, 
simultaneously attacking and driving off the Dofos and Volos, 
(1) 
Ussher's main objective. 
The Volta expedition took place in June, 1870. 
According to plan, the land and river forces converged upon 
the Dofos and Volos, who were then living on islands in the 
river. No attempt was made to treat with these people. 
Unable to escape from the "terrible effects of European 
projectiles" fired at them from the steamer, they were utterly 
defeated. Ussher did not know how many of them were killed, 
but about 300 women and children were captured. Sir Arthur 
Kennedy wrote a covering dispatch to the Secretary of State, 
emphasizing the value of Ussher's exploit and praising it in 
glowing terms. For the past six years, he said, the Dofos 
and Volos, together with other groups hostile to the Government, 
Ashantis among them, had robbed and murdered traders going up 
and down the river. At length, they had stopped all trade in 
"one of the finest rivers, the high road to the most productive 
country in West Africa". Ussherts achievement would open up, 
the river and the country along its course for British trade 
(1) CO/96/85, no. 9016, Kennedy to Granville, 3rd Aug. 9 1870 and Ussher to Kennedy, 8th July, 1870, 
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(1) without interruption. 
Officials in the Colonial office, however, were 
deeply shocked to read of this "wholesale massacre". Sir 
Frederick Rogers did not think that trade, however valuable, 
was 
.!; worth the disgrace of being party to wars which are thus conducted"; 
and added sarcastically that the expedition would certainly 
evoke the wholehearted approval of the entire mercantile 
community. Lord Kimberley, recently appointed Secretary of 
State, shared these views. He endorsed the opinion of his 
predecessor, Lord Granville, that a steamer on the Volta was 
(2) 
unnecessary. 
Sir Arthur Kennedy again tried to prove to the 
Colonial office that the expedition had been essential, and 
would be justified by its results. Perhaps the Secretary 
of State did not appreciate that 
'the 'Doffoes' and 'Voloest are barbarous and bloodthirsty 
pirates, who lived by plunder alone which their commanding 
position on the River enabled them to. carry on, with 
comparative immunity... 
The alternative lay between punishing these people or 
abandonment of the River, and loss of prestige". 
But Lord Kimberley did not alter his former judgment. Prestige,, 
he observed, was the "usual reason for unnecesary war". (3) 
(1) Ibid., and no. 7886, Kennedy to Granville, 4th July, 1870, 
Ussher to Kennedy, 22nd June, 1870, and Glover to Kennedy, 
22nd June, 1870. 
(2) Ibid., minutes by Rogers, 25th July, and Kimberley, 27th July, 1870, 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 11,107, Kennedy to Kimberley, 20th 8ept., 1870, 
and comment by Kimberley. 
T- 
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The Dofos and Volos were not the only obstacles to 
British trade on the Volta. From Awuna there was an equally 
grave threat. Still under the leadership of Giraldo, the 
Awunas were constantly pillaging traders and interrupting 
the flow of produce to the western bank of the river. In 
July and again in August, Ussher asked permission to punish 
these people; and before he received a reply from the 
Secretary of State, he instructed the Senior Naval Officer to 
warn them to expect bombardment if they persisted in their 
activities. Supporting Ussher, Kennedy told Kimberley 
that Government action against the Awunas would prevent losses 
(2) 
suffered by European traders who entered the river for trade. 
Lord Kimberley, however, did not want another bout of 
"murderous hostilities" for the sake of trade, and he firmly 
(3) 
refused to sanction any measures against Awuna. Meanwhile, 
some of the Awuna Chiefs had visited Kennedy in Sierra Leone, 
begging that the Government leave them in peace. If they 
wanted peace, Ussher maintained, the terms should be laid 
down by the Government, and the first of these should be the 
surrender of Giraldo. The Administrator did not believe 
that peace with the Awunas was possible unless they were 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 9016, Ussher to Kennedy, 8th July; and 
no. 9025, Ussher to Kennedy, 3rd Aug., 1870, and enclosures. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 11,107, 
(3) Loc. cit., draft in no. 9016, Kimberley to Kennedy, 
31st Aug., 1870. 
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(1) compelled by force to obey his orders. 
Ussher was anxious that the good results of the 
Volta expedition should be followed up. Once more he pressed 
for a steamer on the Volta. This would facilitate the 
transport of palm oil, and of palm kernels, for which a demand 
had recently grown up in the European market. Again, he 
hoped the knowledge that merchants traded on the river under 
Government2jrotection would check the aggression of the 
Ash antis. Requests for a steamer had by this time become 
monotonously insistent. In December, 1870, the Colonial 
Office at last gave its guarded consent. Ussher was told 
that the steamer was intended to protect trade only on the 
right bank of the Volta. Although it was hinted that in time 
the Government might gradually bring the Trans-Volta area 
under British jurisdiction, no protection could be guaranteed 
to traders in these parts. The Colonial office was still 
reluctant to extend its responsibilities. Obsessed with 
the need for economy, however, the Colonial Office sought to 
buy a cheap steamer. When their purchase arrived on the 
Gold Coast from England, it was found to be completely 
unserviceable. It remained off Cape Coast and was not used 
on the Volta. 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 11,107, and no. 11,470, Ussher to Kennedy, 
12th Sept., ) 1870. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 12,340, Ussher to Kennedy, 11th Oct., 91870. 
ý3) Ibid., minutes by Kimberley, 2nd Dec., and Rogers, 5th Dec., 
1870. 
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Towards the end of 1870, Ussher reported that the 
Ashantis in Krepi had retired northwards, and that the only 
danger to the Protectorate came from the Awunas. He 
confessed that they were largely provoked by a number of Accras 
under King Taki, who were lodged at Ada and refused to obey 
Ussher's command to return to Accra. Only Kimberley's 
prohibition against the use of force prevented Ussher from 
(1) 
punishing both Taki and the Awunas appropriately, At 
Keta and along the Awuna coast, trade was increasing, though 
no customs duties were collected. To bring this troublesome 
area again under British control, Ussher suggested the 
reoccupation of Keta and the annexation of the Awuna seaboard. 
Ada could also be occupied with advantage. Without such 
measures, Ussher pointed out, the Volta could not be fully 
(2) 
utilized for trade. But his proposals could not be 
carried out. All the resources of the local Government, such 
as they were, had to be concentrated around Cape. Coast. 
As it was, the effects of the Volta expedition were 
not so widely felt as Ussher would have liked. Dompre was 
killed in battle in August, 1870, and the sole. aim of his 
successor was plunder. Other bands of marauders helped to 
(1) Ibid., Ussher to Kennedy; and no. 12,341, Ussher to 
Kennedy, 21st Oct., 1871. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 850, Ussher to Kennedy, 5th Dec., 1870. 
Confidential; and C0/96/87, no. 3194, Ussher to Kennedy, 6th March, 1871. 
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perpetuate the disturbed condition of the Volta region, (1) 
while the whole of the Eastern Districts seemed restless. 
a 
Early in 1871, Ussher sent Captain Lees, Civil Commandant at 
Accra, on a mission to restore British authority. Lees 
returned to Accra, after he had captured a number of Akim 
bandits, some refractory Akwapim Chiefs and a fetish priest. 
All these people were to be tried by the Judicial Assessor, 
and Ussher looked forward to a greater degree of peace in the 
Eastern Districts as a result. Lees earned the grateful 
thanks of the Basle missionaries for his achievement. They 
believed that the unrest was due to a "growth of fetish" which 
showed itself in an increased resistance to Christianity as 
(2) 
well as to Government authority. 
In June, 1871, Sir Arthur Kennedy went to the Gold 
Coast in an effort to make terms with the Awunas. Both 
Ussher and the German missionaries at Keta told him that 
Giraldo should not be allowed to go free any longer. But 
when Kennedy demanded that the Awuna Chiefs assembled at 
Dzblukofe surrender Giraldo, they refused. The Governor-in- 
Chief managed to persuade them to consent to the destruction 
of his property; and, after the treaty of peace - the third 
in the series - between the Awunas, Accras and Adas was 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 1198 and 3191, Ussher to Kennedy, 4th Jan. 
and 7th March, 1871, 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 3192, Ussher to Kennedy, 8th March, 1871. 
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concluded, Her Majesty's ships bombarded Giraldo's house 
(1) 
on the beach at Voja. Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, supposed that if 
Britain was to stay on the Gold Coast, it was necessary for 
her to retain her hold over the people by acts like this. 
Lord Kimberley however, maintained that it was impossible to 
(2) 
approve such proceedings, whatever the reason. 
Later in the same year, Administrator Salmon, who 
had succeeded Ussher, ascended the Volta to ensure that it 
remained open for trade. The Ashantis had withdrawn altogether 
from Krepi. Adu Bofo had not conquered it; the counter 
efforts of the Government and Dompro prevented him from doing 
so, though he had gained much plunder and many slaves during 
the war. Once again, the Government hoped that the recent 
Awuna treaty would be observed, and that peace would reign on 
the Volta. But British authority was still painfully weak 
in the Eastern Districts, Accra was the only station 
occupied by the Government, and verbal admonitions to the 
people to keep the peace, made by officials in the course of 
occasional visits, were ineffectual. Salmon had plans for 
laying out a new town at the mouth of the Volta. He proposed 
to call it Queenstown, though the Colonial Office had wearied 
(1) CO/96/88, no. 6368, Kennedy to Granville, 2nd June, 1871. 
This interesting character passed out of the limelight after this time, though he lived for another 20 years. i, 
(2) Ibid., minutes by Hugessen, 2nd July, and Kimberley, 
3rd July,, 1871. 
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(1) 
of this name for Colonial settlements. But the project 
was never carried out. Events in the Western Districts 
called for the exclusive attention of the local Government, 
and of the Colonial Office, in 1872. There, the departure of 
the Dutch from their forts to windward of Cape Coast created 
new and absorbing problems, and the Eastern Districts were 
(2) 
virtually ignored. 
Consequently, there was little news of the eastern 
half of the Protectorate in the dispatches sent to England. 
British traders, however, were by this time beginning to 
establish themselves' along the Awuna coast. Some enterprising 
firms, notably Miller Brothers, which had started in 1869, 
were concentrating on the Volta trade, They wished to know 
the limits of territory within which they might expect 
Government protection, and they wanted that protection to be 
a reality, not a mere name. Trading disputes continued along 
the Volta and the Avruna coast. One such dispute arose over 
(3) 
the payment of dues on produce exported. Since 1867, when 
the Awuna Chiefs realized that legitimate commerce had come 
to stay, it had been customary for them to levy a duty on the 
(4) 
palm oil exported from their territory. Then, finding that 
(1) 00/96/89, no. 10,789, Salmon to Kennedy, 2nd Oct., 1871. 
(2) Vide Chapter III, pp. 227 at seq. 
(3) P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -891)$ no. 52 and enclosures, esp. encl. 3. 
(4) This duty was ls. per puncheon, about 150 gals. 
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the export of palm kernels was increasing, the Chiefs also 
demanded dues on that article of export. After a lone 
argument, the Chiefs and merchants agreed on the duty to be 
(1) 
levied. But British subjects who traded in Awuna took 
up the cry for protection. Since the Government was pre- 
occupied in the Western Districts, these traders aired their 
views in an English journal called the "African Times", whose 
editor, a Mr. F. Fitzgerald, had trading connections on the 
Gold Coast. So frequently did Fitzgerald communicate with 
the Colonial Office on all matters concerning the Gold Coast 
that Elliot remarked how the editor was "trying to make himself 
(2) 
a sort-of Agent" for that territory. It was through 
Fitzgerald that the Colonial Office was kept informed of the 
merchants' demands while the local Government was busy with (3) 
affairs in the Western Districts. 
Convinced by this time of the importance of the 
Eastern Districts, the Colonial Office itself originated the 
next phase. in the drive to establish British authority and to 
provide protection for British traders, by authorizing Glover's 
Volta expedition during the war with Ashanti in 1873. But 
this expedition was only the beginning of a long task that was 
not completed until the end of the century. 
(1) The Chiefs first asked is. for 10 bags. Finally, 3d for 10 
bags was agreed to. The merchants at Kota in 1873 included: 
the agent for Swanzy's; G. B. Williams, J. B. Cole and J. H. Welbed 
-Akolatse, B. P. Johnston (all Africans, though it is not 
stated whether they were all independent traders, as were 
the first two), Mr. Ledlum, a European, and C. Rottman. 
J2ý C0/96/75, minute on no. 7692 by Elliot, 12th Aug., 1867. 3Of. P. P. XLIX, 1873,266-1 no. 140 and enclosures. 
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CHAPTER III. 
Sovereignty and Self-Government: 
The Administration in the Western Districts, 1865-1872. 
After the resolutions of the Committee of Inquiry 
(1) 
had been adopted by varliament in 1865, the Colonial Office 
sought to carry them out by ordering retrenchment in the 
administration and the restriction of British commitments. 
But such a policy was impracticable. At this very time, the 
expansion of trade led the European merchants to plead for 
extended control over the protectorate. In this demand, they 
were supported by the local Government; it realized at once 
that attempts at withdrawal would endanger the Bii tish position 
on the told Coast. In fact, it was maintained, a positive 
assertion of British authority was necessary to enable the 
administration to contend with the aspirations of Africans 
towards self-government; to cope first with the exchange and 
then with the cession of the Dutch forts; and to meet the 
threat of invasion from Ashanti. For several years, the 
Colonial Office wavered between the two extremes of withdrawal 
and expansion; finally, however, in 1872, on the eve of the 
II 
(1) Vide supra, Chapter I, p. 75. 
, ý, ý: Fl . ý,. ýýý_ý 
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Ashanti invasion, the Secretary of State decided to reject the 
policy of withdrawal. 
There were few striking changes in Gold Coast 
administration after 1865. The most important of the 
Committee's recommendations that were put into force was the 
amalgamation of the four west African Settlements. From 1866 
Sierra Leone became the headquarters of the administration, 
(1) 
with the Gambia, the Gold Coast and Lagos as its dependencies. 
Each of these was placed in charge of an Administrator, who 
communicated with the Secretary of State through the 
Governor-in-Chief at Sierra Leone. In this way, the Colonial 
Office hoped that by reducing the establishments of each 
dependency the total cost of the Settlements would be lessened. 
On the Gold Coast, only two stations were to be 
(2) 
occupied by Government officials: Cape Coast and Accra. 
The Executive Council of the four Settlements was to sit at 
Sierra Leone, though the Gold Coast retained its own 
Legislative Council. This was composed of three officials 
(3) 
and one unofficial member, the African merchant, Mr. Blankson. 
In function, the judicial system was unaltered. The 
(1) Charter issued, 19th r'eb., 1866. 
(2) CO/96/72, minute on no. 6047 by Elliot, 5th April, 1866. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 9657, Connor to Blackall, 10th Aug., 1866, 
and minute by Barrow, 11th Oct., 1866. 
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Chief Justice for British ; Vest Africa sat at Sierra Leone, 
but a Chief IvIagistrate was appointed to administer British law 
on the Gold Coast. He also performed the duties of Judicial (1) 
Assessor. In its internal administration, then, the 
Gold Coast suffered little change. The reduction in the 
establishment and the withdrawal from the outposts of Dixcov , 
Anomabu and Winneba merely alleviated the shortage of officials. 
200 'Nest Indians troops remained on the Gold Coast for a time. 
Later the force was reduced to 100 men, though the military 
strength of each dependency was to be at the disposal of the 
(3 ) 
others in case of need. 
Until these alterations were decided upon, however, 
there was much conjecture about the changes to be effected. 
Indeed, even before the Committee of Parliament began its 
inquiries 
.9 
there were portents of the difficulty that would 
face the local Government should Britain renounce any of her 
claims on the Gold Coast. Since 1843, the Government had 
exercised jurisdiction over Cape Coast, and occasionally over 
(1) 00/96/68, no. 12,047, Conran to Cardwell, 6th Nov., 1865, 
Confidential; and minute on no. 11,115 by Barrow, 16th Nov., 
1865* 
(2) Ibid., and CO/96/70, no. 2371, Conran to Cardwell, 28th Jan., <' 
1866, in which Conran wrote that the Governor, the Chief 
Justice, the Chaplain, the Receiver General and the Colonial 
Surgeon were all on leave, and the Colonial Secretaryship 
vacant. These posts had to be filled by military officers. 
Vide also minute by Barrow, 13th March, 1866: "... As to the 
little assistance he has, this has been the case with other 
Governors on the Gold Coast - and under the new system, the 
'Administratorf will have still less". 
(3) CO/96/70, no. 3450. Vide also C0/267/300 , no. 5774 , 29th April, and C0/267/303, no. 5318 10th May 1869, for total 
number of men and ships available for ', Vesý Africa. 
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the surrounding territory. This right the administration 
came to regard as established by usage, though the inhabitants 
of Cape Coast always argued against this assumption, and 
educated Africans took a prominent part in the controversy. 
Pointedly, the Government ignored the opposition. Cape 
Coast was the headquarters of the British administration, and 
there, if anywhere, its authority should not be open to 
(1) 
question. But at the beginning of 1865, the assumption 
of sovereignty was again challenged, this time more gravely 
than before; partly because the uncertainty about the 
revision in the administration raised greater hopes among 
the educated inhabitants, and partly because the opposition 
found a leader to voice its opinions. 
This leader was John Ag ery, who, in February, 1865, 
(2) 
was elected King of Cape Coast. Governor Richard Pine 
approved the choice of the townspeople. Aggery was the 
first Christian to hold this office, and Pine looked upon him 
(3) 
as a friend and ally of the Government. Only a month 
(1) Vide Chapter I. 
(2) John Aggery was the son of King Joe Aggery, and said he 
had been present when his father told Dr. Madden that 
the Cape Coast people would not consent to British rule. 
Vide Chapter I, p. 34, and P. P. XLIX, l8b7,198, no. 1, 
encl. 9, p. 8. (Hereafter referred to as P. P. 198). 
Cape Coast changed its succession from patrilineal to 
matrilineal in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
according to verbal information on the Gold Coast. 
(3) 00/96/67, no. 2308, Pine to Cardwell, 9th Feb., 1865; and 
P. P. 198, no. 1, encl. 1, p. 3. 
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later, Pine had cause to reverse this view. Aggery refused 
to acknowledge the Government's right of jurisdiction over 
the town, claiming that sovereignty rested solely with him. 
A trivial matter started this train of "extraordinary and 
significant events". Aggery, like every other King and Chief, 
held his own court according to tribal custom, and it had 
become usual for the Judicial Assessor to hear appeals from 
(1) 
these courts. But in March, 1865, Aggery would not 
permit a case to be taken before the Judicial Assessor, on 
the grounds that the sentence of his own court was neither 
inhuman nor excessive. If he allowed the appeal, the King 
felt that he would be undermining the dignity of his own 
court. Moreover, he held that since the individual concerned 
was not a British subject, he could not be tried in a British 
(2) 
court. 
In making this assertion, Aggery showed himself 
aware of the indefensible flaw in the British position. 
Owning nO territory on the Gold Coast, the Government could 
not properly exercise sovereignty over the people. The 
Government none the less claimed the right to do so, and Pine 
would not admit that Aggery's claims were justifiable. On 
the contrary, the Governor questioned the King's right to hold 
(1) CO/96/68, no. 11,115, Conran to Cardwell, 7th Oct., 1865. 
(2) P. P. 198, no. 1, p. l, and enclosures, esp. encl. 5, p. 6ö 
r,. ýý 
an independent court. 
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(1) By denying the supremacy of British 
jurisdiction, Aggery was automatically severing the link 
(2) 
between Great Britain and the Protectorate. Pine called 
upon the King to declare openly whether he really wanted to 
end the British connection. At the same time, he made it 
clear that the Government would not tolerate irresponsible 
Kings or courts under the very walls of the Castle. He 
ordered Aggery to close his court and submit all its past 
proceedings to the Judicial Assessor for review. If Pine 
thought fit, it might then be possible to constitute a new 
"King's Court" more in harmony with the wishes of the British 
(3) 
administration. 
To this arrangement Aggery would not agree. 
Instead, he asked that a decision be deferred until the 
findings of the Parliamentary Committee were made known, and 
sent three representatives to London to appear before the 
(4) 
Committee on his behalf. In their evidence, they made a 
point of the confusion that resulted from the division of 
power in the towns. They suggested that the respective powers 
of ging and Government be defined so that each would not overstep 
(1) Ibid., encl. 8, p. 7. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 2, encl. 2, p. 16. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 1, encl. 8, p. 7. 
(4) Ibid., encl. 9, p. 8. 
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(1) the bounds of the other. On the Coast, meanwhile, 
Aggery tried to gain the support of the neighbouring Kings and 
(2) 
Chiefs. In this, he was largely unsuccessful. Problems 
of divided authority did not usually., affect places outside 
Cape Coast. It was only at the headquarters of the 
Government that the Judicial Assessor's court was held, and 
the administration rarely exercised rights elsewhere. 
Further, the parochialism of the surrounding states made them 
disinclined to bestir themselves in a dispute which did not 
concern them directly. But to ensure the neutrality of the 
towns where British magi-strates were still stationed - the 
withdrawal from the outposts had not yet taken place - Pine 
, 
instructed the Civil Commandants of Dixcove, Anomabu and 
Winneba to warn the nearby Kings and Chiefs that Agger Is 
(3) doctrines were misleading and did not merit attention. 
(4) 
In Cape Coast itself, Aggery continued to hold his 
court. When troops were called out at the beginning of 
April, the excitement in the town increased. It seemed as 
though the Government had decided to enforce its orders on the 
(1) Vide Chapter I, pp. 73-74; and P. P. V, 1865, evid. of 
H. Barnes, qq. 5730 - 5826 and of J. Martin, qq. 8326 - 8457. 
The third member of the deputation, Joseph Smith, acted 
as interpreter for J. Martin. 
(2) P. P. 198, no. 3, p. 16 and encl. 1. 
(S) Ibid., encl. 2. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 7, p. 20. 
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(1) 
King. Aggery demanded that these foreign troops be 
(2) 
removed because they terrorized the populace. In 
September, the ill-feeling between Government and people 
culminated in a serious riot during the annual customary 
(3) 
celebrations. But Colonel Conran, the Acting Governor, 
tried to minimize the importance of the opposition under 
Aggery. The Colonial Office was told that Aggery would yield 
to the Government were he not swayed by the counsel of a group 
of "educated natives" 
"who resemble Chartists more than anything else, and have 
nothing to lose, but everything to gain by any change that 
they may effect in this place ... striving for power and the 
means of coercing the other harmless and loyal kings and chiefs 
of the Protectorate into submission to their own rule while 
the British Government is to remain as secondary only 
iý. (4) 
Though he denied Aggery's influence, and that of 
(5) 
his "Chartist" and "Fenian" followers, Conran thought it 
would be wise for the Government to strengthen its position. 
He took care to distribute gifts in Anomabu on the death of 
the old King in November, and proposed to administer the oath 
of allegiance to the new King as a guarantee of his loyalty 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 1, encl. 21, p. 14. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 7, encl. 10, p#40. 
(3) Loc. cit., no, 7, p. 20, and 00/96/68, no. 9784. 
198, no. 7. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 20, encl. 1, p. 58. It is interesting to 
note these epithets applied at the time to agitators on the 
Gold Coast. 
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to Britain. To To end the dispute about sovereignty in 
Cape Coast, Conran felt that no better solution could be found 
than to convert the town lands into British territory. 
Accordingly, he asked some of the cape Coast Chiefs to cede (2) 
the town to Britain. This they politely declined to do. 
Conran then adopted an alternative plan. Without asking the 
Chiefs' consent, he proclaimed that the land witnin five miles 
of the forts in the principal towns on the seaboard was 
henceforth to be regarded as British territory. This 
(3) 
proclamation was not questioned on the Coast. But the 
Colonial Office objected to it as a direct contravention of 
the recently adopted Parliamentary resolution to withdraw from 
committments in West Africa. The Governor's measure had the 
added disadvantage of making the Queen sovereign in territory 
where slavery existed. Conran was instructed to annul his 
(4) 
proclamation. 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 12, p. 47. Conran says that the oath of 
allegiance was inadvertently not administered to Aggery on 
. his election, but there 
is no evidence to support this view 
that Kings and Chiefs were required to take the oath of 
allegiance. Indeed, in earlier years the Colonial Office 
attached no importance to this oath even if it was 
administered on the Gold Coast. Vide CO/96/25, no. 11,180, 
Hill to Takington, 18th Oct., 1852, and minutes. 
(2) P. P. 198, no. 10, p. 45, and C0/96/68, minute on no. 12,039 
by W. E. Forster, 20th Dec. p1865: "... We have to exercise 
sovereignty without claiming it". 
(3) P. P. 198, no. 6, p. 18. 
(4} Loc. cit., no. 5, p. 90. 
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Unable to outwit Aggery by these methods, Conran 
decided to exercise the Government's assumed rights constantly 
in order to show the King that his agitation was fruitless. 
Conran began by issuing orders for the conduct of the 
(1) 
inhabitants, and regulations for the cleanliness of the town. 
He explained to the Colonial Office that it was also necessary 
to prove that the presence of the British Government was 
beneficial. In the past, too little had been done for the 
people, and they had come to distrust the philanthropic 
declarations of the Government. He believed that concrete 
improvements in the town would do more than anything else to 
(2) 
quieten the malcontents. Like all Governors who 
visualized improvements, Conran was handicapped by want of 
money. Nor did Aggery help him to carry out the regulations. 
The King still refused to concede the Government's title to 
(3) 
issue orders affecting the town. The Secretary of State 
reminded Conran that the Colonial uffice could not allow an 
(4) 
extension of responsibility, however good his intentions; 
and financial aid from the Imperial Treasury was out of the 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 11, p. 46; and CO/96/68, no. 9783. 
(2) Loc. cit., nos. 11,109,11,111, and 11,112. 
(3) 00/96/70, no. 1318; and P. P. 198, no. 11, p. 46,, 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 6, p. 90. 
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(1) 
question. But Eliot maintained in a minute that: 
"It may be doubtful whether ... we ought to be on the Coast at all, but it seems to me perfectly certain that we 
ought not to be there, if instead of diffusing the blessings 
of civilization, we are to afford the spectacle of a civilized 
Power lending itself to all the faults of a childish African 
Chief who only exists by its sufferance". (2) 
Conran's hopes that the discontent engendered by Aggery's 
(3) 
followers would spend itself were not fulfilled. In 
(4) 
Janugry, 1866, there was further rioting in Cape Coast. 
By then, the findings of the Parliamentary Committee had 
become known, and Aggery and his supporters were impatient for 
the realization of the recommendations whicn concerned them 
most; that Britain should retire and leave them to manage 
their own affairs. From the beginning, Conran saw that 
these hopes gave rise to a "seditious agitation", and led 
people to believe 
:!, that the time has arrived when they themselves should 
govern the Coast ... to which scheme the merchants ... strongly 
object". (5) 
For the first time, the Colonial Office became aware that the 
(1) of. C0/96/68, minute on no. 11,112 by Elliot, 22nd Nov., 
1865. Conran asked for L200 to repair a tank for drinking- 
water in Cape Coast, but the Colonial Office refused it. 
(2) Loc. cit., minute on no. 12,042 (no. ll, supra, printed), 
19th Dec., 1865. 
(3) P. P. 198, no. 8, p. 43. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 14, p. 48* 
(5) CO/96/70, no. 2375. 
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Committee's resolutions could be dangerous if they were 
literally interpreted. Elliot advised the Secretary of State 
to avoid any public disclaimer of powers previously exercised 
(1) 
on the Coast which might encourage Aggery's ambitions. 
As Conran feared, Aggery's influence was bound to 
spread. 'liwo nearby states, Ajumako and Gomua Ajumako, were 
engaged in a quarrel, and the King of Ajumako, the weaker of 
the two contestants appealed to the Government for help. 
His opponent refused to obey the summons to appear in the 
Judicial Assessor's court, where Conran wished the case to be 
heard. Instead, the King of Gomua Ajumako came to Cape Coast 
in March, 1866, to seek Aggery's assistance and only submitte 
to the Government under threat of force. The summary fine 
and imprisonment of this King was intended as an earnest 
of what might happen to other Kings and Chiefs should they 
(2) 
also choose to defy the Government. 
But the dispute between Aggery and the Government 
was not yet settled. In the same month, the King of Cape 
Coast presented Conran with a list of his demands and 
grievances. One of the most important items was his objectio 
to laws being passed by the Legislative Council without the 
knowledge and consent of the people whom they affected. He 
(1) Ibid., minute by Elliot, 15th March, 1866. 
(2) P. P. 198, no. 17, p. 51. 
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cited the Spirit Licence Ordinance of 1864 as an example. 
This Ordinance was intended to help meet the Government's 
(l) 
debts by raising a local revenue through spirit licenses. 
There was considerable opposition to the law in Cape Coast, 
where it was first applied, African retailers complaining 
(2) 
that the fee was oppressive. Further, Aggery protested 
d. 4t: vs 
that revenue from customsband fines was paid into the 
Government treasury instead of his own. He also wished the 
people to be given military training so that they co ld 
(3) 
defend themselves when the British left the Coast. To 
Conran, this document presaged rebellion: He asked permission 
to pu-c down this "insolent, ignorant, and stubborn man" before 
(4) 
an outbreak occurred. 
In sending these papers to the Colonial office from 
(1) CO/96/65, no. 10,332. Licences for wholesalers were £10, 
for retailers, £2. 
(2) Loc. cit., no, 11,386. Some of the opposition was due to 
the fact that the Government had passed the Ordinance 
without consulting the inhabitants, a reasonable complaint 
in the opinion of the Colonial Office, vide minutes on 
no. 10,332, supra. Colonel Ord recommended in 1865 that 
the Ordinance be repealed, but Colonel Conran advised that 
it be retained despite the opposition, wrnic h was led by 
Aggery, vide CO/96/70, no. 1318, Conran to Cardwell, 
11th Jan., 1866, and the Secretary of State agreed. In 1868 
the Ordinance was applied also to Accra, vide CO/96/74, 
no. 9679. It yielded £760 to the revenue in 1865. 
(3) P. P. 198, no. 18, encl. 2, p. 55. 
(4) Ibid., encl. 1, p. 54. 
I14 
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Sierra Leone - the new system of administration had by this 
time come into force - Gbvernor Blackall pointed to tree 
essence of the problem on the Gold Coast. If the Government 
wished to stay there, he wrote, Britain would have to 
establish her supremacy. This could only bA brought about 
if she was prepared to incur great expense in the upkeep of 
a large military force; and he foresaw that it would be in 
constant collision with the Kings and Chiefs of the 
Protectorate until they were impressed with the necessary 
respect for the Government. Without these conditions, it (1) 
would be bettor for Britain to retire, as Parliament proposed. 
Britain's future policy on the Gold Coast required 
careful deliberation from the Colonial Office. Clearly, 
Blackallts alternative to retirement was unthinkable in view 
of Parliament's decision to curtail expenditure and limit the 
Government's activities. Yet it was considered no less 
absurd to admit Aggery's "splendid pretensions" which sought 
to place the King of Cape Coast above the authority of the 
Queents representative. Officials in the Colonial Office 
agreed that the exact interpretation of the resolutions of 
1865 should rest with the Secretary of State, not with 
"educated natives". 
(2) 
Conran was instructed to make it 
known treat the result of the recent Parliamentary inquiry had 
(1) Ibid., no. 18, p. 53. 
(2) CO/96/71, minutes on no. 4579 (no. 18, supra, printed). 
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evidently been misrepresented on the Coast by interested 
persons. Moreover, Aggery's claims were held to be 
"mischievous" and "inadmissable"; and the King should be told 
that 
"in return for protection, we expect deference to our 
authority, and that he will not bu permitted to make himself 
an exception to this rule". (1) 
Meanwhile, the Administrator was to continue, as before, 
to maintain the supremacy of the British courts, and exercise 
control in the town of Cape Coast without actually claiming 
(2) 
sovereignty over it, 
But this reply from the Secretary of State to 
Aggery's proposals did not and the agitation in Cape Coast. 
(3) 
Tension continued between the King's party - the majority of 
(4) 
the populace - and the Government. Aggery resented 
Government interference in the affairs of the town; since 
Cape Coast was not British territory, he held that it was 
(5) 
beyond the jurisdiction of the administration. He also 
pressed for a share in matters of state, such as the peace 
negotiations with Ashanti, and he was not content with the 
Administrator's reply that he should "mind his own business". 
(1) Ibid., draft reply by Cardwell, 21st May, 1866, 
(2) Ibid., minute by Forster, 20th May, 1866. 
(3) P. P. 198, no. 20, p. 57. 
(4) According to the Queen's Advocate at Sierra Leone, 
- vide loc. cit., no. 23, encl. 2, p. 73. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 19, p. 56, and enclosure. 
(6) Loc. cit., no. 11, p. 46. 
(6) 
., ý, ý.. -ý ý-. ý. 3 ý. -, ý. ý--ý, ý--, 
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In September, 1866, he embodied his complaints in a petition 
(1) 
to the Governor. Blackall's reply from Sierra Leone was 
meant to leave no doubts in Aggery's mind: the British 
Government had no intention of granting self-government to 
(2) 
Aggery and his followers. Yet in spite of this answer, 
Aggery's emissaries appeared to be at work throughout the 
Protectorate, 
"... endeavouring to upset British authority, and to 
persuade the Chiefs that the Parliamentary Committee intondedi 
by its report, to transfer all authority to (them)". (3) 
Conran's attempts at the end of 1865 to win over the King of 
Anomabu to the Government side were unsuccessful. This ruler 
also began to flout British authority at this time, and only 
(4) 
after Conran had taken "resolute action" did the King surrender. 
By the end of 1866, Conran feared that open conflict 
would follow if Aggery's subversive movement were allowed to 
go any further. The Government should make it clear that a 
dual authority would not be tolerated in Cape Coast, and that 
British power was to be paramount. After receiving a letter 
from Aggery in which another "Jamaica rebellion" was 
threatened if the Government persisted in ignoring his demands, 
Conran arrested the King aqd_ seat him to Sierra Leone. Then 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 20, p. 57, and enclosures. 
(2) Loc. cit.,, no. 21, p. 64. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 22, p. 65. 
(4) Ibid. 0 encl. 1, p. 66. 
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(1) 
he declared Aggery deposed and his. court wgs. j9hut. 
Legally, the Government had few grounds on wiieh to base its 
action. Britain had no power to deport or depose Kings, 
though deposition had been practised in the past. Further, 
'ýý since Aggery was not a British subject, he could not be tried 
for sedition. But public safety was taken as sufficient 
(2) 
justification for the course Conran adopted. Admitting 
its expediency, the Colonial Office had no hesitation in 
endorsing it. Officials regarded-ggg_er_ 
___as 
an "ignorant 
savage" who had become the "fows _of 
intriguQa__s ang_erous 
to the ubff4-P It and "inc able__. Qf_. properly- _p. e. rfQxning 1is 
nction". fu 
In Aggery's place, Kwesi Ata was chosen by the 
Administrator as Headman of Cape Coast: Lord Carnarvon, the 
Secretary of State, thought that Aggery "should never have been 
(5) 
invested with the ridiculous title of king". Kwesi Ata 
was one of the few Chiefs who had opposed Aggery. Without 
influence or standing in the community, his followers did not 
include "educated natives". He was therefore regarded as a 
suitable medium of communication between the Government and the 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 23, p. 70, and enclosures; and 00/96/74, 
no. 4422. 
(2) 00/96/72, minutes on no. 979 (no. 23, supra, printed) and 
C0/9e/74, minute on no. 3932, by Elliot, 20th April, 1867. 
(3) 00/96/72, minute on no. 979 by Carnarvon, 8th Feb., 1867. 
(4) Ibid., minute _by 
Elliot, 4th Feb., 1867. 
(b) Ibid., minutes by Carnarvon, 8th Feb.,, and 12th Feb., 1867. 
r0-I-,, 
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townspeople, since he was unlikely to question the Government's 
(1) 
authority. Then, in order to diminish the iior-. Q. the 
leading educated Afrioana, r_, an_, interdicted all &wygxa_frQm 
tira_p ct sing in trie_saur-t ___There_ýuere- s3xr aduý es in 
pe Coa` at the time, __f&ye of whom were Africans. But 
Carnarvon would not consent to this arbitrary measure. The 
Administrator could advance no sound reason to support it; 
and tnough Carnarvon approved of a "paternal" system of ýý j 
government for the Gold Coast, such discrimination would creato 
bitterness and hostility. 
(2) 
prohibition. 
Ussher, hwas ordered to revoke the 'f 
The Administrator was encouraged, however, to 
assert British authority in the Protectorate. It was true 
that the Parliamentary Committee had recommended non-interfer 
in African affairs. But Aggery's claims had snown that even 
the verbal announcement of ultimate withdrawal was liable to 
(3) 
unexpected interpretations. Accordingly, whenever it was 
possible, ussner, 4e Go % tried to exercise 
(1) CO/96/74, no. 4422, ± 1ackall to Carnarvon, 5th April, 
and Ussher to Blackall, 25th March, 1867; and no. 114, 
Us Sher to Yonge, 5th Dec., 1867. 
18 67,1 
(2) CO/96/72, nos. 981 and 983, and minutes, esp. Carnarvonls 
on no. 983,7th Feb., 1867. Other officials were prepared 
to sanction the measure, but Carnarvon wrote that it 
"would not be tolerated for a day in any of the larger 
colonies that are more plainly brought under the light of 
public opinion and there is no reason why it should be 
tolerated on the Gold Coast". 
(3) Loc. cit. , minute on no. 979 by Elliot, 4th Feb., 1867 and 
GA no. 978, minutes, passim; and 00/96/74, minutes on no. 5404. 
, ý_ýý M 
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(1) British power. He intervened in the Beyin district, where 
the two rivals, Beyin and Atuabo, had not yet settled the 
dispute that resulted from British action in 1848. In March, 
1867, Ameki, King of Beyin, appealed to the Government for 
help against Atuabo, whose King belonged to the family 
deposed by the British twenty years earlier. Ussher answered 
the call by sending an officer to arrest Afu, the King of 
Atuabo, who was thereafter detained 14 Cape Coast to ensure 
(2) 
his good behaviour. He was released soon after, only to 
be assassinated, and was succeeded by his brother, Blay. 
Another quarrel in Ajumako also enabled the Government to 
display its authority. The King of Ajumako had been deposed 
three times by his people, and as many times reinstated by 
the Government. Id April, 1867, it seemed that on this 
occasion several other Fanti states might join in the dispute, 
and throw the country into civil war. Ussher took the 
opportunity of exercising the right assumed by the Government 
to make and Unmake Kings by declaring this King finally deposed 
by authority of the queen, and gave official recognition to 
(1) cf. CO/96/74, no. 9679, Ussher to Yonge, 29th Aug., 1867 
in which Ussher wrote that At was impossible to carry on 
the administration without additional assistance, and that 
he proposed to appoint an assistant Magistrate even though 
this was contrary to Parliament's decision. He also 
proposed, vide no. 10,741, to appoint a travelling 
Magistrate for the Eastern Districts, but -t#, e Colonial Office 
refused to sanction this measure. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 3379, Ussher to Blackall, 7th March, 1867; 




his successor. Similar action was taken in Asin Atandaso 
(3) 
and in Anomabu; in the latter, the Administrator also 
closed the King's court. On these precedents, the Colonial 
Office came to regard the Government recognition of Kings as 
an established custom. The proceeding was so referred to 
in 1872, when the Administrator rq orted the election of a 
new King in Western Wasaw and his intention of 4pproving the 
(4) 
candidate. 
While the Colonial Office favoured this practice, 
and others which were likewise calculated to estatl ish 
Britain's authority in the Protectorate, officials could not 
(5) 
help remarking the contradiction of Parliament's recommendations 
en Sir Charles Adderley, however, who had been Chairman of 
the Committee of Inquiry in 1865, and held office as ý, ý d; 
Parliamentary Under-secretary from July, 1866 to December, 1868,1 
found it difficult to advise a course other than "the assertion! 
of undivided authority" if Britain was to remain on the Gold 
(6) 
boast. 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 5814, vssher to Blackall, 29th April, 1867. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 9677, Ussher to Blackall, 22nd Aug., 1867. 
(3) C0/96/80, no. 8298, Simpson to Kennedy, 7th June, 1869. 
(4) P. P. XLIX, 1873,266, (hereafter referred to as 1'. P. 266), 
n os. 90 and 97, pp. 14b and 159. 
(5) of. C0/96/71, minute on no. 5533 by Cardwell, 19th May, 186f 
(6) CO/96/74, minute on no. 114 by Adder, i, ley, 18tn Jan., 1868; and reply, Buckingham to Kennedy, 10th Feb., 1868, in which 
ussher's attention is drawn to the Committeets Resolutions. 
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leader did not collapse with his deportation. Despite 
the subsequent policy of the administration, educated Africans 
continued to hope for self-government. In 1868, their 
chance occurred, not only of realizing this ambition, but also 
of gaining the support of all the ±'anti Kings and Chiefs. 
This time, united by a "national" rather than a sectional 
feeling, Kings, Chiefs and educated men met in the Council of 
the r'anti Confederacy at Mankesim, the traditional headquarters 
(2) 
of the Fanti people; and the impulse which brought them 
together was the exchange of forts between the Dutch and 
British Governments at the beginning of that year. 
But the movement of which Aggery had been the 
(1) 
An exchange had more than once been discussed in the 
(3) 
negotiations for a customs agreement on the Gold Coast, 
The Colonial Office had hoped that the Committee of Inquiry 
would provide a solution to the financial problems of the 
(4) 
West African Settlements, Beyond the payment of some 
existing debts, however, nothing had been done to meet this 
(5) 
permanent difficulty. After 1865, the Dutch Government 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 4422, Ussher to Blackall, 25th March, 1867. 
(2) C0/96/76, no. 6472, Ussher to Kennedy, 18th May, 18b8. 
(3) Vide Chapter I, pp. 28 - 32. 
(4) Ibid., pp. 69 - 72. 
(5) CO/96/70, no. 3446, Conran to Cardwell, 7th March, 1866, 
The Gold Coast was still in debt. Parliament had voted 
only £2000 to settle past liabilities. Seeing no other 
remedy, Elliot wrote that if the indebtedness continued, the Gold Coast would have to extricate itself by stopping salaries, vide minute, 12th April, 
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seemed more willing to reach an agreement with the British, (1) 
and in 1867, a Convention was drawn up between Britain and the 
Netherlands. It provided for an exchange of forts so that 
each Government would have a continuous line of coast under 
its control. The forts east of the River Kakum, which flowed 
between Cape Coast and Elmina, were to be British; all those 
west of the Kakum., were to go to the Dutch. The Convention 
was to come into force in January, 1868. At the same time, 
a. joint customs tariff would be imposed, consisting of a 3% 
ad valorem duty on all goods except spirits, guns, gunpowder, 
and tobacco. On these articles, specific duties were to be 
(2) 
paid. 
Both Governments were aware that the exchange of 
(3) 
forts might cause trouble among the people in the vicinity. 
But the susceptibilities of the inhabitants could not be 
allowed to obstruct an arrangement so advantageous. The 
Fantis, jowever, were greatly alarmed at the prospect. The 
exchange of forts entailed the substitution of Dutch for 
British protection over some of their allies, and this in turn 
implied a change in their relations with the Ashanti enemy. 
(1) CO/96/70, minute on no. 2375 by Elliot, 15th March, 1866. 
(2) CO/96/75, corr. with F. O. passim; and P. P. LXXIV, 1867, (C. - 3900)p p9371, The duty on spirits: 6d per gal; 
tobacco: id per lb; gunpowder: ld per lb; and guns: is each 
(3) Vide Chapter I, p. 31. 
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Britain chose to protect the tribes south of the River Fra in 
order to keep the Ashantis at a safe distance from the coast. 
In this way, the Government hoped to enable traders to carry 
British commerce into the interior; and under cover of 
British protection, the tribes of the coastal belt endeavoured 
to maintain their position as middlemen between the Ashantis 
and the merchants on the seaboard. 
British commercial ambitions were not shared by 
the Dutch. Their trade had declined with the slave trade. 
It was said that apart from a sentimental attachment of the 
Dutch public to the Gold Coast possessions, the only reason 
for keeping them was to obtain recruits, through the Ashantis, 
(1) 
for the East Indian army. For this reason, the Dutch 
maintained the friendship with Ashanti that had started in the 
seventeenth century, and their example was followed by the 
people under their influence in the western half of the 
Protectorate. Neither the Dutch Government nor the Elmina 
and Ahanta people had taken part in the Ashanti wars in the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, though the "Dutch" tribes had 
professed neutrality in these wars, there was reason to suspect (2) 
that they had actually helped their Ashanti friends. 
(1) Ibid., p. 30; and C0/96/70, minute on no. 2375 by 
Forster, 22nd March, 1866; and C0/96/79, no. 1258, 
Kennedy to Granville, 11th Jan., 1869, in which Kennedy wrote 
that the price of recruits had risen to £18 a head. 
(2) of. CO/96/79, no. 1258, Kennedy to Granville, 11th Jany1869, 
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This suspicion had on several occasions led to friction and 
(1) 
conflict between Fantis and "Dutch" people; and the 
sense of betrayal widened the breach caused initially by the 
differences in interest between the two sections. 
The recent Ashanti war in 1863-64 had left the 
(2) 
enemy unscathed, More than this, the Ashaztis could not 
be induced to conclude a peace treaty. Negotiations dragged 
(3) 
on until 1866. In that year, in default of a definite 
agreement, the Administrator issued a proclamation to make it 
(4) 
known that no further hostilities were intended. But the 
Protectorate remained in cDnstant dread of a sudden attack 
(5) 
from Ashanti. The explicit aim of the British Government 
to take no part in the future defence of the Protectorate did 
(6) 
not foster confidence or security. Trade was slow to 
(1) of. Meredith, op. cit., pp. 90 and 164-6; and CO/96/28, 
no. 11,569, Cruikshank to Newcastle, 4th Nov., 1853. 
(2) Vide Chapter I, pp. 65-67. 
(3) Ibid., p. 66; and co/96/67., nos. 1274,2311,3755 and 7693; 
00/96/68, nos. 9782,11,123,12,044 and 298; and C0/96/70, 
no. 1324. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 237e, Conran to Cardwell, 5th Feb,, 1866. 
The Proclamation was issued on 16th January. 
(5) of. CO/96/71, no. 5533, Blackall to Cardwell, 19th May., 18661 
and 00/96/74, no. 5818, Ussher to Blackall, 15th May, 180. 
(6) Vide Chapter i, p. 67; and 00/96/71, minute on no. 5533 
by Cardwell, 20th June, 1866. 
m 
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recover after the war, 
(1) 
and there were frequent alarms and 
( 2) 
disturbances on the Pra frontier. In October, 1867, Ussher 
learnt of the death of the King of Ashanti, Kweku Dua, and of 
(3) 
the election of Kofi Kakari as his successor. The 
Administrator's informant was Prince Oau Ansa, the son of a 
former King of Ashanti. Ansa had been taken hostage by 
Maclean in 1831, and was educated in England at the expense 
of the British Government. Since that time, he had received 
(4) 
an annual pension of £100 from the Foreign Office. Because 
of his connection with the Royal House in Ashanti, Ansa was 
frequently employed as an intermediary between that power and 
(5) 
the British Government. In 1867, he assured Ussher that 
(6) 
Kofi Kakari desired peace and friendship with the British. 
The Fantis, however, regarding Ansa as an Ashanti partisan, 
7) 
doubted his honesty. Their anxiety was not relieved by 
(1) Ibid., Conran to Blackall, 10th May, 1866. 
(2) e. g. CO/96/72, no. 9664, Conran to Blackall, 29th Aug. 1866; 
and CO/96/74, no. 3376, Ussher to Blackall, 9th March, 1867. 
(3) CO/96/74, no. 10,747, Ussher to Yonge, 6th Oct., 1867. 
ux ( cj'Fkr mpem"A t" ßp. 266-r), (4) P. P. A X66-1, h no. 178, p. 340; and P. P. LXX 1872 M-670). 9 (hereafter referred to as P. P. (C; 6'! 0)) no. 16, p. 30, 
(5) e. g. during the negotiations following the war in 1: 863-4. 
(6) CO/96/74, no. 10,747. 
(7) of. CO/96/65, no. 9302, Pine to Cardwell, 3rd Sept.., 1864. 
ý.. ý 
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his declaration, and their fears increased when the Dutch and 
British Governments agreed to an exchange of forts. The 
Convention meant that the Fantis would be deprived of the 
support of Sekondi, Kornenda and Dixcove on the coast, and of 
Wasaw, Denkera and Twifu on the borders of Ashanti, since all 
these lay west of the River Kakum. To the Fantis, the 
exchange was tantamount to the surrender of these stalwart 
(l) 
allies to Ashanti; and they determined to resist it. 
in the Eastern Districts the only Dutch possession, 
Fort Creve Coeur in Accra, was transferred to Britain without 
(2) 
difficulty. In the Western Districts, the Dutch forts at 
(3) 
Senya Beraku, Kormantin, and Klouri also changed hands quietly; 
Dutch influence had long ceased to be felt in these towns. 
Apam was the only town that opposed the transfer to the 
British. There, the King had to be temporarily ranoved because 
(4) 
of his objections. 
The transfer fran British to Dutch ownership, however, 
was not so easily effected. At Dixcove, the people showed 
(1) CO/96/76, no. 2165, Ussher to Kennedy, 6th Feb., 1868; 
and no. 3735, Ussher to Kennedy, 19th March, 1863. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 1195, Blackall to Buckingham, 6th Jan., 1868. 
Some opposition to the transfer had shown itself during 1867, 
but Ussher took precautions and there was no trouble in 1868. 
Vide CO/96/74, nos. 7526,11,699, and 114. 
(3) CO/96/76, no. 1658, Blackall to Buckingham, 28th Jan., 1868. 
(4) CO/96/77, no. 9621, Kennedy to Buckingham, 13th Aug4,1868, in wusch release of this King is mentioned. 
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themselves uo loyal to Britain that they would not sever their 
connection with the English Government. Only when the King 
had been deported and seven of his Chiefs arrested did the 
(1) 
town sullenly acknowledge the Dutch flag. British Sekondi 
and Beyin accepted the change, for the time at least, with 
(2) 
indifference. But British Komenda obstinately refused to 
acquiesce in the substitution of Dutch for British authority. 
After a hostile encounter with Duzch troops, the Komendas"were 
(3) 
fired on by a Dutch ship and -their town was destroyed. 
The Colonial Office regretted that force should have been 
necessary. Still, a Dutch ship was answerable, and the 
Colonial Office, disclaiming responsibility, would have been 
glad to forget the matter. i1liot remarked complacently that 
it was 
"... sometimes indispensable that in such cases the 
uncivilized should be taught the superior power of civilized 
Nations". (4) 
But the Fantis and their allies did not take the 
destruction of Komenda so calmly. This act was the signal 
for the outbreak of a war that aimed to expel the Dutch from 
the Coast and so end the danger of betrayal to Ashanti. In 
(1) CO/96/76, no. 1658, 
(2) Ibid., and no. 2167, Ussher to Kennedy, 12th Feb., 1868. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid., minute by Elliot, 5th March, 1868. 
It 
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February, 1868, Ussher reported that the Council of the Fanti 
Confederacy had been in session at Mankesim for some time to 
discuss self-defence against Ashanti, and to organize 
(1) 
widespread resistance to the Dutch. The Council was said 
to be representative of all the Kings and Chiefs in the 
British Protectorate in the Western Districts; and King Otu 
of Abura spoke for these people when he voiced their feelings 
about the transfer to the Dutch: 
"We cannot understand that the people of Commendah, they 
being no slaves of either Government, could be bartered off 
in this way, and when they refused to go under the Dutch ... 
(their town was destroyed)". (2) 
The Fanti-Dutch war began with the investment of Shama and (3) 
Komenda in February by a large force of Denkeras and Wasaws. 
In the following month, IIssher told the Governor-in-Chief, 
Sir Arthur Kennedy, that opposition to the Dutch was becoming 
(4) (5) 
formidable. Inspired by a "strong National sentiment".. 
large numbers of Fantis from the British section of the 
Protectorate had gone to help the Komendas. In addition.. 
a force of several thousand, led by Otu, King of Abura, laid 
(1) CO/96/76, no. 21ä5, Ussher to Kennedy, 6th Feb., 1868. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 3472, ussher to Kennedy, 6th March, 1863 and 
encl., King of Abrah (sic) to Ussher, 2nd March, 1868. 
Vide also CO/96/77, enclosures in no. 13,245 for remonstrances 
against the exchange. 
(3) CO/9e/76, no. 2724, Ussher to Kennedy, 16th Feb., 1868. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 3472. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 3735, Kennedy to Buckingham, 30th March, 1868. 
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seige to ilmina, blocking its land communications completely 
and causin much hardship to the Elminas and embarrassment to (1) 
the Dutch. The Fantis seemed determined to succeed in 
their plan to drive out the Dutch, and they were willing to 
(2) 
merge their sectional differences in this common desire. 
he British Administrator was acutely aware of his 
Government's difficult position. Three courses were open to 
him: he could assist the Fantis; he could remain neutral; 
or he could help the Dutch. Ussher had little sympathy 
for the Darch Government. Appreciating the Fantis' motives, 
he assumed at first that their hatred of the Dutch implied a 
correspondingly deep affection for the British, and he could 
not disguise his pride at this attachment for his own 
(3) 
Government. Yet it was impossible for him to aid the 
Fantis. They wore fighting against a Government with which 
Britain was on the most friendly terms in zurope. But the 
Dutch force was weak, and it could not even rely on the 
j1minas for support. The war was obviously a "white man's 
palaver", and the Elmina people would only rouse themselves in 
(4) 
self-defence. If the Dutch found themselves unable to 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 3472; and CO/9 6/78, no. 10,332/FO. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 2724; and no. 3735, ussher to Kennedy, 19th March,, 1868. 
(S) Loc. cit., nos. 3472 and 3735, Kennedy to Buckingham, 
30th March, 1868. Vide also no. 4620, Kennedy to Buckingham, 
16th April, 1868, 
(4) Loc. cit.., no. 3472. 
0 
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withstand the Fantis, they might call upon the Ashantis 
for help; and should the Ashantis enter the struggle, the 
Protectorate would be overwhelmed and British control over the 
(1) 
interior would cease. In the circumstances, ussher 
decided uneasily to remain neutral. He proposed to take no 
action in favour of the Dutch which might antagonize the 
Fantis. At the same time, he did not want the Dutch to be 
reduced to the desperate expedient of seeking Ashanti aid. 
-thus, while declaring his own neutrality, he also expected the 
(2) 
people under Bpi. tish protection to keep out of the conflict. 
But the Fantis took a different view, and the small 
number of British troops was unable to enforce neutrality on 
them even in the coastal towns of Cape Coast, Saltpond and 
(3) 
Anomabu. None of Ussher's arguments or threats could 
shake the determination of these people. Their unprecedented 
unity of purpose earned them ljssher's grudging admiration, 
though the Administrator was anxious, not only for the Dutch, 
but also for the British Government. There was no better 
illustration of his inability to command respect in the 
British Protectorate than the disobedience of Kwesi Ata, 
HBadman of Cape Coast. Kwesi Ata slipped out of the town to 
(1) Loc. cit., nos. 2724 and 3735. 
ý2) Idem. 
(3ý Loc. cit., nos. 3472 and 4620, Ussher to Kennedy, 6th April, 
1868. 
- 196 - 
join the allies despite Ussher's order that he should remain 
neutral. In a fit of temper, Ussher outlawed and deposed 
(1) 
this Headman, and ordered his house to be burnt. 
Ussher soon discovered that-his anxiety was not 
groundless. He reported in March that another, and "less 
creditable" motive than the expulsion of the Dutch, was 
inspiring the Fanti Confederacy: the desire to "throw off 
(2) 
British allegiance". It was clear that the movement 
towards independence which had 
Aggery's leadership had spread 
where the Council of the Fanti 
"educated natives" 
: '. who doubtless aspire ... 
should Great Britain abandon hi 
begun in Cape Coast under 
further afield to Mankesim, 
Confederacy lent a ready ear to 
to the reins of Government 
or possessions, " (3) 
The disaffection shown by the Confederacy towards the British 
Government increased. In April, Ussher wrote that 
.:: a small class of discontented and unprincipled natives, 
principally mulattoes and semi-educated blacks .. * is active 
in its endeavours to persuade the ignorant, impressionable and 
child-like Fantis that the time has come to govern themselves; 
and to throw off our rule, retaining us here as advisers only". 
(4) 
Already the Council at Mankesim had passed resolutions "to 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 3735, Ussher to Kennedy, 19th March,. 1868. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 4620. Ussher wrote that these malcontents 
"cunningly and wilfully misrepresent the rarliamentary 
Hesolutions of 1865" to the Fantis, just as they had done 
under Aggory. 
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support and protect themselves regardless of British interests 
(1) 
and protection". Further, to pay for the war against the 
Dutch, the Kings and Chiefs had agreed to a tax on trade, 
and Ussher learnt that a large sum of money had been collected 
t2) 
by these means. 
Independent taxation was regarded by Ussher as a 
distinct breach of the Queen's prerogative in the Protectorate. 
In any case, taxes on trade interfered with the free flow 
of commerce between the coast and the interior, and was 
(3) 
contrary to British policy. Moreover, such action was 
likely to antagonize Ashanti. As it was, the behaviour of the 
Confederacy towards that power was disquieting. Ashanti 
traders and messengers were detained by the members of the 
Council, the Confederacy claiming, and exercising, the right 
to communicate direct with Ashanti rather than through the 
(4) 
medium of the British Government. Ussher feared that the 
Ashantis, noting the estrangement of the Fantis from the 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 3735, 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 4620. Ussher thought that about £8,000 
had been collected. The tax took the form of a toll on 
all loads of goods passing through Mankesim, which was just 
north of Saltpond, a prosperous town engaged largely in I 
the export of palm oil from this region. 
(3) Loc. cit., in no. 2165, Instructions to Thomas Hughes, 
29th Jan., 1868. Private and Confidential. Hughes was sent 
by Ussher to. -, reason with the Council at Makesim and to warn 
them that their activities were treasonable. This man 
had been one of Aggery's supporters in 1865-6. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 4620; no. 5705, Ussher to Kennedy, 7th May, 
1868,, and no. 6472, Ussher to Kennedy, 18th May, 1868. 
/1 
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Government, might seize the opportunity of invading the 
Protectorate. In this event, the British Government 
would be bound to remain aloof, in accordance with the 
(2) 
instructions of the Colonial Office. But if the Ashantis 
were successful, there would be an end to British-trading 
ambitions. 
The leading merchants, Messrs. Swanzy and Messrs. 
Forster and Smith, complained frequently of the disturbed state 
of the interior since the exchange of possessions in January, 
(3) 
1868. Trade declined as a result, while the loss of 
British influence over the Protectorate gavö cause for alarm. 
As British authority ebbed, so relations with Ashanti worsened, 
since there was no check on the obstruction to trade of the 
middlemen. British traders were jealous of the fact that 
disturbances in the Protectorate drove the Ashantis to buy 
their goods at the French ports of Grand Bassam and Assini, to 
(4) 
the west of the Gold Coast. The principal merchants 
therefore made it clear to the Colonial office that for the 
Government to retire from the Gold Coast would be a disaster 
for British trade. But it was not enough to remain passive 
(1) Loe. oit., no. 5700, Ussher to Kennedy, 16th April, 1868. 
(2) Cardwell's instructions of 1864, vide Chapter Is p. 67, 
and Chapter II, p. 147. C0/96/74, minute on no. 10,747 by Buckingham, 23rd Nov., 1866; also C0196/76, nos. 4620 
and 5700. 
(3) C0/96/t78, nos. 12,, 897/F and 13,, 8591S; and C0/96/83, nos. 
6556/F and 9852/8; and CO/96/86, no. 8444/F. 
(4) C0/96/76, no. 5705. Frequent reference was made at this 
time to French activities on the West Coast in the vicinity 
of British possessions. 
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on the seaboard. The Government must assert its authority, 
restore order in the interior, and provide the conditions 
(1) 
necessary for a prosperous commerce with the north. 
Ussher agreed entirely with this point of view. 
If the Government did not demonstrate its power soon, all 
hope of future control over the Protectorate would be lost. 
He begged for a reinforcement of troops to enable him to 
implant a measure of respect for the Government in the people 
(2) 
under British protection. Even in Cape Coast, the 
administration was paralyzed; everywhere men under arms 
(3) 
defied its orders. To avoid further humiliation, he tried 
to arrange a treaty between the Dutch and the Fantis, in which 
the Dutch would discontinue their friendship with Ashanti. 
(4) 
At first, the Dutch Government refused, but by July, 1868, 
the success of the Fantis had so damaged the Dutch position 
that Ussher won his point, and the two Governments drew up 
an agreement of peace. The Fanti Confederacy, however, would 
not accept a treaty arranged by the two European Governments 




Their object was to force the "Dutch" tribes, 
(1) Corr. with merchants, supra. 
(2) C0/96/76, no. 8992, Ussher to Kennedy, 17th July, 1868. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 7029, Ussher to Kennedy, 7th June, 1868. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 5705, Ussher to Kennedy, 7th May, 1868; and 
no. 7029, Kennedy to Buckingham, 15th June, 1868. 
(5) CO/96/77, no. 9621, encl. Chiefs to Ussher, 15th July, 1868.; 
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and especially the Elminas, to enter into an offensive and 
(1) 
defensive alliance with the Fantis against the Ashantis. 
In Elmina, the merchants, who included many educated Africans, 
would have been willing to do so. They shared the desire 
of other merchants along the coast to keep the Ashantis away 
from the sea. But the Kings and Chiefs of Elmina would not 
break the Ashanti connection. At most, they would consent to 
(2) 
remain neutral in a quarrel between the Fantis and Ashantis. 
Nevertheless, the Fantis believed that if the European 
Government were defeated, the Elminas would also be obliged to 
submit. By the end of 1868, Elmina was still beseiged by 
(3) 
the Fa. hti army. 
Yet the Colonial Office would not consent to the 
coercion of the Fantis. Elliot, indeed, remarked that 
"... in the face of the symptoms which are reported of 
a general insubordination and disaffection towards Europeans 
amongst the Natives of the Gold Coast, sound policy demands 
that they should gain no encouragement ... (in) inflicting 
unprovoked reverses on the White Race, whether Dutch or English". 
' 
(4) 
But officials considered that neutrality was the correct 
(5) 
attitude for the British Government. On no account could 
(1) CO/96/76, no. 8992; and CO/96/77, no. 13,245, Kennedy 
to Buckingham, 7th Nov., 1868. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) CO/96/76, minute on no. 5700 by Elliot, 3rd June, 1868. 
(b) Ibid., and minute on no. 4620 by Adderley, 15th May, 1868. 
ý. ý. Ti ., 
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the Fantis be forced to accept the change of protecting power, 
since protection implied a voluntary arrangement between the 
(1) 
two parties. The Secretary of State agreed to ask the 
Admiralty to send warships to the Coast, -but only to ensure (2) 
the safety of the forts. Nor was the Colonial Office 
ready to consider the solution offered by Ussher to the 
problems on the Gold Coast; that the Dutch Government should 
be asked to sell their forts to the British and leave the 
Coast. The departure of the Dutch would in itself remove the 
exciting cause that had led to the Confederacy and, in. turn, 
(3) 
to its threat to British supremacy. This proposal, however, 
was not favoured by officials in London. It might give the 
impression that Britain had persuaded the Dutch to accept the 
exchange of forts only in order to prove that the Dutch position 
on the Coast was altogether untenable. Besides, to acquire 
additional forts would not be in keeping with the resolutions 
(4) 
of Parliament in 1865. 
Sir Arthur Kennedy, the Governor-in-Chief, suggested 
a different approach to the troubles on the Gold Coast. He 
(1) Loc. cit., minutes on no. 2724; and CO/96/77, minute on 
no. 13,, 24b by Mr. Monsell, 12th Dec. ) 1868. 
(2) Loc. cit. , in no. 962., C. O. to Admiralty, 5th Oct., 1868. 
(3) 00/96/76, no. 4620. 
(4) Ibid., minutes by Elliot and Adderley, 15th MZay., 1868. 
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maintained that tue surest way to alienate the affections of 
the Fantis was to try coercing them into obedience. They 
would at once turn to the "educated natives" who advised them 
(1) 
to look forward to "National rule'". He agreed with the 
merchants that British influence had declined. In his view, 
this was 
"... attributable mainly to the increased number of 
partially educated natives, who mingle with their less 
enlightened fellows, and make capital out of their opposition 
to the Local Government, and the hopes and fears which they 
excite in the native mind". 
It was essential to heal the breach between Government and 
Protectorate, and Kennedy felt that an "able and judicious" 
ruler would be able to achieve this by counteracting the 
influence of the "educated natives". (2) 
Mr. W. H. Simpson undoubtedly fell into this category 
of rulers, and he applied himself to the task outlined by 
Kennedy with his usual vigour. Sensitive to the mood of the 
Fantis, he gauged that they were determined to make some attempt 
at "political advancement" in the direction of self-government. 
The Administrator saw where his advantage lay. If he 
anticipated the movement towards independence, he would be able 
to shape it and neutralize its danger to the supremacy of the 
Government and the prosperity of British trade. Accordingly, 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 6472, Kennedy to Buckingham, 29th May, 1868. 
(2) CO/96/78, Kennedy to C. O. 4th Nov., 1869. 
i., 
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he proposed to win the confidence of the members of the 
Confederacy by recognizing the Council at Mankesim and 
appearing to support it. In this way, he would be able to 
substitute 
"... the authority and influence of the Administrator for 
the interested services and pernicious interference of the 
tscholarst and semi-educated natives hitherto in uncontrolled 
ascendancy". 
Once this was achieved, he would then consider whether it 
was feasible to draw up 
"*** some simple scheme, consistent with the prerogative 
of the Crown, whereby a Union for self-defence may be 
practically effected between the different nations within the 
Protectorate and the first stop taken by them under the 
guidance and instruction of the British Government for testing 
their fitness to approximate in any way towards self-government"1 
(1) 
In April, 1869, Simpson decided to carry out this 
plan. By "a certain amount of diplomatising", he obtained (2) 
an invitation to attend a Council meeting at Mankesim, a 
place not previously visited by a British Governor, tnough it 
was only six miles from Saltpond, a flourishing seaport. 
Simpson was convinced that self-govornment for the Fantis and 
paramountcy for the Government were incompatible. He told 
the Governor-in-Chief that his expedition confirmed his opinion 
that "self-government in the sense understood by civilized 
nations" was impossible on the Gold Coast. Moreover, he 
(1) CO/96/77, no. 1252, Simpson to Kennedy, 5th Dec., 1868. 
(2) CO/96/19, no. 5786, Simpson to Kennedy, 19th April, 1868. 
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averred that he had looked in vain for a group of Africans, 
.!! educated or not, capable or sufficiently honest if 
capable, of giving any aid whatever to help forward an advance 
in civilization amongst the lower orders". 
That progress, he believed, would have to be regulated by the 
British Government to which "in their hearts", even if they 
did not show it, the people were deeply attached. He 
continued; 
"I have therefore, while humouring those who believe( that 
the regeneration and independence is at hand, never lost sight { 
of. Tithe necessity which I believe to exist, that so long as the 
British Government is represented on the Coast at all, it must 
be paramount and take the lead in native national affairs". (1)1: 
Simpson realized that his speech at Mankesim, if it 
was to succeed in its object of breaking up the unity of the 
Confederacy, must capture the imagination of the delegates, 
and convince them of his ostensible sincerity. He began by 
playing on the jealousies of the Kings and Chiefs, and 
reminded them that unity among themselves meant the delegation 
of a considerable amount of their individual power to the 
Council. He warned them to think well before they consented 
to a permanently constituted Confederacy. On the other hand, 
if they left all problems of national interest and importance 
to the British Government, each King and Chief would be able 
to retain his independence. Asking them to. place their trust 
(1) CO/96/80, no. 6879, Simpson to Kennedy, 5th May, 1869. 
My punctuation in last passage quoted. 
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in the Government, Simpson advised them to allow him to 
handle such matters as self-government and defence. As head 
of the Government, Simpson declared, he might even help them 
to draw up a constitution which would conform with the prestige 
and prerogative of the Crown. To prove that he merited 
their confidence, Simpson promised to assist them in attaining 
self-government, and to support them if they were attacked by 
the Ashantis. Further, he pronounced that over the Wlmina 
question, the Fantis were right and the Government wrong; 
every effort should indeed be made to induce the Elminas to 
accept an offensive and defensive alliance. He told the 
Council that, like them, he regretted the exchange. Certainly 
Britain would not have allowed it had she known how deep was 
the affection for her flag. Meanwhile, returning to the 
real business of the occasion, Simpson warned the Council that 
before the Government could help the Confederacy to achieve 
its objects, the Fantis must accept British supremacy and 
defer to his wishes. Taxes on trade must cease, and the 
(1) 
decrees of British courts be obeyed. 
The result of Simpson's bold stroke was not 
immediately apparent. Indeed, his speech at Mankesim served 
at first to encourage the Fantis in their campaign against the 
(2) 
Dutch. In May, 1869, Elmina was more closely invested, and 
(1) Ibid., Notes of Proceedings at Mankesim, 22-28th Apri1,18bý; 
(2) Loc. cit., in no, 6952, Nagtglas to Kennedy, 20th May, 1869. 
206 
in the extreme west, where Beyin had chosen to espouse the 
Dutch cause and Atuabo to oppose it, hostility flared up again. 
Dutch ships destroyed several villages along the coast to 
(l) . 
support their ally, Beyin. At Komenda, some Dutch 
prisoners taken by the Fantis were only released by the 
Confederacytoj payment of a large ransom by the Dutch 
Government. Dixcove was sacked by Dutch supporters, an 
act which involved much destruction of property in the town, 
(3) 
including the store of Messrs. Swanzy, and was followed by 
rancorous demands for compensation fr an the Dutch Government 
(4) 
by that firm. In retaliation for Dixcove, the Fantis 
prepared to attack all the Dutch coastal towns, beginning with 
(5) 
Axim. The Dutch Government was justifiably incensed by 
Simpson's partisan language at Lankesim, and the British 
Administrator was severely reprimanded by the Secretary of 
State for his indiscretion. 
remarks about the Dutch; 
He had not only made hostile 
in undertaking to help the Fantis 
against the Ashantis, he had also contravened British 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 8295, Simpson to Kennedy, 5th June, 1869, and CO/96/76, no. 3735. 
(2) CO/96/80, no. 8646, Simpson to Kennedy, 20th June, 1869, 
and encl. XXI. 
(3) Ibid., Simpson to Kennedy; and no. 9398, Simpson to 
Kennedy, 8th July, 1869. 
(4) 00/96/81, draft to F. O. in no. 10., 420; and C0/96/86/3 
Passim, Swanzy's claimed about £8,000 damages from the 
Dutch, vide C0/96/82, no. 12,093/F0. 
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But Simpson's efforts in the British cause on the 
Coast were soon rewarded. His deaarations at Mankesim had 
caused doubt and dissension among the Kings and Chiefs of 
the Confederacy, and some of them began to wonder whether it 
would not be as well to take Slmpson's advice. In August, 1869, 
Simpson was able to report that he had restrained the 
Confederacy from sending help to Dompr6, the Akim Chief, in 
the Eastern Districts, and to the Wasaws in the Western 
(2) 
Districts. In both areas the coastal tribes were subject 
to Ashanti ag^ession; the Krepi war was in progress in the 
(3) 
east, and the Ashantis had made inroads on Wasaw and 
(4) 
Denkera in the west. The Administrator again warned the 
Council that if it acted without consulting the Government, (5) 
the Confederacy would forfeit British friendship. Simpson's 
(1) Loc. cit. , minutes on no. 6879; and no. 
6952, Kennedy 
to Granville, 1st June, 1869, Confidential, and enclosures. 
Simpson had no difficulty in explaining away his statements 
at Mankesim; and he told Kennedy that it would not do 
to contradict them publicly. If he did so, the Fantis 
would suspect his "honesty'. Vide C0/96/81, no. 10,423, 
Simpson to Kennedy, 23rd Aug. 
'ý1869. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 9907, Simpson to Kennedy, 7th Aug., 1869; 
and no. 11,867, Ghartey to Simpson, 7th Sept., and 
Simpson to Ghartey, 8th Sept., 1869. 
(3) Vide Chapter II, pp. 142 et seq. 
(4) CO/96/77, no. 9621, Ussher to Kennedy, 7th Aug., 1868. 
(5) CO/96/81, no. 11,867, Simpson to Ghartey, 8th Sept., 1869. 
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(1) 
policy was acclaimed by the European merchants. He 
believed, as they did, that 
"the Natives want their Rulers to be strong and that they 
should show and if necessary use their strength". (2) 
When Ussher returned to the Coast in November, he had no 
hesitation in following the course mapped out by Simpson, 
One by one, he detached Kings and Chiefs from the Confederacy, 
(3) 
completing the destruction of its unity that Simpson had begun. 
By the end of 1869, the Confederacy had fallen almost entirely 
under the influence of Mr. Ghartey of Winneba, later King of 
that town, who had been elected President of the Council of 
(4) 
Mankesim. The Fantis were still anxious to continue the 
war against the Dutch, and, with the support of a number of 
Fantis, and especially of the Kings of Abura and Mankesim, 
(5) 
Ohartey directed operations against the enemy throughout 1870. 
But the enthusiasm of the Confederacy as a whole for the 
principles of self-government had waned; this was retained 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 12,698, Simpson to Kendall, 14th Oct., 1869. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 9,905, Simpson to Kennedy, 8th July, 1869. 
(3) cf. Ussher's remark in P. P. XLIX, 1873,171, (hereafter 
referred to as P. P. 171), no. 19, encl. 5, p. 58; and 
C0/96/84, no. 5547, Ussher to Kennedy, 9th April, 1870. 
(4) P. P. (C. -670), no. 16, p. 30. 
(5) C0/96/84, no. 1929, Ussher to Kennedy4i 17th Dec., 1869 and 
2nd Jan., 1870; no. 5547; C0/96/85, nos. 11,466 and 11,470, 
Ussher to Kennedy, 19th and 12th Sept., 1870; and C0/96/87, 
no. 1958, Ussher to Kennedy, 26th Jan., 1871. 
I 
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only by the educated Africans. 
(1) 
Ussher's task of dividing the Confederacy was made 
easier by the decision of the Dutch Government to sell their 
(2) 
forts and leave the Coasto The Fanti-Dutch war had ruined 
(3) 
Dutch trade, and no more proof was required to convince 
the Dutch public that the Gold Coast possessions were a 
liability. On the other hand, the Colonial Office had come 
round to the view that the departure of the Dutch mould be the (4) 
only guarantee of peace in the Protectorate. Scruples 
about acquiring additional poss4ssions were overcome, because 
it was found that the resolutions of 1865 allowed for an 
extension of commitments if such extension was necessary for 
the welfare of the existing possessions. Clearly, the 
possession of the whole coastline would be advantageous for 
British trade, and for the administration. Higher customs 
duties could be imposed, and trade with the interior more 
freely developed if the entire coastal belt were under British 
(1) CO/96/87, no. 1495, Kennedy to Kimberley, 25th Jan., 1871, 
Confidential, and no. 3724, Ussher to Kennedy, 18th March, 187L, 
(2) CO/96/86, nos. 765/FO, and 6294/FO. . 
(3) CO/96/84, nos. 3979 and 3980, Kennedy to Granville, 
23rd March, 1870. 
(4) The idea began to take root early in 1869, vide C0/96/79, 
no. 1258, Kennedy to Granville, 11th Jan.., 1869, and minute by Barrow, 3rd Feb,, 1869; and 00/96/82, minute on no. 2123 by Monsell, 3rd March, 1869. By 1870 it was regarded as the best possible course, vide 00/96/84, minute on no. 3980 by Rogers, 15th April, 1870. 
. ý, ý -.., - .. , ý. ý, -r., ýý,,,,. ý., a,. ýý 
- 210 - 
(1) 
protection. After much discussion an agreement was 
reached in Europe in November, 1870. Immediate ratification 
did not take place because the Dutch tried to reopen negotia- 
tions on two other treaties recently concluded - one on Sumatra 
and one on Surinam. It was hoped at the Hague that further 
concessions on these would reduce the opposition to the Gold 
(2) 
Coast treaty. 
Meanwhile, in view of the projected sale of the 
Dutch forts to Great Britain, the Colonial Office instructed 
(3) 
the local Government to pave the way for the transfer. 
Much trouble had been caused in 1868 when British forts were 
placed under Dutch jurisdiction, and the Secretary of State 
wanted to avoid a similar outbreak if the Dutch towns should 
object to British jurisdiction when the Dutch finally left the 
(1) CO/96/79, no. 1258. 
(2) FO/37/534, memo. by H. P. Anderson, 28th Jan., 1874 
on the connection between these treaties. In the 
Sumatra treaty, subject of many years discussion, 
Britain renounced all claims to Acheen and so 
allowed the Dutch to complete their conquest of 
Sumatra, The Surinam treaty, on labour immigration 
from British to Dutch possessions., was thought by 
the Dutch to be to their disadvantage. The Gold 
Coast treaty, negotiated quite independently, was 
disliked, but knowing that the British were anxious 
to conclude it, the Dutch proposed to put all three 
treaties simultaneously before the legislature. 
When the first attempt at ratification failed the 
Dutch asked for a reconsideration of the two East 
Indian treaties. Britain, however, refused to alter 
their substance. Vide also 00/96/86, corr. with 
F. O., passim; and p. 233 infra. 
(3) C0/96/86, no. 11,348/F0. 
ký 
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Coast. Accordingly, in October, 1870, Ussher asked the 
Dutch Governor, Colonel Nagtglas, for a full statement on the 
possibility of opposition to the transfer from the Elminas, 
and for a detailed account of the relationship between Elmina 
and Ashanti. Any treaty or bond between the two, or between 
the Dutch and the Ashantis, might involve Britain in disputes 
(1) 
with Ashanti as soon as the Dutch departed. 
(1) P. P. (C. -670), no. 1, encl. 1, p. l. 
aYet. ) ... 
ýa 
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- 211 - 
On both questions, the Dutch Governor hastened to 
assure the British. There would be no opposition to the 
change of administration, Nagtglas said, providing that the 
British Government continued the payment of the annual stipends 
to the King and Chiefs which had always been paid by the Dutch. 
In respect of Ashanti, Nagtglas emphatically stated that no 
treaty existed with the King of Ashanti and that he had no 
claim over Elmina. The ties were those of friendship only; 
for the past 150 years, the Dutch had paid a small, annual stipend 
of £80 to Ashanti as a token of the goodwill towards that 
power. Nagtglas also undertook to tell the Elminas of the 
proposed change of jurisdiction. People in the British forts 
at Komenda, Dixcove, and Sekondi had not been forewarned of 
the exchange in 1868. But the Dutch Governor was certain that 
if the Elminas were prepared beforehand they would give no 
trouble when the transfer took place. 
His assertion that the Elminas would welcome the 
British Government, however, was not confirmed. When Nagtglas 
broached the subject at a meeting in December:, 1870, the 
Elminas became restive. In reply to the King's query about 
the exact meaning of British protection, the spokesman for the 
British Government rashly said that it implied the suppression 
of disturbances "if necessary with a high hand and by force". 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 2, p. 2., Kennedy to Kimberley, 3rd Nov., 1870, 
and enclosures, esp. encl. 3. 
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Angrily, the King of Elmina retorted that he also desired 
peace, but on no account would his people consent to be united 
with the Fantis and sold like slaves to the British, In the 
excitement that followed, Nagtglas thought it wise to calm 
the Elminas by telling them that as yet no arrangement had been 
(1) 
made by the two Governments for the sale of the Dutch forts. 
He also warned Ussher that a large force might be necessary 
(2) 
at the time of the transfer, and advised against the 
distribution of presents in Elmina which the Colonial office 
had authorized. Gifts from the British at that juncture 
(3) 
would be regarded as bribes by the Elminas. 
This portent from Elmina belied Nagtglas' earlier 
assurances. His statement about Dutch relations with Elmina 
was also open to question. In November, 1869, the King of 
Ashanti, Kofi Kakari, sent a message to Ussher in which he 
expressed the hope that the British Government did not intend 
to include Elmina in the proposed change. That town, he 
(4) 
maintained, belonged to-him by right of conquest. Nagtglas 
again refuted this claim. He explained that the Dutch West 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 5, encl. 4, p. 14. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 4, encl., Ussher to Kennedy, 4th Dec. j, 1870, 
p. 6* 
(3) CO/96/87, no. 3004, Ussher to Kennedy, 24th Feb., 1871, 
Private; and Sir F. Rogers to Kennedy, 21st Jan., 1871, 
Private, in no. 149. 
(4) P. P. (C. -670), no. 5, in encl. 2, p. 13. 
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India Company had paid an annual stipend to the King of 
Donkera in the seventeenth century to promote the slave trade 
with Elmina. When Osei Tutu, they( King of Ashanti, 
conquered Denkera at the end of that century, the "pay-notes" 
of the Denkeras came into the possession of the Ashantis and 
thereafter the West India Company paid Ashanti instead. 
Taking over the Dutch possessions in 1791, the Dutch Government 
saw no reason to stop this friendly gesture, and the payment 
had been continued up to that very time. Nagtglas indignantly 
denied that the annual stipend was a tribute to the King of 
Ashanti or that it gave him any title to sovereignty over 
Elmina. But Nagtglas made it clear to Ussher that the loss 
of Elmina would be a great blow to Ashanti, since they valued 
that town as their only outlet to the sea. He believed that 
Kofi Kakari would hinder the transfer to Britain, and if 
possible prevent it, though the Dutch Governor told Ussher to 
hCeA, (1) 
pay no to Ashanti pretensions. 
Nevertheless, Ussher was disturbed by the Ashanti 
claim, and the protestations of the Dutch Governor did not 
convince him. A year earlier, in December, 1869, a large 
force of Ashantis, under a Chief named Akempon, had approached 
(2) 
the Protectorate from the extreme west. It was said that 
(1) Ibid. # encl. 3, p. 13. Confidential. 
(2) CO/96/81, no. 616, Ussher to Kennedy, 3rd Dec-, 1869; 
C0/96/84, no. 1929, Ussher to Kennedy, lst Jan., 1870; and 
no. 2077, Ussher to Kennedy, 26th Jan., 1870. 
S 
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they had come at the invitation of the Dutch Government to 
help against the Fantis, though the Dutch declared this 
(1) 
allegation untrue. No attempt was made by the Dutch to 
stop this force, and by March, 1870, Akempon. and some of his 
(2) 
band had reached Elmina. At the time, the Dutch Governor 
hinted that this might be the vanguard of an invasion force, 
and that, in case of an invasion, all the windward people, 
with the exception of those traditionally British in sympathy, 
(3) 
would rally to the Ashentis. By the and of 1870, Akempon 
Was still in Elmina, and Ussher believed that much of the 
excitement shown in December when the transfer was discussed 
(4) 
had been due to Akempon's presence at the meeting. 
It seemed that the Ashantis were determined not to 
lose Elmina. The recent behaviour of the Fantis and their 
allies made it imperative that the Ashantis should cling to 
direct 
this port if they wished to tradeAwith the merchants on the 
(1) CO/96/79, no. 3173.. Simpson to Kennedy, 2nd March, 1869; 
and no. 4987, Kennedy to Granville, 16tlj April, 1869, 
and enclosures. 
(2) CO/96/84, no. 3980, Kennedy to Granville, 23rd iiarch, 1870. 
The depredations of the force on its way to Elmina caused 
much excitement among the Fanti allies. 
(3) Loc. cit. , no. 2168, Kennedy to Granville, 8th Feb., 
1870. 
(4) CO/96/87, no. 1497, Kennedy to Kimberley, 25th Jan., 1871, 
and Ussher to Kennedy, 17th Jan., 1871, Confidential. 
The British Government asked the Dutch repeatedly to remove 
Akempon, but they seemed powerless to do so. Vide also 
CO/96/87, no. 857, Kennedy to Kimberley, 2nd Jan., 1871. 
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coast. Directed by the Council at Mankesim, the members of 
the Fanti Confederacy were making strenuous efforts to 
maintain their position as middlemen, and the unity they 
displayed was largely responsible for their success. Few 
Ashanti traders were allowed to pass to the coast other than 
those who travelled with the King's envoys and shared their 
diplomatic immunity. But a flourishing trade in all goods 
but munitions was conducted with Ashanti across the Pra River 
(1) 
by the Asins.. Ussher hesitated to prohibit the sale of 
arms and ammunition in the Protectorate, because the merchants 
would protest strongly against this interference with one of 
(2) 
the staple articles of trade. In spite of Ussher's threats, 
therefore, the Fantas refused to allow Ashantis to trade on 
the coast where they could buy warlike stores. The Asins were 
especially obdurate; from their privileged position on the 
borders of Ashanti, they virtually controlled Ashanti trade 
(3) 
with this part of the Protectorate. In vain, the 
Administrator tried to pezisuade the Fantis that their fear of 
(1) P. P. (C. -670), no. 7, p. 17; and C0/96/81, no. 613, Ussher to Kennedy, 2nd Dec., 1869, 
(2) CO/96/84, no. 2077, Kennedy to Granville, 4th Feb., 1870. 
Vide also draft reply Granville to Kennedy, 2nd March, in 
which Granville wished the protests of traders. to be disregarded should it prove necessary to prohibit the sale 
of arms. 
(3) Vide esp. loc. cit,, no. 1929, Ussher to Kennedy, 2nd Jan. 
1870; also C096/`79, no. 4987, Simpson to Kennedy, 9th April, 
, 
1869; and CO 96/81, no. 9,907, Simpson to Kennedy, 7th Aug., 
1869. 
R. ýýý, 
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invasion was needless. The Ashanti aggression in Wasaw and 
Denkera, and the force under Akempon in Elmina were to the 
(1) 
Fantis sufficient justification for their policy of self-defence., 
The Council at Mankesim also decided to take Ashanti 
negotiations into its own hands. In spite of Simpson's 
declarations, the Fantis could not see that the Administrator 
was concerned for their interests. Accordingly, Mr. Ghartey 
began to negotiate with Ashanti on his own account at the end 
(2) 
of 1869. Ussher reminded him sternly that he was 
transgressing the prerogative of the Crown, and that only the 
Queen's representative could handle the foreign policy of the 
Protectorate. Moreover, if the Council persisted in making 
private arrangements with Ashanti, it need not expect British 
(3) 
help in case of a conflict. At the same time, Ussher took 
care to tell the King of Ashanti that no credence should be 
(4) 
given to the Confederacy. 
To counter the effects of the Confederacy's hostile 
bearing towards Ashanti, Ussher resolved to conciliate that 
power. He told King Kofi Kakari that the removal of his 
forces from the Eastern and Western Districts of the 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 11,867, Simpson to Kendall, 3rd Oct., 1869, 
and enclosures. 
(2) P. P. 
,, 171, no. 
19, encl. 13, p. 63. 
(3) Ibid., enclosures, 14 and 15, p. 64* 
(4) CO/96/84, in no. 1,929, Ussher to King of Ashanti, 10th Dec., 
1869* 
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Protectorate must be the preliminary to a permanent peace 
(1) 
settlement. But in response to the King's request for a 
European officer on the Pra to see that Ashantis were not 
molested, Ussher detailed Major Brownell forthis duty in July, 
(2) 
1870. Fantis and Ashantis had each detained many of the 
other's people, and Ussher proposed that these prisoners be 
( 3) 
mutually exchanged under Brownell's supervision. This 
officer, however, was withdrawn from his post at the 
beginning of 1871; in spite of his presence, disturbances on 
the frontier continued, and the experiment of stationing a 
(4) 
European on the Pra was hot repeated. Ussher also offered 
in July, 1870, to ransom the Europeans who had been captured 
(5) 
in the Eastern Districts in 1869. No effort had hitherto 
been made to secure their release, though they had been able 
to communicate with the Government through the King's envoys. 
The Administrator suggested that the Europeans be delivered 
when the African prisoners were exchanged on the Pra. But 
the Europeans were not surrendered, although a number of 
(1) CO/96/85, no. 9019, Ussher to Kennedy, 11th July, 1870. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 9025, Ussher to Kennedy, 27th July, 1870. 
(4) C0/96/87, no. 1497, Ussher to Kennedy, 17th Jan., 1871, 
Confidential; and no. 2479, Ussher to Kennedy, 20th Feb., 1871. 
(5) C0/96/85, no. 9025. 
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ýý, ý. 
African captives were released from Ashanti in March, 1871, 
including Prince Osu Ansa, who had been held in Kumasi since 
the end of 1867, and Mr. Watts, the African representative 
(1) 
of the Wesleyan Mission there. 
Towards the end of 1870, both Ussher and Sir Arthur 
Kennedy were hopeful of a speedy agreement of peace with 
Ashanti. In the Western Districts, the Dutch had lost nearly 
all their power and were preparing to leave. This implied 
that on the windward coast the parties opposed to Ashanti had 
been successful, and would provide an effective barrier against 
(2) 
Ashanti aggression. To impress this fact on the King, 
Ussher told him that the British Government intended to assume 
control over Elmina, and that any attempt on his part to 
(3) 
dispute the transfer by force of arms would be useless. 
In the Eastern Districts, Kennedy himself had recently arranged 
a treaty which was designed to secure the Volta for British 
(4) 
trade. The Governor deduced that since the Ashantis were 
held back in the east and in the west, they would be obliged 
to pursue a peaceful commerce through the Protectorate on 
(1) C0/96/87, no. 3191, Ussher to Kennedy, 8th March, 1871. 
Vide Ramseyer and Käme, op. cit., for an account of 
missionary activities in Kumasi at this time. 
(2) CO/96/85, no. 11,106, Kennedy to Kimberley, 19th Sept., 1870. 
(3) 00/96/87, in no. 1497, Ussher to King of Ashanti, 16th Jan., 
1871. 
(4) Vide Chapter II, pp. 162-163. 
- 219 - 
British terms. (1) 
K9nnedy misjudged the position. There were several 
indications that the Ashantis would not acquiesce in the 
transfer of Elmina to Britain. One was Kofi Kakari is decision 
not to release the European captives. Taking them for 
important people, the Kirg believed that he could use them to 
exert diplomatic pressure on the British Government to prevent 
the loss of his port. That the Government was willing to 
(2) 
ransom them evidently lent colour to this view. Another 
portent was a second claim, made in May, 1871, to sovereignty 
(3) 
over Elmina. Ashanti envoys tried to quiet Ussher's alarm 
(4) 
by blaming Ansa for writing this letter; and the 
Government's fears were dispelled by a "Certificate of Apology's 
(5) 
from the King. In Elmina itself, the people were uneasy. 
Akempon and his force of Ashantis had entrenched themselves in 
the town, and refused to obey the orders of the Dutch Government 
(6) 
to move away. Then, in January, 1871, Ussher heard that 
(1) 00/96/85, no. 11,106; P. P. (C. -670), 
vide Chapter II3p. 146, for C. O. view. 
expressed in CO/96/87, minutes on no. 8 
(c. - L'/o) (2) P. P. 1(no. 4, p. 6. Ramseyer and Kühne, 89 et seq; Co/v6/88, no. 7629, Ussher 
1871; and P. P. ,, 
266, no. 91, 
(3) P. P. (C, -670), no. 12, p. 22. 
no. 13, p. 23; and 
Similar views are 
57. 
op. cit., pp. 69" and 
to Kennedy, 19th June, 
encl., p. 154. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 8, P-19- 
(5) CO/96/90, no. 12,680/FO. 
(6) 00/96/87, no. 3191; and P. P. (C, -670), no. 11, p. 21. 
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several thousand Ashantis had appeared in the neighbourhood of 
the French ports of Assini and Grand Bassam. After purchasing 
munitions there, it seemed that these Ashantis would make for 
(1) 
the Dutch towns on the windward coast. Just at this 
point, the French Government decided to abandon its 
(2) 
protectorate over these ports, with the result that there 
was no European power to stop the progress of the Ashantis: 
the Dutch had many months since abandoned their outposts in the 
(3) 
west. Should this Ashanti force succeed in joining 
Akempon in Elmina, its transfer to Britain would become 
impossible to effect, and war would certainly break out between 
the Fantis and Ashantis. In spite of its decisions to the 
contrary, the British Government would inevitably be drawn 
into the conflict. 
Rather than drift into another Ashanti war, the 
Secretary of State would have preferred not to purchase the 
(4) 
Dutch forts. Yet the Dutch were eager to be rid of their 
Gold Coast possessions, and there was no choice but for Britain 
to take them over, since this stretch of coast could not be 
left without European control. The Ashantis would overrun 
(1) CO/96/87, no. 1958, Ussher to Kennedy, 26th Jan. f1871. 
(2) Ibid., and encl. in no. 2119, Commandant Martin to Nagtglas, 
3rd Jan... 1871, 
(3) CO/96/85, no. 9024. 
(4) CO/96/87, minute on no. 2119 by Hugessen, 7th March, 1871. 
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the territory, chronic warfare would follow, and the interior 
would be closed to British traders. The Colonial Office 
therefore considered that the best course was quickly and 
(1) 
quietly to assume control of Elmina and the windward forts. 
But the British Government insisted on some guarantees that the 
transfer would be reasonably-peaceful. In the first place, 
before proceeding with the proposed Convention, the Colonial 
Office asked the Dutch to procure a renunciation of the 
Ashanti claim to sovereignty over Elmina. Ashanti could be 
told that Britain would continue the annual stipend on 
condition of good behaviour, and on the understanding that the 
payment did not signify a recognition of Ashanti claims. 
Further, the Dutch Government would have to remove Akempon from 
Elmina. While lie remained there, it was unlikely that the 
(2) 
inhabitants would agree to the cession. 
In the British Protectorate, meanwhile, the Fantis 
had for the most part ceased hostilities in the expectation of 
the Dutch departure. 
(3) 
But the Fantis were still unwilling 
to accept the policy of Britain towards Ashanti. If they did, (4) 
they would lose their position as middlemen. By December, 
(1) P. P. (C. -670), no. 11, p. 21- 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 1, p. 37; and vide corr. in CO/96/92, no. 3626. 
(3) CO/96/87,. no. 1497. 
(4) of. attitude of the Asins 
ýP 
p. 215, and of the Akims, 
CO/96/89, no. 10,787, and P. P. h f 4zQ, no. 14, encl. 1, p. 27. 
(G-6'to)9 
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1871, Sir Arthur Kennedy felt that the Government ought to 
take a decisive stand in the Protectorate in order to show 
both the Fantis and the Ashantis that Britain was the paramount 
power, and Mr. Salmon, acting as Administrator in Ussherfs 
absence, concurred. Pointing to the dEnger of continued 
vacillation, Salmon wrote: 
"There is a certain party in this country ... a large 
and influential party, though much in minority of people, who 
are opposed to a peace with Ashantee ... They argue that since the Ashantee frontier has been closed, the people have relied 
more on themselves than on trade, and the productions of the 
country have consequently much increased. 
I consider this view both narrow-minded and incorrect; 
the country has undoubtedly increased in productive wealth in 
the last 10 years, but .. I cannot see how the closing up of the whole interior, in the effectual manner in which it has 
been closed for some years, could benefit the line of coast. 
It is an undoubted fact, however, that the opinion is 
widespread and accounts .. for the .. want of faith in the Ashantee proposals ... The prejudices ... are so strong that the present sentiment of expectancy and insecurity will not be 
removed until things have taken a more definite shape". 
The members of this party boasted that they could easily 
defeat the Ashantis in case of an invasion, even without 
(1), 
British help. Should this prove true, Britain's claim to 
rights of protection would become absurd. It had long been 
recognized that only fear of the Ashantis led the Fantis to 
(2) tolerate and defer to British authority. 
(1) P. P. 266, no. l, p. l. 4 
(2) cf. Meredith, op. cit., p. 2051 writing in 1812: "If the Fantees were not kept in some awe by the Ashantees, they 
would be as troublesome perhaps to the Britiski interest, 
as they have been to the Dutch... " And vide P. P. XLIX 1O7ý3, 266, no. 2, p. 3. for the apparent submission of Akim Kotoku 
under threat of Ashanti invasion. Vide Ramseyer and Kihne, op. cit., p. 132, for Ashanti intention to attack Akim in Aug., 1871. 
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Fearing the damage to the British position if the 
Government did not retain the initiative in the Protectorate, 
Kennedy resolved to, assert British authority. It was 
important for the Ashantis to realize that the issue of war 
or peace lay with the Government, not with the Fantis. He 
therefore authorized a peremptory note to Ashanti, stating 
definite terms as the basis for future negotiations. Before 
anything else could be discussed, the message ran, the 
European prisoners must be surrendered; and further, the 
British Government could not entertain any Ashanti claims to 
Elmina. Writing to London, Kennedy urged the Colonial office 
to conclude the Convention with the Dutch, so that the cession 
(1) 
of Elmina could speedily take place. With the whole 
coastline in her possession, Britain would be better able to 
direct affairs in the Protectorate. 
The need for undisputed control over the entire 
Protectorate was clearly demonstrated at the end of 1871. 
a 
A group of educated Africans, judging that/suitable moment had 
come to seize power and put their ideas of self-determination 
into practice, had formally launched their scheme, by 
publishing a Constitution for the self-government of the 
Fanti people. The movdment was called the Fanti Confederation, t 
and its line of development was plainly discernible. First, 
(1) P. P. (C. -670), no. 16, p. 30. 
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there had been the early, incoherent dissatisfaction of 
(1) 
educated Africans in Cape Coast. Under Aggery's leadership, 
their opposition to the Government assumed a more positive 
form, and had merged three years later with the Fanti 
Confederacy. This body, with its specific aims of national 
unity and independence, had a much wider application, and 
though Simpson and Ussher had detached most of the allied Kings 
(2) 
and Chiefs from the Council at Mankesim, the idea of a 
Confederacy was not forgotten. Ussher had observed in 
January, 1871 that the local Government was "gravely menaced" 
by a small knot of people who wanted to "re-establish the old 
(3) 
and mischievous scheme" of a Fanti Confederacy. In the 
course of that year, the educated Africans in Cape Coast, 
together with some Kings and Chiefs, the most important being 
King Otu of Abura and King Edu of Mankesim, planned a successor 
to the Confederacy. They called it the Fanti Confederation, 
(1) Vide Chapter I, passim. 
(2) Vide CO/96/86, in no. 7302/FO, for the interesting comment 
of Barrow in a memo,, 18th July, 1870, which shows the 
distorted view the Colonial Office had of this movement: 
"The aim of Her Majesty's Government, since the Report of 
the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1865 on 
West Africa having been to 'educate' the Natives to 
'administer their own affairs and to protect themselves, the 
Administrator of the Gold Coast endeavoured to model the 
Council (at Mankessim) into a kind of Government, but his 
attempt seems to have failed". 
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and its aims were those always cherished by educated Africans: 
to give them power over their own people, and responsibility 
in their own affairs. These ambitions combined well with the 
general desire of the Fantis and their allies, to control the 
trade of the interior, and served to place the whole in direct 
(1) 
opposition to British policy on the Gold Coast. That such 
a plan should be put forward emphasized the want of Government 
power in the Protectorate and the contempt for its authority. 
The Constitution of the Confederation claimed to 
represent a number of Fanti Kings and Chiefs. It stated that 
a meeting had been held in October, 1871, at Mankesim, and a 
Committee formed to bring about unity among the Fantis and to 
improve the country. One of their number was to be elected 
King-President of the Confederation, but he was to have an 
educated representative, and the holders of the executive posts 
would also be educated men. Together, the executive would 
form a Ministry. Each King and Chief would be asked to appoint: [ 
two delegates, one a Chief and one an educated man, and this 
body would be called the "Representative Assembly" of the 
Fanti Confederation. All officers and delegates were to hold 
office for three years. The Assembly would meet annually, 
the Executive Council every three months, and this Council was 
to give its consent to the laws passed by the Assembly on a 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 1, p. 1. 
ýý 
r 
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majority vote. Each delegate would be responsible for 
carrying out, in his own territory, the laws of the 
Confederation. The Executive Council was also to act as a 
court of appeal, and it was empowered to appoint all 
subordinate officials, judicial and executive. The 
Confederation proposed to build roads and schools, and to pay 
its way, a tax was to be levied on the member states by the 
Assembly. All foreign treaties and alliances were to be 
(1) 
controlled by the Confederation. At its first meeting in 
November, the "National Assembly" passed a revenue law, 
imposing a tax on trade, and the Executive Council was chosen. 
The Kings of Abura and Mankesim were jointly elected 
King-President, and the Executive Council members were Messrs. 
(2) 
W. E. Davidson, J. E. Amissah, J. H. Brew, F. C. Grant and J. M. Abadoo. 
Copies of the Constitution were sent to the 
Administrator and to the Governor-in-Chief$ for their informs- 
jtion, and these officials were requested to transmit the 
(3) 
documents to the Secretary of State. In a covering letter 
(4) 
to Sir Arthur Kennedy, it was said that the Confederation 
(1) P. P. 171, no. 1, encl. A, p. 3. 
(2) Ibid., encl. H, p. 11. Mr. R. J. Ghartey, President of the 
Fanti Confederacy in 1869, was one of the organizers of the 
Confederation, though he did not become an office holder. 
(3) Ibid., enclosures D and E, p. 10. 
(4) Ibid., encl. D. 
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would endeavour to promote all the philanthropic objects 
Britain professed to have in view, but which she had not yet 
attempted to put into practice. The leaders of the 
Confederation assured him that they wished Britain to remain 
on the seaboard; indeed, their Constitution allowed for 
(1) 
appeals to British courts. Moreover, at the injunction 
of the Executive, the members of the Confederation were to 
assist the British Government, and in return they hoped that 
the Government would help them in their efforts. 
ti'Vhen Salmon read the Constitttion, the knowledge of 
the Governmentºs weakness increased his alarm. He told 
Kennedy that: 
"This dangerous conspiracy must now be destroyed for good, 
or the country will become altogether unmanageable... (2) 
The law of the matter is clear. The authority of the 
protecting power, respecting life and death, the levying of 
taxes, and the making of treaties with foreign powers, and the 
supremacy of its courts, is well established by custom and 
precedent ... u (3) 
It was difficult to assess how far the movement had spread, 
(4) 
All the members of the Methodist Church were implicated, and 
every educated African in Cape Coast sympathized with the objects! 
(5) 
of the Confederation. The Executive Council, with the 
(1) Ibid., encl. A. 
(2) Ibid., encl., Salmon to Kennedy, 4th Dec., 1871, p. 2. 
(3) Ibid., encl., Salmon to Kennedy, 10th Dec., 1871, p. 3* 
(4) 00/90/92, no. 867, Salmon to Kennedy, 3rd Jan., 1872, Private. 
l.! 
(5) P. P. 171, no. 19, p. 46. 
.ý 
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exception of Mr. Grant, Salmon arrested and imprisoned, together 'i 
(1) 
with six other prominent Africans. Grant, whom Salmon 
(2) 
called the only "respectable" member, was, under pressure, 
induced to disavow the Confederation. The other members, ILI' 
(3) 
and particularly the leaders, Salmon did his best to discredit, 
by describing them at length and in libellous terms to the 
(4) 
Governor-in-Chief. Thus primed, Kennedy wrote to the 
Secretary of State, Lord Kimberley: 
"I cannot learn that there is a single English speaking 
native or person of whole character connected with this foolish 
project; the promoters are for the most part mulattoes, who, 
having failed in all honest business have now as a last and 
desperate resource adopted patriotism". (5) 
Because the leaders of the Confederacy had drawn up 
their Constitution without consulting the Government, Salmon 
condemned it as illegal; though a member of the Confederation 
explained that had the promoters asked the Administrator's 
advice, he would have placed his own nominees at the head and 
(6) 
so defeated the whole purpose of the movement. But Salmon,, 
(1) Ibid... encl., Salmon to Kennedy.,, 4th Dec., 1871. 
(2) CO/96/89, no. 152, Kennedy to Kimberley, 16th Dec. 91871. 
(3) P. P. 171, encl., Salmon to Kennedy, 4th Dec., 1871; and 
Grant to Salmon, Ist Dec., 1871, p. 13. Vide also 00/96/92, 
no. 867, Salmon to Kennedy, 24th Dec., 1871. 
(4) Ibid. 
*5) Loc. cit., no. 1012, Kennedy to Kimberley, 2nd Jan., 1872. 
Confidential. 
(6) P. P. 171, no. 7, P. 24., encl.., letter to "African Times", 
5th Feb., 1872. Mr. Fitzgerald, the euitor of this paper, 
was appointed London agent of the Fanti Conf eueration. 
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knew that,. his arrest of the leaders was of doubtful legality. 
Since they were not British subjects, they could not be tried 
for treason, and on this or any other charge it was difficult 
(1) 
to bring them to court. The Administrator proposed that 
the Judicial Assessor should try the prisoners, because the 
vague system of law that prevailed in his court might meet the 
case. But feeling ran high in Cape Coast, and Salmon was 
aware that he had no other justification for arresting the 
leaders but in defence of the British prerogative. He 
therefore released them on heavy bail, explaining to Kennedy 
that the projected trial was meant more as a warning to others, 
(2) 
than as a means or punishing the leaders, The Judicial 
Assessor persuaded Salmon that there was very little chance of 
a successful prosecution that would also accord with legal f ormp 
(3) 
and advised him to delay the trial. In January, 1872, the 
Colonial Office ordered Salmon to stop all proceedings and free] 
h4) 
the parties from bail. 
By his action at the outset, however, and by 
intimidation, Salmon succeeded in drawing most of the Kings and 
Chiefs away from the Confederation. Several who had not been 
(1) 00/96/92, no. 867, and no. 909. Kennedy to Kimberley, 
9th Jan., 1872. 
(2) P. P. 171, no. l, enclosures, Salmon to Kennedy. 
(3) C0/9o/93, no. 8e7, and P. P. 171, no. 13, encl. l, p. 32. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 2, p. 13. 
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at the recent meetings at Mankesim hastened to express their 
(1) 
disapproval; the Asin Kings being especially bitter in 
their denunciation because the policy of the Confederation was 
to make Mankesim the centre of the inland trade, to the 
(2) 
detriment of Asin's privileged position. Salmon considered 
that the worst feature of the Constitution, next to its 
assumption of sovereignty over the Protectorate, was 
"the complete manner in which all power (was) taken from 
the native kings and placed in the hands of the 'Ministry"" 
which was composed of young men "some of doubtful respectability 
(3) i 
and none with any means". 
Nevertheless, officials in the Colonial Office 
disapproved of. Salmon's conduct. Sir Henry Holland, Assistant 
Under-secretary, and a competent legal authority, pronounced 
that none of the acts or intentions of the Confederation were 
illegal; and in arresting the leaders, Salmon had exceeded 
(4) 
the powers of British jurisdiction. Mr. Isnatchbull- 
Hugessen, the Parliamentary Under-secretary, agreed with 
Holland. Salmon had obviously erred in his judgement. If 
the movement was so absurd, it'would surely have collapsed of 
(1) Loc. cit., enclosures in no. 13, p. 31, passim. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 5, p. 21, and no. b, p. 22. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) CO/96/89, minute on no. 152, no. 1, supra, printed), by Holland, 6th Jan., 1872. 
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its own accord, and there was no need for the Government to 
f6c 
make martyrs of ihre leading men. Hugessen confessed that the 
Confederation was merely trying to achieve self-government as 
the Committee of 1865 recommended. Should the Colonial 
Office uphold Salmon in the affair, it was clear that 
u... we shall be saying in effect that we will allow no 
attempt at the development of the principles of self-government 
in tale Protectorate unless and until we initiate it ourselves, 
and that in fact we claim a jurisdiction over the 'Protected' 
tribes much more strict and extended than we have hitherto 
done, and in direct opposition to the views of the Committee 
of 1865". 
Yet HuSessen believed that it was none the less important for 
(1) 
the Colonial Office to support the local Government. 
Lord Kimberley's dispatch incorporated all these views. 
Salmon was reproved for his hasty action, but the Secretary of 
State acknowledged that he had acted in good faith and in the 
interests of the Government. Guarded in its opinion of the 
Confederation itself, the dispatch stated that while Her 
Majesty's Government wished to encourage the rantis in their 
efforts to improve their government, they should always consult 
(2) 
the protection power before deciding on any such scheme. 
The Confederation, its aims and the local Government's;; 
attitude towards it raised many important issues concerning 
the relations between Government and people on the Coast, and 
(1) Ibid., minute by Hugessen, 9th Jan., 1872. 
(2) Ibid., minutes by Herbert, 10th Jan. land Kimberley, 11th Jan., 1872, and P. P. 171, no. 2, p. 13.1 
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the resolutions of the Committee of 1865. A question in the 
House of Commons in February, 1872, about the fate of the 
Confederation, prompted the Colonial office to take the next 
move. Mr. John Pope Hennessy who was sent to West Africa 
in the same month to act as Governor-in-Chief, was instructed 
(1) 
to inquire into the Confederation and report on it. 'When 
he arrived in Sierra Leone in March, Hennessy learnt that 
Ussher, since returned to the Gold Coast, was following 
Salmon's example by intimidating members and potential members 
of the Confederation with threats of prosecution. In 
addition, he had proclaimed the body illegal, though this was 
(2) 
contrary to the opinion in Lord Kimberley's recent dispatch. 
Hennessy himself reached the Gold Coast at the beginning of 
April. At once he made it known that he did not sanction the 
Administrator's policy, and invited the leaders to hold 
discussions with him. He told these people that if they 
cared to draw up a detailed statement he would give it his 
sympathetic attention and transmit it to the Secretary of State 
for approval. Hennessy observed to Lord Kimberley that 
if Salmon and Ussher were right in their views on the 
character of educated Africans, then 
(1) CO/96/92, minute on no. 867 by Hugessen, 20th Feb.., 1872. 
(2) P. P. 171, no. 15, p. 42; and no. 17, . p. 
43 and enclosures. 
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"... it would be a painful commentary on the so-called 
christianising and civilizing effect of the Gold Coast 
administration. But, on the contrary, my inquiries on the 
spot, and an examination of the archives of the local Government, 
convinced me that the educated natives have contrasted 
favourably, as a body, with . uropean residents". 
(1) 
At tais stage, however, riennesey was unable to put 
his mind to the Confederation. he had another, and more 
important task to perform during his stay on the Gold Coast. 
This duty was to effect the transfer of the Dutch possessions 
to the British Government. After further discussions between 
London and the Hague, the Convention, drawn up at the and of 
(2) 
1870, was finally passed by the States-General in January, 
1872. Ratifications were exchanged in iebruary and both 
(3) 
Governments were anxious to complete the cession. Oppositi 
to the measure had increased in ilmina, and just before the 
Convention was approved by the States-ueneral, a representative 
of the townspeople had arrived in Holland with a petition 
(4) 
against the transfer to Britain. Moreover, the emergence 
of the Fanti Confederation in the British Protectorate, with 
its aggressive attitude towards Ashanti, made it desirable 
that the coastline should fall under British control before 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 19, p. 46. 
(2) Vide supra, p. 210. 
(3) C0/96/90, corr. with F. O. passim, and C0/96/95, corr. with 
F. O. passim, esp. nos. 634 and 1771. 
(4) Loc. cit., nos. 566/FO and 750/F0. 
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(1) 
the Fantis could provoke an Ashanti war. Hennessy, had 
therefore come to the Gold Coast to assume formal authority (2) 
over the Castle at Elmina and so enable the Dutch to retire. 
Hennessy had explicit instructions from the Secretary 
of State on this matter. Lord Kimberley repeated that he did 
not want the transfer in 1872 to provoke disturbances like 
those of 18t8. On no account was Hennesdy to compel the 
Elminas to accept the transfer. He was to make certain that 
a majority of the people would acquiesce, and to tell those 
who objected that the British Government would not force them 
to place themselves under British protection against their 
(3) 
will. With these instructions in mind, the Governor 
decided not to take reinforcements with him from Sierra Leone 
to the Gold Coast so that there would be no suggestion that 
(4) 
force was to be used, At the time the Gold Coast garrison 
consisted of 100 troops of a West Indian Regiment, and it was 
to be streu thened for the occasion by about 80 Hausa police (5) 
from Lagos. In addition, the Admiralty agreed that two 
(e) ships should be in the vicinity when the transfer took place. 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 1, p. 1. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 20, 
it 
p. 11. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 11, p. 6. 
(4) Loc, cit. , no. 27, p. 16. 
(5) Loc. cit. , no. 12, 
"ýi 
p. 8. 
(e) C0/96/95, draft 
1872 ti fid C 
in no. 750/F0. C. O. to Admiralty, 25th Jan. 
, l , on en a . 
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On 6th April, 1872, with much ceremony, Elmina 
(1) 
Castle was formally transferred to Great Britain. 
Hennessy, was confident that the event would pass off peacefully, 
and could detect no signs of opposition in the town. About 
a month previously, Akempon and some of his followers had 
been removed; a Dutch ship had deposited them on the far 
(2) 
windward coast. Again, the Dutch Governor had taken the 
precaution of deposing the King of Elmina in February, 1872, 
(3) 
so that there would be small chance of organized resistance. 
At a public meeting before the cession, Hennessy, assured the 
Elminas that the British Government would not interfere with 
any of their customs. He also promised the educated members 
of the community that they w aald have a share in the new 
(4) 
administration. On 10th April, the Governor reported that 
the peaceful transfer of the Dutch forts on the windward coast 
had been completed. Small detachments of troops were 
(5) 
stationed at Dixcove, Axim, Sekondi and Elmina. Shortly 
afterwards, Hennessy promulgated a revised customs tariff; 
ad valorem duties were abolished and the spirit duty was 
(6) 
raised from 6d. to is. a gallon. The resulting increase 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 33, p. 22 and enclosures. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 34, p. 32. 
(3) Loc. cit., encl. in no. 24, p. 13. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 32, p. 19 and enclosures. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 35, p. 33. 
(6) C0/96/92, no. 510 1. 
,I 
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in revenue would more than pay for the cost of the transfer, 
which was fixed at less than £4,000, the value of the Dutch 
(1) 
stores taken over by the British. At first, however, 
Hennessy ordered the suspension of the tariff at the former 
Dutch ports, so that the change in Government should not seem 
(2) 
oppressive. 
Before the end of April, Hennessy's reports of the 
tranquil state of the new possessions was belied by news of 
a serious riot in ilmina, which involved the death of a Dutch 
(3) 
officer. It was difficult to ascertain the real cause of 
the riot. Hennessy was in Lagos at the time, and Gold Coasb 
officials denied that it had been caused by the cession to 
Britain. The wrath of the Elminas seemed to be directed 
against Mr. G. B. Eminsang, an African whom Hennessy had 
(4) 
appointed Civil Commandant of the town. Eminsang had taken 
a leading part in promoting the transfer when Hennessy arrived 
on the Coast, and this was probably the reason for the 
(5) 
antipathy of the inhabitants. Administrator Ussher, with 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 101, p. 165. At first, the Dutch had asked 
Z80000 for the forts, vide Co/96/86, no. "1302/F0. They 
lowered the price to +; 24,000 in Oct., 1870, vide Loc. cit., 
no. 10,714/FO. In the end, they were so glad to be rid of 
the Gold Coast forts that they allowed them to go for zhe 
value of the stores, and for concessions in the East Indies, 
vide loc. cit., no. 78o9/F0 and no. 9255/FO. 
(2) P. P. 266, no. 67, p. 97. 
(6) Loc. cit. , nos. 43-49, p. 38, et seq. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 43, p. 38, and no. 47, p. 47. 
LOO-cit., no. 32; and vide CO/96/92, in no, 5389, 
memo. by rminsang. 
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a private grudge against him, (1) made no effort to help him 
put down the disturbance, and Usshorts conduct earned him the 
(2) 
severe censure of both Lord Kimberley and Hennessy. Soon 
afterwards, Ussher went on extended leave and the administration 
(3) 
again devolved on Mr. Salmon. 
Elsewhere in the Windward Districts, the transfer 
to the British Government was quietly accepted, though local 
quarrels persisted. Hennessy hoped that these disputes would 
end under British authority, and in September, Dr. Horton, 
an African appointed by Hennessy to act as Civil Commandant at 
Sekondi, reported the settlement of one such quarrel between 
(4) 
the Wasaws and Ahantas. In order to preserve Government 
influence in Western wasaw, Salmon proposed'to station a 
(5) 
Government agent there. 
In the extreme west of the Protectorate, however, 
matters were more complicated. Akempon had not made his way 
back to Ashanti as the Dutch Government wished. Instead, he 
(1) Ussher was cited as co-respondent in the divorce case 
between htninsang and his wife, vide CO/9b/93, no. o429, 
Hennessy to Kimberley, 31st May, 1372, Confidential. 
(2) P. P. 2bo, no. 54, p. 79, and no. 47, encl. 5, p. 54. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 5o, p. 80. Officials in the Colonial Office 
were disturbed by the differences of opinion between 
Hennessy and üssher, and also between Hennessy and Capt. 
J. Glover, Administrator of Lagos, and resolved to remove 
both Administrators. Vide CO/9e/93, minutes on nos. 5bbl 
and 597u. 
(4) P. P. 2oo, no. 89, p. 14b, and enclosure. 
(b) Loc. cit., no. 90, p. 14b and enclosures. Sir H. Holland 
thought that such a step implied too much interference in tribal affairs, vide CO/9o/93, minute on no. 10,419, 2nd Nov., 1872; also P. P. 2bb, no. 105, p. 170, and CO/96/93, minute on no. 11,703 by Hales, 29th Nov,, 1872. 
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again entered the Protectorate with a large body of armed 
followers, and lodged himself at Beyin where the King, Ameki, 
depended on Ashanti support for his position. In return for 
their assistance, Ameki agreed to allow Ashantis to trade 
direct with merchants at Beyin and Half Assini, and even with 
ships in the roads, a concession which enabled the Ashantis to j 
buy goods at prices about 50% cheaper than those charged by the 
middlemen. But King Blay of Atuabo had identified himself 
with the Fantis in their policy of keeping the Ashantis away 
from the sea. Like his forbear Kweku Aka, who had been 
deposed by the British in 1848, Blay sought to establish a 
monopoly over the nearby territory, and this ambition intensified 
his desire to oust his rival from Beyin. The people of Axim 
were also friendly towards tue Ashantis, so that blay was 
engaged in a two-sided struggle on his left and right flanks. i 
When the Government Commissioners sent by Hennessy to inquire 
1 
into the disturbed state of this region, they found blay's 
campaign still in progress. Trade had declined so much as a 
result of the incessant fighting that merchants hesitated to 
accept further commitments in Axim and even thought of 
abandoning the area as unprofitable. In the interests of 
trade, therefore, a settlement required to be made between the 
factions. The Government decided, on the advice of the 
Commissioners, to recognize Blay as independent of Ameki, but 
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inferior in rank, and all parties were bound to keep the 
(1) 
peace. A more effectual guarantee of quiet was the removal 
of Akempon. In October, 1872, a Government force was 
detailed to arrest him at Half Assini, and he was brought to 
Cape Coast. The Government's object was to send him back 
(2) 
to Ashanti through the rrotectorate under Government escort. 
Tedious negotiations for a peace settlement with 
Ashanti continued throughout 1872. To put pressure on the 
Ashantis, Salmon had closed the Yra frontier in February. 
This stop was also taken to ensure that the tension in the 
Protectorate at the time of the transfer of Elmina did not (3) 
cause an incident on the borders and so precipitate a war. 
But Hennessy was anxious to prove to Kofi Kakari that the 
Government sincerely wanted peace, and he had ordered the trade 
(4) 
paths to be opened in April. After consultation with 
Prince Ansa, Hennessy agreed to pay P11,000, on behalf of the 
Basle Missionary Society, to ransom the European prisoners in 
(5) 
Kumasi. Another friendly gesture made by Hennessy was the 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 86, p. 133, and enclosures. 
(2) CO/9 6/95, no. 3118/F. 
(3) P. P. 266, no. 22, p. 12, and enclosure. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 61, p. 84. 
(5) Ibid., Who B. tish Government did not want to appear 
parsimonious in the matter of ransom for the Europeans, 
but they did not wish to set a precedent either for Ashanti 
to hold Europeans to ransom, or for Europeans to wander in 
the interior where they were likely to be captured. 
Vide minute on no. 6428 by Kimberley, 29th June, 1872. 
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release of the son of Adu Bofo, who had been held as a 
(1) 
Government hostage since the Krepi war. 
For the next few months, it seemed that Hennessy's 
efforts to establish peace might be successful. Kofi Kakari 
sent a message in September that he would soon release the 
captives, though Salmon refused to pay the ransom until they 
were actually set free. HA had reason to suspect that 
Prince Ansa and Mr. Blankson, the member of the Legislative 
Council, were responsible for the King's reluctance to close 
the agreement. sJhese two men were "inseparable", Salmon 
(2) 
noted, and in constant communication with the Ashanti envoys. 
Later it came to light that the King of Ashanti was in debt to 
Ansa, who had stood surety for purchases made since Hennessy 
had opened the frontier, and Blankson was doubtless involved 
in the transactions. The ransom was to be paid to Ansa in 
part settlement of this debt, which explained why the King was 
in no hurry to release the Europeans; he hoped by delaying to 
(3) 
bargain fdr a higher sum. 
At last, in November, 1872, Salmon heard that the 
Europeans had been sent as far south as Fomana in Ashanti, and 
were waiting to leave on the last stage of their journey to 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 65, p, 273,, and enclosures. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 91, p. 149 and enclosures; also C0/96/93, 
no. 10,697, for omission from encl. 4. 
(3) Ramseyer and ifühne, op. cit., pp. 189-195. 
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(1) the coast. But Kofi Kakari apparently had no intention 
of setting them free, and had only allowed them to go to 
Fomana in the hope that the Government might pay the ransom 
at once. It was also clear that the Ashantis were bent on 
war. The European prisoners in Kumasi sent a note to warn the 
Government in October that all the great Chiefs in Ashanti 
were eager for battle. Moreover, Kofi Kakari secretly told 
(2) 
the King of Elmina - Hennessy had reinstated him in May - to 
appear friendly with the British, so that Ashanti would have 
time to prepare for war. Hennessy's move in opening the 
frontier unwittingly helped the Ashantis to do so, for it 
enabled them to trade openly on the coast. After April, 
hundreds of Ashantis hurried back and forth, making large 
purchases of salt and gunpowder. By the end of the year, 
these stores were judged sufficient, and on 9th December, 1872, 
(3) 
the Ashantis began their invasion of the Protectorate. Not 
until some time later, however, did the British Government 
(4) 
become aware of this fact. 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 122, p. 182 and enclosures. 
(2) Hennessy maintained that he had done so in April. 
Vide P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -892), no. 115, p. 129. 
(3) Ramse er and Rühne, op. cit., pp. 203-205, and P. P. XLIX, 1873, (C. -819), no. 1, p. 1. 
(4) Vide Chapter IV, pp. 254-255. 
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On the coast, meanwhile, European merchants were 
extremely dissatisfied with the conduct of the local Government. 
Hennessy's sympathetic bearing towards Ashanti and the members 
of the Confederation irritated them. They asked the Secretary 
of State to send out a more "experienced" Governor who would 
know how to deal with "educated natives" and be more congenial 
(1) 
to the merchants. They were especially angered by a 
trading dispute which arose in the latter part of 1872, and 
urged the Colonial Office to assert authority to protect 
British trade. Formerly, it had been the custom for 
regular 
European traders to make/payments to the Chiefs of 
(2) 
the coastal towns. The tribute took the form of 3% of the 
total amount of goods purchased, and ensured the goodwill of 
the local Chiefs. Not only did they act as hosts to Ashantis 
or other strangers; ' they also introduced them to particular 
merchants by arrangement, and guaranteed good behaviour and 
fair dealing in the transactions. Since the Ashanti war in 
1863, Ashantis had ceased to come to the coast, and the trade 
had only revived to its full extent after April, 1872. As 
before, Chiefs on the coast demanded their tribute. The 
European merchants, however, refusea to pay, maintaining that 
trade should be free. Their attitude provoked a riot in 
(1) P. P. 26b, nos. 7o and 92, pp. 101 and 157. 
(2) It was said that the custom originated with the arrival 
of the first Europeans on the Coast, vide loc. cit., no. 127, 
encl. B. p. 195. 
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Cape Coast in October, and the townspeople threatened to 
blockade the merchants' stores until the tribute was paid. 
Government officials disagreed with the merchants' view and 
declined to support them. With Hennessy's backing, Salmon 
proposed to submit the whole matter to arbitration; it could 
(1) 
then be judged on its merits. 
Annoyed and frustrated, Messrs. Forster and Smith 
told the Colonial uffice that the demand for tribute, and 
the Government's indifference. to the merchants' appeals for 
help was only one instance of 
"... the propensity of the natives to intercept trade, 
to regard that of other natives as the subject or plunder by 
themselves, and the failure of the Colonial Government to 
understand their true object, namely, to keep open the 
countries around their residences for the widest and safest 
intercourse possible. The Ashantee question now is simply that 
of the resolution of the Fantees to prevent the Ashantees from 
going direct to Cape Coast, and to compel them to buy 
European goods second-hand of the Fantees between Ashantee and 
the coast. The assertion of a moderate amount of energy 
and resolution would reduce to order these mischievous 
obstructors of the improvement of the country". (2) 
In bringing the same matter to the notice of the Colonial 
Office Messrs. Swanzy pointedly expressed the hope that British 
protection might not "exclusively be confined to the native 
inhabitants". They continued: 
(1) Loc. cit., nos. 106,109 and 127, and enclosures, pp. 171,172, 
and 189. Colonel Harley, Administrator from November, was 
evidently more sympathetic towards the merchants, 
vide C0/96/96, no. 2196, Hennessy to Kimberley, 12th Feb., 1873, 
Confidential. But the question of tribute fell into 
abeyance because of the war. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 106, p. 171. 
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"Wie venture to assert that European enterprise and 
capital are absolutely necessary to develope (sic) the renurces 
of West Africa - we know of no Settlement or colony on the 
West Coast where the natives have prospered without those 
elements of success; but, judging from the conduct of many 
British officials, we are led to believe they do not hold that 
opinion. Among the citizens of the various countries trading 
in Africa those of Great Britain alone have to submit to 
insult and plunder without hope of redress". (1) 
To illustrate their complaint that the local 
Government was quite incapable of carrying out its main object 
of promoting civilization through the agency of commerce, 
these two firms alleged that the Government actually encouraged 
"bad native customs"; and the Colonial Office was supplied 
with lurid descriptions intended to provoke the Secretary of 
State into immediate action to remedy the situation on the 
(2) 
Coast. Salmon and Hennessy indignantly denied these 
(3) 
charges. Hennessy, indeed, questioned the merchantst 
justification in expecting to trade with complete disregard 
for the customs and wishes of the inhabitants. Further, he 
reminded the Colonial Office that the British owned no 
territory on the Gold Coast and could exercise no sovereignty 
(1) Loc cit., no. 109, p. 172. 
(2) P. P. 266, no. 128, p. 196 and enclosures. The customs 
referred to were a funeral custom which happened to coincide 
with the more rare but no more "barbarous" celebration ofsome- 
girls attaining puberty. The latter custom was, and is, 
uncommon because only rich men can afford the expense; the 
former is still an everyday occurrence. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 116, p. 178. Hennessy pointed out that the 
Administrator had recently taken steps to eradicate what he 
considered to be a really "bad" custom - that of bux'yil ,g the dead in houses - by setting aside a piece of land as 
a burial ground. 
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over the people. In the circumstances, the Government had to 
pay at least as much attention to the people of the Gold Coast 
(1) 
as to the merchants. But the merchants maintained that 
a stronger Government and a more resolute policy were essential 
for the prosperity of British trade. The Colonial Office 
was inclined to believe the merchantst version in the matter 
of the "bad customs". One official had 
"... little doubt that there is greater laxity at 
Cape Coast in consequence of the ready ear given by Mr. Hennessy 
to the Natives... " (2) 
Although Hennessy had approached the members of the 
Confederation with great civility in April, he was not able 
to consider their programme until October, 1872. At his 
request, the leaders had amplified their original scheme. 
Unless the Government supported the Confederation, they told 
him, the whole plan for self-determination would collapse. 
Barely strong enough to form a coherent whole unless by some 
strong impulse, such as the Dutch war, the Confederation 
would be destroyed altogether by deliberate opposition. If 
the British were sincere in their desire to foster self -govermat'!, 
then the local administration should come to an agreement on 
the spheres of influence and jurisdiction of the two bodies; 
and to ensure harmonious co-operation between the Government 6 
(1) Loc. c it. , no. 127, p. 189. 
(2) CO/96/93, minute on no. 703 (no. 128, printed, supra) by Hales, 30th Jan., 1873. Vide also minute by Kimberley, 
5th Feb., 1873. 
- 246 - 
and the Confederation, members of the latter should sit on 
the Legislative Council at Cape Coast. But if, on the other 
hand, the Government disapproved of such an arrangement, then 
the alternative they put forward was for 
"... Her Majesty's Government ... to take over the whole 
country, and govern it as vigorously and on the same .. 
principles as it does Her other Colonies, but not permit us to 
be governed and ruled in the shameful and neglectful way in 
which we have been for many years past, and give free scope for 
our legitimate aspirations to raise our benighted country to 
the same height of civilization as other more favoured nations 
have attained to... " (1) 
Before pronouncing on these alternatives, Hennessy 
asked Ussher for his comments. Ussher replied that the 
scheme for self-government was too complicated, and that in 
any case he did not trust educated Africans to carry out this 
or any other project. The British Government, he thought, 
should retain complete control of financial matters; and a 
majority of Africans on the Legislative Council 
"could not be entertained with due regard to the authority 
of the Government". 
Though Ussher was not prepared to give details of his own 
alternative to the Confederation, he was 
11... strongly in favour of a native council of chiefs; 
but it should be properly prepared and welded together, and 
should place the chiefs themselves, not the 'scholars', in 
direct relation with the Government". (2) 
(1) P. P. 171, no. 19, e ncl . 2, p. 51, 
(2) Ibid., encl. 5, p. 58. 
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Believing the Kings and Ch 
(1) 
and child-like". Ussher 
would not endanger British 
granted that they would be 
The payment of stipends to 
absolute guarantee of this 
fiefs to be "ignorant, impressionable 
was convinced that his proposal 
supremacy, because he took it for 
willing to obey Government orders* 
the Chiefs would provide an 
(2) 
obedience. Mr. Chalmers, the 
Chief Magistrate and Judicial Assessor, agreed with Ussher 
that some form of indirect rule was best suited to the 
(3) 
interests of the Government on the Gold Coast. But Chalmers 
considered that it was most important for the Government to 
create a sound legal basis for its assumed right to legislate 
(4) 
for the Protectorate, since it was not British territory. 
Hennessy's own opinion of the Confederation was tnis: 
that whatever the feeling of the people before the transfer 
of the Dutch possessions, there seemed after this event to be 
a widespread desire to continue the British connection. Yet 
he conceded that deep dissatisfaction had led the Fantis, and 
especially the educated members of the community, to strive for 
self-government and independence. In his view, these aims 
were justifiable, and the solution to the problems on the 
(1) Vide supra, p. 196. 
(2) Po P. 171, no. 19, encl. b. 
(3) Ibid., dnc1.28, p. 101. 
(4) Ibid., encl. 26, p. 97, and memoranda in encla27, pp. 99 and 100; and C0/96/93, memo, in no. 11,507,16th April, 1872, 
omitted from printed dispatch. 
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Gold Coast lay in one of the two alternatives suggested by 
the leaders of the Confederation: either a form of self- 
government recognized by the British, or the introduction of 
full Crown Colony government. 
(1) 
recommended the latter. 
In the circumstances, Hennessy 
Summing up, Hennessy stated that if the Government 
intended to remain on the Gold Coast, it was essential that 
the administration should have the necessary legal and 
military power. On the legal question, he referred the 
Secretary of State to Chalmer's remarks on the right of 
(2) 
legislating for the Protectorate. On the military, 
Hennessy advised that a force of Hausas and Fantis be built up 
to replace the re lar troops which it was part of Imperial N) 
policy to remove. The Governor also advocated district 
magistrates to be stationed in the interior to protect trade 
and administer justice in concert with the Kings and Chiefs. 
For the towns, Hennessy thought that municipal institutions 
should bd setý4j, in which educated Africans could play a 
leading part. He had observed their "intelligence and 
public spirit", and he wanted to give them scope for their 
(1) P. P. 171, no. 19, p. 46. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid.,, and P. P. 266, no. 59, p-81- 
(4) P. P. 171, no. 19. 
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ambitions which would also tend to the general welfare of the 
(1) 
people. But municipal councils did not materialize. 
In June, 1873, Colonel Harley asked permission from the 
Secretary of State to set up such councils, though his object 
differed from Hennessy's. Hennessy had envisaged a body with 
a majority of independent members, whereas Harley suggested 
that the members be nominated entirely by the Government, 
intending that the Council should bring the Chiefs, not the 
educated Africans, into "closer relations with the Government". 
By that time, however, the Ashanti war was in progress, and 
(2) 
neither plan was put into operation. The project for a 
Hausa force was at first doubtfully received. Nevertheless, 
the Hausas from Lagos had acquitted themselves well during the 
transfer of Elmina, and the Colonial Office consented to a 
similar force for the Gold, Coast. Once formed, all the 
(3) 
regular troops could be withdrawn. 
The most important issue, that of the future 
government of the Gold Coast, was not discussed in the Colonial 
Office until February, 1873. By an oversight, Hennessy's 
dispatch was kept from the principal officials until another 
question in the House of Commons on the Confederation prompted 
(1) CO/96/99, minute in no. 7017, by Hennessy, 6th June, 1876, 
(2) Ibid., Harley to Kimberley, 23rd June, 1873 and enclosure, 
Harley to Hennessy, 16th Dec., 1872; and minute by Holland, 16th July, 1873. 
(5) CO/9e/93, draft reply in no. 6426 (no. 59 printed, supra), 
Kimberley to Hennessy, 11th July, 1872, 
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clý 
them to call for the necessary documents. The discussion 
which followed in the Colonial office provided an opportunity 
for a decision to be taken on the findings of the Committee 
of 18o5, because it seemed that the Confederation had its 
starting point in the resolution of the British Government to 
withdraw from the Gold Coast. In addition, the principal 
officials were able to lay down the principles on which the 
administration was henceforth to be based. 
In Hugessen's opinion, there were two main points 
to be settled. One was the part to be played by educated 
Africans, and the other was the position to be assumed by 
Britain in relation to the Protectorate. In dealing wit# both, 
Hugessen favoured the repudiation of the resolutions of 1865. 
They implied abandonment by Britain, and encouraged ideas of 
self-government among the people. In his minute he wrote that: 
it. In the present tone and temper of the British mind, 
no abandonment of territory would .. 0 be permitted by 
Parliament, or sanctioned by Public Opinion. Not, indeed, that 
we must be misled by this fact ... into the contrary extreme. 
The British Public will protest and be indignant against 
abandonment of territory, but there is a long step between that 
indignation and a readiness to put its hand into its pocket to 
pay for the enlargment - or even the retention - of territory 
from which the material advantage to Great Britain may be 
considered remote. " 
Parliament had certainly changed its view in the eight years 
since its Committee of Inquiry had reported, and Britain must 
necessarily retain her hold over the Gold Coast. In doing so, 
(1) CO/96/104, no. 1327/Hse of Commons. 
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she could adopt one or other of the alternatives suggested by 
the Confederation and by Hennessy himself. Hugessen believed 
that to encourage self-government was out of the question. 
It followed that the Gold Coast must be converted fr cm a 
Protectorate into a Crown Colony, and he did not think that a 
compromise was possible. He ended his minute by saying that 
"educated natives" should be ignored and only the hereditary 
Chiefs used as Government agents; and he conceived that 
"Natives 
... (should) be dealt with kindly, but with a firm and strong hand". (1) 
Lord Kimberley agreed largely with these views. 
Perhaps, he wrote, Africans would one day be ready to govern 
themselves. For a long time to come, however, Kimberley 
maintained that Britain's withdrawal would mean a return 
to all their worst customs; and all prospect would 
be lost of opening the interior to commerce. Such a result 
would commend itself neither to philanthropists nor traders". 
Since Britain was to remain on the Gold Coast, she must 
unquestionably occupy the paramount position. Kimberley 
continued: 
"I would have nothing to do with the 'educated natives' 
as a body. I would treat with the hereditary Chiefs only, 
and endeavour as far as possible to govern through them. I 
would reject entirely the scheme for a Fanti Confederacy laid 
before us... 11 
Yet Kimberley did not think that the only alternative to the 
Confederation was Crown Colony government. If the Protectorate 
(1) Ibid., minute by Bugessen, 18th Feb., 1873. 
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were to become British territory, Britain would have to 
defend it against foreign enemies; 
"This means that we must defend it against the Ashantees, 
an obligation which, if we were rash enough to undertake it, 
we could not dischar§ e except at a cost of lives and money 
not to be thought of . 
Another "equally insuperable difficulty" was the existence of 
slavery throughout the Protectorate. This institution could 
not be abolished without social upheaval; nor, on zhe other 
hand, could it be tolerated in British territory. 
The decision of the Secretary of State was therefore 
to continue the rrotectorate as before, but with this 
difference: that the powers and obligations of the British 
Government, and the obligations of the inhabitants, should 
be clearly defined. jnumerating the powers to be assumed by 
Britain, Kimberley Yaentioiied the followwixi ; that Britain 
would defend the forts, while Africans would have to defend 
themselves against the Ashantis; that Britain would have 
absolute control over revenue; and Britain was to have 
sovereignty over the land round the forts, the right to enforce 
her orders in the Protectorate, to maintain peace within it 
and to protect trade. Britain's obligations were to effect 
improvements in the country, to pay stipends to the Chiefs, (1) 
and to encourage education - in the vernacular only. 
(1) Agitation by educated Africans was negligible in the 
Eastern Districts up to this time, and Lord Kimberley was 
probably influenced by the knowledge that the Basle 
missionaries who worked there taught only in the vernacular. 
Vide Chapter II, p. 93. 
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Lord Kimberley would be prepared to sanction the employment 
of educated Africans in subordinate posts, but for superior 
(1) 
posts, he doubted their fitness. On these principles, 
Britain would be able to achieve its object of exercising 
sovereignty without corresponding expense and responsibility. 
These views were embodied in a dispatch to the 
(2) 
Governor in February, but before it was sent, news came of the 
Ashanti invasion of the Protectorate. The dispatch was 
suspended, and another was substituted in March. It stated 
briefly that as the attention of both Government and people 
was occupied entirely by the invasion, the moment was inopport= 
for discussing and settling the permanent organization of the 
Government and its relations with the tribes. These important 
(3) 
subjects would be deferred until the conclusion of the war. 
A few months later, the Governor confirmed that the grievances 
alluded to by the Confederation had been forgotten in the 
(4) 
excitement and stress of the Ashanti invasion. 
(1) CO/96/104, minute by Kimberley, 22nd Fob., 1873. 
(2) Ibid., draft reply, Kimberley to Keate. 
(3) P. P. 171, no. 20, p. 112. 
(4) P. P. XLIX, 1873, (C. -891), no. 20, p. 112. 
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CHAPTER N. 
The Imperial War. 
The Ashantis began to invade the British 
Protectorate in December, 1872. For the next six months 
the Colonial office followed the policy laid down in 1864 at 
(1) 
the end of the previous Ashanti war and repeated in the 
(2) 
intervening years - that neither British troops nor British 
money would help the tribes of the Protectorate in wars against 
each other or against the Ashantis. In July, 1873, there was 
a dramatic change when the Colonial Office decided to make 
the war the direct responsibility of the Imperial Government. 
All its resources were placed unreservedly. at the disposal of 
the distinguished officer chosen for the supreme command, 
Sir Garnet Wolseley. His campaign was so important for future 
relations between Britain and the Protectorate that no effort 
was spared to guarantee its success. At its conclusion, 
in February, 1874, Britain's position as paramount power 
was assured. 
Rumours that the Ashantis had crossed the Pra River 
(1) Vide Chapter I, p. 67. 
(2) Vide Chapter II, pp. 146 - 147, and Chapter III, pp. 19$- 
and p. 251. 
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reached Cape Coast early in January, 1873. So many alarms 
and false reports had been current in the past few months 
(1) 
that no one knew whether to believe this latest story. If 
it had any foundation at all, it might be just another border 
raid. The friendliness of recent communications from the 
King of Ashanti, and of his envoys in Cape Coast, allayed the 
(2) 
Administrator's suspicions, and it was not until February 
that Colonel Harley received trustworthy information of the 
(3) 
invasion. Several thousand Ashantis had reached Fosu, 
about a dayts march south of the Pra, and their numbers were 
(4) 
increasing daily. 
The local Government was ill-prepared to defend 
its interests. There were 170 West Indian troops of the 
garrison together with 250 Hausa and Fanti police; the 
equipment of the force amounted to 190 rifles, 380 flint guns 
(5) 
and a small quantity of ammunition. Even this inadequate 
regular force was about to be reduced when the Ashanti inroad 
(6) 
was confirmed. With some relief perhaps, Colonel Harley 
Ana.. 
_I i. 
(1) P. P. _Eb_v, ' EJ73,266-l,.. nno. 133, p. 217 anc3 enclosures; and 
no. 139, p. 230 and enclosures. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Loo. cit., no. 135, p. 219 and enclosures; and no. 149, encl., 
p. 248. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 135, sub-encl. 4, p. 224* 
(5) 00/96/96, no. 1762 (omitted from no. 135, encl. , printed, suprL and minute by Hales, 26th Feb., 1873. 
(6) P. P. 266-1, no. 133. The removal was in accordance with 
British policy to reduce Imperial expenditure on defence. Vide Chapter III, p. 250. 
t 
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announced that the Government was bound by the instructions 
of 1864. Unless the forts themselves were in actual danger, 
(1) 
no Imperial troops could fight against the Ashantis. 
(2) 
This declaration was approved by the Colonial Office. 
Neither Lord Kimberley nor the other officials intended to 
alter the policy of the British Government, and for the first 
few months of the war, the Secretary of State saw no necessity 
for change. From the early reports of the invasion, the 
Colonial office could not form an exact picture of the 
situation on the Gold Coast. Details tended to be obscured 
by the open dislike that Governor Hennessy felt for Colonel 
(3) 
Harley. When Harley did not wish to place too much reliance 
on rumours, Hennessy accused him of withholding important 
(4) 
information; when it was known that Ashantis were in the 
Protectorate, Hennessy told the Secretary of State that Harley 
was exaggerating an affray on the borders, and attributed the 
unrest on the Coast to Harley's tactless handling of people 
(5) 
whose character he did not understand. Whatever the facts 
(1) P. P. 266-1, no. 139, encl. 1, p. 233. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 142, p, 240, 
(3) Journal of events during the Gladstone Ministry, 1868-74, p from the m er ey Papers, by courtesy of Miss E. Drus, 
entry of 6th Sept., 1873. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 133. 
(5) Loc. cit. , no. 148, p. 243, 
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on the Gold Coast, however, the settlements there, as well as 
at the Gambia and Lagos, appeared to the Colonial office to be 
in a troubled state. Lord Kimberley took the precaution of 
advising the War Office and the Admiralty that more equipment 
(1) 
and ships might be needed on the West Coast. As soon as 
dispatches confirming the invasion reached London on February 
28th, the War Office was further notified that the withdrawal 
of Imperial troops which had been pending since 1865 would 
(2) 
have to be indefinitely postponed. 
Knowing Hennessy's propensity for quarreling with 
his subordinates, Kimberley did not pay much attention to his 
(3) 
criticisms of Harley, and refused to allow the Administrator 
(4) 
to be moved from the Gold Coast, as Hennessy requested. 
On the contrary, the Secretary of State insisted that all 
Harley's actions should be given the utmost support. Any sign 
of disapproval from superior officials would destroy confidence 
(5) 
in the Government and weaken its position in the Protectorate. 
Kimberley himself saw no reason to doubt that Harley's measures 
(6) 
were judicious. 
(1) Loc. cit., nos. 136 and 137, p. 228. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 145, p. 2429 
n., d cP. (3) /, -Up-. cit., 6th Sept., 1873, A Hennessy Is dislike of Ussher 
and Glover in 1872, Chapter III0 p. 237, footnote (3). 
(4) P. P. 266-1, no. 139. 
(5) Loc. cit. , no. 142, p. 240. 
(6) CO/96/96, minutes on no. 2594 by Herbert, 19th March, and 
Kimberley, 20th March, 1873. 
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Although Fanti country was subjected to the main 
Ashanti attack, the Fantis and their allies were as badly 
prepared as the British for repelling the invaders. Their 
chief wdakness lay in their disunity, so easily effected, and 
(1) 
so deliberately preserved by the administration. Taught 
to rely on British protection, the Fantis were also dependent onj 
the Government for the means of defence, because assistance 
(2) 
in arms, ammunition and money had always been promised them. 
The friendly feeling of the allied Chiefs towards the 
Government at the beginning of the war and their requests for 
(3) 
aid showed that they were willing to act if the 
(4) 
administration helped them as they had been led to expect. 
In Cape Coast itself, there was great enthusiasm for the 
coming conflict; a Volunteer Corps of 250 young men was 
(5) 
enrolled, to be armed and equipped by the Government. 
From the outset, ljowever, Harley was warned that 
the Fantis were ready to co-operate with the Government only on 
condition that the administration shared with them the burden 
of the war. The educated community know that to keep the 
Ashantis out of the Protectorate was as much in the interests of 1 
(1) Vide Chapter III, pp. 202-209, esp. 
(2) cf. Chapter I. p. 67. 
(3) P. P. 266-1, no. 149, encl. 2, p. 248. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 175, p. 319. 
(5) Loc. cit. , no. 135, encl.., P9220 and sub-encl. 9, p. 227. 
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the Government and the European merchants as it was to the 
advantage of the Africans. Their consciousness of the import 
of British policy was evident from a letter sent in February 
to the Administrator by King Edu of Mankes/im, the traditional 
head of the Fanti Confederacy and one of the leaders of the 
Confederation movement in 1871. This document called on the 
Government to accept the responsibility of its policy in the 
Protectorate by giving full support to the Fantis in their 
(1) 
struggle with the enemy. But Harley knew that the 
educated Africans had threatened British supremacy before, and 
he did not want them to menace it again. He planned the 
(2) 
Government's part in the war accordingly. 
His main object was to forestall the educated 
(3) 
Africans in taking the initiative. As soon as he was sure 
that an invasion was in progress, he sent a European officer, 
Dr. Rowe, on a spacial mission to the various Fanti Chiefs 
to ensure that they communicated direct with the Government. 
(4) 
Dr. Rowe told the Chiefs that the Government would issue them 
with moderate quantities of ammunition, but more than this the 
administration 
(1) Ibid., sub-encl. 3, p. 224. Harley quoted this letter 
three times in dispatches to England, an indication of the 
importance he attached to it. In the Colonial Office 
Mr. Hugessen drew attention to the letter in which, he said "is apparent the hand of an 'educated native'. ' Vide CO/96/ot' 
minute on no. 4283,5th May, 1873. 
(2) P. P. 2tib-1, no. 149, encl. 2, p. 248. 
(3) P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -b90), (hereafter referred to as 
P. P. (C. -c, 90) ), no. 77, p. 137, esp. para. 5. 
(4) P. P. 2o6-1, no, 13b, encl.., p. 220. 
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(1) could not do. No money could be iven to them because (2) 
the local Treasury had none to spare. The detachment of 
fifty Hausas sent inland by Harley to Dunkwa were to watch 
events for the Government, and were forbidden to take part in 
(3) 
any action. If the Chiefs wished to expel the Ashantis 
from the Protectorate they would have to rely on their own 
(4) 
exertions. Harley and other officials in the Government 
had persuaded themselves that the Fantis were incapable of 
(5) 
combining except under European leadership. As if to 
prove their point, Harley nominated a Chief of Mumford, whose 
loyalty to the British had never been questioned, as commander 
of the Fanti arm with instructions to unite the people for 
(6) 
their defence. But the Administrator determined that the 
Government should not lose control, and it was he and Dr. Rowe 
(7) 
who urged the Fantis to gather for an attack on the Ashantis. 
All these measures left the Fantas divided among 
themselves and uncertain of the intentions of the Government. 
Unable to infuse into them a belief in their own capabilities 
(1) Ibid., sub-encl. 7, p. 226. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 149, encl. 2, p. 248,, 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 135, sub-encl. 7. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 139, in encl. 2, p, 235; and no. 157, sub-encl. in en c 1.2, p. 288. 
(5) of. Loc. cit., no. 149, in encl. 2, minutes of Leg. Co., p. 252, 
esp. opinion of. HHChief Magistrate; and no. 175 esp. p. 321. 
(6) Loc. cit., no. 149, encl. 2, p. 248. 
(7) Ibid. 
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which he did not have, Harley could not succeed in persuading 
(1) 
them to join the Asins who were waiting at Akrofum. On 
February 10th, afraid to maintain this position alone, the 
Asins retreated south of Mansu, leaving the enemy in 
possession of the country from Asin - Nyankumasi to the Pra (2) 
and free to obtain reinforcements and supplies from Ashanti. 
In these circumstances, Harley judged it prudent to lend more 
(3) 
security to the forts; he sent to Lagos for 100 Hausas and 
(4) 
asked the Navy to keep two rau"ships in the roads. 
At this stage, Mr. Keate, the new Governor-in-Chief, 
arrived at Sierra Leone, and Acting Governor Pope Hennessy was 
(5) 
relieved of his duties. Qute new to Gold Coast affairs, 
Keate was unable to assess the magnitude of the invasion and 
the danger to the Lorts. After a hasty reading of Harley's 
dispatches, he formed the impression that the people of the 
Western Districts were deliberately postponing their advance to 
(1) Ibid., postscript on p. 250. 
(2) Ibid., encl. 3, p. 255. 
(3) Ibid.., sub-encl. in encl. 3, p. 266* 
(4) Ibid., Harley to Stephens, 8th Feb. 9 1873, p. 257. 
(5) Vide Journal, op. cit., 6th Sept., 1873, in which Lord 
Kimberley says: II was ... unfortunate in appointing Pope Hennessy as ad interim Governor till Mr. Keate's arrival. 
I never suspected that he would hold the appointment more 
than a few months. Instead of which, owing to Mr. Keate's 
delay in taking up his appointment, Mr. Hennessy remained 
long enough to have much influence on the course of affairs. 
A man of quick intelligence and considerable abilities, he 
is vain, unscrupulous, wanting in sound judgment and common 
sense, and prone to quarrel with his subordinates. Colonel Harley 
... is a painstaking, well meaning man: and did his best in great difficulties'. 
+- 
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the front in the hope that British reinforcements would arrive 
to fight with them. If this was true, the Government should 
restrict its activities to the most important forts and so 
(1) 
make it absolutely clear that the people must defend themselves. 
latest reports from the Gold Coast at the end of February told 
of the folly of delay in resisting the Ashant is , and of the 
strange apathy which appeared to have taken hold of the Chiefs 
and their followers. The Government itself seemed to be 
disorganized. Colonel Harley had become seriously ill and 
his life was despaired of. Meanwhile the Hausas from Zaps had 
arrived without their own ammunition and there was very little 
on the Coast. Neither the Accra nor the Krobo people in the 
Eastern Districts could be supplied with the gunpowder they 
requested. Further, Colonel Foster Foster, the Acting 
Colonial Secretary, writing privately to Sierra Leone during 
Harley's incapacity, admitted that although the Government was 
directing the Chiefs to attack the Ashantis, no detailed 
(2) 
plan for the first military campaign had been drawn up. 
Keate decided that the best way to find out what was happening 
on the Gold Coast would be to go there himself. Believing 
that a reinforcement of Imperial troops from Sierra Leone was 
(3) 
not required, he sailed for Cape Coast on March 1st without them. ' 
(1) P. P. 266-1, no. 157, p. 283. 
(2) Ibid., sub-enc1.2, Foster to private Secretary, 23rd Feb., 
1873, p. 290. 
(3) Ibid., no. 157, p. 283. 
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He arrived there to find that little progress had 
been made. Ashantis were thought to be advancing into Wasaw 
and Akim on either side of their main force on the Cape Coast 
(1) 
road, yet the administration still met with considerable 
difficulty in trying to rouse the people. Chiefs promised 
to come forward but they were slow to do so, and the official 
messenger who was sent to hurry them heard many complaints 
and excuses. One Chief said that the powder issued to him 
by the Government was unusable, another that Hausas plundered 
his villages if the inhabitants left them, a third that the 
(2) 
Government ignored him except in time of trouble. It 
was important, however, that the Ashantis should not be 
allowed to approach any nearer to the coast. The garrison 
was too small to defend the 
Ports, most of which were in any 
case unfit for occupation; and the (}overnment fs supply of 
(3) 
ammunition for the Chiefs was almost exhausted. Keate at 
(4) 
once summoned 100 troops from Sierra Leone. But a few 
days after reaching the Gold Coast, Keate himself fell ill, 
(5) 
and he died on March 17th. Colonel Harley, since recovered,! 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 174, encl. 2, p. 308. 
(2) Ibid., sub-encl. in enc1.2, Mr. Thompson to Col. Foster, 
26th Feb., 1873, p. 310. 
(3) Ibid., encl. 3, p. 312, and CO/96/96, no. 3650, for omission 
from printed document. 
(4) -CE 21M, no. 174. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 176, p. 338. 
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was sworn in as Governor-in-Chief in his stead, and resumed 
(1) 
control of affairs in the Protectorate. 
At the end of February it was decided that the Lagos 
Hausas should be sent to join the force already at Dunkwa. 
All the Hausas were then placed under the command of Lieutenant 
Hopkins, a European officer seconded from Sierra Leone to 
help the Gold Coast administration in the emergency of the 
invasion. He had strict orders not to take part in any 
engagement between the Fantis and Ashantis; his advance with 
the Hausas was intended as a forward defence of the Ports, not 
(2) 
as assistance to the Fantis. The Chiefs, however, insisted 
on support from the Government force, and it was not until 
(3) 
Hopkins dispatched some of the Hausas to Fanti-Nyankumasi thati 
the allies moved in large numbers to the extensive camp at that 
(4) 
place. But Government stocks of ammunition were so low 
that Harley found it difficult to comply with the demands which 
came from all parts of the Protectorate. He was unwilling to 
replenish the Government store by purchase from the merchants; 
their prices had risen because of the war and the local treasury 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 177, p. 338. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 174, sub-encl. in encl. 2. Foster to Hopkins, 
24th Feb., 1873, p. 311, and Foster to Hopkins, 3rd March, 1873, 
p. 315. 
(3) Ibid., , Hopkins to Harley, 1st March, 1873, p. 314, 
(4) Ibid,, Hopkins to Harley, 3rd March, p. 314. 
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(1) could not bear any extra expense. Yet he knew that the 
Chiefs relied on the Government to fulfil its promises and 
provide them with powder and lead for the flint-lock guns they 
(2) 
used. On March 10th, Lieutenant Hopkins reported from the 
front line that the defenders were outnumbered by the enemy; 
and, when the Fantis ran out of ammunition, they gave way to 
(3) 
the Ashanti onslaught. 
With the enemy at Fanti-Nyankumasi, only thirty 
miles from Cape Coast and Elmina, Harley deemed it no longer 
safe for the Government to remain in the background. Abandon- 
ing all pretence of allowing the Chiefs to conduct the war, 
he appointed Hopkins to command the army of defence. The 
recent defeat of the Fantis, he explained to the Colonial 
Office, demonstrated his conviction that these-people were 
(4) 
incapable of uniting under their own leaders, A new 
encampment was to be formed at Dunkwa, and as the Chiefs had 
protested against the inaction of the Hausas at the last 
battle, Harley believed it politic to permit them to take part 
(5) 
in the next. Officials in the Colonial Office questioned 
(1) Loc. cit., no, 199, p. 361, para. 9. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 175, esp. p. 321, 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 175, p. 319; and enclosure Hopkins to Harley, 
13th Mar., 1873, p. 322. 
(4) Ibid.,, p. 321. 
(5) Loc. cit. , no. 183, P. 348; and no. 199, encl. 1, P. 361. 
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this concession; it did not seem to be in keeping with the 
instructions that no troops in the pay of the Government were 
to be employed except in defence of the forts. After due 
consideration, however, Lord Kimberley left the matter to 
(1) 
Harley? s discretion. The Governor intimated that the 
Fantas seemed angry and embittered. Shortly after the defeat 
at Fanti-Nyankumasi, a mob in Cape Coast gave vent to their 
feelings by brutally assaulting the Ashanti Prince Ansa and his 
(2) 
household. Ansa was suspected of being an enemy spy whom 
(3) 
the Government befriended and suffered to be at large, It 
would therefore have been unwise to let the Fantis think that 
the administration would give them no support at all. At 
Hopkins' request, Harley issued some ammunition from his 
(4) 
diminishing store. Most of the Chiefs asked for a further 
(5) 
supply during March, and Harley was anxious that an attack 
should be made on the Ashantis before the rainy season was too 
far advanced. Once scattered by the weather, the Fantis might 
not assemble again. The Ashanti. s themselves might retire 
with the change of season, but the Government would regret that 
(6) 
they had escaped unpunished. 
(1) CO/96/97, minutes on no. 4283 (no. 199 supra, printed), 
by Herbert, 3rd May, and Kimberley, 4th May, 1873. 
(2) P. P. 266-1, no. 178, p. 340. 
(3) Vide Chapter III, p. 190 and p. 240* 
(4) P. P. 266-1, no. 199, encl. l, p. 361. 
(5) Ibid. , encl. 5, esp. p. 366. 
(6) Loc. cit., no. 204, p. 381. 
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When news came of the retreat from Fanti-Nyankumasi, 
the Colonial Office took more careful note of the state of 
the defences on the Coast. In order to share the responsibility 
and possible blame, the Colonial office reminded the War Office 
(1) 
of the small number of regular troops on the Gold Coast. 
The shortage of ammunition among the Fantis was also remarked; 
Lord Kimberley asked the War Office to send out a large 
(2) 
quantity of ammunition for use among the Chiefs, as well as 
(3) 
supplies for the regular troops. But no reinforcement for 
the garrison was thought to be necessary. 
By the beginning of April most of the Fantis were 
(4) 
collected at Dunkwa. Some men fr mit Eastern Akim had come 
to help them, the Hausas were prepared, and a full-scale attack 
(54 
seemed opportune. The battle took place on April 8th, and 
(6) 
for the first time in memory the allies withstood the Ashantis. 
Eager to follow up this success, both Hopkins and Dr. Rowe 
urged the Governor to send more ammunition for the Hausas, the 
(7) 
Cape Coast Volunteers and the Chiefs, ' On April 14th, 
another heavy engagement took place, and at first an allied 
(1) CO/96/97, in no. 3651, memo. by Harley on defence, and 
draft to V1.0. , 23rd April, 1873. 
(2) P. P. 266-1, nos. 184 and 194, pp. 349 and 353. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 136, p. 228. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 199, p. 359. 
(5) Loc. cit. , no. 204, p. 381. 
(6) P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -890), (C--890), no. 1, p. 1. 
Ir, t 
(hereafter referred to as P. P. 
.'1 Loc. cit. , no. 5, p. 21, and enclosures 1 to 5. 
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victory appeared certain. But fresh supplies of powder 
and lead reached the field too late. After holding their 
position alone for several hours, the Fantis suddenly broke 
(1) 
and fled. 
Just at this point, Mr. Blankson was accused by 
(2) 
the Fantis on the battlefield of giving aid to the enemy. 
Blankson, the only unofficial member of the Legislative 
Council, was the Governor's chief African adviser. Blankson's 
denunciation symbolized the sense of betrayal among the 
(3) 
Fantis. The Governor had made no effort to help them 
while their country was overrun by the Ashantis; indeed, he 
had hindered the allies' chance of success by withholding from 
(4) 
them the means of defence. By their lack of interest in 
(5) 
the war from that time, the Fantis showed that the 
Government had forfeited their trust. Conversely, the Fantis 
became discredited in the eyes of the Government and of the 
Colonial Office. The successive defeats of the Fantis in 
the war gave colour to Harley's initial picture of them as a 
timorous and irresolute people, unable to unite or stand firm 
(1) Ibid. , and encl. 6, p. 26. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 4, p. 16 and enclosures. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 5, p. 21. Harley wrote that he was inclined 
to believe the charges of treachery made against Blankson, 
andýýAnsa, vide supra, p. 266. 
(4), (5))... 
- 269 - 
(4) This assertion was first made by Mr. F. Swanzy, vide 
00/96/98 in no. 5001, account of interview between Swanzy 
and Holland, 19th May, 1873, and the facts appear to 
substantiate the charge. At the beginning of February, 
1873, Harley had 12$500 lbs. of powder. (P. P. 266-1, p-25,3). 
Of this amount he distributed 8,000 lbs. by 14th Feb., 
(loc. cit., p. 255). Small amounts were issued thereafter, 
and 2,000 lbs. on 24th March, (loc. cit., p. 361). On 
14th April, he sent an equal quantity to Dunkwa where the 
battle was in progress, but it arrived too late to be of 
any use (P. P. (Co-890), no. 5, encl. 4, p. 2. -) . Mr. Swanzy 
said at this interview that only 15,000 lbs. had been 
issued since the beginning of the-; war. Harley bought small 
quantities from the merchants, (P. P. 266-1, p. 321) and 
received an gdditional small amount from the Commisariat in 
Cape Coast, (loc. cit., p. 349) which presumably made up the 
total issue to 15,000 lbs. (vide P. P. (C. -890), p. 50). 
There is no way of ascertaining how much powder was needed 
by the Fantis, but there are indications: Bentill, 
appointed C. -in -C., asked for 10,000 lbs. for 20,000 men 
(he did not get it) (vide P. P. 266-1, p9252). 
With this estimate as a rough guide, it is plain that the 
amount of powder issued by Harley was quite inadequate for 
the 40,000 allies engaged in the Dunkwa battle on 14th April 
(this is a low estimate - Dr. Rowe said he did not think 
there were many less than 56,000 men at Dunkwa (vide P. P. 
(C. -890), no, 25, encl. 4, p953). Harley's blustering reply 
to Swanzy's accusation, and to similar charges on the 
Coast, was that the Fantis were too cowardly to make a 
stand. Against this are Harley 's frequent statements that 
his supplies pf ammunition were almost exhausted and the 
testimony of Dr. Rowe and Lt. Hopkins, officers in the 
field. Indeed, the inadeqwte supplies issued for the 
Dunkwa battle make the Fantis' resistance all the more 
remarkable. 
(5) of. P. P. (C. -890), no. 63, p. 1200 
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cl) 
in the face of the enemy. 
At Dunkwa, the Ashantis wire little more than twenty 
miles from Cape Coast, but the resources of the Government had 
not increased materially since the beginning of the war. 
(2) 
In March, 100 West Indian troops arrived from Sierra Leone, 
and at the and of April, a quantity of ammunition for the Chiefs 
(3) 
and the regular force. The Colonial office realized, 
however, that the retreat from Dunkwa placed the-Forts in a 
vulnerable position. As soon as Lord Kimberley heard in May 
of the Ashanti victor , he asked the War office for 200-300 
(4) West Indian troops; and, since these men would take some 
time to reach the Coast, the Admiralty agreed to send 100 
Marines without delay. But the Secretary of State made it 
clear, in reply to a query from the War Office, that these 
troops were to operate only in defence of the Forts, and that 
he did not wish any alteration to be made in the instructions 
(6) 
of 1864, 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 5, p. 21; vide also comment in no. 30, 
sub-encl. l, p. 59 and WO/33/26, Pr6cis of the Ashanti Expedii- 
tion, 13th April, 1874. Harley even went so far as to say 
that the Fantis had never made any attempt to unite for 
self-defence, though only 5 years had passed since the 
formation of the Fanti Confederacy. Vide P. P. 2e6-1, no. 175, 
P. 319, 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 183, p. 348. 
(3) P. P. (C, -890),, no. 44, p. 79. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 12, p. 30, 
(5) Loc. ci t. , no. 11, p. 29, 
(e) Vide Chapter I, p. 67. 
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The intention of the Colonial Office to keep the 
British Government out of the war was established beyond 
doubt towards the end of May when the War Office asked for 
comments on a scheme drawn up by Colonel do Ruvignes, an 
officer formerly employed on the Gold Coast. The plan involved 
the invasion and conquest of Ashanti by European troops marching 
(1) 
along the Volta River. Obviously the adoption of the 
project would mean a complete reversal of the policy of non- 
(2) 
intervention on the Gold Coast. Even Hugessen, the 
Parliamentary Under-secretary, though he had often advocated 
(3) 
a strong line towards Ashanti and the Protectorate, shrank 
(4) 
from the responsibility such a change would entail. Lord 
Kimberley ridiculed the whole idea of the invasion and conquest 
of Ashanti, and the threat of French competition which 
de Ruvignes had urged as a reason in favour of his proposal: 
"Colonel do Ruvign6s lays much-stress on the danger of 
France acquiring a great African Empire. I look on his fears 
as wholly baseless and chimerical ... I can think of nothing 
more certain to weaken France than further extenbions of 
territory towards the interior of Africa, and it is rather 
absurd to talk of French aggrandizement in that quarter when we 
have just extended our influence over the whole coast from 
Lagos westward nearly to Assinee with the single exception of 
Porto Novo. 4(5) If we wish to weaken ourselves we cannot 
adopt a better course than to spend a few millions in 
(1) P. P. (C. -890), no. 36, p. 63, and enclosure. 
(2) CO/96/107, minute on no. 5112, (no. 36 supra, printed), by 
Holland, 28th May, 1873. 
(3) of. CO/96/96, minute on no. 1762,27th Feb., and on no. 2594, 
21st March, 1873. 
(4) CO/96/107, minute on no. 5112 by Hugessen, 27th May, 1873. 
(b) An exaggeration. British jurisdiction on the Gold Coast 
ended at Keta, though it was only nominal east of the Volta. Over 100 miles of coast lay between Keta and Lagos. 
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conquering Ashantee, and establishing a West African Empire. 
It is to be hoped that no Government will be mad enough to 
embark on so extravagant an enterprise". (1) 
The scheme was sent to Harley as a matter of course on 21st 
June for his information, but it was unequivocally stated that 
Her Majesty's Government did not contemplate any of the 
(2) 
operations recommended, 
In the same way, the Colonial Office did not intend 
to proffer financial assistance for the prosecution of the 
war. By April, despite Harley's stringent economy, the 
Government was unable to pay current expenses, and the one 
method of improving the local revenue was to increase customs 
(3) 
duties, This unpopular measure called forth an immediate 
(4) 
protest from traders on the Coast and in England. The 
Colonial office therefore ordered the tariff to be revised so 
(6) 
that it conformed more closely to the merchants' wishes, and 
on Mr. Swanzy's advice, authorized Harley to raise a loan of 
(1) CO/96/107, minute on no. 5112 by Kimberley, 28th May, 1873. 
(2) Ibid., draft, Kimberley to Harley, 21st June, 1873. 
Confidential. 
(3) P. P. (C. -890), no. 21, p. 37. In the new tariff, the duty 
on spirits was raised from is. to 1/6d. per gallon, and 
an ad valorem duty of 10% was imposed on general imports. 
Vide Chapter III, p. 235. 
(4) P. P. (C. -890)., no. 2b, p. 64; no. 82, p. 346; no. 85, p. 148; 
and no. 99, p. 167. Vide also CO/96/98, in no. 5001, account 
of Swanzy's interview. 
(5) p. P. (C, -890),, no. 66, p. 131; specific duties were to 
remain, but the ad valorem duty was abolished. 
d 
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(1) £25,000 by means of public subscription on the Coast. 
Again, at the request of the trading community, Lord Kimberley 
approved the appointment of two merchants to the Legislative 
Council. One was Mr. W. Cleaver, the European agent of 
an Arrsceln 
Swanzy t s, and the other was Mr. F. C. Grant,, ( who traded 
(2) 
independently. 
In contrast with the desire of the Colonial Office 
to remain aloof in the conflict was the eagerness among the 
traders on the Coast to precipitate an imperial war. These 
people wanted the Ashantis driven back and the Protectorate 
(3) 
restored to order. Harley hinted at another motive: an 
Imperial war would involve an expenditure of money frau which 
(4) 
they hoped largely to profit. But, until the Colonial 
Office changed its policy, Harley was cautious of taking any 
step which might draw the imperial Government into the war as 
(5) 
a principal participant. 
(1) Ibid., and C0/9b/98, in no. 5001, account of interview. 
(2) CO/9o/98, no. 5014, Harley to Kimberley, 21st April, 1875. 
(3) of. r. k'. (C. -890), no. 7, p. 26; and P. P. LI], 1875, tC. -1140) 
no. 7U, p. 52. in this letter dated 28th July, 1874, 
Mr, Cleaver, Swanzy's chief agent on the Coast, wrote: It 
is well known ... that I advocated the expedition as the only 
way of settling the Ashantee question and of recovering the 
trade of the interior". 
(4) CO/9b/99, no. 6489, Harley to Kimberley, 1st June, 1873, 
esp. para. 6. 
5) P. P. 266-1, no. 174, p. 304, esp. para. 7. 
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It was for this reason that Harley hesitated in May 
to proclaim Martial Law in the Protectorate with the object 
(1) 
of endowing the Government w. L th powers of coercion. During 
k2) 
April, the Governor was not sure of the Ashantis' next move. 
(3) 
They might press on from Dunkwa to Elmina, or they might 
(4) 
turn west and make for the friendly Windward Districts. 
By the end of May, however, the enemy threatened both Jukwa 
and Abakrampa, two important junctions which, if captured, 
(5) 
would lay the road to the coast open and defenceless. 
But the Fantis seemed indifferent to the emergency, and the 
Government found it almost impossible to persuade them to 
(6) 
defend these posts. In an effort to rouse the people, 
Dr. Rowe again visited the Fanti Chiefs. He had difficulty 
in dispelling their illusion that the British were about to 
abandon the whole rr otectorate and retire to the forts, and 
endless exertion was necessary to cajole and threaten the 
Chiefs to lead their people into the camps at Jukwa and 
(7) 
Abakrampa. This was Harley's last attempt to stir up the 
(1) P. P. (C. -890), no. 87, p. 156. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 21A, p. 38. 
(3) Loc. cit. , no. 6, encl., p. 26, 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 25, p. 51. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 77, p. 137%. 
(6) Loc. cit., no. 63, p. 120. 
(7) Loc. cit. , no. 77; - no. 104, p. 172; and no. 87, p. 156. 
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Fantis. Desultory fighting took place between the Fantis 
and Ashantis on June 3rd and 4th at Jukwa, but on June 5th 
there was a major engagement in which the Fantis were thrown 
back after a feeble resistance. Panic gripped Cape Coast. 
The town was filled with homeless and destitute refugees, and 
many of the Fanti Chiefs placed themselves under the control 
(1) 
Of the Government, begging for help and protection. 
This submission of the Chiefs Harley claimed as 
the most complete answer" that could be given 
"to the designs and intrigues of those who endeavoured 
to organize the so-called 'Fantes Confederation'. " (2) 
The Confederation was still kept alive by a small group of 
educated Africans, whom Harley held responsible for continually 
"urging upon the people the grossest misrepresentations 
with regard to the motives and actions of the Government, and... 
by so doing, (promoting) their own ends by producing 
dissatisfaction and disaffection". (3) 
Shortly before the rout at Jukwa, these agitators had 
sponsored petitions from the Chiefs in which the Government 
was again asked to provide money so that the Chiefs could arm 
and subsist their men. Harley had repeatedly refused to 
subsidize them on-the grounds of the poverty of the local 
treasury. Nevertheless, the "educated natives" did not cease 
(1} P. P. XLIX, 1873, (C. -804), (hereafter referred to as 
P. P. (C. -804), no. 1, p. 1. 
(2) P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -891) (hereafter referred to as 
P. P. (C. -891)), no. 5, p. 9. 
(3) P. P. (C. -804), no. 1, p. 1. 
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to press the Chiefs to demand a part of the money received 
by the administration as customs duties, a revenue derived 
largely from the trade of the Protectorate. This claim 
Harley rejected without argument. To surrender the right of 
the Government to collect customs duties and expend the 
proceeds at its discretion would be to subvert the whole basis 
(1) 
of the administration. The Colonial office had never 
doubted the legality of exercising this fundamental-sovereign 
right over the seaboard. Like r: ost of his predecessors, 
Harley found it convenient to underrate the influence of the 
educated Africans over the people of the hinterland. That 
they were capable of producing disaffection was clearly 
demonstrated by the attitude of-the Fantis to the war. But 
Harley preferred to give the Colonial Office his own 
interpretation, that the apathy of the Fantis signified their 
innate weakness end want of character. 
The "educated natives" had caused the Government so 
much trouble in the past that the Colonial Office was disposed 
(2) 
to accept Harley's opinion. Over the past few months, 
officials had noted the Governor's references to the activities 
(1) P. P. (C. -89o), no. 77, p. 137 and encl. 10, p. 141. 
(2) of. C0/96/99, minute on no. 6219 (no. 77, supra, printed) 
by Hales, 18th June, 1873: "... The notorious mulattoes and 
educated Natives are endeavouring to complicate matters and 
have induced the Kings and Chiefs to ask for ... a loan"; 
and minute by Kimberley, 20th June: "The Cape Coast people 
seem to be an idle, cowardly lot',. 
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of this group. The wilful attack on Prince Ansa in Cape 
Coast called attention once more to the familiar problem of 
how much authority Britain could exercise in territory that 
did not belong to the Crown. 
important for two reasons: 
In this case the question was 
the outrage had taken place at 
the headquarters of the Government where it was essential that 
Britain's right to maintain order be established; and the 
ringleaders were well-known to the Colonial Office as the (1) 
organizers of the Fanti Confederation in December, 1871. 
The Secretary of State had not publicly pronounced judgment on 
that affair, but it was evident from Harley's dispatches that 
although the outbreak of the war had put the matter out of 
mind for the Colonial Office, the members of the Confederation 
were still bent on embarrassing the Government. Sir Robert 
Herbert, Permanent Under-secretary, considered that the 
incident in Cape Coast provided the Colonial Office with a 
suitable opportunity to tell the Confederation finally that 
(2) 
the British Government would have "nothing to do with them". 
Although no action was taken, the disparaging remarks of the 
Colonial office officials in their minutes were a sufficient 
indication of agreement with Colonel Harley's views. 
Disaffection among the Fantis was not Harley's only 
fear. Ever since the transfer of the Dutch possessions in 
(1) CO/96/100, minute on no. 7520 by Holland, 29th July, 1873. 
(2) Ibid., minute by Herbert, 29th July, 1873. 
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April, 1872, the administration had been uneasy about the 
(1) 
new members of the Protectorate in the Windward Districts. 
Peace between the Fantis and the Dutch tribes had been patched 
up before the transfer, but the Government could not tell how 
long the peace would last. Harley's anxiety was intensified 
by the knowledge that the Imperial troops on the Coast were too 
few in number to deal effectively with a widespread rising. 
Akempon, the Ashanti general who had long caused disquiet in 
the west did not leave the Protectorate until December, 1872, 
and it was hoped that his departure would make the peace more 
(2) 
secure. 
In the following month, however, a serious riot 
occurred in Sekondi between the two sections of the town, one 
of which had been Dutch before the transfer. The enmity 
between the Dutch and English sections dated back many years, 
and had its origin in the disputed possession of a palm 
plantation. Disturbances had often taken place, but this 
time the outbreak was more serious. Apart from loss of life 
and much damage to property in Sekondi, the neighbouring towns 
of Shama and Takoradi had attempted to join their friends in 
the Dutch section. An incident at Dixcove in the same month 
increased the apprehension that this defiance of British 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 132, 
no. 149, sub-encl.. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 135, 
p. 212, esp. para. 10; and P. P. 266-1, 
Horton to Matthews, 23rd Jan., 1873, po 258* 
encl. p. 220; and vide Chapter III, p. 239 
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authority might easily turn to rebellion and spread throughout 
(1) 
the Windward Districts. Harley decided to punish the 
Sekondi Kings severely as a warning to other Windward towns. 
An officer and a detachment of Hausas were sent to help the 
Civil Commandant restore order, and both the English and the 
(2) 
Dutch Kings were arrested and imprisoned in Elmina Castle. 
Other parts of the Windward Districts also worried 
Harley. In 1872, the King of Beyin had sent to the Ashantis 
(3) 
for help against his rival at Atuabo. The conduct of 
the King of Elmina was even more suspicious. He had not only 
(4) 
spurned the stipend offered him by the British Government; (5) 
he had also taken an oath to ally himself with the Ashantis. 
When the invasion took place, therefore, Harley realiZed that 
the Ashantis would support the Windward districts if they 
revolted against the Government, and he took measures to secure 
the British position as far as his means allowed. Early in 
(1) P. P. 266, no. 132 and enclosures, and P. P. 266-1, no. 156, 
p. 266 and enclos-ares. Dr. Horton, the African Civil 
Commandant in Sekondi at the time was officially absolved 
from blame for his handling of the riot. But Lord 
Kimberley wrote in his minute on the dispatch, no. 132, supra, 
vide C0/96/96, no. 1595: ".. I am not surprised that he had 
not influence enough to stop this unlucky quarrel. I fear 
except in quite subordinate posts we cannot safely employ 
natives". Harley's comments on Horton's conduct helped 
him to form this view. Vide no. 156, supra, and enclosures, 





P. P. 266-1, no. 138, 
Loc. cit., no. 135, 
Loc. cit., no. 157, 
Loe. cit., no. 135, sub-encl. 4. 
p. 229. 
subr encl. 4, p. 225. 
encl. 1, p. 284. 
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February, he asked the Commanding Officer to make Elmina Castle 
(1) 
the headquarters of the garrison, and instructed this officer; 
as well as the Civil Commandants at Dixcove, Sekondi and Axim, 
to watch carefully for any signs of treachery among the 
(2) 
people. He also issued a proclamation calling upon all 
Ashantis in Elmina to leave the town peacefully, but this 
(3) 
order could not be enforced. 
After the Fanti defeat at Fanti-Nyankumasi on March 
(4) 
10th, Harley decided to test the loyalty of the Elminas, 
and at a meeting the next day the King and his Chiefs were 
asked to take the oath of allegiance to the British Crown. 
When the King and two of his Chiefs refused, they were arrested 
(5) 
and imprisoned in Capo Coast Castle. For some weeks 
Harley had wanted to make the King declare himself so that the 
Government might have an estimate of how much support to 
expect if the Ashantis were able to reach the Coast. In 
Elmina there were two parties, one led by the King and the 
other composed mainly of traders and educated Africans. The 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 149, sub-encl. in encl. 3, Harley to Turton, 
9th Feb., 1873, p. 260. 
(2) Ibid.,, Harley to Turton, 10th Feb., 1873, p., 261; and no. 174, 
p. 304, and enclosures, p. 317. 
(? ) Loc. c3. L. , in no. 175, Proclamation, p. 334. There were 
several hundred Ashantis in Elmina at the outbreak of the war, 
and they could not be made to leave. 
(4) Ibid., encl., Keate to Turton, 11th March, 1873, p. 323, 
(5) Ibid., encl., Turton to Keate, 13th March, 1873, p. 324. 
r 
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traders were not in favour of an Ashanti monopoly of the route 
to the interior, while the King's party, made up of at least 
half the population of the town, was traditionally allied to 
Ashanti. The Governor calculated that the arrest of the 
King would intimidate his followers and lead all those who 
were opposed to him to declare themselves in favour of the 
(1) # 
Government. But the detention of the disloyal leaders 
did not improve the podition as much as Harley hoped. At the 
beginning of April he applied to the Colonial Office for 
(2) 
permission to deport the prisoners to Sierra Leone. 
Officials in the Colonial office found it difficult 
to decide the point. Hugessen maintained that abstract r 
arguments on the justice of the case were inexpedient. He 
contended that: 
"If we are to hold our position on the Gold, Coast, at 
this moment it is above all things essential to show the native 
kings and Chiefs that we will deal with a strong hand with treachery or disloyalty". (3) 
But Kimberley regarded the issue more coldly. He was not 
sure that the Elminas could be required to take the oath of 
allegiance since they were not British subjects, and still 
(1) Ibid., no. 175 and enclosures; and no. 201, encl., p. 373. 
Vide also CO/96/97, no. 3651 for enclosures, O'Reilly to 
Foster, 3rd Mar. and 27th Feb., omitted from printed dispatch 
no. 175, supra. I 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 201, p. 371. 
(3) CO/96/97, minute on no. 4289 (no. 201, supra, printed), 
by Hugessen, 5th May, 1873. 
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less sure that the King could be punished for refusing to take 
it. Again, the icing had not committed any overt act against 
the Government. It would be impolitic to treat the King as 
an irreconcilable enemy on such a pretext, and his deportation 
would colour the allegations made in Holland that the Elminas 
(1) 
had been forced to accept the transfer in 1872. The 
Secretary of State told Harley that he could not permit the 
prisoners to be removed from the Gold Coast until he had more 
(2) 
conclusive evidence of danger to British authority fr an Elmina. 
Before this dispatch reached the Coast, however, 
Harley acted on his own responsibility and on April 24th sent 
(3) 
the King of Elmina with his two Chiefs to Sierra Leone. 
The same course of putting the oath of allegiance to the King 
(4) 
and Chiefs was adopted at Beyin. There they cheerfully 
complied, and though they remained under suspicion, there 
(5) 
was no cause for their removal. As an additional safeguard, 
(6) 
the Navy was asked for gunboats to lie off Beyin and Elmina. 
For the next month no open disaffection was manifest, 
but in that time the Ashantis had advanced close to the sea, 
(1) Ibid., minute by Kimberley, 4th May, 1873. 
(2) P. P. (C. -891), no. 1, p. 1. 
(3) P. P. (C. -890), no. 51, p. 83, and enclosures. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 22, p. 419 and enclosures. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 58, p. 110, and enclosures. 
(6) Loc. cit., no. 22, encl. l, p. 42, 
,ý 
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and if the Fantis were defeated at Jukwa or Abakrampa, the 
road to Elmina would be open. At the beginning of June, 
Harley again ordered the oath of allegiance to be administered 
to the Elminas as a test of their loyalty. At first, the 
Captains of the eight Companies in the town refused to attend 
a meeting for the purpose. Then, on June 5th, only half their 
number obeyed the summons. But two days la-ter, ,. hearing that 
the Ashantis were close by after their success at Jukwa, the 
people of the King's party streamed out of the town to join 
(1) 
them, Fortunately for the Government, the Marines and 
West Indian troops requested by Lord Kimberley in May arrived 
on the Coast at this pointo On June 12th, Harley declared 
Martial Law in Elmina and demanded that the people surrender 
(2) 
their arms. Men they failed to do so, warships 
bombarded the town. Marines, West Indians and Hausas were 
landed and took possession after two sharp engagements with 
the Elminas and Ashantis. The King's quarter of the town 
(3) 
was razed. A few days later, a number of the Chiefs 
surrendered themselves to the British in order to save further 
(4) 
destruction. 
(1) P. P. (Ce-804), no. l, p. 1, and enclosures. 
(2) Loc. cit., p. 2, no. 2. 
(3) P. P. XLIX, 1873, (C. -802), (hereafter referred to as 
P. P. (C. -802) ), no. l, p. l, and enclosures. 
(4) p. p. (C. -891), no. 18, p. 32. 
i 
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Because of an accident to the mailships, official 
news of the bombardment did not beach the Colonial Office 
until July 13th, nor the dispatch announcing the Fanti rout 
(1) 
at Jukwa until July 16th. As soon as he had confirmation 
of the events at Elmina, however, Lord Kimberley decided to 
revise the policy of the British Government. Probably the 
disaffection of the inhabitants of the Protectorate prompted 
Kimberley suddenly to reverse the policy es much as the news 
that the Ashantis had reached the seaboard. To have 
Britain recognized and respected as the paramount power on 
the Coast was an object of the first importance; and the 
Secretary of State realized that by making the war an 
Imperial concern, this object could be forcibly achieved. 
Despite the reluctance of the military authorities, Kimberley 
(2) 
won his point at a meeting on July 15th at the War Office. 
It was accordingly decided that Imperial troops should 
participate actively in the war. 200 Marines were at once 
sent to reinforce and replace those already on the Coast, 
many of whom had fallen sick. The War Office, as well as 
ordering an additional 400 West Indian troops to the Coast, 
(1) P. P. (C. -890), no. 109, p. 176. These events were reported 
unofficially in "The Times" of 10th July, and Kimberley 
first heard of them from that source. 
(2) WO/33/26, Pr4cis. This document states that the meeting 
was held on 15th July. Lord Kimberley, in his Journal, 
supra, wrote that it was held on 14th July. Both º 
statements were retrospective. 
a 
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(1) 
agreed to hold part of a European regiment in readiness. 
More than this, Lord Kimberley reconsidered the 
idea of an expedition to Ash.? iti. Two months earlier, he 
had rejected the de Ruvignes plan as impracticable and 
(2) 
contrary to policy. At the end of July, he decided to 
accept and amplify the suggestion by dividing the scheme into 
two distinct parts: one, the invasion of Ashanti by 
European troops; the other, a Volta expedition. On 
28th July, Kimberley examined the papers on the Volta expedi-- 
Lions of 1868 and 1870 in which Captain John Glover had 
(3) 
taken part. Two days later, at the instance of tha War 
Office, Glover himself wrote to the Colonial Office, 
(4) 
offering his services for a similar project. Kimberley 
hesitated; he considered Glover to be lacking in judgment, 
and thought his reappearance on the West Coast might cause 
(1) Journal, supra, and P. P. (c. -8o), nos. 123 and 131, 
pp. 219 and 224. Vide also CO/96/100, no. 752 4., 
draft, Kimberley to Harley, 29th July, 1873, promising 
Imperial assistance. 
(2) Vide supra, pp, 271-272. 
(3) 00/96/100, minute on no. 7524. 
(4) P. P. (C. -891), no. 8, p. 13. 
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(1) 
excitement among some of the tribes* But on August lst, 
rather than abandon the Volta expedition for want of a man to 
(2) 
organize it, Kimberley accepted his offer. Glover's 
force was to consist of African levies and the object of his 
expedition on the Volta was to create a diversion for the 
Ashantiswa'K wdraw them away from the Ports in the Western 
(3) 
Districts. His operations, however, were to be secondary 
to a more spectacular action in the west. An officer of 
"high military reputation" was to lead an expedition of 
hUropean troops from Cape Coast to Kumasi in order to imbue 
the Ashantis, and incidentally the Protectorate at large, with 
a "wholesome fear" of British power. Sir Garnet Wolseley 
was chosen to conduct this campaign; his reputation had been 
(1) CO/96/108, minutes on no. 7796, (no. 8 supra, printed) by Herbert, 31st July, and Kimberley, 1st August, 1873, 
Kimberley wrote of uloverts application: "This is a vain- 
glorious letter, thoroughly characteristic of the man. 
Nevertheless there is no doubt that he has many merits, and 
he is one of the exceptional boasters who have proved that 
boasting and solid qualities sometimes go together ... 'there 
are reasons that render it inexpedient that he should return 
to the Coast at the present time. (I fear it would not do 
to employ him)". Glover had recently been recalled from 
his post as Administrator of Lagos (which he had held from 
18bb to 1872), whore he appears to have stirred up unrest 
among the surrounding people. 
(2) The draft on Kimberley's minute, supra, was cancelled, 
and the reply in P. P. (C. -891), no. 11, p. 15, substituted. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 41, p. 42. 
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made in the Canadian tied River Rebellion in 1869. In 
employing European troops, careful planning was necessary, for 
thera had been an alarming proportion of sickness among the 
(1) 
Marines sent out in May. They had arrived on the Coast 
at the "very sickliest season" of the year. On no account, 
therefore, were troops for the main expedition to be landed on 
the Coast until the beginning of the dry season in December. 
VVolseley, holding both civil and military commands, would 
arrive on the Gold Coast in October in order to prepare for 
the reception of the white regiments, which were to go into 
(2) 
action as soon as they disembarked. 
The Cabinet consented to Glover's expedition just 
(3) 
before Parliament rose at the beginning of August. But 
Woleeley's appointment and the decision to invade Ashanti were 
made by Kimberley and Cardwell, the Secretary for War, on their 
(4) 
own responsibility after the Cabinet dispersed. It 
remained for the two ministers to convince the Prime Minister, 
(1) 
(2) Gladstone Papers, vol. CXL, Kimberley to Gladstone, 
13th Aug., 1873, p. 73. Original. 
(3) ournal, op. cit. his entry is dated 26th July. But 
Parliament's consent was obtained on 2nd August. Vide 
Gladstone Papers, loc. cit., Kimberley to Gladstone, 29th Aug., j 
1873, p. 85.0. 
(4) ournal, op. cit... 6th Sept., 1873. Kimberley wrote: "The 
latest accounts which have reached us are that Commodore 
Commerell tthe senior Naval Officer) and Colonel Harley are 
qu arreling and that the senior military officer Colonel Wise th drunken. Cardwell and I have therefore determined to cut 
ee knot by sending out Sir Garne; Wolseley''. 
Of 110 Marines who arrived on the Coast in June, two died 
on the Coast, and 87 were invalided home at the beginning of 
August. Of these 10 died on the voyage, and 58 were sent 
to hospital on arrival at Portsmouth. Vide loc. cit., no. 71, 
p. 27., 
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Mr. Gladstone, of the validity of the course they had adopted. 
(1) 
Gladstone was "aghast" at the expenditure entailed, and 
Kimberley had to persuade him that the advantages of the 
expeditions would outweigh the cost. He wrote privately to 
the Prime Minister: 
"It is very provoking to have to spend such large sums 
of money on these savages, but we cannot leave the matter as 
it is... whatsoever we do must be done quickly, and if possible 
in such a manner as to deter the Ashantees from attacks upon 
our settlements for a long time to come. it is not likely 
that any permanent peace can be secured unless we can got to 
Coomassie ... and I know of no possible plan which promises 
such considerable effects at anything like so small (comparativ 
ely) a cost". (2) 
Again, Gladstone's conscience troubled him more than once 
while the arrangements were in progress. He objected to the 
wording of Voleeleyts instructions, drafted in August, which 
assumed the use of European troops for the invasion. 
Gladstone desired wolseley to try every other means of putting 
an end to the war before he sent for the English regiments; 
and Gladstone protested also that the instructions enabled 
1Volseley to invade Ashanti without first asking the enemy to 
retire. Though Kimberley told the crime Minister that as the 
Ashantis were obviously in the wrong there was no need to 
waste time on diplomatic niceties, Gladstone insisted that 
peace terms should be offered before the invasion took place. 







(2) Gladstone Papers, loc. cit., Kimberley to Gladstone, 
13th Aug., 1873. 
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Kimberley made it clear, however, that Wolseley would use 
his discretion in military matters and would act without 
(1) 
waiting for instructions from England. 
(2) 
Gladstone continued to disapprove, but the Ashanti 
(3) 
war was far removed from his more immediate troubles. The 
real test of the acceptance by the Government of the new 
policy was the readiness with which the Treasury acceded to 
every request for money. At the and of July, Harley was told 
that Parliament would vote £40,000 towards the cost of the war, 
and he was instructed to dispense money freely among the Chiefs 
(4) 
in order to enlist their sympathy for the Government. The 
sum of £27,000 was advanced by the Treasury, without estimates, 
(5) 
for Glover's expedition. Only once did that body venture 
(1) Gladstone ?a pers, loc. clt., iimberley to Gladstone, 
1st Sept. and 5th Sept., 1873, pp. 87 and 9,3,0. 
(2) of. Gladstone Papers, Cabinet papers, etc., notes for 
Cabinet of 4th Oct., 1873. 
ýý 
ý'> 
(3) Gladstona's government, in office since 1868, was tottering, 
and fell at the beginning of 1874. 
(4) CO/9ö/100, in no. 7020, C. O. to Treasury, 15th July, 1873; 
and draft in no. 7523, Kimberley to Harley, 26th July, 1873. 
The loan authorized in June, vide supra, pp. 272-273, was 
cancelled in September, vide P. P. (C. -891), no. 162, p. 211. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 25, p. 35, and no. 31, p. 38. At first, 
£20,000 was advanced, though the Treasury was most unwilling 
to advance any money at all without estimates. At the 
end of August, this sum was increased to Z27,000. 
Vide loc. cit., nos. 59 and 80, pp. 83 and 103. 
-- -- 
Aý 
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to suggest that local funds might bear a portion of the burden. 
But with rare confidence, the Colonial Office rejoined that 
(l) 
this point was inadmissable in the emergency which had arisen. it 
In September, a further F, 45,000 was granted, on Wolseley's 
advice, for the purchase of materials for a tramway to be 
built from Cape Coast to Mansu, by which means the transport of 
(2) 
troops and supplies to the interior would be facilitated. 
Meanwhile, Harley reported from the Coast in July 
that the Ashantis did not seem to be contemplating an attack 
(3) 
on the forts; they were encamped in force at Efutu, some 
thirteen miles from Cape Coast, with advance posts about 
(4) 
seven miles from the sea. In Cape Coast itself, all was 
confusion. The town was packed with refugees, a smallpox 
(5) 
epidemic was raging, and food was scarce. There was much 
excitement in the Windward Districts, and the rumour of a large 
Ashanti force approaching from the extreme west under Akempon 
was confirmed. 
(6) 
As a warning to the inhabitants of these 
(1) Loc. cit., nos. 109 and 165, pp. 138 and 212. 
(2) Loc. cit., nos. 121 and 145, pp. 146 and 191; and vide 
C0/96/103, no. 1940/W, for memo. by Wolseley on this tramway, 
2nd Sept., 1873. The total cost of the war was close on 
£1,000,000. 
(3) The Ashantis always maintained that tney had no quarrel 
with wnite men, with whom they were most anxious to trade. 
(4) P. P. (C. -802)., no. 1, p. l; and P. P. (C. -891). 9 no. 6, p. 12. 
(5) P. p. (C. -890)., no. 14, p. 182. 
(6) P. P. (c. -891)., no. 15, enclosures 4 and 5, pp. 22 and 23; 
and P. P. (C. -802), no. 2, p. 11, 
-f 
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districts that the Government was watching their movements, 
Harley detailed a gunboat to cruise along the Coast between 
(1) 
Dixcove and Axim. Since the beginning of July, Harley 
had wanted to dislodge the Ashantis from Efutu. This measure 
might help to restore confidence in the Government among the 
Fantis by proving to them that Britain really meant to punish 
their enemy, however belatedly. The action would also enable 
the Fantis to return to their villages in time for the planting 
season in August and September; unless they could sow their 
crops, the famine would become more widespread. But 
(2) 
Commodore Coninerell, an old antagonist of Harley, refused 
to furnish the requisite naval support, and the project was 
(3) 
dropped. 













Districts grew more serious. The people of Beyin joined the 
(4) 
Ashanti force in the vicinity and together they attacked Atuabo. 
(1) Ibid, 
(2) Commerell had been a friend of Pope Hennessy, and, like 
him, had disliked Harley. of. CO/96/96, no. 2196, Hennessy 
to Kimberley, 12th Feb., 1873: In the trading dispute which 
arose in Cape Coast in 1872, vide Chapter III, p. 242, Harley 
had sided with the merchants, contrary to Hennessyts 
instructions, and to the attitude of Mr. Salmon. Commerell 
commented that an official could not be friendly with both 
. Guropean traders and Africans, and that Harley, supporting the traders, would be sure to quarrel with the Africans. 
Certainly the inhabitants showed no particular regard for 
Harley in the war that followed soon after. 
(3) P. P. (C. -890), no. 112, encl. 3, p. 180; P. P. (C. -891),. no. 69, 
encl. l, p. 96; and nos. 66 and 70, pp. 86 and 97. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 58, p. 69. Vide Chapter III, p. 238, for this long-standing quarrel. 
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With the approach of a party of Ashantis, feeling from Shama 
(1) 
westwards became openly pro-Ashanti. Reinforcements were 
sent to Dixcove, Sekondi and Axim because Harley knew that the 
amount of support shown to the Government would be in 
(2) 
proportion to the power it displayed. In August, the 
Ashantis abandoned the camp at Efutu of their own accord with 
the apparent intention of moving westwards into the Ahanta 
country where, if British forces did not act promptly, the 
(3) 
enemy was assured of popular support. After several 
engagements with the Wasaws, who were unable to hold them back, 
a force of Ashantis was said to be nearing the lower course of 
(4) 
the t{iver Pra on its left bank. In an effort to stop this 
force from crossing the river, a naval expedition was arranged. 
It was to start at the mouth of the Pra, east of Shama, and if 
the River was found to be navigable, gunboats and troops would 
be sent. up to disperse the Ashantis on the left bank and prevent 
(5) 
them from joining their follows in the west. 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 67, enc 1.5, p. 92; and no. 58, encl. 12, p. 75. 
(2) Ibid., no. 58, p. 69, and enclosures. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 89, p. 117. 
(4) Ibid., encl. 1, p. 118; and no. 129, enclosures, pp. 170-b. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 129, p. 168. An expedition of this kind was 
advocated by Lord Kimberley in his dispatch to Harley of 
29th July, 1873, vide 00/96/100, draft in no. 7524, but 
the expedition was actually carried out before this dispatch 
reached the Coast. 
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The Fra expedition, which took place on August 13th 
under the command of Commodore Commerell, was a complete 
failure. Refusing to obey the order to assist the British, 
the people of Shama joined in the Ashanti attack, and the 
(1} 
British force had to retire, defeated. At this signal, 
the Windward coast, except Dixcove, Komenda and British 3ekondi, µ 
rose in open rebellion against the Government. Harley 
realized that the naval squadron was no longer a-sufficient 
protection for the Government. The forts themselves were safe;: 
(2) 
it was outside them that the British position was in dsn ger. 1; 
Lord Kimberley had already decided on an offensive which 
Harley hoped would 
"once and for all time assert and settle the Sovereignty 
of . ngland on this Coast". (3) 
Until this offensive could be carried out, warships summarily 
fired on most of the villages on the Windward coast, 
(4) 
including Shama, Dixcove, Sekondi and Axim. Defiance 
continued, however, and with each enemy triumph, Harley felt 
(5) 
the humiliation of the Government more deeply. Anxious to 
(1) P. P. (C. -891), no. 130, p. 177; and no. 122, p. 146 and encls. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 132, p. 182. 
(ý5) Loc. cit., no. 131, p. 179. In this dispatch of 19th Aug4873, 
and in no. 150, p. 200, Harley pleaded for European troops. 
Kimberley's decision was not known on the Coast until 11th 
ý Sept. (4) Loc. cit. 
., 
no. 148, p. 197; no. 151, p. 204; also P. P., ( 
1874, 
(C. -892), (hereafter referred to as P. P. (C. -fl J2) ), no. 14, 
p. 10 an(L enclosures. 
(5) P. P. (C. 891), no. 151; no. 158, p. 209 and. enclosure; no. 148, 
p. 197; and C0/96/101, no. 9782, for omission from printed dispatch; and . Pe (C. -892),, no. 29, P, 45. 
r 
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take vigorous action as a means of restoring British prestige; 
he began discussions with the naval and military authorities 
(1) 
on the Coast. But on September 11th, the mailship brought 
Captain Glover and the news of Wolseley's appointment. Harley 
(2) 
therefore agreed to wait for Wolseleyts arrival. 
Nevertheless, the success of the Ashantis on the 
Yvindward Districts meant that both they and their allies in the 
coastal towns were readily able to obtain supplies of' arms and 
ammunition to enable them to prolong the struggle. From the 
beginning, barley had been at pains to prevent the enemy from 
having access to such supplies, for on these depended the 
strength of the Ashanti resistance. In February, 1873, he 
issued a proclamation forbidding the sale of arms and ammunition 
to the Ashantis, and proscribing the ports of entry into the 
(3) 
Protectorate except at Cape Coast, Elmina and Accra. But 
it was common knowledge that the Ashantis obtained supplies 
outside the Protectorate - on the Volta and east of it, and 
in the west at Assini, Grand Bassam and Krinjabo, places where 
(4) 
the proclamation had no effect. A new proclamation in May, 
enabling the Government to impose penalties on traders at these 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. n9, p. 79, and enclosure, 
(3) P. P. 266-1, Proclamation, 8th Feb., 1873, no. 149 in encl. 2, 
P. 254. 
(4) cf. P. p. (C. -892)., no. 65, p. 68,, encl. l; P. P. (C. -891), 
no. 15, p. 19, encl. l. 
:ý 
k 
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(1) (2) 
non-British ports was open to legal objections, and the 
announcement in August of a blockade of the Coast with the 
(3) (4) 
right of search was also declared invalid. Since most 
of the arms sold on the Coast came from Englands it was 
suggested that a Royal Proclamation be issued, forbidding the 
export from Britain of all munitions destined for the Vest 
(5) 
Coast, but the Crown had no power to do so. Not until 
December was a satisfactory and lawful proclamation of blockade 
(6) (7) 
drawn up and enforced until February, 1874. 
Throughout the year 1873, however, neither the 
Government nor the Navy was able to prevent the arms traffic 
that was carried on within and without the Protectorate. 
oven after Elmina was placed under Martial Law, the Ashantis 
(8) 
were supplied with goods by the townspeople. Herbert 
(1) P. P. (C. -890), no. 52, p. 87. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 75, p. 134. It was beyond the powers of the 
Legislature to apply regulations beyond the borders of 
the Gold, Coast. 
(3) P. P. (C. -892). no. 19, p. 18. 
(4) In November, 1873. Loc. cit. , no. 145, p. 157. 
(5) CO/96/105, no. 11,062 (omitted from P. P. (C, -892), no. 65 
supra), and minute by Holland, 24th Oct.,, 1873. 
(6) P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -894), (hereafter referred to as 
P. P. (C. -894)), no. 3, p. 3. 
(7) Loc. cit. , no. 56, p. 81. 
(8) P. P. (C. -891),, no. 81, p. 104. 
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remarked sourly: 
"These small black traders are probably well aware that 
they are only following the example of the patriotic English 
merchants who supply us with good advice, and the Ashantis 
with guns and powder". (1) 
For it seemed that British merchants were responsible for the 
(2) 
bulk of the illicit trade. Dutch and French ships were 
implicated, but the Navy was chiefly engaged in trying to 
(3) 
prevent the landing of arms by British ships. All the 
English mail steamers carried a large supply of gunpowder which 
they landed whenever the opportunity occurred, and ships 
(4) 
belonging to private fires, such as Swanzy's, were also suspect. 
Mr. Swanzy conducted a long and acrimonious correspondence 
with the Colonial Office, angrily refuting the charges made 
(5) 
against his ships, and complaining about the interference 
of her Majesty's ships while he was trying to open new fields 
(6) 
for British commerce at Assinee and Grand Bassam. 
did not find all his denials convincing, and the legal 
Officials 
restrictions on a more energetic campaign against the traffic 
were resented by the Colonial Office. 
(1) CO/96/100, minute on no. 9055, (no. 81, supra, printed) by 
Herbert, 3rd Sept., 1873. 
(2) CO/y6/103, no. 13,328, Wolseley to Kimberley, 15th Nog., 1873. 
(3) of. P. P. (C. -892), no. 19; no. 22, p. 35; no. 152, p. 160; 
and no. 65, encl. l. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) P. P. (C. -892), no. 139, p. 153 and enclosures; nos. 43,56,79, 162,172 and 175; and P. P. (C. -894). no. 14, p. 16. 
(6) P. P. (C. -892),, no. 138, p. 152; He asserted that the Ashantis did not trade with Krinjabo, beyond Grand Bassam. 
But it was well known and beyond doubt that they did so. 
Vide loc. cit. , no. 92, p. 104 and 195, p. 2` ' yerbal information to: this effect was oota. lnod on the " }olds 
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Herbert's comment was: 
"It is commercial freedom run mad for us to be fighting 
our own merchants as well as the Ashantis"o (1) 
When the Windward Districts joined the Ashantis, 
Harley became acutely aware of the danger the arms traffic 
might cause to the British position on the Coast. If 
Africans were able to obtain arms of precision, the main 
strength of the Imperial troops - their superior weapons - 
would be nullified; and he asked the Colonial office to send 
(2) only flint-lock or "trade" guns for African use. Wolseley 
went further than this. He wduld have liked to stop the 
supply of all munitions to Africans. There was some 
discussion in the Colonial office about an agreement with the 
French and Portuguese Governments to blockade the West Coast 
with the object of preventing the import of arms and 
ammunition. But many parts of the Coast were at this time 
still independent of European powers, and no steps were taken 
(3) 
in the matter. 
West of the Protectobate, the territory was under 
French influence, and Harley asked the French authorities to 
(4) 
co-operate in preventing the arms traffic. On the east, 
(1) CO/96/106, minute on no. 10,501, by Herbert, ist Oct., 1873. 
(2) P. P. (C. -891), no. 131, p. 179,, and CO/96/101, no. 9561, for 
omission from printed dispatch. 
(3) CO/96/103, no. 13,328 and minutes; and CO/96/106, corr. 
with F. 0. 
(4) P. P. (C0-892), no. 24, P-37; and no. 22, encl. 2, p. 36, 
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British authority was slight throughout the . astern Districts, 
and negligible beyond the volta. At the outbreak of the 
war, the government was represented by an acting tivil 
Commandant in Accra, and by minor customs officials at Ada and 
(1) 
Kota; and parley was too occupied in Cape Coast to pay 
much attention to affairs in the eastern half of the 
(2) 
rrotectorate. It was left to the i' avy to try and enforce 
the arms regulations, and to the n; uropean merchants, through 
their organ the "African Times", to keep before the Colonial 
(3) 
Office the demand for a more substantial authority. 
By July, 1873, Harley feared that the success of the 
Ashantis in the west would be matched in the east. The 
enemy might again form an active alliance with Akwamu and Awuna, 
as they had done a few years before, ana so endanger the 
growth of British commerce. Indeed, wrote Harley, the very 
success of the Ashantis was destroying the belief in British 
power which it was essential to maintain if the Government 
wished to consolidate its position on the Coast. He asked 
Lord Kimberley to sanction an active policy on the Volta so that 
the relations of the Government and the merchants with the 
tribes could be placed on a more certain footing. As the 
M 
(1) Vide Chapter II, p. 1633, Customs officials were posted 
at these places in 1873. 
(2) It was said in Aug., 1873, that for two years, Accra had not 
been visited by an officer administering the Government. 
Vide P. P. (C. -892), no. 21, encl. 10, p. 33. 
(3) Vide Chapter II, pp. 165. 
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corner-stone of the policy Harley advocated a Government 
alliance with Awuna and Akwamu to ensure their loyalty to the 
(1) 
British. But treaiies alone were not enough. A full 
staff of Government officials shoula be stationed at the mouth 
of the Volta to see that the agreements were kept; and the 
treaties should include a cession of territory on the left 
bank of the river to the British, or at least the consent of 
the tribes to the exercise of British jurisdiction within 
clearly defined limits. The advantages of such a course were 
obvious: the Government would be able to suppress smuggling, 
collect a revenue, and afford protection to merchants engaged 
in legitimate commerce. The value of the river under British 
control was well known to the Colonial Office. It would 
give British merchants an "undisturbed water highway to the 
borders of Ashantee, by which a vast and important trade (might)i, 
be opened, not only with that country but wit# the interior 
(2) 
beyond". 
The course outlined by Harley was the continuation 
of the policy inaugurated in the '60's in the Eastern Districts, 
and hitherto rejected by the Colonial Office. At the 
beginning of the '70's, the necessity for such a course was 
gradually conceded, 
(3) 
and by mid-1873, the Colonial office 
(1) P. P. (C. -891)., no. 52, p. 48. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 53, p. 60 and enclosure. 
(3) Vide Chapter II, p. 128 et seq. 
1 'i 
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(1) 
was prepared to-acceptXand direct its development. 
In sending Glover to conduct the Volta expedition, Lord 
Kimberley directed him to pay attention to these matters. 
It was true that Glover's object was to create a diversion for 
the Ashantis in the west, but he was also told that: 
"The nature of the permanent arrangements to be made as 
to our relations with the tribes in these aistricts must 
materially depend upon the result of Captain Glover's 
proceedings ... Her Majesty's Govornment attach much importance to the trade by way of the Volta, and not the least of the 
advantages which they hope may be obtained by Captain Glover's 
mission is that it may lead to the improvement of our relations 
with the tribes on the Volta, and the opening up of constant 
and increased communication by means of that river with the 
interior". (2) 
Glover did not need to be reminded of the potential 
value of the Volta. In 1870 with characteristic exuberance, 
(3) 
he had described it as the finest river in Africa, and his 
experience in the previous expeditions made him familiar with 
its problems. In this expedition, he proposed to arm 10,000 
men from the Eastern Districts, grouping them under European 
(4) 
officers, and he had visions of himself sweeping them up 
and down, clearing the river, subduing Akwamu, crushing Awuna, 
(1) of. CO/96/100, minute on no. 8491 (no. 53, supra, printed), 




P. P. (C. -891), no, 64, p. 85. 
CO/96/85, no. 7886, quoted by Kennedy. 
P. P. (C. -891), no. 19, p. 33. 
i 
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(1) securing the coast from Ada to Keta, and finally, in 
support of Wolseley, invading Ashanti from the east. The 
(2) 
grandiose scale of his venture caused some surprise in the 
Colonial Office, and Herbert had occasion to wonder whether 
(6) 
Glover was always "in full control of his judgment". But 
most of his requisitions were complied with, fOr the Colonial 
(4) 
Office did not want to hamper his activities. 
To the people in the Eastern Districts, however, it 
was plain that Glover's expedition was a "white man's palaver", 
and they dissociated themselves from it. Even before his 
appointment, it was remarked that the people in the Eastern 
(5) 
Districts were not disposed to-support Government authority. 
When Glover arrived on the Coast in September, he found them 
13"149 T., P. 
(1) P. P. XLVI, A(C. -893), (hereafter referred to asj(C. -b93)), 
nos. 19 and 65, pp. 18 and 53, and enclosures. 
(2) of. P. P. (C. -892), nos. 82,85,90,117,163,104,106,, 155, being 
requisitions for supplies of all kinds, from beads to 
blasting material. 
(3) CO/96/102, minute on no. 11,303,28th Oct., 1873. 
(4) cf. C0/96/107, minutes on no. 8048 by Herbert, and 
Kimberley, 8th Aug., 1873. Glover's expedition, a Colonial 
Office concern, caused some inter-departmental jealousy with 
the War Office, which maintained that it could arrange a 
similar expedition much more cheaply. Herbert remarked that 
this was "a general protest (by the War Office) against 
anyone else being able to organise ... economically or 
efficiently. I should myself be curious to see what the 
War Office would require to put in motion 10,000 men... " 
(5) P. P. (C. -892), no. 28, encl. l, p. 44. 
! 'I 
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completely indifferent to his project. An offer of 
assistance came from the Kings of Accra, on condition that they 
directed operations. But because Glover insisted on having 
(1) 
sole charge, they made no effort to help him. He had 
brought with him to Accra part of the Hausa force in the 
(2) 
Western Districts to form a nucleus for his own. most of 
the Hausas in the Eastern Districts were domestic slaves, and 
one of Gloverts first setbacks came when Mr. Gladstone forbade 
(3) 
him to give £5 a head for recruits. But neither his 
exhortations nor his distribution of gifts and supplies among 
the various tribes led them to flock to his standard. The 
Accras who promised to join him at Ada, his main base, were 
(4) 
dilatory. Other people along the coast excused themselves 
by saying that they could not move into camp until the Accras 
had'passed by; if they did, their unprotected villaLes 
(5) 
would be plundered by the Accras who followed them. Glover 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 99, p. 115, enclosure. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 69, p. 79. 
(3) P. P. (C. -893)., nos. 20 and 25, pp. 19 and 21; and 
Gladstonets telegram forbidding the purchase of slaves in 
CO/96/102, no. 13,327. Vide also Gladstone Papers, 
vol. CXL.. Kimberley to Gladstone, 15 and 18th Dec., 1873, 
pp. 129 and 133,0. Kimberley tried to persuade Gladstond 
to allow this method of recruitment, but had to give way. 
(4) P. P. (C. -896), no. 65, p. 53 encl. Only 224 Accras had 
arrived by the end of November. 
4 
(5) P. P. (C. -894), no. 5, p. 8, encl. 
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ordered the Akwapims to cross the volta into Awuna country 
at one point; they preferred another, and they too, refused 
(1) 
to move until the Accras came to meet them. It seemed 
as if the people of the Eastern Districts were bent on 
harassing clover and deliberately upsetting his plans by delay. 
Although Glover found it impossible to control the 
movements of the people as he wished, it was not long before 
(2) 
the tribes were again drawn into conflict with one another. 
Glover's warlike preparations at Ada alarmed the Awunas on the 
opposite bank of the river, and at the end of September, Ada 
and Awuna resumed their old quarrels, Ada as usual with the 
(3) 
support of the Accras. But when Glover proclaimed his 
intention of forcibly reminding the Trans-Volta people of 
their duties as British subjects, the Awunas showea defiance (4) 
of . uropeans and destroyed several factories on their coast. 
For the Awunas had never acknowledged themselves as British 
subjects, and to their allegiance the Government had no claim, 
facts which were brought to the notice of the Colonial Office 
(5) 
by German missionaries working in the Awuna country. 
Glover persisted in his course, however, confident of success. 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 18, p. 21, encl. 
(2) Vide Chapter II, p. 128 at seq. 
(3) P. P. (C. -892). no. 99, p. 115, encl. 
(4) P. P. (C. -893), nos. 19 and 29, enclosures, pp. 18 and 22. 
l5) P. P. (C. -894), no. 10, encl. 3, p. 12. 
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Captain Sartorius, one of his subordinate Officers, was 
instructed to set Akim and Krobo against Akwamu, and then, 
as soon as he could bather a force of Krobos and AS-Mapims, 
to begin hostilities on the right bank of the Volta. After 
Sartorius had silenced all possible opposition there, he was 
(1) 
to join with Glover on the left bank in an attack on Awuna. 
But the delaying tactics of the tribes in the 
1astern Districts were so effective that by mid-December 
Glover was obliged to relinquish his ambition of conducting 
(2) 
a war against Awuna in person. A sharp reminder came 
from Wolseley, his superior officer, that Ulover's duty was 
to ensure the success of the invasion of Ashanti with 
(3) 
European troops by his help in the east, and Glover 
reluntantly turned his attention towards Ashanti. The Colonial; 
(4) 
Office knew that VWolseley disliked Glover; they were both 
(1) P. P. (C. -893), no. 46, enclosures 2 and 3, pp. 35 and 37. 
he Colonial office grew nervous about the effects of 
Glover's expedition. Vide CO/96/102, minutes on no. 13,756 
no. 46, printed). Meade wrote, 27th Deo., 1873: 
"I hope we shall not have any trouble from Captain Glover's 
high-handed dealings with native tribes - he had no check 
over him not even what might be exercised by ]riglish 
newspaper correspondents". 
(2) P. P. (C. -894)., no. 5, p. 8, encl. 
(3) Loc. cit. , no. 18, encl. 3, p. 23. 
(4) of. CO/96/107, minute on no. 13,690 by Herbert, 23rd Dec., 
and Kimberley, 25th Dec., 1873. Vide also C0/96/102, 
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too autocratic to work together harmoniously. Wolseley's 
task of establishing British supremacy in the west, however, 
was more pressing than Glover's, and the Colonial Office 
agreed that the question of trade on the Volta would have to 
(1) 
wait until the end of the Ashanti war. 
Wolseley landed at Cape Coast with a team of officers 
(2) 
on October 2nd. A week later he informed the Home Gcvern- 
ment that European troops would be required on the Coast; 
he was convinced that only a large body of white soldiers with 
superior arms could show the full power of the British 
(3) 
Government. These troops would not arrive until December, 
and he did not want to undertake a major offensive without 
them. Yet he felt that it would be highly impolitic to take 
(4) 
no action against the enemy in the interval. With much 
satisfaction, therefore, he learnt that the Ashanti force 
beyond Cape Coast and Elmina had, before his arrival, begun 
(5) 
to move back slowly by way of Abakrampa, Akroful and Dunkwa. 
(1) P. P. (Co-892),, no. 191, p. 221, 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 106, p. 125. 
(3) Loc. cit., nos. 156 and 204, pp. 162 and 233. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 150, p. 159. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 101, p. 121. I do not know why the Ashantis 
retreated after their successes, and before any offensive 
by British troops was undertaken. It was said that the 
Ashantis were short of supplies and that sickness had uroken 
out among the enemy. Possibly also a guerilla warfare, 
carried on by Wasaws, Asins, etc. on their own account 
since the beginning of the war had helped considerably to 
weaken the Ashantis, but there is no documentary evidence 
of this, except for one reference, vide P. P. (C. -891), no. 15, p. 19, encl. l, maue in July, 1873. 
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Rather than impede the enemy retreat, he was anxious to assist 
it. By it, he was saved the necessity of dislodging the 
Ashantis from the vicinity of the forts, and the buropean 
troops, when they landed, would be able to march as far as 
(1) 
Ashanti without encountering any resistance. At the same 
time, Wolseley thought it would be salutary for the Protectorate 
if he could create the impression that the Ashantis were 
falling back through fear of the Government. With this object, 
he used the Marines for purposes of display, and he wrote to 
Lord Kimberley: 
"My intention is to show European troops as often and 
in as many directions as possible, but .. to let .. the actual fighting and marching fall upon the native levies really, 
using the . uropeans as little as possible for any exhausting 
work'. (2) 
But 4dolseley miscalculated if he imagined that 
people in the Protectorate would be willing to help him carry 
out the imperial war. Some minor operations took place in 
(3) 
October and November. The Navy bombarded Boutry, and Beyin, 
(4) 
where King Blay of Atuabo was holding out against his rival. 
There were also engagements near Elmina, in villages which 
(4) 
were still loyal to the enemy; and the Ashantis themselves 
(1) P. P. (C. -892), no. 187, p. 218. 
(2) Loo. cit., no. 203, p. 229. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 202, p. 226, encl. 
t4) Loc. cit., no. 183, encl., p. 206. 
(0) Loc. cit., no. 177, p. 195. 
1j 
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fought two rearguard actions at Dunkwa and Abakrampa. 
(1) In 
all these land actions, however, regular troops - Marirs s, 
west Indians and Hausas - had to be used. In September, 
Harley had warned Kimberley that the Fantis were reluctant to 
l2) 
Support the Government, and Wolseley found that Harley had 
not exaggerated -Lie indifference of the Yroteccorate to the 
British cause. , 'ne LIajor-General confessed surprise that 
%3) 
the people in and near Cape Coast were not at all savage; 
nor were they so gullible as to believe his flamboyant 
declarations that this was their war and he had come to assist 
l4) ýo) 
them. Meetings and speeches for the Chiefs, even a (6) 
reception for the women of Cape Coast, did not produce a 
response; wolseley could not disFgaise the insincerity of his 
(7) 
protestations. Material inducements which he flaunted 
before the people were also ineffectual. After attaching 
. iropean officers 
to the various Fanti Chiefs, he offered £10 
for every 1,000 men the Chiefs mustered and promised pay and 
(1) Loc. cit., nos. 203 and 218, pp. 229 and 249. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 69, p. 79. 
(3) Loc. cit. , no. 204, p. 2332 encl. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. loci, p. 125; and W0/33/26, no. 15, p. 161. 
(5) Ideen; and W0/33/26, no. 31, p. 172. 
(6) P. P. (C. -892)., no. 184, encl. 4, p. 211., and. W0/33/26, no. 39, 
p. 182. 
(7) P. P. (C. -892), no. 150, p. 159. 
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subsistence to the men themselves. The Chiefs uid not 
object to making a mercantile transaction of recruiting, and 
bargained with Wolseley for four times as much pay to their 
2() 
men. But the few recruits who came forward had no intention 
of fighting. In the Dunkwa affray with the Ashantis, the 
officer in cinarge said of them: 
"... More than verbal persuasion had to be resorted to, 
to make the natives fight at all, whilst great numbers 
carefully abstained from taring part". (3) 
Soon realizing that he vould not obtain allies in 
Fanti country, Wolseley sent officers to recruit further 
(4) (5) 
afield. The Gambia sent 100 men, and Sierra Leone 85, 
(6) 
while 100 men came from Bonny to the south. In the hope 
that tribes further inland would be more willin6 to fight than 
{ 
the Fantis, he instructed one of his staff, Captain butler, 
(7) 
to build up a force in Akim country, He was again disappointed. j 
His first impulse was to blame Glover, who had been active in 
Akira with the same object of collecting men, Wolseley's 
anger and frustration were evident when he wrote to the 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 10e. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 135, p. 149. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 203, encl. l, p. 230. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 135. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 214, p. 244. 
(6) P. P. (C. -893)., no. 54, p. 48,, encl. 
(7) Loc. cit., no. 43, p. 33, encl. 
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Colonial Office: 
"... Owing to the large presents given by Captain Glover 
to the Chiefs of the Eastern tribes, and the purely mercenary 
spirit in which this war is viewed by the natives, the King of 
Western Akim refused point blank to move towards Prahsue, or 
take any steps to send his forces in that direction... The 
result is singularly unfortunate: I am deprived of the 
services of the whole of the best fighting races of this 
country". (1) 
Herbert was sceptical of the allegation about Glover; 
(2) 
Wolseley himself had been generous with gifts. But the 
bitterness between the two officers worried Lord Kimberley, 
and he began to regret his decision to send Glover to the 
Volta. Wolseley's dispatches on the lack of response to his 
orders in the Protectorate proved beyond doubt that Britain 
had a more shadow of authority on the Gold Coast. Kimberley 
trusted that Wolseley and Glover would pepress their private 
feelings and concentrate on the main business of the war. 
(3) 
At all costs the war had to succeed. 
It was quite evident, however, that Wolseley would 
not receive any assistance from the people of the Protectorate. 
To cover the humiliation he felt at their contempt for his 
authority, he represented their apathy to the Imperial war as 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) C0/96/107, minute on no. 13,690 by Herbert, 23rd Dec., 1873. h 
In his dispatch to the Colonial office on this subject! (P. P. (C. -893), no. 38, p. 31, ) Wolseley wrote that the Akims had beeng" demoralized by the freedom with which money and Gin 1 
have been lavished among them by Captain Glover that it is 
impossible to induce these usually warlike people to act. 
(3) CO/96/107, minute on no. 13, x, 90 by Kimberley, 2bth Dec., 187$, 
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(1) cowardice and worthlessness. As each day passed and his 
irritation increased, the accounts he sent to England of the 
base, treacherous, deceitful character of the inhabitants 
grew more damning. Before the end of October, he told the 
Home Government that he would not be able to rely on Gold 
(2) 
Coast auxilliaries, and in asking for an extra white regiment - 
a total requisition of nearly 3,000 men - he, urged the War 
Office to send only "the very best officers and the most 
(3) 
highly disciplined troops". 
To prepare for their reception in December, Wolseley 
proposed to cut a road northwards from Cape Coast to the Pra, 
with rest huts, supplies and fortifications on the way, so 
that the white troops could begin their march to Ashanti as 
(4) 
aoon as they disembarked. But Wolseley's difficulty in 
obtaining recruits in the Protectorate was dwarfed by that 
he experienced in trying to find labourers to carry out his 
plans. By the beginning of November, the position had 
become serious and Wolseley told the Colonial Office that he 
would have to make a "severe example" of the men in Cape 
WO/33/26,, no. 5l, p. 203. Wolseley had made up his mind 
that Africans were worthless before he over reached the 
Gold Coast. Vide Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, p. 10. 
(2) P. P. ((;. -892), no. 184, p. 208; and no. 228, p. 255. 
(3) W0/33/26, no. 42, p. 188, and no. 39, p. 182. 
(4) Loc. cit., Pr6cis. I: 
i 
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(1) (2) 
Coast, from whom other districts took their cue. No 
more willing to help Wolseley as labourers than as soldiers, 
the people resisted every appeal for their services in clearing 
the bush and carrying supplies. No labourers could be found 
to construct the tramway from Cape Coast to Mansu, and this 
(3) 
plan had to be abandoned. When the people of the Windward 
Districts began to sue for peace, Wolseley threatened them 
with dire punishment if they did not come forward as labourers, 
(4) 
but without result. . Even King Blay of Atuabo, who 
had 
been so consistently "loyal" in resisting Beyin and its Ashanti 
(5) 
allies, had almost to be forced to provide men. 
On 8th November, Wolseley proclaimed a general 
impressment. All men, women and children were to act as 
(6) 
carriers or suffer the consequences. But the people who 
were rounded up deserted at the first opportunity, and an 
officer actually caught a Chief urging his men to run away. 
In spite of "vigorous steps", Wolseley was unable to prevent 
`l ) 
the defection of such carriers as he managed to obtain. 
(1) P. P. (C. -893), no. 16, p. 15. 
(2) P. P. (C. -892). no. 184, p. 208. 
(3) P. P. (C. -893), no. 42, p. 33. The material was never even landed at Cape Coast, vide C0/96,3, minute on no. 1940/W 
by Hemming, 23rd Feb., 1874. 
(4) P. P. (C. -893), no. 38, p. 31. 
(5) P. P. (C. -894), no. 19, p. 24, 
(6) WO/33/26, Pr4ci s, P-328; and p. P. (C. -893),. no. 58, p. 50. (7) P. P. (C. -894) . no. 53, p. 63. 
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In January, he reported that the people of }louri, near Cape 
Coast, were in open rebellion against the impressment. 
Carriers from the town deserted just as white troops were about 
to land. Exasperated beyond endurance, Wolseley took refuge 
in invective from the ridiculous position in which he was 
placed by the people of the Protectorate. He wrote to the 
Colonial Office: 
"This question of the desertion of our carriers has 
assumed a most formidable aspect. Too cowardly ýo fight their 
own battles, and too lazy, even when well paid, to help those 
who are risking their lives in their cause, tt? ey have been 
deserting by whole tribes; and I do not hesitate to say that, 
were the most stringent measures not auopted to force them to 
work, the successful termination of the expedition might be 
endangered". (1) 
To give the punishment of deserters legal form, penalties were 
inflicted under the authority of the Judicial Assessor, who, 
on Wolseley's instructions, adapted tribal law to suit the 
(2) 
emergency . In reply to the gentle query of the colonial (3) 
Office., Wolseley explained that death sentences were passed 
only to intimidate the people; and though the Secretary of 
(4) 
State heard privately that punishment was carried out more 
(5) 
fully than Wolseley's reports indicated, it was the opinion 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 55, p. 65. 
(2) P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -907), (hereafter referred to as 
r. P. (C. -907)), no. 9, p. 10. 
(3) P. P. (C. -893), no. 58, p. 50. 
(4) CO/96/111, minute on no. 2582 (no. 13, infra, printed) 
by Carnarvon, 7th March, 1874. 
(5) P. P. (C, -922), no. 13, p, 16 and encl. 1. 
.. -- 
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of one of the officials in the Office that "no treatment could 
(1) 
be too bad for the Fantees". But despite all Wolseley's 
measures, there was still no labour, and he was obliged to 
ask the Navy to bring labourers from other parts of the west 
(2) 
Coast. 
Wolseleyls reports of the resistance of the Prote6 o- 
, (6rate 
to all Government appeals for assistance made it easy for 
Lord Kimberley to obtain Cabinet sanction for the employment 
of white troops on the Coast. Kimberley himself had not 
(3) 
doubted that they would be needed. Unwittingly, by their 
attitude to the war, the people of the Protectorate provided 
the justification for the policy which the British Government 
intended to adopt towards the Gold Coast at the conclusion 
of hostilities. Few people in England would venture to 
contradict the opinion of so eminent a man as Sir Garnet 
Wolseley. In approving Wolseley's request for European 
regiments, Lord Kimberley presaged the future; 
"With respect to our relations after the war with the 
tribes of the Protectorate, considering that with some few 
exceptions the native tribes since their first defeats have 
made very little effort to defend themselves against the 
Ashantees, and that, practically, the whole burden of the war 
has fallen upon this country, it must be understood that when 
the present operations have been concluded, Her Majesty's 
(1) CO/96/111, minute on no. 2582 by Hemming, 7th larch, 1874. 
(2) WO/33/26, Precis, p. 342; and P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -962) 
no. 5, p. 4. These carriers were mainly Krumen from the 
neighbourhood of Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
(3) Journal, op. ºcit., 17th Nov., 1873. 
--_ , ý,. 
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Government will hold that they have discharged their 
obligations to the protected tribes and that they are free to 
review their relations with those tribes and to place them 
on such footing as the interests of this country may seem to 
them to require: (1) 
Wolseley was also told to take account of the 
Protectorate's conduct when he drew up a peace treaty with 
Ashanti. In accordance with Gladstone's wish, Wolseley had 
offered terms to the Ashantis in October, demanding the 
immediate withdrawal of their forces, the surrender of all 
t2) 
prisoners, and the payment of an indemnity. The offer was 
not accepted; the Ashanti general who was leading the 
retreat out of the rrotectorate replied that the King would not 
make peace until he had conquered the Fantis, so that the 
(3) 
Ashantis might trade freely with the coast. British policy 
was opposed to an extension of the Ashanti Kingdom to the 
(4) 
south. But Lord Kimberley instructed Violseley to impress 
on the Ashantis that Her Majesty's Government would not 
countenance interruptions to trade from the coastal tribes, 
and that Britain's chief object was unimpeded trade from the 
coast to the interior. ache final peace terms, therefore, 
should be based on two considerations: that the Ashantis had 
suffered provocation from the Protectorate; and that the 
(1) P. P. (C. -892). no. 207, p. 239. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 156, p. 162. 
(3) Loc. cit. , no. 184, encl. 1, p. 210. L 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 216, p. 247, for Tiolseley's views on this 
subject. 
0- 
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permanent occupation of Ashanti by British troops was impossible 
for health reasons. The entry into Kumasi of a large body 
of disciplined, well-armed, European troops would demonstrate 
to the Ashantis and to the Protectorate that Britain was the 
mightier power. But Wolseley was to take care that he did 
not defeat the Ashantis so severely as to destroy their k 
Government. If it should collapse, wolseley might find himself 
in possession of Kumasi, unable to secure a guarantee of peace 
from any recognized authority, and so failing in one of the 
objects of the war. He might also be compelled to linger in 
the capital, endangering the health of the troops, while 
(1) 
waiting for another Ashanti Government to be formed. 
Conscious of the fact that speed was the essence 
of success, Wolseley had intended to begin the march to 
Ashanti as soon as the European regiments arrived on the Coast 
(2) 
in mid-December. All the Ashantis had left the Protectorate 
(3) 
by the end of November, and the only operations carried on 
in the Protectorate after that time consisted of skirmishes 
4f 
(1) Loc. cit. , no, 207. Vide also C0/96/108, no. 8795/0 for 
an article in the "Observer" of 24th Aug., 1873 on the 
subject of the Ashanti peace settlement. Kimberley took 
note of the article, and many of its views were incorporated 
in this dispatch. 
(2) WY0/33/26, Confidential Memorandum. The whole campaign 
had to be completed within the limits of the dry season 
from December to March. 
(3) P. P. (C. -893), no. 64, p. 52. k sä 
- .ý_ "- 
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arising out of local rivalries at Beyin 
(1) 
and Shama. But 
Wolseley's calculations were upset by the people of the 
Protectorate. . 6y delaying first the preparations for the 
campaign, and then the landing of the European troops, they 
(3) 
almost succeeded in defeating the Government. If the 
campaign was to be over before the end of the dry season in 
March, Wolseley judged that the last date on which he could 
cross the Pra into Ashanti was January 15th. Want of labour 
prevented the disembarkation of the English regiments until 
(4) 
about a week before that date, and even after the-march 
(5) 
began, progress was impeded by the dearth of labourers. 
He was fortunate in being able to reach the Pra by mid-January. 
(1) P. P. (C. -B94).. no. 42, p. 46.. encl. ; and (C. -907)2 no. 6, p. 7 
The Government decided at last to support Blay of Atuabo 
against Ameki of Beyin, as a reward for Blay's "loyalty". 
(2) P. P. (C. -894)., no. 20, p. 25* 
(3) WO/33/26, no. 112, p. 256- The European troops arrived 
between 9th and 19th December, but could not be disembarked. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 129, p. 267. A regiment which was landed 
at the beginning of January had to be sent back to sea. 
Wolseley wrote in this dispatch: "I have noiv made known to 
them all (the Chiefs of the Protectorate) that I have re- 
embarked one regiment, because of their failure to supply me 
with transport, and I hope that the knowledge... may... stir 
them to exertion's. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 137, p. 276. VJolseley wrote on 25th Jan., F; E 
1874 that he hoped the transport difficulty had been over- 
come, though this had only been possible by "strong measures 
of coercion". Vide also loc. cit., Pr6cis, p. 342; ve Lt. Col. Colleyts efforts along the road to the Pra helped 
Wolseley's expedition to reach that river at the 
appointed time. 
---- 
- 317 - 
The invasion of Ashanti, according to CYolseleyts 
plans, was to take place in four columns. His own column, 
the most important, was to consist almost entirely of 
European troops. Kumasi was its object, and Ldolseley forbade 
the leaders of the other three either to treat with the enemy 
} 
or to enter the capital. To protect his left flank, Captain 
Dalrymple was to lead a force mainly drawn from Wasaw, Denkera 
and Twifu. Captain Butler was to lead a similar force on his 
right, consisting of Akims. On the extreme right, Captain 
Glover was to create a diversion with his levies from the 
(1) 
Eastern Districts. It was important that all four columns 
should enter Ashanti simultaneously, and this led Wolseley 
to send his peremptory command to Glover to cease all other 
(2) 
operations so that he would be ready on the Pra By January 15th. 
Wolseley's column managed to cross the Pra on 
(3) 
14th January, and he heard later that Glover had crossed 
(4) 
on the following day somewhere to the east. Butler was 
held up by the Akims, and only entered Ashanti at the end of 
January with an uncertain force of Akims, still arguing and 
procrastinating. This column afforded no help to Wolseley, wkilk 
(1) P. P. XLVI, 1874, (C. -921), (hereafter referred to as (C. -921)),, no. 11, encl. 1, p. 5. 
(2) Vide supra, p. 304. 
(3) W0/33/26, Pröcis, p. 341* 
(4) P. P. (0. -922), no. l, p. l, encl. 
, ý- 
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Dalrymple's force failed to materialize, even with the threat 
(1) 
to the Wasaws of wolseley's "severe displeasure". 
On January 24th, when the European troops were 
nearing Adobiasi in Adansi, the King of Ashanti announced his 
acceptance of the peace terms Volseley had again offered at 
(2) 
the beginning of the month. This time Wolseley demanded 
the surrender of all prisoners, an indemnity of 50,000 ounces 
(3) 
of gold, and a treaty to be signed in Kumasi. The German 
missionaries and the French trader who had been imprisoned 
(4) 
in Ashanti since 1869, had already been released, and 
WJolseley t. old the King that the British force would halt at 
Fomana to allow time for the fulfilment of the other demands, 
which at this stage included the surrender of hostages and 
(5) 
immediate payment of half the indemnity. On January 26th 
and 27th, Kofi Kakari again expressed his desire for peace, 
but both he and Wolseley were temporizing. The King wanted 
(1) Ibid; 17,0/33/26, no. 147, p. 288,0 and P. P. (C.. -907)., no. 8, p. 8, 
4ý 
'` ý 
(2) Loc. cit., no. l, p. l. Telegraphic communication was 
established between Cape Coast and Mansu (P. P. (C. -894), no. 44, ', 
p. 48, encl. ) in January, 1874. Fast ships took messages to 
Madiera which were relayed to London by wire. Communication;, '! 
in this way was shortened from 3-4 weeks to about 16 days. 
(3) P. P. (C. -894), no. 51, p. 59, and enclosure. 
1 oz. of gold u about £4. 
(4) WO/33/26, no. 134, p. 271. kühne arrived at Prasu on 
13th Jan., the Ramseyer family and Bonnat on 23rd January, 1874: 
(5) P. P. (C. -907), no. 1, p. 1 and no. 8, p. 8. 
k 
.- 
"stc. ^mtaý'nf_ýiný-gym ^"m]> 'si qný 
- 319 - 
a few days in which to collect his forces and Wolseley was 
(1) 
waiting for supplies from the coast. A secret message 
from a Government agent still imprisoned in Kumasi warned 
(2) 
Wolseley that the King would resist, and on January 29th and 
31st, the European troops encountered stiff opposition at 
Edubiasi and Amoaful, the second engagement resulting in many 
(3) (4) 
casualties. On February lst, Bekwai was taken, and 
after continuous hard fi hting, Wolseley entered Kumasi on the (5) 
evening of February 4th. The King of Ashanti and most of 
the inhabitants had left the capital. On the next day, 
Wolseley ordered the King's palace to be destroyed and the 
(6) 
town to be burnt. 
Although the King had promised to come to Kumasi 
to sign the peace treaty, Wolseley feared a break in the 
weather and did not wait. On February 6th, he began the return 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 13, p. 11 and enclosures; and P. P. (C.. 922), 
no. 10, p. 14. 
(2) P. P. (C. -907), no. 13. The message ran thus: "See, 
please, 2 Cor. ii 1111 and was written in place of a,, ate at the head of a letter. The agent was lyr. Dawson, X who iad 
been sent to Kumasi at the end of 1872 in the course of 
the negotiations between the Government and Ashanti. This 
verse reads: "Lest Satan should get an advantage of us: 
for we are not ignorant of his devices". 
(3) WO/33/26, ? r6cis, pp. 350-10 
(4) Loc. cit.., p. 361. 
(5) Loc. cit 
r, 
P. 362. 
(6) Loc. cit. , and P. P. (C. -922), no. 14, p. 19. e 
I 
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(1) march to the coast. Sending the white troops ahead, 
Vdolseley paused at Romana for a few days in the hope that the 
King or his representatives would come to meet him and sign 
(2) 
the treaty. On February 13th, an envoy arrived from the 
King with 1,000 ounces of gold, in spite of Wolseley's 
stipulation that the first instalment of the indemnity should 
(3) 
be 5,000 ounces. But the rains had started, and Wolseley 
(4) 
could not waste any more time. Accepting the sum brought 
to him, he sent a copy of the treaty to Kumasi for signature 
(5) 
and made for the coast. 
Before Wolseley left Ashanti, the King of Adansi 
begged to be allowed to leave the Ashanti Kingdom with British 
protection. This request, and a similar appeal from Bekwai, 
pointed to the imminent collapse of the Confederacy, and 
Wolseley was anxious to avoid the embarrassment the dissolution 
(6) 
would cause him if he were still in the country. He 
could not promise protection to Adansi - Bekwai he ignored - 
because he did not know what changes the British Government 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 17, p. 26. 
(3) Loc. cit. , no. 25, p. 38. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 14, p. 19. 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 25. 
(6) Loc. cit... no. 35, p. 43. 
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intended to make in the nature or extent of the Protectorate. 
But he gave the people of Adansi permission to emigrate from 
Ashanti, and one of the terms of the Trdaty of Fomana, as the 
final agreement was called, was the recognition of Adansi 
independence. The other clauses included the payment of an 
indemnity of 50,000 ounces of gold in such quantities and at 
such times as the Lritish Government might order, and the 
renunciation by Ashanti of all claims over Elmina and the 
tribes of the Protectorate. Trade paths were to be kept open, 
and, as a special concession to the queen of England, the 
King of Ashanti was to try to stop human sacrifice in his 
(1) 
country. By the time tiolseley and the white troops sailed 
for England at the beginning of March, the treaty had not been 
(2) 
completed. A week later, however, on March 11th, a 
(3) 
signed copy was brought to Cape Coast. 
The Colonial Office had some misgivings about the 
conclusion of lVolseley's campaign. It had been their wish 
that the treaty should be signed while the European forces 
(4) 
threatened the Ashantis. But even after the destruction 
of Kumasi -a measure not altogether approved by the Home 
(1) Loc. ci t. , no. 37, p. 44. 
(2) Loc. c it. , no. 73, p. 89. 
(3) WO/33/26, Procis, p. 377. 
(4) 00/96/111, minutes on no. 2970 by Holland. and Herbert, 17th March, 1874. 
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(1) Government - the King evaded Wolseley's commands, and the 
treaty was not signed until a month later. To all appearances, 
however, the campaign had been successful. The Government, 
the press and the public were lavish in their praise and 
congratulation, and decorations and gratuities were generously 
(2) 
distributed among the officers and men. Even Glover was 
(3) 
not forgotten. With the Queen's "high approval" of his 
"indefatigable perse/verence" `vent a knighthood and a handsome 
(4) 
monetary present. But the campaign in the Eastern Districts 
did not end so decisively as that in the west. 
(1) Loc. cit., minute on no. 2588 by Herbert, 7th March, 1874. 
Herbert wrote that Wolseley's proceedings in Kumasi were 
"very disappointing", but this feeling did not show itself 
in Carnarvon's congratulatory dispatch, P. P. (C. -922), 
n o. 29, p. 40. 
;r 
,4 
(2) of. the sarcastic comment of Sir Wilfred Lawson, M. P. in 
the Commons debate on the war, that if Britain feted soldiers 
in the Ashanti campaign on such a scale, how would she 
reward those who might take part against France or Russia. 
Vide Hansard, CCXVIIL, debate on 4th May, 1874,159y. 
Silver necklaces were struck for loyal pings, but 
p esentation was delayed so long that it was decided in 
1E76 not to distribute them at all. Vide C0 96/115, 
n. 3559; C0/96/116, no. 11,707; and C0/96/119, no. 100887/ 
Agents. 
(3) Wolseley could not hide his dislike of Glover even at the 
end of the campaign. In recommending officers for 
distincting, he wrote of Glover to the Secretary of State: "Captain Glover's position is so conspicuous, and your 
Lordship's knowlecl{-e of his aoility is so complete, that I 
scarcely think it would be suitable for me to report upon 
him... 11 Vide P. P. (C. -922), no. lb, p. 23. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 30, p. 41; and p. p. XLVI 1874, (C. -1006), (hereafter referred to as p. p. (C. -10061)., nos. 18 and 25, PP- 15 and 18. i 
L 
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When Glover was ordered by ITolseley to cross into 
Ashanti on January 15th, the war against Awuna had to be left 
in the hands of Dr. Gouldsbury, a medical officer on Glover's 
(1) 
staff. Glover himself proceeded to enter Ashanti, not 
with 10,000 allies of the Eastern Districts, but with less 
than 1,000 mercenaries from Nigeria. His invasion took place 
(2) 
at a point south of Obogu. Wolseley had issued an 
injunction that he was not to approach nearer to Kumasi than 
(3) 
Juaben and under no circumstances was he to enter Kumasi - 
that triumph was reserved for Wolseley alone. After the 
middle of January, Wolseley had no news of Glover's progress 
Marcj 
(4) 
until the returnlto the coast had started in February. 
Wolseley then heard that Glover had lost his way in Ashanti 
and marched into Kumasi six days after Wolseley had left the 
(5) 
town. 
To make it clear to Glover that operations on the 
Volta were to cease, Wolseley had sent a message to Awuna at 
(6) 
the beginning of January that Britain was not at war with them. 
(1) P. P. (C. -894), no. 52, p. 62, encl. 
(2) P. P. (C. -907)0 no. 3, enc1.1, p. 4. Lake Bosumtwi. 
(3) P. P. (C. -894)., no. 47, encl. 6, p. 54. 
(4) P. P. (Co-922), no. 15, p. 23. 
Obogu is due east of 
(5) Loc. cit., no. 36, p. 44; and V; 0/33/26, Pr6cis, p. 369. 
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Isolated in the interior, however, Dr. Gouldsbury continued 
the campaign in accordance with Glover's instructions, and 
with the object of attaching Awuna to the Protectorate. 
A number of Accras and Akwapims had been drawn to the left 
bank of the Volta, and towards the end of January, this force 
attacked a number of Awuna villages. by inaucing the Krepis 
to fight against their old enemy Akwamu, Gouldsbury was able 
to extend hostilities over a wide area in the Trans-Volta 
(1) 
districts. But, like Glover and Wolseley, he was unable 
to secure the co-operation of the people, and he also resented 
the wilful degradation he experienced as a European and an 
officer. He urrote: 
"It appears impossible to get the native Chiefs and 
Captains to carry out any orders. They seem conscious that 
I am entirely dependent on them for transport; and, therefore, 
by refusing or saying they are unable to obtain tha carriers ... 
prevent my making any forward movement; in fact, on their 
caprice, the marching or halting entirely depends". (2) 
By the middle of February, most of the allies from the 
Protectorate had aeserted Gouldsbury. To-continue the war, 
he sent further east to seek help in subduing Awuna, and was 
even hopeful that some of the Protectorate people might 
(3) 
rejoin him. 
(1) P. P. (C. -922)9 no. 40, p. 47.9 and enclosures. 
(2) P. P. (C. -894), no. 47, encl. 4, p-53. 
(3) P. P. (C. -922)., no. 42, p. 54., encl. 
- 325 - 
Wolseley could not understand what Gouldsbury was 
trying to do on the Volta, and ordered him to make peace with 
Avvruna and Akwamu so 'that all operations connected with the 
(1) 
war might be concluded before he himself left the Coast. 
In March, however, the Acting Administrator, Colonel Maxwell, 
became aware that Gouldsbury had made no attempt to negotiate 
(2) 
with these tribes, and another officer, Dr. Rowe, was sent 
(3) 
to arrange a settlement. His mission failed. Some 
Accras were waiting at Ada for a suitable opportunity of 
attacking Awuna, and Rowe could not persuade them to return 
(4) 
to their homes. Not until June did the Administrator, 
with the aid of a warship, force them to obey, and only then 
(5) 
would the Awunas consent to sign a peace treaty. In the 
(6) 
same month, Gouldsbury negotiated a peace with Akwamu. 
But peace on the Volta was nominal. In the years 
following the war, the Government was to turn its whole 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 40, encl. 13, p. 53. 
(2) P. P. (C. -1006), no. 12, p. 12. 
(3) Loc. cit. , no. 13, p. 12. 
jt 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 35, p. 28 and enclosures; CO/96/114, no. 6321/G,, 
and enclosures; and P. P. LII, 1875, (C. -1140), no. 43, p. 31. 
(5) Loc. cit. nos. 61 and 65, pp. 44 and 47. ý 
(6) Loc. cit. , no. 73, p. 55. 
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attention to the establishment of British authority in that 
area. The success of Wolseley's campaign in the west enabled 
the administration to concentrate on the east . In the 
Western Districts, British power had been amply displayed, 
The reputation which attached to the inhabitants during the 
war died hard in England, and supplied a sufficient answer to 
any suggestion that they were capable of responsibility or 
ýº 
(1) ýý 
self-determination. The time had not yet come for a 
permanent occupation of the country. But with the confidence 
of success, the Government was able to extend its influence 
and impose its will in the Protectorate in a more positive 
manner than was possible in the previdus thirty years. 
(1) It is interesting to note that after the Ashanti War a 
religious "revival took place in the Western Districts. 
It would seem that those people who had before been 
politically active found Methodism a suitable outlet for 
their energies. Vide Methodist ldiissionary Notices. v. XXI, 
Gold Coast letters, passim. 
aa0 
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CHAPTER V. 
i. The Administration, 1874-1880. 
The Colonial Office determined at the conclusion 
of the war to correct the anomalies previously so characteristic:; 
of the administration and of the authority of the Government 
in the Protectorate. There was still no desire, however, 
to extend the territorial possessions of the Crown in the 
interior. The coastline, with its Forts and Settlements, 
remained the only British territory on the Gold Coast, and 
(1) 
this area was proclaimed a Crown Colony, Lagos was 
included in the Colony, a sign of the ambition of the 
Colonial Office to gain control of the whole of the intervening 
coastline. But there was this important difference in the 
legal status of the Government: for the first time, 
ordinances passed by the Legislative Council were declared 
(Z) 
operative in the Protectorate. This Council was set up as 
(1) P. P. LII, 1875, (C. -1140), (hereafter referred to as P. P. (C. -1140)), Appendix 1, p. 97, being Letters Patent 
of 24th July, 1874. 
(2) P. P. LII, 1875 (C. -1139), (hereafter referred to as P. P. (C. -1139)), no. 1, p. l. The constitutional changes 
were embodied in an Order-in-Council of 6th Aug., 1874, which 
was proclaimed in September. 
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(1) an entirely official body, and after larch, 1877, Accra 
(2) 
became the new headquarters of the Government. 
To demonstrate the confidence engendered by the war, 
Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State, instructed Governor 
Strahan in August, 1874, to take immediate action in the 
(3) 
matter of slavery. Hitherto, domestic slavery had been 
tolerated by the British Government as a necessary part of the 
social structure on the Gold Coast and other parts of West 
Africa, and no attempt was made to interfere with the 
(4) 
institution. In 1874, however, Carnarvon thought that 
recent events enabled him to lay aside the 'somewhat timid 
attitude' of his predecessors. In a long dispatch to the 
Governor, he recapitulated the course of the war in order 
that the Fanti Chiefs might not forget 
'. that as by the costly and unaided efforts of the Queen 
they have been raised from the abyss of misery and defeat in 
which they lay, to a position of peace and security, so 
Her Majesty, as their deliverer, is entitled to require of them 
a greater degree of deference and conformity to the known 
desires of herself and her people than she has in former times 
exacted". 
(1) Much to the relief of the Colonial Offi-ce. cf. CO/96/117, 
no. l1,783/vi for Wolseley's remark on 22nd Nov., 1875 that 
"there is no one there (in the Gold Coast Legislative 
Council) to question or cavil at the orders of the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies". 
(2) The decision to remove to Accra was taken in March, 1875, d! 
after a great deal of uiscussion, vide C0/96/115, no. 35o0, 
Strahan to Carnarvon, 5th March, 1875. 
(3) P. P. (C. -1139), no. 3, p. 6 
(4) Vide Chapter I, PIP-4'f-g, and P. P. XLVT 1874, (C. -1007), no. 2, P-2. 
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Accordingly, Strahan was to forbid slave dealing at once, 
and arrange for tie gradual abolition in the Protectorate of 
slavery itself. 
In carrying out the wishes of the Secretary of 
State, Strahan went even further than Carnarvon had thought 
prudent. He drafted two Ordinances, one to abolish slave 
dealing, and the other to emancipate all slave children after 
(2) 
January 1st, 1875. Then, summoning the Kings and Chiefs 
of the Western and Eastern Districts to Cape Coast and Accra 
(3) 
respectively, he explained the import of the Ordinances. 
` 1 
In December, they were passed in the Legislative Council and 
(4) 
proclaimed in the Protectorate. The Governor had taken 
military precautions against any outbreaks these measures might 
(5) 
occasion. But he expressed the conviction that the 
people of the Protectorate were incapable of united action 
against the Government. The Imperial war had obviated that 
(6) 
danger. 
Petitions protesting against abolition and demanding 
(7) 
compensation were sent to the Government by the Chiefs. 
(1) P. P. (C. -1139) , no. 3. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 5, p. 13. 
(3) Loc. cit., nos. 9 and 10, p. 25. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 21, p., 36. 
(5) Loc. cit. , no. 16, p. 34, 
(6) Loc. cit., no. 5. 
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Both Strahan and Carnarvon detected in these documents the 
influence of the "secucated natives" and were therefore 
(1) 
inclined to ignore them. One of the petitions, however, 
called for notice. It stated that because the war had been 
fought more to uphold the dignity of the Empire than in 
defence of the Protectorate, it was an insufficient warrant 
(2) 
for obedience from the people. Carnarvon singled out 
this statement as proof of the "lamentable want of patriotism" 
to the Crown which was so characteristic of the Gold Coast 
people. He ordered Strahan to tell them that their remark 
(3) 
had caused the Queen much "pain and surprise". Moreover, 
Strahan was told that no importance need be attached to the 
views and sentiments of the Chiefs except where they showed 
active co-operation in giving effect to the changes brought 
(4) 
about by the Government. 
As Strahan expected, there was no overt opposition 
(5) 
to the slave ordinances. 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 4, p. 12. 
(2) Loc. cit. , in no. 2. 
(3) Loc. cit. , no. 4. 
Perhaps the main reason was that 
(4) P. P. (C. -1139), no. 3, esp. 434. 
(5) P. P. LII, j1876, (C. -1402), (hereafter referred to as P. P. (C. -1402), no. 42, p. 70 and enclosure; and P. P. LII, 1875, (C. -1343), (hereafter referred to as P. P. (C. -1343) ), 
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the system of domestic slavery continued undisturbed. 
British courts had never taken cognizance of cases involving 
slavery, so that the emancip^tion Ordinance made no difference 
to the legal status of the slaves or their masters. Slave- 
dealing was known to be prevalent, particularly in the 
Volta region. But prosecutions were difficult in these cases, 
since Africans were unwilling to inform against their fellows, 
and there were no European officials in the interior to check 
(1) 
the practice. On the rare occasions that instances of 
slave-dealing were discovered by the Government, severe 
punishment was meted out to the culprits. The King of 
Eastern Wasaw, Enimil Kwaw, was indicted on this charge in 




created political unrest in his state, 
following year the King was deported to Lagos. But in 
1878 it was reported that few people had availed themselves 
(5) 
of the emancipation ordinance. Domestic slavery, so deeply 
rooted as a custom, and so much a part of the social and 
economic life of the tribes, was unlikely to disappear until 
(1) 00/96/120, no. 2469, Freeling to Carnarvon, 30th Jan., 1877, 
and enclosure. Vide also CO/96/131, no. 10,051, Ussher to 
Beach., 25th May' 1880. The Kin of Eastern Akim was 
acquited by ar(tij'"tfry on charges of slave-dealing in the face 
of clear and uncontraclicted evidence. 
(2) 00/96/118, no. 3925, Strahan to Carn, rvon, 4th March, 1876, 
and minutes. 
(3) Loc. cit., nos. 5960 and 6385, Lees to Carnarvon, 22nd April 
and Ist May, 1876, 
(4) C0/96/120, no. 1967, Freeling to Carnarvon, l5th Jan.,, 1877 and minutes; and CO /J6 /121 no. 5267, Freeling to Carnarvon, 
(5)5th 
0 
April, 1877 ahu minutes. Po LV, 1878, (C. -2148), no. 2, p. 1, and encl. 1. 
and in the 
(4) 
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the material conditions of the country had changed. 
Opinion in the Colonial Office had been unanimous 
about the abolition of slavery. It was divided, however, 
on the subject of forced labour. Sir Garnet Wolseley's 
difficulties in obtaining labour for his expedition during the 
war were experienced on a smaller scale by Governor Strahan. 
He had been embarrassed by a general refusal on the part of the 
(1) 
tribes to provide labour for an expedition to Akim in 1875. 
To prevent a similar refusal in future emergencies, Strahan 
drafted a Crown Labour Ordinance for the approval of the 
Colonial Office, but officials hesitated to assent to it. 
Fairfield, one of the Clerks in the Office, pointed out that 
Wolseleyº s plight had not resulted from the absence of an 
ordinance but fr aln the complete disregard of the people of 
(2) 
any summons, civil or military, The Colonial Office 
decided to set aside the draft until an occasion should arise 
(3) 
demanding its operation. 
Strahan's expedition to Akim was only one example 
of his frequent use of the force at his disposal in different 
(1) CO/96/119, no. 13,490, minute by Fairfield, 4th Sept., 1876; 
and vide this chapter, pt. ii, p. -363. 
(2) CO/96/119, no. 13,490, minute, supra. Fairfield wrote that 
the means by which Wolseley finally overcame labour 
difficulties during the war "were far sharper than any 
remedies provided in this bill (draft Crown Labour Ordinance),, 
and were indeeu such as are not capable of being stated in 
a Bill". E. D. Fairfield joined the Colonial Office staff 
in 1866 and was appointed Second Class Clerk in 1872. 
(3) Ibid., minutes, passim. 
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parts of the Protectorate. Both he and the Colonial office 
realised that the Government on the Gold Coast still depended 
for its power on armed force. Between September, 1874 and 
March, 1875, Strahan sent bodies of troops on four separate 
missions in the Nestern Districts; to Busua on the Windward 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coast., to Denkera, to Eastern Wasaw and to Western 
(4) 
Akim. In the most trivial incident he saw signs of 
insubordination to the Government. But troops and the 
imposition of fines on the refractory Chiefs had the desired 
effect of inculcating upon the tribes a fear of the Government's 
power, and the impression created by the Imperial war was thus 
fixed on the minds of the people. His object was to teach them 
that they could not defy the Government with impunity. 
Since armed force was so important for the "successful 
government" of the Gold Coast, the size and efficiency of the 
force were assiduously watched by the Colonial Office, and (5) 
Carnarvon grudged no expense in this branch of the administrati 
By August, 1874, there were 200 aen of a West Indian Regiment 
(1) P. P. (C. -1140), no. 108, p. 84. Wolseley had imposed fines 
on the rebellious Windward towns for their conduct during 
the war, vide P. P. (C. -1006), no. 29, p. 20, and enclosure, 
and $trahants expedition was occasioned by the refusal of 
one of these, Busua, to pay its fine in August, 1874, 
(2) P. P. (C. -1140), no. 115, p. 89. 
(3) P. P. (C. -1343), no. 47, p. 75. 
(4) Loc. cit. , no. 40, p. 65* 
(5) 00/96/120, minute on no. 4245 by Carnarvon, 26th May, 1877. 
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still on the Gold Coast. At the conclusion of the war, 
Carnarvon had publicly undertaken to allow the complete 
withdrawal of Imperial troops from the Gold Coast and to rely 
entirely for its defence on the Hausa force which at the 
(1) 
time was 350 strong. But Strahan advised against the 
(2) 
removal of the regular troops. Hausas were able to overawe 
the people, but the West Indian troops were required to keep 
(3) 
the Hausas in order. There were also times when the 
presence of a regular force was indispensable for the safety 
of the Government. A case in point was the promulgation of 
the slave Ordinances. At the end of that year, the Colonial 
Office told the War office that the withdrawal of the West 
(4) 
Indian troops would have to be postponed indefinitely. 
Nevertheless, the mainstay of the Government's 
defence was to be the Hausa force, which was reorganized in 
1875 under the name of the Gold Coast Constabulary, and its 
(5) 
strength was increased to 600 men. In the next year, 
(1) Hansard, vol. CCXIX, 1874,163. 
(2) CO/806/30, no. 183, Strahan to Carnarvon, 20th Aug., 1874. 
(3) C0/96/112, minute on no. 10,685 (no-183 supra in 
Confidential Print) by Malcome, 12th Sept., 1874. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 12,708, Strahan to Carnarvon, 16th Oct., 1874; 
and minute by Herbert, 10th Nov., 1874. 
(5) P. P. (C. -1343).. no. 78, p. 97. 
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(1) 200 recruits were added, and in 1877, the numbers of the 
(2) 
force were brought up to 900. The Hausas were armed with 
breechloaders, and some of them, in accordance with a 
favourite scheme of Carnarvon, were trained in the use of 
(3) 
artillery. There were in addition to the Hausas, about 
200 Fanti police who were unarmed, and used exclusively for 
(4) 
civilian duties. The European officers attached to the 
Constabulary were designated Inspectors, or Assistant 
Inspectors, of Police, according to rank. At the end of 1879, 
Governor Ussher reported that four stations on the Gold Coast 
were occupied by Hausa detachments - Axim, Elmina, Accra and (5) 
Keta. The stations so occupied varied from time to time. 
As well as their military duties, these officers 
were also to carry out legal and administrative functions. 
Wherever officers occupied stations along the coast, they were 
to take the place of Civil Commandants with the new title of 
(1) CO/96/118, minute on no. 6740 by Ommanney, 14th June, 1876. 
(2) CO/96/122, no. 12,609, Freeling to Carnarvon, 13th Sept., 
1877, and minutes by Hemming, 22nd Oct., and Carnarvon, 
30th Oct., 1877. 
(3) C0/96/115, minutes on no. 9083 and draft reply, Carnarvon 
to Strahan, 4th Feb., 187 6; and C0/96/120, no. 4245, minute 




(4) CO/96/123, no. 2834, Freeling to Carnarvon, 31st Jan., 1878. 
Fantis were not considered fit for military duties. 
Freeling wrote: "The more I see of them, the more convinced 
I am that they are thoroughly worthless". 
(5) 00/96/128, no. i, Ussher to Beach, 27th November, 1879. 
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(1) District Commissioner. At other coast stations, civilian 
District Commissionbrs were employed. The posts generally 
under the direct supervision of Government officials, when 
these were available, included Sekondi, Dixcove, Cape Coast, 
Anomabu, Saltpond, Winneba and Ada, in addition to the four 
places already mentioned. The main duty of the District 
Commissioners, apart from keeping the peace, was magisterial. 
When in 1874 British laws were declared valid throughout the 
Protectorate, there was no necessity to continue the office 
(2) 
of Judicial Assessor, and the office fell into abeyance. 
The judicial establishment was reconstituted by the Supreme 
Court Ordinance of 1876 to consist of a Chief Justice, a 
Puisne Judge and a Queen's Advocate. But officials at the 
outstations were to act as magistrates administering English 
(3) 
common law. Tribal courts held by the Kings and Chiefs 
continued, though the Colonial Office would have liked to 
abolish them. Fairfield thought that 
'! the justice of even the most unintelligent Hausa Officer 
is better than Native justice". (4) 
But since it was necessary to retain these courts, the Colonial 
Office considered that the best way of controlling their 
(1) P. P. (C. -1343), nos. 78 and 79, pp. 97 and 105. 
(2) CO/96/111, minute on no. 5542 by Fairfield, 16th May, 1874. 
(3) Ibid., and C0/96/115, minute on no. 9084 by Fairfield, 





procedure would be to recognize the Chiefs as magistrates 
and require them to conform with certain regulations. This 
Step, however, would depend on the precise definition of the 
relative powers of the Government and the Chiefs, and came 
under discussion in the Colonial office as soon as the war 
ended in connection with the rights which the Government 
(1) 
intended to assume. 
In 1844, through the agency of the Bond, and later 
by tacit consent, Chiefs of the Protectorate had delegated to 
(2) 
the British Government vague rights of jurisdiction. But 
in 1874, the Government claimed acknowledgement of far more 
substantial rights. In defining its claims, the Government 
had a choice of two modes of action. The Kings and Chiefs 
could again be asked, as in 1844, to sign an agreement of this 
nature; or the Governor could simply issue a proclamation 
(3) 
announcing the powers that it assumed. The recent war 
made it possible for Britain to adopt a "somewhat higher tone" 
with the Chiefs, and the balance of opinion in the Colonial 
Office lay in favour of a proclamation. If an agreement were 
drawn up, a large number or Chiefs might refuse to assent to it. 
On the other hand, there were so many petty Chiefs in the 
(1) CO/9o/111, minutes on no. 5542. 
(2) Vide Chapter I, pp. 4-4-. 
(3) CO/9b/113/Law Officers, minutes on no. 1136 by Herbert, 
2bth June, and Carnarvon, 13th July, 1874, 
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Protectorate that some of them might inadvertently be omitted 
from the list of signatories, and afterwards maintain, with 
justification, that they were not bound by the document. 
The final decision was to rest with the Governor. Carnarvon 
instructed him to include in the proclamation or agreement 
the following powers as belonging to the Governmcnt: the 
administration of civil and criminal justice, the protection 
and encouragement of trade,, the maintenance of order, settling 
of disputes, and the right to raise a revenue by customs, 
licence or direct impost. These powers had been exercised in 
the past, and Carnarvon did not want it to seem as if these 
sovereign rights were granted as a concession by the Chiefs. 
nnatever proceeding was adopted, however, it was important that (1) 
Britain's tittle to the rights should be placed beyond dispute. 
Strahan replied in March, 1875, that a proclamation 
was the more appropriate way of defining Britain's rights, if 
E 
h 
a definition was required. But he doubted its necessity. 
He knew that the Colonial office wished to extend the limits 
of the vrotectorate, and only when its bounds were exhaustively 
known could the Government accurg. tely define the nature and 
extent of its jurisdiction. I1eanwhile, it was sufficient for 
the Government to assert its rights to the utmost. 
(2) 
(1) P. P. (C. -1139),, no. 2, p. 2. This dispatch of 20th Aug., 1874 
was labelled "Secret'", but was presented to Parliament 
shortly afterwarus. 
(2) CO/96/115, no. 4825, Strahan to Carnarvon, 27th March, 1875. 
Secret, and enclosure. 
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Strahan's arguments were convincing, and the Colonial Office 
agreed to delay the proclamation. Fairfield remarked that 
if it were prematurely issued, it was more than likely that 
the "sharp-witted persons" who had protested against the 
(1) 
abolition of slavery would find loop-holes in the definition. 
It was decided therefore to use the content of the draft 
proclamation as Secret Instructions for the Governor, so that 
he at least might be certain of the rights he was entitled to 
(2) 
exercise in the Protectorate. 
But it was still thought desirable to define the 
powers of the Chiefs as a means of providing for a system of 
administration for the Protectorate. In 1874, Carnarvon told 
Parliament that British policy in the past had tended to 
destroy the power of the Chiefs and made the people rely too 
(3) 
much on the British Government. Not until 1877, however, 
was any attempt made to formulate a policy for the future. 
Governor Freeling set about the task, and the policy he 
outlined was based on the assumption that the Chiefs should 
act as Government agents. If they declined to carry out the 
orders of Government officials - their refusal to provide 
(1) Ibid., minute by Fairfield, 9th May, 1875. 
(2) Ibid., minutes by t'auncef ote and Carnarvon, 17th and 2nd 
Sept., 1875, and draft reply, Carnarvon to Strahan, 8th Oct., 
1875, Secret. 
(3) Hansard, CCXIX, 1874,155. 
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labour for Wolseley during the war was a relevant example - it 
was regarded by &he administration as a sign that they lacked 
authority over their people. This position should therefore 
be remedied by the Government, whose aim was also to ensure 
that the Chiefs did not act independently and so endanger 
British supremacy. At the same time, they should be clothed 
with enough power to enable them to give effect to the 
instructions of the Governor. There was no need for Freeling 
to emphasize the potential use of the Chiefs in a system of 
indirect rule. The Colonial Office had always admitted 
that these traditional rulers, properly controlled, would be 
(1) 
the "best and cheapest" instruments of government. It was 
impossible to have a sufficient number of Europeans in the 
interior to carry out British laws without an enormous cost 
in money and lives. But even if there were white magistrates 
in the hinterland, 
It*** it would still ... be desirable to maintain 
the 
authority of the Native Rulers were it only as executive 
officers for carrying out in the interior the directions of 
the Government and of courts and magistrates. The physical 
features of the Country are such - covered almost everywhere 
with thick bush or forest, that except by the aid of the Chiefs, 
it would be difficult to have real control over the population.. " 
(2) 
A proclamation of the powers which the Government 
was prepared to delegate to the Chiefs was sent in draft to the 
(1) CO/96/120, no. 4245, Freeling to Carnarvon, 13th March, 1877; 
and Vide Chapter Is pp. 35-1_ 
(2) CO/96/121, encl. in no. 5953, Chalmers to Freeling, 
10th April, 1877. 
ý-ý .. .ý 
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Colonial Office in April, 1877. This document was mainly 
(1) 
concerned with their powers of jurisdiction in minor offences. 
Freeling explained that it was not the intention of the 
Government 'to add to the authority of the Chiefs; it was 
merely desirable to state the limits of the authority that the 
(2) 
Government recognized as belonging to these rulers. 
Lord Carnarvon agreed with the principles of the draft, but 
he was reluctant to allow a public declaration of the Chiefts 
powers. He was more inclined to consent to Freeling's 
second proposal, that the draft should be amended and issued 
privately to European magistrates for their guidance, since 
(3) 
the Chiefs themselves could not read. The amended draft 
was transmitted to London in January, 1878. It defined in 
detail the scope of jurisdiction allowed to the Chiefs. They 
could hear specified cases provided that the accused preferred 
these tribunals to British courts. Chiefs could levy fines 
up to £30 and pass sentences of imprisonment not exceeding 
8 days, and fees of court were laid down. All decrees of the 
Government or its courts were to be obeyed, and the Chiefs were 
to keep the peace in their districts. They might hold 
meetings for the regulation of customs, but any rules could be 
(1) Ibid., enclosure. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 10,429, Freeling to Carnarvon, 26th July, 1877, 
and encl. 
(3) Ibid. 
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disallowed by the Government. In case of abuse of any of 
(1) 
these powers, a Chief could be dismissed from his office. 
Though this draft met with general approval in the 
Colonial Office, officials were still undecided about acting 
on Freelingts proposal. A suCLesti. on that the Government 
should promulgate the powers of the Chiefs by Ordinance was 
given much consideration. One objection to this was that it 
might teach the Chiefs to be even more dependent on Government 
support than before. But Administrator Lees, while on leave 
in London in March, 1878, told the Secretary of State that 
a decisive declaration by means of an Ordinance had many 
advantages: 
floe* The renewed powers of the Chiefs should rest rather 
upon English authority, than upon their innate right, thus 
tending to render the Chiefs less formidable to act in 
opposition to the Government ... 
" 
But he believed that the portion of the Ordinance to be 
published should be of a general character. The details should 
be reserved for the guidance of the Governor and the European 
(2) 
magistrates. This course was sanctioned by Sir Michael (3) 
Hicks Beach, who succeeded Carnarvon as Secretary of State. 
The Ordinance, which was passed by the Legislative Council in 
June, 1878, was known as the "Native Jurisdiction Ordinance'. 
(1) 00/96/123, no. 2437, Froeling to Carnarvon, -24th Jan., 1878 
and enclosures. 
(2) Ibid.., minute by Capt. Lees, 21st March, 1878. 
(3) Ibid., minutes, and draft reply, Beach to Carnarvon, 
29th March, 1878. 
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It was only to have effect in such areas as were proclaimed by 
(1) 
the Governor. But this Ordinance never came into force. 
With amendments, it formed the basis of a second Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance in 1883, which was proclaimed from 
(2) 
time to time in certain areas of the Protectorate. 
fIcir 
The central feature of these Native A4-2 1 
Ordinances was also their main defect, namely, that they 
(3) 
required the Chiefs to act as Government executives. It was 
believed by the Colonial Office that the tribal structure 
should be utilized as far as possible in the administration 
of the Protectorate. Yet by transforming the Kings and 
(4) 
Chiefs into "public officers" the Government was investing 
these rulers with a function which they did not possess in 
their own society. Certain functions were inherent in the 
office of a Chief - religious, military or judicial or all 
(5) 
three. Executive powers were foreign to the nature of 
that office, and especially so when orders came frcan an 
entirely alien institution - the Government - whose European 
(1) 00/96/124, no. 9852, Lees to Beach, 3rd July, 1878, and 
enclosures, and minute by Wingfield, 3rd Sept., 1876. 
(2) CO/96/149, no. 3406, Rowe to Derby, 30th Jan., 1883, 
(3) The title of King was abolished, at Carnarvonºs wish, 
vide, 00/96/121, minute on no. 10,429,12th Sept., 1877; 
andAChapter III, p. I'Z. 
(4) The term used by Lord Grey in 1849, vide Chapter I. p. 3&. 
(5) Among the Akan group, Chiefs would have all three functions. Among other groups, such as Ga and Ewe, military and religious functions are quite separate and are vested in different persons. 
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officials were for the most part quite unaware of the 
sentiments or the organization of the people. In the new 
role of public officers the Government would support the 
Chiefs in the exercise only of such powers as it chose to 
recognize. It was not surprising therefore that when the 
Ordinance was eventually put into operation, it was 
disappointing in its results. So long as the administration 
was based on these principles, it was bound to be weak in 
structure and disruptive in effect. Further, this system of 
administration gave no scope for the development of tribal 
society. Since it was easier to govern uniform and static 
society than a changing one, the Government was prepared to 
give particular support to the system of indirect rule in 
areas such as the coastal towns where an educated element had 
(1) 
evolved, at variance with the tribal authority. 
Closely connected with indirect rule was the question 
of stipends to the Kings and Chiefs. Elsewhere on the West 
Coast salaries were given to the Chiefs, and the system worked 
(2) 
well. It had more than once been suggested for the Gold Coast. 
In 1878, when the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance was passed, 
the project was again revived, the usual reasons being 
(1) of. C0/96/121, encl. in no. 5953. 
(2) Vide Chapter I, pp. 35-6 and Chapter III, p. 247. 
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advanced in support of it. British rule had closed many 
sources of revenue to the Chiefs. By giving them a small 
monetary grant, the Government would attach them to its rule. 
The Chiefs would be aware of the importance of good behaviour 
if they received a stipend, and at the same time their influence 
over the people would increase because the stipend would show l 
that the rulers were substantially supported by the Government. 
Lieutenant Governor Lees proposed to begin by offering a 
(1) 
selected list of 2b Chiefs the sum of £40 per annum each. 
While it conceded that the advantages of the scheme were 
indisputable, the Colonial office hedged. An increase of 
£1,040 in the annual expenditure could not be lightly undertaken, 
If some means of direct taxation could be devised, the Colonial 
Office would consent to the scheme. Until then, the 
Governor was instructed to postpone its operation. Lees 
argued that it would be better to give the Chiefs 
'; an interest in the Revenue before attempting to increase 
it directly at the expense of their subjects". 
(2) 
But the Colonial Office thought otherwise. 
Some form of direct tax was a favourite object of 
the Colonial Office. It was true that the Poll Tax had 
failed some twenty years previously, but the causes of its 
failure were "preventable". Hemming, one of the principal 
C1) CO/96/125, no. 16,370, Lees Vo beach, 18th Novemoer, 1878. 
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Clerks, prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of State in 
1878 in which he said: 
"It must not be forgotten that we now exercise a degree 
of jurisdiction and authority over the Chiefs which we never 
did before; that in the event of a Chief or tribe proving 
hostile or refractory a force is immediately moved up either 
for punishment or precaution, and the natives are thereby 
shown that the Government is more than a mere name; that we 
have much better means than formerly of checking abuses in the 
collection of a tax; and that by the special efforts made in 
the late Ashantee War for the defence and freedom of the 
Protectorate we have greatly strengthened the claim ... to call 
upon the people to contribute to the cost of the Government 
without making any stipulations as to the mode of expending 
their contributions. (1) 
But the Governor was more aware than the Colonial Office of 
the difficulties of imposing a direct tax. Freeling remarked 
in 1877 that many ''ignorant natives", thinking that advantage 
was taken of them by the collection of import dues, felt that (2) 
they might have been "better off without our protection". 
It was unlikely that they would have consented to additional 
taxation by means of a direct levy, and no attempt was made to 
impose a direct tax. 
Although direct taxation was often considered by 
the Colonial Office, the revenue from customs dues was so 
substantial that there was no urgent necessity to seek an 
(3) 
alternative source. With an annual average revenue of 
(1) Ih 1., memo., 27th . ec., 1878. A. W. L. Hemming, appointed 
to the Colonial office in 1860, was promoted to LIrst Class 
Clerk in 1874- 



















(3) CO/96/118, minutes on no. 10,719, 
- 347 - 
about £90,000 between the years 1875 and 1880, the Gold Coast 
(1) 
was for the first time in a satisfactory financial position. 
Trade flourished after the war, though it fluctuated in 
volume from year to year, and merchants still complained that 
the Government did not care for their interests as it should. 
A particular grievance was that there was no mercantile 
representation on the Legislative Council. But some df 
their discontent undoubtedly resulted from an increase in 
competition for the trade. Offshoots from the old-established 
firms broke away and set up business on their own account; 
and, in addition to newcomers to the field from Britain, there 
was a noticeable growth in the number of small African concerns. 
It was to be expected, Governor Freeling told the Colonial 
Office, that as the competition was more intense, so the gain 
(2) 
to individuals was less. 
Customs revenue was derived principally from the 
tax of 2/6d. a gallon on spirits, imposed since 1873. The 
effect of this duty was to diminish the quantity of spirits 
(3) 
imported while adding considerably to the revenue. In 
spite of the satisfactory state of the revenue, however, the 
Colonial Office was anxious for it to show a steady annual 
increase, not only to provide for the growing needs of the 
Government, but to enable it to save an amount each year so that 
any serious outbreak could be dealt with independently of the 
(4) 
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(1) This average revenue was made up of £77,000 from customs; 
x, 4,000 from fees, fines, etc; 43,000 from licences 
kincluding spirit licence which was again put into operation 
- it had fallen into abeyance in 1872 - in Jan., 1875. 
Vide C0/96/118, no. 2220. In the new Ordinance, retail 
licences were +, 2, and wholesale licences and import licences 
were abolished). The rest of the revenue came from 
miscellaneous sources. 
(2) of. CO/96/120, no. 2470, Froeling to Carnarvon, 30th Jan., 
1877, and enclosed memorial. The merchants signing this 
memorial were: Lintott, Spink and Co. (who appear to have 
taken over Forster and Smith's interest - this firm 
disappeared after 1873); W. H. Selby, F. C. Grant (an indepen - äsnt African trader )o G. Rendell; Lyall and Courtenay (an 
offshoot of Swanzy's established in 1876 - both men had been 
agents for that firm); C. MeIver & Co. (also an offshoot of 
Swanzy's estd. in 1873); A. Reid" Campbell Mackenzie and Co. 
(estd, in 1876 -a small concern ; John Sarbah (African 
agent for Grimvale, Ridley & Co. ); and African traders 
J. Sago, J. Christian kagent of Mc, Iver's); R. H. Brew, 
J. b. Clement, J. F. Acquay, J. Vr. Sey, C. Pobee. Vide also 
C0/96/123, no. 2031, Freeling to Carnarvon, 21st Jan., 1878, 
and enclosures. The principal firms having agents on the 
Coast in 1876 were the three London firms of Swanzy, 
Lintott and Spink, and Staley.. Radford and Co., vine C0/96/11§ 
no. 8835. Miller ts was a Glasgow firm9 aLo t-ºýýýýý ' X-kbi ýve1, ýi f -i cf S. 
(3) C0/96/118, no. 10,719, Lees to Carnarvon, 10th Aug., 1876. 
(4) of. CO/96/122, minute on no. 19 by Hemming, 1st Jan., 1878, 
and CO/96/123, minute on no. 2833 by Herbert, 9th March, 1878. 
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Office and the Governor tried to devise a new tariff in 1876. 
Lees reported that the consumption of imported spirits had 
decreased substantially since the war because the increased 
price had led to a greater consumption of the locally-produced 
palm wine. A heavier tax on spirits would diminish the 
importation still further, with a corresponding loss to the 
revenue. Lees therefore proposed the imposition of an 
ad valorem duty. Anticipating the merchants' protest, he 
(1) 
suggested a simultaneous reduction in the spirit duty. 
Sir Robert Herbert was not impressed with the necessity of 
giving any "sop" to the merchants. The Colony, he said, was 
kept up chiefly for their benefit, and he was sure that they 
(2) 
profited from the spirit trade. Less vehemently, however, 
another official in the Colonial office, lyr. Graham, pointed 
out that the object of the Government was revenue; the 
consumption of spirits which paid duty was preferable to the 
(3) 
consumption of spirits - palm wine - which did not, and a 
(4) 
lower spirit duty seemed desirable. Duties were also 
collected on guns and gunpowder when the importation of these 
(5) 
articles was resumed in 1876. But though they yielded 
(1) CO/96/118, no. 10,719. 
(2) Ibid.., minute by Herbert, 12th Oct, 1876. 
(3) Tapped from palm trees. 
(4) Ibid., minute by Graham, 14th Sept., 1876. F. Graham, 
appointed to the Colonial vffice in 1870, was a Second Class 
Clerk from 1872. 
0 5) CO/96/123, no. 3439. Duties of 2s. each on guns and 6d. per lo. on- gunlpowuer were iiýl poseu0 
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Z2-3,000 every year, the revenue from this source was 
precarious. At any time it miCht be advisable to stop the 
sale of arms in the Protectorate if trouble threatened from 
Ashanti. At length, the Colonial Office decided to sanction 
a 06 ad valorem duty and Lees was instructed to lower the 
spirit duty to 2/-de a gallon. By an oversight 2/6d. was 
printed in the new Customs Ordinance passed in 1877, and this 
(1) 
duty was allowed to stand. The result of the new tariff 
was a considerable improvement in the revenue. 
With the new tariff, the system of quarterly credit 
to importers was reintroduced. It had first been in operation 
in 18 67, though it was disapproved six years later because 
it was said to favour the larger merchants. But in 1876 
the Governor advocated the system for the opposite reason. 
Large merchants, he said, could always find the money to pay 
duties in advance, whereas small traders could not. Quarterly 
(2) 
credit would therefore encourage competition. The abolition 
of wholesale and import licences for spirits was said to tend 
(3) 
in the same direction. 
The expenditure of the Colony increased proportionate- 
84aly. In the years 1875-1880, the average annual expenditure 
(1) C0/96/118, minutes on no. 10,719, and 00/96/120, no. 1966. 
(2) CO/96/118, no. ' 9a X0,719_ 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 2220, and vide supra, p. 348, footnote (1). 
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was £83,000. Of this amount, nearly £46,000 was spent on 
the establishment, more than half of which was taken up by 
the Constabulary and its European officers. The judicial 
establishment cost about £5,000 a year. In the same period, 
the Gold Coast was required to repay the sum of £21,000 to 
the Imperial Treasury as its contribution to the cost of the 
war. Then, since the Government had elected to stay on the 
Gold Coast, it set about entrenching itself more firmly by 
making provision for the health of its European officers. 
A programme of "public works" was drawn up, costing nearly 
Z10., 000 a year. It consisted of repairs to some of the 
Ports., houses for the Governor and other officers, and a 
j,, Y ILCM 
country houseAat Aburi. Small amounts were set aside for the 
clearing of roads from Accra to Aburi, and from Cape Coast to 
(1) 
Prasu, the latter being strategically important. A 
permanent staff of the Public Works Department was maintained 
at a cost of £4,000 annually, to supervise the construction 
of these works. As for public works which might be of use 
to the African population, Governor Freeling was of the opinion 
that 
"nothing that is not absolutely necessary should be done 
for people who do nothing for themselves, who are idle and 
worthless". (2) 
(1) CO/96/115, no. 9083, Strahan to Carnarvon, 14th July, 1875, 




(2) CO/96/121, no. 7756, Freeling to Carnarvon, 2nd May, 1877. 
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Mr. Fairfield queried this notion that "people ought to be 
badly governea to punish them for want of general moral 
(1) 
qualities". But while money could nearly always be found 
to increase the Constabulary or other branches of the 
establishment, there always seemed to be financial difficulties 
in the way of works of general utility, such as a proposed 
hospital in Accra, roads for the improvement of trade, and 
the construction of landing places at the main ports. 
Hemmingfs view was typical of Colonial office opinion: 
"It (is) 
... our first duty to attend to the welfare of 
our officers, and only a secondary one to attempt (we shall 
never get beyond this stage) to improve the Colony". (2) 
Much consideration was therefore given to the 
European staff. In 1874, tropical pension rates were 
introduced for Colonial officials. Senior officers were paid 
(3) 
at appreciably higher rates than before the war, and the 
Government could afford a more numerous staff. But 
Europeans still suffered badly from the effects of the climate 
and disease, and staff deficiencies were constantly complained 
of by the Governors. In 1877, there was a death and permanent 
(4) 
invalid rate of 30% among the European officers. This was 
an exceptionally high figure, but in the four years 1874-1878, 
(1) Ibid. , minute by Fairfield, 19th July, 1877. 
(2) 00/96/123, minute on no. 2436,7th March, 1878. 
(3) e. g. The Governor received L3,000 a year, with £500 
allowances. 
(4) CO/96/123, no. 2436, Freeling to Carnarvon, 24th Jan., 1878. 
- '; __, -, ___-_____; < 
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the averaUe health casualty rate was 13%, and the average 
length of service was nine months out of the regulation 
(1) 
eighteen. It was not surprising, therefore, that despite 
its increased power and resources, the administration remained 
inefficient and still lacked continuity. 
The Gold Coast remained as unattractive to European 
officials as it had always been. Everyone agreed that only 
the "best type" of man should be appointed to the Gold Coast 
service, but the Colonial office had no option but to appoint 
(2) 
those who applied for the vacant posts. Governors' 
comments showed that the officers were not exceptional for 
their tact, their ability or their good behaviour. Fairfield 
held that it was 
11 bjectionable to have on the Gold Coast Englishmen not 
occupying the position of gentlemen'. (3) 
But it was clear that they were not always entitled to that 
position. It was recognized that the employment of educated 
(4) 
Africans would be the most "feasible expedient". But the 
Colonial office had taken its stand against this course before 
(1) CO/96/125, minute on no. 11,988 by Hemming, 26th Oct., 1878. 
At this stage, the Colonial Office deciue( to try new leave 
regulations in an effort to maintain better health among 
the 
. uropean officers. Since 
1869,6 months leave had been 
granted after 18 months' service. In 1478,6 months after 
12 months' service was tried for some years, but was not 
found to be more satisfactory, 
(2) of. CO/96/115, minutes on no. 8795,4C. O. comments on one 
particular officer. 
(3) 00/96/115, minute on no. 8274 by Fairfield, 24th July, 1875. 
(4) 00/96/112, minute on 1'10.12. , 406 by Fairfield, 6th Nov., 1874. 
ý. ý.. ý, 
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(1) 
the war. After it, Hemming took the trouble to compile 
a memorandum for Lord Carnarvon consisting of excerpts from 
4 
all dispatches since 1668 concerning this group, and in it he 
(2) 
laid particular emphasis on their subversive activities. 
Those who had experience of the Gold Coast assured the 
Colonial Office that the employment of "educated natives" 
(3) 
would be "worse than useless". as before, all the minor 
posts were open to the eüucateci Africans. There were usually 
two or three Africans employed as District Commissioners when 
no buropeans were available, and occasionally Africans 
temporarily occupied the more highly paid posts in the Customs 
and. Treasury Departments. 
the Government showed no inclination to increase the 
number of educated Afr. Lc. _ ls. 
Hemming wrote in 1E5u that 
he life of one -. glish officer ; wash of more value 
than the converting of a hundred 'untutored savages? into 
'educated Africans": (4) 
An indication of rho extent of official interest in education 
was the amount of financial support given it. Between 1875 
and 1E380., about £200 were spent each year in the form of 
subsidies to mission schools. The Colonial Office was 
(1) Vide Chapter III, pj. J513esp. { 
() CO/96/113, memo. in no. 6904/Misc., 20th June, 1874. 
(3) C0/96/112, minute on no. 12., 406 by Fairfield, 6th Nov., 1874. 
(4) CO/96/130, minute on no. 2538 by Hemming, 9th March, 1880. 
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indifferent to educational policy. Indeed, the only person 
to make a statement on euucation was Sir Garnet Wolsel. ey, who 
said emphatically in 1874 that the teaching of English in all 
(1) 
mission schools should be made compulsory. 
observed four years later, 
But, as Lees 
11 
I 
"... nei Eher Gi1e objects to ue a: Lmod at, nor the methods 
to be followed, nor even the language in which European I" 
knowlecto may most suitably be imparted, has as yet received ... i 
deliberate considerationr'. (2) 
lt was easy to plead many other calls on the revenue as an 
excuse for the neglect of euucation. Both the local 
Government and the Colonial Office were satisfied that if there 
was a demand for education, the people themselves should pay 
(3) 
for it by means of a direct tax. 
This attitude to eth cation and to the welfare of 
Africans generally was in keeping with the temper of the post- 
war period, It lacked the humanitarian sentiment which had 
been so characteristic of the early years of the administration. 
The Colonial Office frankly accepted its mission on the Gold 
Coast as commercial, and its primary function as the 
maintenance of order. In 1877 in begging for greater conside- 
Oration from the Secretary of State, a group of merchants wrote: 
(1) C0/96/111, minute on no. 6110, by SVolseley, 20th F'eb., 1674. 
This view contrasted with that of Lord Kimberley, who 
favoured teaching in the vernacular. Vide Chapter III, p. 2"Sý, 
(2) P. P. LV, 1878, (C. -2148), no. 2, p. 1. 
(3) Cf. t'. P. (C. -1006).. no. 37, p. 34: and C0/96/130, minute 
on no. 2538 by Hemming, 9th March, 1880. 
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"It (is) generally conceded that the British Merchants 
are entitled to and should receive every encouragement from 
the Imperial Government in their endeavours to carry trade and 
civilization into all parts of Africa by the introduction and 
supply of cotton goods to the millions of still unclothed 
Africans". (1) 
"I suppose this is intended as a joke! " was Hemmingts comment. 
But, less crudely expressed, the Colonial Office hold the 
belief that civilization might well follow, however accidentally, P 
in the wake of trade and other forms of European enterprise. 
A great expansion of iuropean enterprise particularly 
in gold mining seemed likely when the war was over. Publicity 
during the war, and the pronouncements of people like Sir John 
Glover afterwards, prompted several enquiries from prospectors 
and company promoters about the possibility of exploration and 
(2) 
investment. At first the Colonial Office sent discouraging 
(3) 
replies, fearing endless complications about land and laoour. 
But with the abolition of slavery, the legal bar to a supply 
of free labour was removed. In addition, the many demonstrat- 
ions of the power of the Government seemed to obviate the 
danger of outbreaks and outrages on curopeans in the interior. 
As early as 1875, four Juropeans were reported to be 
prospecting in the Wasaw District, but they soon abandoned their 
(4) 
efforts. Two years later, in answer to another enquiry 
(1) C0/9 6/120, memorial in no. 2470,2bth Jän., 1877. 
(2) CO/96/114, minute on no. 5633 by Fairfield, 19th May, 1874. 
(3) 
(4) P. P. (C. -1345), Americans. 
Ibid., minutes by Herbert and Carnarvon, 19th and 20th May, 
1B74. 
no. 47, p. 75. They were said to be 
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about exploration of gold fields in Wasaw, Governor Freeling 
told the Secretary of State that gold mining could not be 
successfully undertaken by Europeans unless the Government 
could guarantee rights in land and water. This it was beyond 
the powers of the Government to do, since the British owned 
no land in the Protectorate. According to the system of 
land tenure which prevailed on the Gold Coast, all land was 
very closely associated with the stool, and there was no 
unoccupied land in the sense that it was all part of stool 
property. The Chiefs themselves, as temporary occupants of 
the stool during their lifetime, were not able to alienate 
(1) 
permanently any land whatever. 
Undeterred by these facts, the energetic French 
(2) 
trader, M. Bonnat, backed by a joint English and French 
company, began prospecting near Tarkwa in 1877, and obtained 
(3) 
concessions of land along the Ankobra River. Two years 











(1) CO/96/121, no. 76Y4, FreelinG to Carnarvon, 2ýuth May, 1877, 
Vide also Hancock, op. cit., pp. 177 and 182-7. 
(2) He had been captive in Ashanti from 1869 to 1874. 
(3) CO/96/123, report in no. 6743. This Company was called 
the African Gold Coast Company. The French promoters were 
Messrs. Bass and Verillon, the English, Messrs. Radcliffe 
and Durant, f' of Liverpool. 
(4) The second of these was Messrs. Swanzyts concern. The 
third, promoted by Mr. Fitzgerald of the "African Times" was 
called the Gold Coast Mining Co., with concessions at 
Abontakon, and this concern was linked with the Effuenta Co., ' 
started in 1380. 
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and by this time, the Colonial office and the local Government 
saw the advantages of encouraging their activities. Governor 
Ussher, who was then in office, differed from his predecessor, 
and told the Secretary of State that it was difficult to 
ascertain the exact value and extent of the concessions made 
to the various companies. But it should be remembered, he 
said, that the companies no less than the Chiefs stood to 
lose by this uncertainty. Ussher refuted the argument that 
the Chiefs, being ignorant of money values, had been unable to 
comprehend the value of the trifling royalties that were 
promised them in return for the lease of stool land. If 
difficulties and disputes should arise in the future, surely 
it was time enough then to deal with them in the Law Courts. 
Meanwhile he considered it most unwise for the Government to 
interfere with these commercial undertakings on pretexts like 
tribal land customs. He had no doubt that the Chiefs were 
f 
conscious of the import of the documents they had signed. 
It suited the Government in "so good a caus, 3" to assume that 
the Chiefs were "by no means as foolish as might be supposed, 
(1) j 




In vain Chiefs Justice Marshall insisted, as Freelinj had done, 
that the Chiefs were not empowered to part with tribal land. 
A clause in one of the concessions was so advantageous to the 
(1) CO/96/126, no. 13,430, Ussher to Beach, 18th July, 1879. 
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company that it was obvious either that the Chiefs had been 
unaware of what they were doing, or also that their individual 
rapacity had led them to sign awa,; r stool property against the 
interests and customs of their tribes. lt also appeared from 
the concessions that African rights to dig for gold would be (1) 
greatly curtailed. 
The Colonial Office, however, was impressed with 
Ussher's opinions, and it agreed that there should be no 
interference in the mining; uistrict. Hemming again voiced 
the current Colonial office opinion when he said: 
"It seems to me that if any good is ever to be done on the Gold Coast, if the country is to be opened up and its 
resources developed, if the arts and benefits of civilization 
are to be brought before the natives and they are to be shown 
the advantages which may accrue to them, it can only be by 
means of such enterprises as that undertaken by this Company. 
Their object is of course, commercial and monetary, not 
pinthropic, - but if in attaining it they are likely, even 
unintentionally, to do good to the country, I would encourage their efforts ... '' (2) 
From 1878, the District Commissioner at Axim paid occasional 
visits to Tarkwa and reported on the progress of the new 
industry. Axim was the nearest station and it was also the 
port of entry for mining machinery and equipment. 
Officials on the Gold Coast and in the Colonial Office 
realizad that the system of administration adopted after the 
(1) Ibid., enclosure, Marshall to Lees, 30th June, 1879. 
(2) Ibid., minute by Hemming, 25th Aug., 1879. 
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war was unsatisfactory. Despite the increased powers and 
resources gained as a result of it, the Colonial office was 
still reluctnt to accept the responsibility for the territory, 
and the physical and climatic difficulties alone made complete 
dominion over the Gold Coast unthinkaole. The reorganization 
after 1873 seemed to augur a period of vigorous and decisive 
action. But the real exercise of jurisdiction in the 
Protectorate continued to be halting and tentative. 
Development of the country was left entirely to private 
enterprise, and few Government restrictions were imposed on 
the activities of commercial firms. Yet the expansion of 
trade demanded extended control of the country by the 
Government, and this was the end kept in view by the 
administration though it was not achieved for another twenty 
years. 
*0 
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ii. Relations with Ashanti, 1874-1880. 
Before the Ashantis began their invasion of the 
(1) 
Protectorate at the end of 1872, there had been signs of 
dissension among the states of the Confederacy, and its break- 
down seemed likely. Disruption was stayed by the war, but as 
soon as it was over, the Kingdom began to crumple. Britain (2) 
had been careful not to inflict a crushing defeat on Ashanti. 
It was her intention to convert the Ashantis into 'faithful 
allies" and to trade freely with them and with the countries 
to the north. The collapse of the Confederacy would. reduce 
the interior to disorder and the hope of peace and trade would 
bd lost. Evidence of disunity in Ashanti, however, mace it 
clear that Britain would have to adapt her policy to suit the 
altered circumstances. Since the Kingdom had fallen almost 
of its own accord, it became an object of policy to prevent a 
revival of Ashanti military power and tracing monopoly. This 
could*be achieved by encouraging states and tributaries that 
had broken away to remain independent, and by opening up new 
trade routes from the coast to the interior to counter the 
exclusive control of the Ashantis. Britain was unable to 
(1) pp. (C. -E319), no. 1, encl. 3, p. 4. Mr. Dawson, the 
Government messenger sent to Kumasi, remarked on this in 1872. 
(2) Viele Chapter IV, pýf" 3I4--5. 
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occupy posts in the interior, and the Colonial Office was 
unwilling to take direct responsibility even in the Protectorate 
rcesponsibilities beyond its boundaries were therefore out of 
the question, and the nominally the Government pursued a policy 
of neutrality and non-intervention in the affairs of the 
surrounding states. But this was sometimes found to be 
inconsistent with British aims in the interior and the policy 
was altered whenever it was expedient to do so. 
the case of Adansi illustrated this vacillation. 
Adansi independence was recognised by ; he Treaty of Fomana. 
Wolseley could not promise British protection, but he gave the 
Adansis permission to move out of Ashanti and settle south of 
the rra River, and the Wasaws and Denkeras agreed to set aside 
(1) 
a portion of their land for the immigrants. When the 
Treaty was ratified in March, 1874, the Ashanti envoys asked 
the Government to order the Adansis to return to the Ashanti 
allegiance. This request was naturally refused, but the 
(2) 
Ashantis appeared to doubt the Government's intentions. 
Since the Adansis did not show any anxiety to leave Ashanti 
territory, the delay gave more scope for rumour and intrigue. 
Ashanti messengers tried to persuade the Adansis that they would 
not be allowed to stay in the Protectorate, and that it would 
(1) Loc. cit., pp. 32o-l. 
(2) P. P. (C. -1006), nos. 11 and 39, pp. 11 and 35; and 
P. P. (C. -1140), no. 56, p. 41. 
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be to their advantage to rejoin the Confederacy. Fearing 
that the Ashantis might succeed in their design, the Governor 
sent a messenger in May to ascertain the disposition of the 
Adansis.. They gave their assurance that they did not wish 
to return to the Confederacy, and in the following month they 
told. the Governor that though they found it inconvenient to 
(1) 
move out of Ashanti they still wished for British protection. 
But instructions from the Colonial Office on this point were 
unequivocal: 
r'... Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to sanction 
any extension of . she limits of 
the British Protectorate, and ... 
they cannot enter into any relations whicz would involve a 
Clain to protection v. i, h any trice dwelling ueyond those limits 
(2) 
After this, Adansi affairs did not obtrude on the 
Government's notice for more than a year. At the end of 1875, 
however, some of the Chiefs of Adansi came to tell the 
Governor that their King, with the support of a section of the 
people, had decided to rejoin the Confederacy ana was then about 
to tender his submission to the King of Ashanti. before he 
could do so his death was announced, and it seemed that Ashanti 
would seize the opportunity to place an Ashanti adherent on the 
stool. It was also possible that Ashanti might go to war 
against the errant state which had given cause by its molestation 
(1) Loc. cit. , nos. 16 and b3,, pp. 14 and 39. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no, 64, p. 46. 
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cl) of Ashanti traders. atranan resolved to forestall the 
Ashantis. Early in 1876 he sent an officer to the iiin ; 's 
town, Fomana, in order to watch the election of the new icing 
(2) 
and to recognize him in the name of the Governor. 
Faction continued in the Adansi state. Three years 
after his election, the King pleaded for help from the 
Government in order to maintain his independence from Ashanti. 
Alternatively, he asked that Adansi be formally included within 
the rrotectorate. He reported that the AAshantis had gained 
control of some of his villages, and that by himself he was 
powerless to eject them. In response to this appeal, Lieutenant; 
Governor Lees sent a peremptory note to numasi ordering the 
Ashantis to stop all interference in Adansi, and to prove that 
the Government intended to support Adansi he sent an officer and 
a detachment of Hausas to Fomana to see that his orders were 
(3) 
carried out. To the Colonial Office it seemed that Lees 
was acting contrary to policy by auopting such an openly 
partisan attitude, "if the King of Ashanti returns a saucy 
ansv er we shall look foolish", said Meade, one of the Assistant 
Under-secretaries. the prospect of another war with Ashanti, 
(1) 00/96/116, no. 1132, Strahan to Carnarvon, 29th Dec., 1875. 
(2) C0/96/118, no. 3184, Strahan to Carnarvon, 19th Feb., 1876. 
(3) 00/96/126, no. 6105, Lees to Beach, 25th Feb. , 1879. 
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if that power should take up Strahanºs challenge, was not 
(1) 
pleasant. Officials were relieved to hear in July, 1879, 
(2) 
that Adansi appeared to be more settled. 
The policy of the Government towards other states 
in Ashanti, as well as Adansi, showed that it was intended to 
preserve Ashanti weakness. Ashanti-Akim and Kwahu had also 
thrown off their allegiance to the Confederacy as soon as the 
war ended, and only a few days after the 't'reaty of Fornana was 
concluded, Ashanti envoys complained to the Government that 
this revolt had been incited by the Kings of Eastern and 
Western Akim. Further, these Kings warn not only harbouring 
the refugees in their territory; they were also scheming 
with other towns in Ashanti, and especially with Juaben, to 
leave the Confederacy. The King of Ashanti asked that those 
of his subjects who were hiding in the rrotectorate be made to 
return, and that the Akims be stopped from causing more 
defection. Administrator Maxwell was uncertain of his best 
course of action. He told the Colonial Office that many 
people then in Ashanti would gladly leave the Confederacy and 
retire into the Protectorate if they were sure that the 
Government would give them its protection. It was unwise to 
prevent them from entering the Protectorate, where they would 
(1) Ibid., minutes by Meade, 7th and 8th April, l87y. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 7591, Lees to Beach, 14th April, 1879 and 
enclosures. 
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(l) 
provide a valuable addition to its defences. The Colonial 
Office agreed that people who moved out of Ashanti voluntarily 
could not be compelled to return and the King of Ashanti was 
so informed. But the Government maintained its stand on the 
(2) 
question of extending the boundaries of the rrotectorate. 
The King of Akwamu asked for British protection when 
Dr. Gouldsbury concluded a treaty of peace with that tribe in 
(3) 
June, 1874, but the Government refused. 
Just at this time, news came of a serious quarrel in 
Ashanti. Juaben, one of the most powerful members of the 
(4) 
Confederacy, was waiting ita chance to revolt. Ashanti 
envoys, bringing down 400 ounces of gold as the second 
instalment of the war indemnity as a sign of their good faith, 
told Strahan that civil war was imminent, if Juaben revolted, 
Bekwai would follow, and there would be a virtual end to the 
Kingdom. Though the King of Ashanti, Kofi Kakari, was 
unwilling to go to war with Juabon, he was desperately anxious 
to prevent its secession. His envoys begged the Governor to 
mediate in such a way that Juaben would be obliged to remain 
within the Confederacy. Strahan was equally loth to see a 
(1) P. P. (C, -1006),, no. 14, p. 13. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 21,, p. 17. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 86, p. 65 and enclosure, 
(4) ttamseyer and KCühne, op. cit.,, A The mi 
through Juaben in 1869 on their way to the rivalry between Juaben and Kumasi. 
practically equal in power. vi-48 P. 6 
and no. 90, p. 69. \/Ktc 
Ch. IV, p 325. 
ssionaries passed 
Kumasi and remarked on 
The two stales were 
fir. 
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renewal of warfare so soon after the Imperial campaign. The 
more fact that Ashanti was at war again would tend to restore 
much of the prestige that they had lost. Some of the 
disaffection so successfully quelled in the Windward Districts 
might revive, and tribes in the k'rotectorate, like the 
Denkeras and Akims, would be drawn into the conflict. because 
he wished to preserve peace in the interior Strahan decided 
to send an officer to Kumasi and Juabon to arrange a friendly 
compromise between them. This step he acknowledged to be 
exceptional to the general policy of non-interference. But 
the urgency of the case demanded action of this kind. A 
collision would be followed by a long period of desultory 
warfare, "trade would be paralysed, and progress and civilizatioii 
(1) 
... rendered impossible". 
The result of the Government mission, led by Captain 
Lees, a senior official, was the recognition of . uaben 
independence by Kumasi. Strahan hoped that the power ana 
wealth of Juaben would overshadow that of Kumasi and keep it 
z) in check. 
(2) 
But it soon became obvious that the settlement 
would not be permanent. Kofi Kakari sent one messenger after 
another to the coast, seeking Government influence to regain 
Juaben allegiance, and dissension between the two states 
continued. While in Ashanti, however, Lees observed that the 
(1) P. P. (C. -1140., no. 86, * p. 62. 
i2) Loc. cit., no. 106, p. 80 and enclosure. 
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position of Kofi Kakari as King of Ashanti was precarious. 
she states of Nsuta, Kokofu and Bekwai sided with Juaben in 
the dispute, and though the first two elected to stay within 
the Confederacy, Bekwai refused to acknowledge Kofi Kakari as 
(1) 
its head. 
As Strahan expected, the deposition of 1. ofi Kakari 
was announced shortly after, in January, 1875, and his brother, 
Osei Mensa, was elected in his Lead. The new King, however, 
also tried to win Government support for iumasi against 
t2) 
Juaben, and his cause was espoused by a group of merchants 
on the coast. Prominent among these was M. Bonnat, who sought 
trade concessions from Kumasi in the north of Ashanti. 
(3) 
These merchants, assisted by rrince Ansa, Osei Mensa's agent, 
drew up a list of complaints against Juaben and presented them 
to the Governor. they accused Juaben of causing disturbances 
and stoppages of trade in the interior. This state was aided 
by Eastern and Western Akim, and the trauers maintaineu chat 
if ohe Government uid not want to interfere actively in 
Ashanti, it should at least guarantee the neutrality of the 
(4) 
people under its protection. But Strahan wised to turn 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) P. Y. (C. -1343), no. 22, p. 55. 
(3) G. J. H. Lyall, U. Kendall, W. H. Selby, McIver, Campbell and Co., 
- all . uropeans. 
t4) P. P. (C. -1402), no. 66, p. 70 and enclosure 1. 
0 
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the rivalry of Kumasi and Juaben to the best account for the 
Government, and he made no move until October, when he heard 
that he two factions were on the verge of open war, with 
Juaben soliciting help from Akim and Akwapim in the Proteccorata 
At this juncture, he deemed it opportune to send Dr. Gouldsbury 
on another mission to Kibi and Akropong, the chief towns in 
Akira and Akwapim, to warn the tribes against taking any 
action in the quarrel. Gouldsbury was instructed to proceea 
(1) 
from Akim to Asbbanti to mediate between Kumasi. and Juaben. 
Both Strah_an and Gouldsbury were aware that a Kumasi success 
might have'the unwelcome effect of frightening other seceded 
(2) 
states into submission to the Confederacy. 
To Strahan's disappointment, however, Gouldsbury 
reported on his arrival in Ashanti that Juabon had been 
completely routed at the beginning of November. Simultaneously 
with this news, the 4in6 of Eastern Akim sent a message that 
Juaben fugitives were pouring into his territory and asking 
for Government help in case the victorious Kumasi army should 
pursue the Juabens into the Protectorate. Strahan at once 
dispatched a force of Hausas and a sup ily of ammunition to 
strengthen Akim defences, and Gouldsbury was instructed to 
invite all Juabens who wished to do so to come into the 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 74, p. 85. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 81, eucl. 1, p. 101. 
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Protectorate. These people would act as a bulwark in case 
(1) 
of an invasion by the Ashantis. 
The Colonial Office hoped that beyond these measures, 
Strahan would avoid unnecessary interference. Gouldsbury 
suggested that armed intervention by the Government was the 
" (2) 
only way to stop unrest and rival ambitions in Ashanti. 
(3) 
But such action the Colonial Office would not countenance. 
The Gold Coast force was in any case hardly strong enough to 
undertake it. Nevertheless, Strahan took the risk of 
demanding an indemnity from Osei Mensa for disturbing the 
(4) 
peace in Ashanti. The daiger of his refusal was far 
greater than the advantage which might result from this display 
of paramount power, and the Colonial Office waited with some 
(5) 
trepidation for a report of the proceeding. After some 
delay, the King agreed to pay the full amount of 500 ounces of 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 79, p. 96. 
(2) Loc. cit. , no. 81, encl. 1. 
(3) CO/96/116, minute on no. 13,560 (no. 81, supra, printed) 
by Hemming, 14th Dee., 1875. 
(4) Loc. cit., no. 1132, Strahan to Carnarvon, 29th Dec., 1875. 
(5) Ibid., minutes by Meace, 31st Jan., Herbert and 
Carnarvon, lst February, 1876. 
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(1) gold, and the affair ended peacefully. 
Asafu Ad j ei, King of Juaben, was brought to live at 
the headquarters of the administration, where, under the oye 
of the Governor, he would be less likely to plot against his 
(2) 
Ashanti enemies. In spite of this precaution, however, 
there were constant accusations from the Ashantis that Asafu 
Adjei and his Chiefs were using the Governor's name to stir 
up dissension and revolt in the Confederacy. On his part, 
the Juaben King levelled counter-accusations at the Ashantis. 
The Governor warned him repeatedly against taking sides in 
Ashanti affairs, but he was unable to stop Asafu Adjei's 
machinations so long as they were not overt. To the Ashantis, 
the invariable reply was that the Government could not 
interfere in disputes outside the Protectorate. Nor could as' 
officer be stationed in Kumasi to keep the peace, as the 
Ashantis requested. In 1877, Freeling also refused to send a 
Government messenger to Kumasi to prove to the Ashantis that 
(1) CO/96/118, no. 2697, Strahan to Carnarvon, 30th Jan., 1876. 
The Colonial Office, realized that by demanding payment for 
a new offence, the Government was forfeiting its claim to 
the remainder of the war indemnity, only one instalment of 
which had been paid. The King, through Osu Ansa, complained 
of the indignity he suffered when British officers entered 
his territory without permission. In reply, Carnarvon 
wished him to be told that "the Queen's messený"ers and 
soldiers are free to go anywhere and that no permission from 
him or any other African Chief will ever be asked". 
Vide loc. cit., no. 5955, enclosures and minutes. 
F 
F 
(2) CO/96/116, no. 1132. 
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the Government did not support Asafu Adjei, as he boasted. 
(1) 
But the Ashantis were not convinced of the Government'. s strict 
impartiality. Certainly the Government was not concerned to 
help the Ashantis solve the difficulties of the Confederacy. 
On one occasion in 1877, King Taki of Accra was implicated in 
a Juaben plot against Kumasi, and Freeling punished him with 
a fine. It would ease the tension, the Governor told the 
Colonial Office, if Asafu Adjei were deported to Lagos. 
But this move would lead the Ashantis to think that the 
(2) 
Government was on their side after all. 
A piece of sparsely-populated land lying between 
Eastern Akim and Akwapim was allocated by arrangement with 
these Chiefs to the Juabens and to the people of Essumeja and 
Asokori who fled with them. But they showed no desire to 
settle in this area. The Juabon Chiefs complained that the 
land was unsuitable, since it contained neither gold nor palm 
oil, and the Juabens were not accustomed to tilling the soil. 
Freeling suspected that their reluctance was an excuse to 
procure another stretch of land closer to the frontier, where 
Asafu Adjei would be in a better position to carry out his 
(3) 
schemes against Ashanti. 
(1) CO/96/120, nos. 1313 and 1973, Freeling to Carnarvon, 
2nd and 20th Jan., 1877. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 9758, Freeling to Carnarvon, 18th July, 1877. 
(3) CO/96/121, no. 7778, Freeling to Carnarvon, 2yth May, 1877, 
'1 
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By August, 1877, Freeling was no longer able to 
ignore the complaints of the Ashantis. They threatened to 
close all the trade paths unless the Government stopped the 
activities of the Juabens; and they would go to war if the 
tribes within the Protectorate were not restrained. On 
investigation, Freeling found that the Ashanti accusations 
were true. Asafu Adjei admitted that he had sent agents to 
distant states to ask for their assistance against Ashanti. 
But far more serious was the discovery that the Juabens in 
Akim and Akwapim had armed themselves and were preparing to 
fight at a signal from their King. Freeling ordered the arrest 
of Asafu Adjei, his daughter and six of his Chiefs and 
imprisoned them in Elmina Castle. A strong Hausa detachment 
was sent to Kibi and Akropong to see that peace was maintained 
and to seize the arms and ammunition which the Juabens had 
stored there. In the two years since they entered the 
Protectorate these people had, with the help of the Protectorate 
tribes, collected a considerable quantity of guns and gunpowder (1) 
and were well*prepared for an attack on Ashanti. 
The disclosure of this uangerous plot revealed also 
the insecurity of the Government's authority in uistant parts 
of the Protectorate. It was impossible for the headquarters 
to be aware of all t}V<t w- 1 ]lý I nening in the outlying districts, 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 10,857, Freeling to Carnarvon, 10th Aug., 1877; 
and nos. 11,380 and 11,622, Freeling to Carnarvon, 14th and 23rd Aug., 1877, 
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and it showed that admonitions were futile unless backed by 
force. Yrequent missions to the interior were essential, and 
for such (jmergencies it was important that the Hausa force 
should be numerous and efficient. An immediate increase in 
the force and in the number of officers was sanctioned by the 
(1) 
Colonial office. 
Even the imprisonment of the leading Juaben chiefs 
did not end the agitation. Some months later, ±reeling heard 
that members of the King's family were still causing unrest. 




At the end of 1879, however, Asafu Ad j ei was 
allowed to return to the cold Coast. By that time, most of 
the Juabens had settled on the land set aside for them round 
Koforidua, and since all danger seemed to have passed away, 
the Governor judged that it would lend stability to the new 
(3) 
community if their ding was with them. 
Yet another source of anxiety to the Ashanti 
Confederacy arose in the states of j aman and Sefwi, which had 
been tributary to Ashanti. Jaman had as its principal town 
the great trade centre of Bonduku, and was also rich in gold. 
(1) CO/9b/122, no. 12,609, FreelinL to Carmurvon, 13th Sept. , 1& 
(2) CO/9t)/123, nos. 2434 and 3094, Fr©e1in ; to Carnarvon, 
24th Jan., and 7th Feb. 2187B. 
(3) CO/9b/126, no. 390cß, Lees to Beach, 6th Feb, , 1879, and CO/9b/128, no. 19, b82, Ussher to Beach, 8th Nov., 1879. 
- 376 - 
Through Sefwi lay an important route to the coast leading to 
Krinjabo, behind Assinee. The Ashantis had therefore kept 
a strict hold over these states and carefully guarded their 
trade. Daman and Sefwi had taken advantage of the general 
confusion after the war to separate themselves from Ashanti, 
-tv 
and it wasithe interest of the British Government that their 
trade should be diverted to British ports. In 1877, messengers 
arrived at Cape Coast from these two states under the auspices 
of Artestern Wasaw, and offered to place themselves under the 
British flag in return for help in fighting against the 
Ashantis who molested and intimidated them. They also 
requested that a Government messenLer be allowed to return with 
them to show that they had uovernment support. But Freeling 
had just refused to send a messenger with the Ashanti envoys 
to Kumasi, and he was bound to take the same course with the 
Jamans and Sefwis. In accordance with his instructions, he 
told them that the British Government could not enlarge its 
(1) 
, Protectorate nor interfere with the states outside 
it. 
When the Colonial office received this report, 
however, they began to doubt the expediency of such unwavering 
neutrality. she strategic position of these states, on the 
west and south-west flank of the Ashanti Kingdom demanded that 
they be encouraged in their independence. 't'here was also the 
(1) CO/96/120, no. 2320, Freelin 0 to Carnarvon, 26th Jan., 1877. 
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question of new trade routes with states which had hitherto 




Meade+s opinion was that it would be better to send messengers 
(2) 
to all the states who asked for them rather than to none. 
Though they could not persuade the Government to 
help them, the Jamans found a willing ally in Asafu Adjei, 
who sent some of his Chiefs to arrange with them for mutual 
(3) 
aid. In 1878, Lees heard that war had broken out between 
Ashanti and Jaman, and that Jaman had been joined by some 
Ashanti Chiefs from -zechiman and Nkoranza. The Ashantis were 
making use of a Dane who had been attracted to their country 
in search of gold, to give their enemies the impression that 
they had the support of the white Government. It was also 
said that the Sefvis and Adansis were preparing to shut the 
paths from the coast to stop the Ashantis from obtaining arms. 
reports which reached the Government indicated that the Jamans 
(4) 
had the greater success in the war of border skirmishes, but 
in 1879, more Jaman messengers arrived to seek British aid in 
consolidating their gains. They wanted to make sure that the 
(1) Ibid., minutes. 
(2) Ibid., minute by Meide, 2nd March, 1877. 
(3) CO/96/121, no. 10,857, Freeling to Carnarv on, 10th Aug., 1877. 
(4) CO/96/124, no. ll, 616, Lees to Beach, 15th Aug., 1878 and 
enclosures. Osu Ansa was the Governor's informant, and he 
asked the Government to give its moral support +o+l, e 45kaP+(s. 
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Government was not in fact helping the enemy, and told of the 
many Ashanti Chiefs who would join them if the circumstances 
were favourable. Ashanti was still hindering Jaman's trade 
with the coast, and the messengers concluded their plea for 
help by saying that they had refused to aid the Asha ntis 
(1) 
against the . uropeans in 1873. 
Judging the moment to be opportune, and mindful of 
the views of the Colonial Office, Lees agreed to send an 
African Government official back with them as far as Bondukuo 
This official, Mr. Smith, was instructed to investigate the 
political situation in the states through which he passed, and 
to make it known that the Government did not support the 
Ashantis. More important, he was to make every effort to 
open up trade routes for British merchants and to encourage 
(2) 
Sefwi and Jaman to remain independent of Ashanti. After 
an absence of several months, Smith returned to the coast in 
October, 1879. His report showed that the inter-tribal 
quarrels in the interior were far more complicated than the 
Government had imagined. Many Chiefs who had broken with 
Ashanti would gladly have accepted British protection; yet in 
most towns there was a prominent group who wished to return 
to the Ashanti allegiance. In Jaman, the collapse of the 
rff 
(1) CO%9b/12fi, no. 7593, Lees to Beach, 14th Aprll, 1879, and 
enclosure. ý:. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 8991, Lees to Beach, 5th May, 1879, and 
Instructions, 1st May, 1879. 
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ruling house was threatened by jealousies among the Chiefs, 
and loyalties varied from time to time. Smith's report 
portrayed the confusion and anarchy in the interior, but the 
(1) 
Government gained nothing from his mission, His journey 
had been long and costly, and the Colonial Office decided that 
except for urgent reasons, no missions of this kind should in 
(2) 
future be sent. 
Unrest in Jaman and Sefwi meant that the Government's 
hope of securing trade routes in the north-west was small. 
io the north-east of Ashanti, however, the prospects looked more 
promising. The country lying in this direction had always 
t3) 
been thought rich, and the Ashantis had retained a close 
monopoly over the trade with these parts. here, as elsewhere, 
tributaries had broken free of Ashanti at the end of' the war, 
among them Salaga, Krachi, Atebuou and buem. Before the 
final revolt and exodus from the Confederacy the Juabens had 
allied themselves with these states and posed as their 
protectors. but protection implied a substitution of the 
Juaben monopoly for that of the Ashantis over the trade with 
the north, and the stales, though they valued Juabents military 
ll) C0/96/128, no. 19,680, Ussher to Beach, 8th Nov. . 187J and 
enclosure. 
(2) Ibid., minute by Herbert, 19th Dec., and draft reply, 












(3) of. the interest taken in the Volta trade in the 160? s and 
w, _ ýý. ý.,.. ý. q >ý. >. ý' 
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aid, were unwilling to submit to its tutelage. (1) 
honnat was the first European trader after the war 
(2) 
to make an attempt to open commercial relations with Salaga. 
Mühen he failed to achieve his object, the Government began to 
give the matter its earnest consideration. Salaga, like 
Bonduke, was the terminal point of one of the caravan routes 
across the Sahara desert. The market was reputed to be 
fabulously wealthy and able to absorb large quantities of 
European manufactures. Since Ashanti had lost its hold over 
Salaga, the British Government set about encouraGinL- a 
f4i s merket "free and friendly intercourse" between Jet and the coast. 
There was a danger that Ashanti might regain its former status 
and once more bar the way to the interior; and, as Bonnat's 
experience showed, the formation of two separate powers in 
Ashanti, such as Juaben and Kumasi, would be no more conducive 
(3) 
to commerce with the coast. The solution which suggested 
(1) P. P. (C. -1402). no. 77, encl. 1, p, 90. 
(2) Loc. cit., nos. 71 and 72, p. 84. Bonnat eapoused the 
Kumasi cause in Ashanti in 1875, hoping thereby to gain 
Kumasi support against Tuaben, which was unwilling to allow 
him to go to the interior. Osel Iviensa, King of Kumasi, 
granted Bonnat a 6-year monopoly over the northern trade in 
return for his support, but this agreement was worthless. 
Earlier, in 1874, Bonnat had applied to the Government for a 
monopoly of the Volta trade, but in reply he was told that 
this was contrary to British commercial policy. 
Vide 00/96/114, no. 14,117/W. 
(3) P. P. (C. -1402), no. 77, encl. 1, p. 90. 
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itself was a route to Salaga which did not pass through 
Ashanti, and it was obvious that the River Volta should be 
regarded as a means to that end. Governor Strahan told the 
Colonial Office in 1875 that he had mapped out a route which 
would start at Ada and follow the river to Kpong, since it 
was easily navigable to that point. Traders could then pass 
into Krepi, a country friendly towards the British, and go 
northwards through Buem and so to Salaga. A deputation had 
-P'vowt 3veoi 
recently come to the coastXexpressing a desire for British 
protection, and though this could not be granted, Strahan had 
told these messengers that the Government would appreciate the 
(1) 
trade and friendship of the Buems. Shortly afterwards, 
the chance came to test this trade route. Dr. Gouldsbury 
went to Ashanti at the end of 1875 to mediate between Kumasi 
(2) 







Salagä "for the purpose of opening up a trade route between that,, 
country and the Coast by way of the countries bordering on the 
(3) 
Volta". Gouldsbury left Kumasi for the north in January, 
1876. The trade route to Salaga had caught the imagination 
of the Colonial Office and his report was awaited with great 
(4) 
interest. 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 77. 
(2) Vide supra, p. 369. 
(3) CO/96/118, no. 1159, Strahan to Carnarvon, 10th Jan., 1876. 
(4) Ibid., minute by Meade, 31st Jan., 1876; and C0/96/116, 
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At Salaga, Gouldsbury met Bonnat and an African 
trader, Mr. R. Bannerman, from Accra both of whom had come up 
the Volta as far as Yeji by canoe, a voyage which lasted nearly 
two months owing to the difficulties of navigation. Cowrie 
shells, carried up the Volta from the coast, the currency 
used in the market, and salt, also brought from the coast by 
land or water, was a very lucrative article of trade. But 
by far the most valuable article sold in the market was the 
kola nut. The nuts were brought to Salaga by the Ashantis 
and sold to the Muslims who came on journeys about seven 
months distant to buy them. In exchange the Ashantis received 
cattle and sheep, cotton and woollen cloths, ivory and slaves. 
Since the war, however, Gouldsbury learnt that disturbances 
in Ashanti had almost stopped the delivery of the kola nuts 
and trade had consequently declined. He was told that before 
the war as many as 10,000 people came to Salaga in one day, 
and he judged that the tales of Salaga's wealth which had 
reached the coast had not been exaggerated. 
Gouldsbury found that Salaga was under : the influence 
of the Fetish of Dente, near Krachi, and that the priest there 
was mainly responsible for preventing the free navigation of 
the Volta in this area. Accordingly, Gouldsbury journeyed to 
Krachi and propitiated the Fetish so liberally that its priest 
agreed to open the river and land routes that passed through 
that to. At Yendi, Gouldsbury told the King and Chiefs that 
- 382 - 
the Government wished to trade with them, and similar messages 
were given to Salaga and to the representatives of the Muslim 
caravans. Having opened the way through Krachi, Gouldsbury 
returned to the coast by way of I3uem, Krepi and Battoh on the 
Volta. Both Buem and Krepi assured him that they would not 
hinder trade, but Gouldsbury noted that Krepi was in a state 
of anarchy. In common with all other Europeans who saw this 
stretch of country, Gouldsbury was enthusiastic about it. 
Cotton grew well there and the people appeared to him to be 
more industrious than other tribes on the Gold Coast. But, 
to make Krepi the "most flourishing country on this part of 
the Coast", he assured the Governor that the people required 
"a strong and just ruling power over them". 
Salaga itself he regarded as a most important centre 
of commerce. He realized that if the Ashantis did not trade 
there, the market would not prosper, but he stressed that they 
should only be permitted to do so under British supervision. 
If the Ashantis went to Salaga independently, and their power (1) 
re-established itself - the defeat of Juaben made this likely - 
the Ashantis would undoubtedly "begin as traders and end as 
masters" of the place. Britain might well be aale to carry on 
a profitable trade in this part of the interior. Gouldsbury 
had seen quantities of European goods in 5alaga brought there 




ý; 'ý ýý 
(1) Vide supra, p. 369. 
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after a journey of nearly two years. Trade with the coast 
which was so much closer therefore held out great promise. 
But the Government would have to be careful that Ashanti did 
(1) 
not grow too poworful. 
Little was accomplished, however, apart from the 
demonstration that it was possible to travel along the new 
route. The Government was unable to take active measures to 
ensure that it remained open, nor could it contemplate the 
control of Salaga, as Gouldsbury sug£; ested. Later in 1876, 
news was brought to the coast that war threatened between 
Salaga and Ashanti, and Salaga promised trade and friendship 
to Britain in return for a: ". 'ris and animunition to ficht against 
t2) 
the 4ýshantis. Asafu Adjei, the Juaben fin; --, sent emissaries 
to Salaga and undertook to protect them if they would help 
(3) 
restore him to his former position in Ashanti. But the 
Government had to remain passive. Sala6a was too distant 
for anything more than verbal encouragement to be offered. 
The Government was pleased to learn in 1377 that t. ý)e trade 
route was still open and that an African trader was engaged in 
(4) 
business there, but while the administration was extremely 
(1) CO/96/119, no. 5162, Report of Dr. Gouldsbury's visit to 
Sala ; a, 27th March, 1876. Vide also minutes. 
(2) C0/96/118, no. 11,900, Lees to Carnarvon, 6th Sept. , 1876, 
enclosures and minutes. 
(3) C0/96 121, no. 10,857, Freelin to Carnarvon, 10th Aug. , 1877, 
"1 
and 00/96/127, no. 16,082, Ussher to -beach, 1st Sept., 1879. 
(4) Mr. Bannerman; vice CO/96/120, no. 4891, Freeling to Carnarvon, 28th March, 1877. 
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interested in trade with the north, it could not extend its 
responsibilities. 
The Colonial Office approved this attitude. 
Mr. Lowther, the Parliamentary Under-secretary, probably voiced 
the prevalent opinion among the officials when he said: 
"I fear the task of playing off these savages one against 
the other will oe an endless source of difficulty. These 
solemn engagements entered into with the Fetish and similar 
ruffians are of course absolutely worthless beyond the reach 
of gunshot, though they may for a time help to keep tribes 
friendly through fear of formidable neighbours like the 
Ashantees. We shall always be liable to be pounced upon by 
some bolder spirit amongst these barbarians, and have a 
'little wart as the inevitable result. As however the 
'Penny a liners? and the old women of both sexes insist upon 
our keeping up these undesirable possessions on that 
pestilential coasts there is no help for it but to keep muddling 
on as best we can". (1) 
Lowther's hopes were not fulfilled. Britain was so 
far committed on the Gold Coast that abandonment was not a 
realistic possibility. The alternative to "muddling on" 
was a more forward policy in the interior, but that did not 
come until the end of the century. 
(1) CO/96/119/G, no. 5162, minute by Lowther, 15th May, 1876. 
II 




iii. The Frontiers - Smuggling and Extension P8 
k ýý 
During the war in 1873, the Government had been 
acutely embarrassed by the smuggling that took place all along 
the seaboard, and particularly by the traffic in arms on the 
(1) 
eastern and western frontiers. After peace had been 
concluded, the Government determined to extend its jurisdiction 
on the frontiers in order to consolidate the newly-won authority 
in the Protectorate. Unless the administration was secure 
along the coast, control over the interior would be ineffectual. 
Part of the British policy in the post-war years was 
to prohibit the importation of arms and ammunition into the: 
Protectorate. In this way, the Colonial office hoped to 
prevent a revival of the Ashanti military power. The bulk of 
the trade in these articles has formerly taken place through 
the Protectorate., but when the Government forbade the sale of 
munitions in February, 1873, the Ashantis founa a convenient 
source of supply at Krinjabo, on the north bank of the Assini 
(2) 
lagoon. Assini itself was about 10 miles beyond Newtown, 
the most westerly of the British posts on the Gold Coast. 
Up to 1870, the French Government had exercisea a protectorate 
(1) Vide Chapter IV, pp. 2.94-ß. 
(2) Ashantis had traded at Krinjabo before the war. 
Vide Chapter III, P-198. 
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over Assini and Grand Bassam, still further west, and though 
they had relinquished their rights in that year, they retained 
(1) 
the option of resuming them. Meanwhile, these ports were 
not subject to the control of any European Government, and the 
arms traffic thrived. 
There was much concern about this trade. Guns 
were not only bought by the Ashantis at the free ports, but 
also by people in the Protectorate. This meant that the 
policy of prohibition was nullified. It was even foolhardy. 
Wherever the Ashantis purchased guns and gunpowder, there also 
they would buy general trade goods. The free ports to the 
west of the Colony were therefore drawing trade and revenue 
away from British ports; in addition, because the Ashantis 
could obtain arms outside the Colony, Assini and Grand Bassam (2) 
were also a menace to the security of the Gold Coast Government. 
Merchants on the Gold Coast realized the danger to 
trade., and soon after the war they asked the Government to 
raise the arms embargo. To their surprise and disappointment, 
their request was not granted. Nor were they mollified by 
Strahan's explanation that the prohibition was ultimately 
(1) CO/96/95, minute on no. 4334/Admiralty by Barrow, 26th April,, ' 
1872. There were no French officials at Assini in 1875, 
but a French merchant, iui. Verdier, virtually controlled the 
trade in this area. 
(2) CO/96/115, no. 4861, Strahan to Carnarvon, 23rd March, 1875, 
Confidential, and CO/96/118, no. 6917, Leos to Carnarvon, 
10th May, 1876. 
- 387 - 
designed to benefit trade; without arms the tribes would be 
unable to continue their incessant warfare, and peaceful 
(1) 
conditions would foster commerce. Strc+han's persistent 
refusal to relax the prohibition was supported by 
(2) Colonial Office. Nevertheless, he agreed that the 
position was one of great difficulty, both for the Government 
and for trade. Early in 1875, a remedy was put forward. 
If Assini and Grand Bassam were annexed to the Colony, the 
prohibition on arms importation could be extended for about 
forty miles to windward. Even if this did not entirely 
prevent the Ashantis from obtaining arms, it would at least 
become very difficult for them to do so. Since the French 
had abandoned these ports, all that was required was a formal 
abdication of French rights before the British Government (5) 
could incorporate the territory into the Gold Coast Colony. 
I 
At the end of 1875, it became more than ever desirable 
that this project should be carried out. The victory of 
Kumasi over Juaben seemed to herald the renewed growth of 
Ashanti strength. Dr. Gouldsbury, who was in Kumasi at the 
(1) C0/806/30, no. 86; and P. P. (C. -1402), nos. 95 and 98, 
pp. 72 end 75. The agent for Swanzy's, Pair. Lyall, was 
particularly insistent that the embargo should be raised. 
He pointed out that other British traders sold arms at 
Assini, ana singled out a schooner belon6inC to hedway and Co.,, 
of Brixham. 
(2) CO/96/113, minutes on no. 11,377/F0. 
(3) CO/96/115, no. 4861. 
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time, witnessed the victory parade through Kumasi and noted 
the vast supplies of gunpowder collected by the Kumasi army 
since the end of the Imperial war. It was obvious that the 
greater part of this store had been purchased outside the 
Protectorate on the west, for the Juabens and their allies the 
Akims would have blocked the trade paths on the east. The 
quality as well as the quantity of Ashanti arms worried the 
Government. Gouldsbury told of one company of the Kumasi army 
that was armed with Sniders. The dangers of an uncontrolled 
traffic in arms would be intensified if the Ashantis had 
access to arms of precision. Clearly, it was urgent that the 
(1) 
Government should annex the free Ports- 
Although the Colonial Office was generally opposed to 
an extension of British jurisdiction on the Gold Coast, 
officials conceded the necessity in this case. Negotiations 
between France and Britain on a wider basis had begun in 1874, 
the two Governments proposing to divide the 'Vest Coast between 
(2) 
them into spheres of influence. The British sphere would 
include the River Gaboon in the south and the Rio Pongas in 
the north; the French sphere would extend north of the Pongas. 
Each Government would relinquish all rights in the other's 
sphere, an agreement which would involve the abandonment of 








(2) FO/146/2680 contains (in Conf. Print, no, 4955, April, 18841,; 
a memorandum prepared by Sir R. Herbert on this subject, 
7 Feb ., 1876. Exchange proposals were first made in 1866 and 
repeated at intervals until 1875, when the Gold Coast pressed 
for a settlement of its western boundary. A final effort 
was then made to effect the exchange. 
:9 
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(1) 
the Gambia by Britain. Once the arrangement was 
concluded, the Gold Coast Government would be at liberty to 
(2) 
extend its frontiers. 
In 1876, however, discussions between France and 
Britain ended, and the whole scheme had to be dropped. The 
French clung to all their rights on the Test Coast and became 
the serious rivals of the British in the establishment and 
protection of French trade. For the Gold Coast, the failure 
to reach an agreement meant that the plan for extension to 
windward was also abortive. In order to safeguard the trade 
at British ports, the Colonial Office was prepared to consent 
at once to the resumption of arms importation into the 
(3) 
Protectorate. Governor Freeling advised against this step 
on the grounds that hostile states, such as Sefwi and Adansi, 
were able to prevent the Ashantis from obtaining warlike 
(4) 
stores from the coast. But in 1877, Governor Lees as. ied 
permission to allow arms importation at British ports. The 
diversion of trade took place on too large a scale and the 






(1) Vide P. P. /1876, (C. -1409) for corr. on proposed exchange 
of the Gambia. 
(2) C0/96 112, minute on no. 10,541 by Fairfield, 9th Sept., 1874; k 
and C0/96/115, minutes on no. 4861 by Hemmini; and Meaae, 
4th and 10th May, 1875. This agreement would dive Britain 
rights over all the coast lying between 0° and 10° N. 
(3) CO/96/118, no. 6917 and minutes. 
(4) CO/96/120, no. 3744, Freeling to Carnarvon, 22nd Feb., 1877. 
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were encouraged to buy arms at British ports, the Government 
(1) 
would be able to supervise the kind of arms supplied to them. 
Accordingly the embargo was raised in 1878, arms and gunpowder 
(2) 
being subject to duty. It remained for France and Britain 
to demarcate a permanent boundary between their territories, 
(3) 
but this was not done until the '90's. 
On the east as in the west, the British Government 
wished to extend the frontiers of the Gold Coast Colony. 
Gun-running was known to take place along the trans-Volta coast, 
but this was not the main problem. Smuggling in spirits, 
the main source of customs revenue, was carried on to such a 
degree in this area that the revenue was annually drained of 
large sums of money. Equally important was the fact that 
smugglers competed with "honest" traders and crippled their 
(4) 
endeavours. The external slave trade had survived in this 
region long after it had ceased from other Gold Coast ports. 
YVhen it finally ended in the '60's, an increase in the volume 
(1) CO/96/122, no. 12,977, Lees to Carnarvon, 25th Sept., 1077. 
(2) CO/96/123, no. 3439. 
(3) CO/96/133, minutes on no. 19,173. The Boundary Corimission 
which was to be appointed in 1880 was postponed indefinitely. 
(4) SmugglinL took place all along the coast within the 
Protectorate, but not on the scale east of the Volta. 
Vide CO/96/127, no. 16,080. It was a common practice for 
the masters of trading vessels to bribe the badly paid 
customs officials at small landing places. Vide also 
CO/96/128, no. 11. 
..,. 
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of legitimate trade came as a fitting reward for the efforts 
of the Navy and the Government in combatting the slave trade. 
But the imposition of customs duties at about the same time 
created a new threat to legitimate trade at British ports - 
the threat of smuggling. Even with the increased staff after 
1874, the administration was unable to cope with illicit 
trading that took place at most of the ports along the 
coastline wrest of the Volta. East of the Volta, evasion of 
duties was rife. Loss to the revenue in this way also meant 
defiance of British laws and officials. In effect the 
determination of the Government to answer the challenge of 
smuggling was a continuation of the policy, begun in the t60's, 
which aimed at establishing British authority in the Volta 
districts. 
Hostilities provoked by Glover's campaign were 
brought to a tardy end in June, 1874. Several attempts had 
been made to impose peace along the Volta, but only when 
Governor Lees was able to threaten the warring tribes with 
force was a peace treaty concluaed between the Accras, Adas, 
(1) 
Awunas and the British Government. The Government was 
resolved that there should be no dispute about its rights over 
Awuna country; the treaty included a formal acknowledgement 
of britaints title to occupy Kota and Dzelukofe, and any other 
(1) Vide Chapter IV, p. 3ý. 5. 
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places along the coast, and to exercise the same jurisdiction 
over the Awunas as over the rest of the Protectorate. Once 
the treaty was signed, the Governor stationed 100 Hausas in 
the district under the supervision of a European officer, to 
maintain order. Customs officials were placed at various 
(1) 
posts to collect the revenue. There was no mention-of the 
limits of British jurisdiction in the treaty, but the 
Government made Adafienu the last port of entry into British 
territory. Between Adafienu and the westerly limit of the 
Lagos settlement lay eighty miles of independent coastline, 
where free ports existed to the detriment of British trade and 
revenue. In 1875, Governor Strahan reported that there were 
at ldast five European factories within fifty miles east of 
Adafienu where large importations of articles were made that 
would be dutiable if the ports were British. The free ports 
were injurious to the prosperity of both Lagos and the Gold 
(2) 
Coast. 
The simplest solution for this problem, which was 
similar to that on the western frontier, apieared to be the 
(1) CO/96/112, no. 8121, "Lees to Carnarvon, 19th June., 1874; 
and no. 10,245, Strahan to Carnarvon, 5th Aug., 1874. 
(2) C0/96/115, no. 4861. Strahan does not give the names of 
the merchants or tý-, ie ports. But in 1872 it was reported that, 
Messrs. Swanzy had factories at Porto Seguro, Little Popo, 
Ague, Grand Popo anti Wida. Vide CO/z)6/y5, minute on 
no. 4334/Actrniralty by Barrow, 26th April, 1872. 
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annexation of the w'iola between Adafienu and Kotonu, 
a port to the west of the Lagos frontier. In making this 
sugijestion in March, 1875, Strahan assured the Secretary of 
State that tr: e Lain to the revenue would far exceed the outlay 
entailed by the expansion. There would be no European power 
to consult over this move. France had assumed a short-lived 
protectorate over Porto Novo in the '60's, but haa. abandoned 
(1) 
it in 1364 without retaining any ra`hts there. The only 
power to be considered was the King of Dahomey, a potentate 
who had extended his sway from the interior to the sea between 
WYida and Kotonu. But in his case, Strah. n wrote, a settlement 
woula be a matter of offering him a handsome stipend to 
compensate him for the loss of his customs revenue, which would 
(2) 
be aiverted into the Government treasury. To the 
Colonial office, control over the whole coastline seemed an 
attractive proposition. In addition to the gain in revenue, 
the British would be able to exercise some restraint on the 
periodical depredations of Dahomey on its less powerful 
neighbours, and particularly those in the nei, _hbourhood 
of 
Lagos. Nevertheless, Carnarvon aavised the Governor to wait 
until the contemplated international a-reement with France had 
been concluded. There were French trading houses along the 
coast, and their objections to any premature action by the 
(1) C0/96/116, no. 10,458, Confidential, and minutes. 
(2) CO/96/115, no. 4861. 
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clý ý British Government might endanger the whole scheme. 
When the French negotiations failed early in 1876, 
each power sought to gain the advantage over the other along 
the West Coast. An incident at Wida in 1876 promised to give 
the British a claim to the occupation of the Dahomian seaboard. 
Swanzy's alleged that their European agent at Wida had been 
"grossly ill-usea" by the inhabitants, and not fox the first 
time. Tr e representatives of the firm urged upon the 
British Government 
". the desirability of attaching that Country to this 
(Gold Coast) Colony and so prevent(ing) in future such 
disgraceful acts". (2) 
Weida was an independent port, and the Foreign Office hau to 
seek redress for the outrage through the Admiralty. The King 
of Dahomey was required to pay a large fine in palm oil, and 
when he refused to pay, the Foreign Office ordered the Admiralty 
(3) 
to blockade his coast. '- Governor Lees saw in the blockade 
an opportunity for inducing the King to cede the control of his 
seaboard to the British. If the blockade could be continued 
(1) Ibid., minutes. 
(2) 00/96/118, no. 3767, Strahan to Carnarvon, 23rd Feb., 1876, 
and enclosures. 
ý3) Loc. cit., no. 4119, Strahan to Carnarvon, 14th March, 1876 
and enclosure. The King was required to pay 80,000 gallons 
of oil. The method of payment was not stated i. e. whether it was paid airect to the Navy or farmed out to merchants. Vide also nos. 5557 and 6907, and enclosures. Swanzy's agent 
complained that the agent of the French firm, Regis Aine, 
was instrumental in the King's refusal to pay. 
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until the King yielded to this pressure and consented to the 
(1) 
arrangement. The Colonial office favoured the plan. 
To Carnarvon it was particularly agreeable, for it involved 
the minimum of political liability. He wrote: 
"'Vie get the fiscal command of the position - we hold a 
more post which makes us responsible for very little, and we 
have the power when we find it desirable, to convert it into 
actual sovereignty". (2) 
But in May, 1877, the olockade was raised after a partial 
(3) 
payment of the fine by the King. Lord Derby, the Foreign 
Secretary, was opposed to any extension of British responsioi-- 
cities on the West Coast and refused to sanction a mission to (4) 
Dahomey with the object of gaining control of the coast. 
Shortly afterwards, the French Government negotiated a treaty 
with Dahomey for the cession of Kotonu. Though this cession 
was not permanent at the time, it gave the French a claim to 
the coast which ended all hope of linking the Gold Coast with 
(5) 
Lagos. 
Thwarted in the effort to annex the Dahomian seaboard, 
the Colonial Office and the local Government considered a 
change of tactics. It might be expedient gradually to annex 
(1) Loc. cit. , no. 5904, Lees to Carnarvon, 22nd 
April, lb76, 
Confidential and minutes. 
(2) Ibid... minute, 20th May, 187 6. 
(3) CO/96/121, nos. 7768,7769 and 7053. 
(4) cf. CO/96/127, minutes on no. 16,019. 
(5) CO/96/123, no. 6739, Freeling to beach, 26rd April, 1878; and CO/96/125, minite on no. 7150/Admiralty by Hemming, 12th June, 
1878. 
'YW^ i' +amarAn. 9 
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those portions of the coast which were independent of Dahomey. 
Some of these independent states, indeed, has asked for 
British protection against that warlike Kingdom. In February, 
1874, the Chiefs of Grand Popo had offered to come under the 
British flag, but at that juncture Britain was still occupied 
with the war against Ashanti and did not relish the prospect 
(1) 
of entanglements with another equally powerful state. But 
(2) 
when Grand Popo repeated its offer a year later, the 
Colonial Office viewed the acquisition of that area with more 
(3) 
enthusiasm. Again the Government temporisea on account 
of the pending agreement with France, but in 1877, Hemming 
thought that the time had come to take action. In February 
of that year, Porto Seguro and Ague, both to the east of the 
Gold Coast frontier, asked for British mediation in a quarrel, 
coupling this request with the desire for British protection. 
Governor Freeling was instructed 
11 not to miss any favourable opportunity of extending 
the Coast line of the Protectorate, if it can be cone without 
risk of complications with the native tribes ... 
" (ý) 
In November, 1877, however, Freeling was asked to 
delay the contemplated extension of the frontiers, though he 
(1) CO/96/114, in no. 6321/a, and minate by laollana, 6th June, 
1874. 
(2) P. P. (C. -1343), nos. 27 and pp. bB and 59. 
(3) CO/96/117, minutes on no. 1843 (no. 27, supra, printed). 
(4) CO/96/120, no. 3743, Freeline to Carnarvon, 21st i eb. , 1877 and minutes. 
- 3, ý 7- 
was enjoined to cultivate friendly relations with the 
independent slates and to lead them 
'r... to look up to and respect the British Government, so 
as to pave the way for any negotiations which at a future 
period it may be found desirable to open ... 
" (1) 
The reason for this decision was that the Colonial office 
granted to reconsider its West African policy. Neither the 
Gambia nor Sierra Leone were paying L-heir way, and all the 
British possessions on he West Coast suffered loss to the 
revenue through smuggling. At first, officials discussed the 
advisability of a Parliamentary Committee of lnouiry, similar 
to that in 1865, which would decide whether to reduce the 
este. olishments at Sierra Leone and he Gambia, or to embark on 
large-scp-1e annexations to safeguard the revenues. But the 
Colonial office shrank from a public inquiry. It was recalled 
that In 1865 the Committee had proposed withurawal, but that no 
Government "had ventured to take a single step in pursuance of 
this recommendation", On the rather h. nus it was difficult to 
obtain the consent of the Foreign Office and of the Caine t to 
the smallest acquisition of territor r, esoeclý lly in areas 
where French interests were involveü. Carn<-rvon res_., ned his 
office in January, 187; -3, fend hI s successor, Sir Michael Dicks 
Beach, had to decide on the best course to oe ta'cen. He aL, reed 
that abandonment of the we,, tkjr settlements was impossible in 
(1) C0/96/121, draft in no. 10,424, Carnarvon to Freeling, 
9th Nov.. 1877. 
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practice. Too many interests and too much sentiment were 
involved. The wisest policy seamed to be a grauual extension 
of the possessions to protect their revenues, wherever 
annexations could be made without reference to the French. 
In the meantime, Hicks Beach saw no necessity, with regard to 
the Gold Coast, for urging the Foreign Office and the Cabinet 
to acquiesce in the annexation of the coastline as far as 
(1) 
Grand Popo. 
This permissive authority to protect the revenues by 
small extensions, however, was timely. by 1878, some measure 
was essential to ensure the prosperity of legitimate traue and 
to guard the rev. nue of the Gold Coast on its eastern frontier. 
The treaty signed in 1874 with Awuna had not served the 
(2) 
purpose. 
To the Awrunas, the treaty of 1874 was simply another 
paper agreement. They were not used to restrictions in their 
trading activities, ana they were unwilling to submit to the 
limitations imposed by the British Government. After the 
(3) 
customs tariff was raised in 1873, trade in the trans-Volta 
area had flourished. The introduction of British revenue 
laws-in the following year involved a dislocation of trade for 
(1) Ibid., minutes. 
(2) Vide supra, p. 391. 
(3) Vide supra, pt, i, py5.347. 
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the Awunas and for the merchants who traued there. It was 
customary for traders to pay duties to the Chiefs, generally 
in spirits or gunpowder, in return for permission to trade in 
the locality and for immunity from molestation if the merchants 
i (l) 
conformed to the wishes of the community. When the 
Government imposed duties, however, the result was not only a 
consiaerable rise in the price of goods, but also a loss to the 
Chief's revenue since the merchants would not pay Chiefs and 
Government. The Awunas did not therefore take kindly to the 
new system. They determined to resist British jurisdiction, 
and in their resistance they received the cordial co-operation 
of the merchants. Many of these were agents of European firms, 
but there were a number of independent African traders. Not 
long after i; he Hausas had been posted to the district, their 
officer reported that a clash had occurred at Atokaw, one of 
the new revenue stations. The Hausas tried to support the 
customs officer in enforcing the payment of duty on goods which 
(2) 
had been landed, and the inhabitants had maltreated the Hausas. 
It was the first in a long series of affrays arising out of 
the efforts of the Government io stop smuggling along the coast 
(3) 
between Ada and Adafienue 
(1) CO/96/115, in no. 4861, Lees to Strahan, 23rd Nov., 1874; 
and vide Chapter II, pp. /64 -5 a.. ý º. QMe (i). 
(2) P. P. (C. -1343) no. 83, P. 12 and enclosures. 
(3) e. g. P. P. (C. -1402)., no. 88, p014. 
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These efforts were of no avail. In the Keta district 
the loss to the revenue was so great that the local administ- 
(1) 
ration had to be subsidized by the central treasury at Accra. 
Moreover, smuggling took place on such a vast scale that 
merchants who paid duty could not compete with those who 
traded in smuggled goods. The result was that an increasing 
proportion of goods was landed at free ports to the east of 
the British frontier, and smuggled into the Protectorate on 
or beyond Jhe network of lagoons anu creeks which stretched 
for miles on the north side of the beach. This illicit trade 
affected the whole of uhe Volta area, in which the Government 
and the merchants had been so long anxious to establish a 
regular highway for legitimate trade. Messrs. Miller Brothers, 
whose main interest on the Gold Coast lay in this Volta trade, 
complained bitterly to the Government of the hazards of (2) 
cormnerce Without adequate protection. 
But the Awunas themselves had cause for complaint. 
The system of smuggling that was carried on in their district 
operated consistently to their disadvantage. Denu, a 
collection of trading shacks just outside the boundary of 
British jurisdiction at Adafienu, was the centre of' the 
(1) 00/96/127, no. 14,45o, Ussher to Beach, 11th Aug., 1879. 
(2) CO/96/119, no. 2262/M and 7400/M; and CO/96/125, minute 
on no. 711 by Hemming, 15th Jan. , 1879. 
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smuggling activities. This trading post had come into being 
(1) 
in 1875 when Mr. G. B. Williams, an enterprising African merchant, 
set up a store at Dena where he traded in duty-free goods. 
Other merchants, finding that they were undersold by Williams, 
also opened stores at Denu. It was the practice to take 
delivery of produce in palm oil or kernels from the Awunas in 
British Territory, and to give them in exchange credit notes 
with which they could buy goods and spirits at Denu. The 
risk of loss, and the responsibility for smuggling their 
purchases over the border thus fell entirely on the Awunav. 
It was they who took punishment for smuggling, while the 
merchants reaped the profits of the illicit trade. In any 
case the Awunas resented the Government interference with their 
(2) 
trade. When in 1878, an energetic District Commissioner, 
(3) 
Mr. A. B. Ellis, began a vigorous campaign against smuggling, 
their resentment turned into hatred and rebellion. 
In October, 1878, Ellis reported the most serious 
of the many clashes between Hauaas and Awunas. An attempt 
(1) Williams, who had come from Sierra Leone, carrLed on an 
extensive trade in the Volta districts until the '90's. 
I saw some-of the papers belonging to the Williams family 
on the Gold Coast. Another Sierra Leonian, Mr. S. B. Cole, 
was one of the first merchants to set up a store at Denu 
after Williams. 
(2) CO/96/125, no. 711, Lees to Beach, 18th Dec., 1878 and encl. 
i 4! 
(3) As a result of Ellis' efforts, the revenue at Keta rose 
from a monthly average of £300 to nearly £1,500 in July, 
1878. Vide C0/96/126, in no. 2630. 
Fr'ý 
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was made on his life and on that of the captain of a trauinL 
vessel, and it was rumoured that the Awunas were gathering for 
an attack on Ceta. Ellis asked for an immediate reinforcement 
(1) 
to protect the Government position. Merchants complained 
(2) 
that traue was at a stanastill, blaming the Hausas' 
behaviour for the ill-feeling felt towards the Government. 
Tension in the district was increased wýien a party of hausas 
sez fire to the town of Koji in a skirmish with the inhabitants 
(3) 
which resulted in the loss of several lives. Governor 
Lees accordingly sent the Chief Justice to Keta to ., ial. e a 
thorough investigation. This inquiry, anu. subsequent re,, orts 
by the Inspector General of Constabulary, who was also posted 
to Kota, revealed to the Government that the grievances of the 
Awunas undoubtedly arose out of the action against smugglin ;. 
It was evident that the Hausas were guilty of numerous petty 
assaults on persons and property committed under cover of 
their dubies. Irritation on these grounds was intensified 
because the District Conunissioner refused to acknowleüge any 
wrong on the part of the Hausas. The hostility of the Awunas 
(1) CO/9b/128, no. 15,17w, Lees to Beach, 28th Oct., 1878, and 
enclosures. 
() Among the merchants who protesteu were G. h. Williarns, 
G. R. Turnoull (European agent of Swanzy), 6. j: . Co1e, C. Rottinan (a Ger-, van merchant), L. F. Neizer (African agent for Walsh 
Bros. of Liverpool) , and J. Instone (unsp)ecj. f l_e(-. ). Vide Co/9 /125, in no. 16,639, Leis to beac^, 
lH th iv ov . , 1878. 
ý5) Loc. cit., no. 15,594, Lees to beach, 6th Nov., 1878 anu 
enclosure. 
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was so great that the Governor was obligeu to remove Ellis 
from his post at Kota and to award compensation to the people 
(1) 
of Koji. In order to quieten the district, the Hausa 4 
detachments were withdrawn from the outstations at Adina and 
Adafienu, and the Government had to relax its efforts to 
(2) 
protect the revenue. In consequence, the trade in smuggled 
(3) 
goods flourished more than ever before. 
Clearly, the Government could not afford to let the 
matter rest. The only practicable solution which suggested 
itself was the-annexation of Denu and the coastline east of it 
(4) 
as far as Ba. guida for customs purposes. MMeaae in the 
Colonial Office foresaw that there would be no end to the 
process of following up traders who landed goods just outside 
the frontier, but the situation was grave, end the Governor was 
(5) 
asked to advise on the annexation. At this point, Lees told 
the Colonial Office that Adafienu was not in Avmna territory 
and that the Government had been at fault in making this place 
the last port of entry in British territory. In fact, Awuna 
territory ended at Koji, and the strip of coast between Blekuso 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 16,369, s. nd enclosures; and CO/96/126, 
no. 12,642, Ussher to Beach, 7th July, 1879. 
(2) C0/96/125, no. 711 anti enclosures. 
(3) cf. Ibid., minute by Hemming, 15th Jan., 1879. A represen\- 
-tative of Miller Bros. told Hemming the t the Volta was so 
flooded with smuggled goods that this firm had recently been 
obliged to redirect a cargo to a free port, in order to 
compete on equal terms. 
(4) Ibid., no. 711 and encl. 
(5) Ibid., minutes by Meade, 19th and 27th Jan- j1879- 
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and Adafie belonged to the Agbosom4s, who were quite independent. 
of the Awunas and were not affected by the treaty in 1874. 
The tiny area of land between Denu and Af12ta was owned by the 
Aflaos, another independent group, and that between Aflao and 
Baguida to a third group. Prestige and consideration of 
revenue combined to make it impossible for the Government to 9 
acknowledge its error in occupying Agbosomg without their 
consent. Lees thought it would be sufficient to offer some 
payment to the Agbosome Chiefs in return for a formal cession 
of their coastline, and that similar agreements could be made 
(1) 
with Aflav and Baguida. 
Although Hemming wanted to ignore the Agbosomesuntil 
(2) 
they themselves pointed out the Government's mistake, Lees 
informed the Secretary of State that in April, 1878 those 
people had protösted against the occupation of their country. 
Their petition stated that they had shown the boundary of 
their territory to a Government officer in 1874 but they had 
received no answer from the Government. Having by this time 
found the behaviour of the Hausas intolerable, they again asked 
that the Government withdraw: 
"... Although our population are profounuly imbuou with 
the sense of respect ... towards the English people, we would 
rather also oe frank in saving that we wish to remain only as 
friends of the English ... 
Y, 
i 1) CO/96/126, no. 2630, Lees to Beach, 12th Jrn., lä79 and 
enclosures. 
(2) Ibid., minute, 15th Feb. , 1879. 
cr i 
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In answer to this petition, Governor Freeling had invited these 
Chiefs to visit Accra, but beyond mutual promises - the 
Agbosomes to stop smuggling and the Government to reduce the 
(1) 
force of Hausas - nothing was none to settle the question. 
A second petition w^s sent by the Agbosome`s, this 
time to the Secretary of State, in January, 187Y, praying for ii 
the withdrawal of the Hausas and customs officers. Lees 
assured the Colonial Office that the petition emanated from 
the traders in whose interests it was that the Government 
should leave the Agbosome country ana allow them to continue 
the profitable trade in smuggled goods without hindrance. 
The Governor wrote to Hicks Beach: 
"Mile therefore conceding the abstract justice of the 
claim set up for the petitioners I venture to think on grounds 
of public policy that they should rather be compelled to 
receive a fair compensation for their seaboard - to which I 
think if left to themselves they would agree - than be allowed 
at the instigation of str,,!. ngers to overturn the scheme for the 
protection of the Revenue... " (2) 
On the instructions of the Colonial Office, Lees offered 
stipends of £40 to the King of Agbosom6 and £30 each to the 
Chiefs of Adina and Adafienu as compensation for the occupation 
(3) 
of their country. Later in the year, however, Lees 
reported that none of the Chiefs had accepted their stipends, 
(1) Ibid., enclosures. 
(2) Ibid., Lees to Beach and Petition, 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 8185, Leas to Beach, 19th Apri1,1879. 
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and that smuggling was still carried on to a considerable 
(1) 
extent in and near Denu. In preparation for more drastic 
action on the frontier, the Colonial Office obtained the 
consent of the Foreign Office to the projected annexation of 
(2) 
the coast as far east as BaEuida. 
Soon after Governor Ussher took up his appointment 
in the middle of 1879, he determined to make a satisfactory 
settlement on the frontier. In August, he instructed an 
(3) 
African trader to act as his agent in negotiating with the 
Aflaas for the cession of their coastline. The agent was to 
hint that the Government had rights over the country which 
originated from the purchase of the Danish possessions in 1 50. 
If the Afl. jms did not voluntnrily accept British jurisdiction, 
he was to t'irea. ten an enforcement of these ri6hts of 
sovereignty, and to warn them that they would forfeit the 
(4) 
stipends offered them by the Government. 
There was a momentary diversion in OcI oder when two 
American filibusters cl: imed that Denu and the surrounding 
territory, including some tows already occupied by the British, 
(1) 00/96/127, no. 14,451, Ussher to Beach, 9th Au6,, 1879, 
(2) CO/96/12ü, rni_nui. te on no. 8183 by beach, 17th June, 167j vnd 
CO/96/12 , no. 10., 826/FO. 
(3) Mr. Luttero . t. ITe had been in the employ of the Danish 
Government up to 1850 and apxer )errs to have been of Danish 
extraction, It is not clear whether'he was an i_no. opendent 
trader or an agent. 
(4) CO/96/126, nos. 13,444 and 16,110, Ussher to beach, 
21st July and 3OtT-L Aug", lýirly, both Confidential. 
IQP! 
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had been ceded to them. Ussher at once announced that this 
(1) 
"Treatyi' would not be recognized, but he saw that the 
private negotiations of his African agent would be unsuccessful..! 
Meanwhile, thousands of pounds were lost to the revenue each 
month and British authority was constantly defied. In 
November, Ussher proposed to send large reinforcements to Keta 
and Adafienu to inculcate respect for the Government. Before i 
taking any further action, he asked the Secretary of State for 
precise instructions, but at the same time he made it clear 
that high-handed methods would have to be adopted: 
"It is I think a question whether Great 13ritain, as a 
civilizing power, and in order to protect her own interests, 
should not step in, and if unable by fair means to obtain the 
control she desires, and to which she had a moral rij;: r. üt in 
simple self-defence, t'ýen to employ other and more effectual 
means. As to the practicability of annexing the sea-board, 
I would undertake to do it with ease with the force at my 
Comm, nd, assisted by a man of war'". (2) 
Despite Ussher's assurance that no hostilities would occur, 
Hicks Beach telegraphed that on no account was force to be used 
(3) 
in obtaining the cession. The Foreign office would be 
unlikely to assent to anything but peaceful annexation. As 
Ussher expected, however, the use of force proved to be 
(1) CO/96 127, no. 19,049, Ussher to Beach, 30th Oct., 1879; 
and C0 96/128, no. 19,603, Usshor to Beach, 11th Nov., 1379. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) CO/lz; 6/127, in no. 16,110,12th Nov. , 1B7ý). 
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unnecessary. Its display was sufficient to bring the 
Agbosomes and Af1eos to terms. 
ýý 
tý 
On their part, these people were also making warlike 
preparations in conjunction with the Awunas, and in November 
(1) 
the whole district was on the verse of open rebellion. 
As a precaution, Ussher sent more reinforcements to Kota, 
bringing the total force in the district up to 200 men and 
four officers. In addition the force was supported by heavy 
guns which had been taken there by the warship provided by the 
(2) 
Navy to watch events and if necessary to take part. Ussher 
himself arrived in Keta at the end of November. Calling a 
meeting of mercr. ants, he warned them that it was in their 
interests to advise the people to keep the peace, bec<use the 
Government would take no responsibility for damage to property 
in case bombardment or other action should take place. Most 
of the traders seemed reconciled to the occupation of Denu, 
(ý) 
and some of them began to move their goods to Keta and Ada, 
At the beginning of December, Ussher told the 
Colonial Office that these measures had been so successful that 
ý1) CO/96/128, no. 19,478, Ussher to Beach, '12th Nov., 1879, 
Confidential. 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 19,805, Ussher to Beach, 17th Nov., 1879. 
(3) Loc. cit. , nos. 20,614 and 10, Ussher to Beach, 23rd and 29th Nov., 1879. Ussher mentions Williams, aftd the agents of 
Miller Bros., Walsh Bros., and Swanzy, and Rottman as the 
principal merchants concerned. 
ri iý 
ý! ` . 
ý'; . 
..., ý . ý.. ýýý 4Y 
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the Aflaas had made a provisional cession of the seaboard in 
return for £100 a year and a small quantity of duty free 
(1) 
spirits for the Chiefs. With this provisional agreement, 
pressure was brought to bear on the Agbosom4s, who were thus 
placed in complete isolation between British territory in 
Awuna and Afla . Accordingly, they also consented to 
acknowledge the formal annexation of their seaboard from Adina 
to the borders of Af1jRo, including Denu, Their compensation 
amounted to £253.2.6d. per annum together with a prescribed 
(2) 
amount of duty free spirits. Negotiations with the people 
of Baguida failed. Ussher suspected that traders were 
responsible for influencing these people against accepting the 
(3) 
Government terms. But he regarded the peaceful cession 
of the coastline to Aflo as satisfactory, and he thought it 
would Oe sufficient to prevent much of the smuggling in that 
area. An enlarged force of Hausas was stationed alone the 
coast to ensure that the new treaties were observed. To the 
Awunas, Ussher gave a last warning about smuggling and aefiance 
of British authority. They petitioned the Government for 
(4) 
lower customs duties, but Ussher strongly advised the 
(1) Loc. cit., no. 24, Ussher to Beach, lst Dec., 1879, Confiaentil 
(2) Loc. cit., no. 393, Ussher to Beach, 3rd Dec., 187J. 
(3) Loc. cit., no. 738, Ussher to Beach, 11th Dec., 1879, and 
enclosure. Messrs. Williams and Cole were particularly 
suspect. 
E 
(4) Loc. cit., no.:, -)94j, Ussher to Beach, 6th Dec., 1879. 
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Colonial Office against this step, because it would mean a 
(1) 
considerable loss to the revenue of the Colony. 
Although the Colonial office had asked permission 
ýý ý, 
ý , 
I,: ý . 
1ý, ' ýý 
of the Foreign Office to make this small but important addition 
to the seabo., _rd of the Colony, Lord Derby 
deprecated the 
annexation, The Colonial office was told that no further 
extension was in future to oe made without specific reference 
(2) 
to the Cabinet. This did not bode well for the Gold Coast. 
Although the Keta district was quieter during 1880, merchants 
feared that they would again have to compete with goods lanced 
just outside the borders at Baguida, where Williams and at 
(3) 
least one other trader had started business. But the 
instructions from the Foreign Off"_cte has to be obeyed, 
(4) 
Secretary cf State forbade any further annexations. 
The problems of the- rans-Volta. district were 
partially settled by the extension of jurisdiction along; the 
coast, ano. it seomed that at last the Volta woula 'become the 
centre of legitimate traue. The interior, however, was still 
in a disturbed condition. Smuggling and pillaging conti_nae . 
unabated, and since there was no Government authority inland, 
(1) C0/96/130, no. 5318, Ussher to beach, 12th March, 1880. 
(2) CO/96/133, no. 1893/F0. 
(3) C0/96/130, no. 6521, Ussher to Beach, 30th March, 1880. 
(4) 00/96/133, minutes on no. 1893/FO. 
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white tracers took the law into their own hands. Africans 
retaliated, and the drive to seek commerce in the interior 
(1) 
was accompanied by constant disturbances and outbreaks. 
Under these conditions, trade could not prosper. The next 
two decades of the century were to see the attempts of the 
Government to make its authority felt in the interior. In 
the same period, France and Germany entered the field as 
serious and determined rivals of Britain in the effort to find 
markets in West Africa, 
(1) cf. CO/96/131, no. 8975, Ussher to Beach, 10th May, 1880. 
&00 
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APPENDIX I. 
Governors of the Gold Coast, 1843-80. 
Captain G. Maclean (Act. Lt. Gov. ) 
Commander H. ti'p'. Hill (Lt. Gov. ) 
J. Lil1ey, Esa. (Act. Lt. Gov. ) 
Commander W. Winniett (Lt. Gov. ) 
J. C. Fitzpatrick Esq. (Act. Lt. Gov. 
Sir W. Winniett (Gov. ) 
J. Bannerman, Esq. (Act. Gov. ) 
Major S. J. Hill (Gov. ) 
B. Cruickshank, Esq. (Act. Gov. ) 
Major S. J. Hill (Gov. ) 
H. Connor, Esq. (Act. Gov. ) 
Sir B. C. C. Pine (Gov. ) 
Major Bird (Act. Gov. ) 
E. B. Andrews, Esq. (Gov. ) 
W. A. Ross, Esq. (Act. Gov. ) 
R. Pine, Esq. (Gov. ) 
W. Hacicett, Esq. (Lt. Gov. ) 
R. Pine, Esq. (Gov. ) 
Brevett Major R. Jones (Lt. Gov. ) 
W. E. Moc kkler, Esq. It 
Lt-Colonel E. Conran '' 'ý 
H. T. Ussher 
W. H. Simpson 
H. T. Ussher 
C. S. Salmon 
H. T. Ussher 
C. P. Salmon, Esq. 
Colonel R. tip. Harley 
Sir G. Wolseley 
Lt. Col. Maxwell 
Capt. C. C. Lees 
Capt. G. C. Strahý7n 
Capt. C. C. Lees 
S. Freeling, Esq. 
Capt. C. C. Lees 
H. `1'. Us Sher, 
(Administrator from 
of 
(Act. Adm. ) 
Administrator 
(Act. Adm. ) 
(Administrator) 
(Act. Auirn. ) 
(Administrator) 
it 
(Act. Adm. ) 
11 
(Administrator) 
(Governor from July, 
(Lt. Gov. ) 
(Lt. Gov. ) 
(Governor from June, 




Mar. , 184b Apr.,, 1846 




































Mar. , 1845. 
Apr. , 1846. 








Apr. , 1860. 
Apr. , 1862. 
Oct. , 1$62. 
Apr. , 1864. 
July, 1864. 
Apr. , 1865. 
June, 1b65. 
Aug. , 1865. 
Feb. , 1867. 
Aug. , 1868. 
Nov., 1869. 
July, 1871. 
Mar. , 1872. 
Apr., 1872. 
Nov., 102. 




Apr., 187 6. 
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Governors-in-Chief of the 
West African Settlements, 1866-74. 
Major S. LY. Bla ckall 
Lt. C ol. G. N. Yonge 
Major S. W. Blackall 
Sir A. Kennedy 
J, J. Kendall, Esq. 
Sir A. Kennedy 
J. Pope Hennessy, Esq. 
R. IV. Keat e, Esq. 
Col. R. V. Harley 
G. Berkeley, Esq. 
(Governor) 
(Acting Gov. ) 
(Governor) 
It 
(Actin; Gov. ) 
(Governor) 
(Acting Gov. ) 
(Governor) 
(Actin Gov. ) 
Feb. , 1866 - 
July, 1867 - 
Nov., 1b67 - 
Feb. , 186 3- 
Au ;., 1869 - 
Dec. , l8r6y - 
Feb. , 1872 - 
Feb. 1873 - 
liar. 1873 - 




Feb. 18 68. 
Aug., l869. 
Dec. , 1är39. 
Jan., 1872. 
Feb. , 1; 73. 
Ilar. , 187. x. Auf;., 1873. 
July, 1874. 
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APPENDIX 1I. 
Officials in the Colonial Off ice, (1843-1880). 
Secretaries of State 
Viscount Stanley Sept., 1841 - Dec., 1845. 
W. E. Gladstone Dec., 1845 - July, 1846. 
Earl Grey July, 1846 - Feb., 1852. 
Sir J. Packinston Feb., 1852 - Dec., 1852. 
Duke of Newcastle Dec., 1852 - June, 1554. 
Sir G. Grey June, 1854 - Feb., 1455. 
Sidney Herbert Feb., 1855. 
Lord John Mussel Feb., 1855 - July, 1855. 
Sir W. Molesworth July, 1855 - Oct. ) 18550 
H. Labouchere Oct., 1855 - Feb., 1858. 
Lord Stanley Feb., 1858 - Mar., 1858. 
Sir E. Bulwer Lytton Mar., 1858 - June, 15bß. 
Duke of Newcastle June, 185' - April, 1864. 
E. Cardwell April, 1864 - June, 1b66. 
Earl of Carnarvon June, 186x6 - Iviar., 1867. 
Duke of Buckin, -ham Mar. , 1867 - Dec., 1866. 
Earl Granville Dec., 1868 - July, 1870. 
Earl Kimberley July, 1870 - Feb., 1674. 
Earl of Carnarvon Feb. 2 1874 - Feu. ) 1878. 
Sir M. Hicks Beach Feb., 1878 - April, l6BO. 
Earl Kimberley April, 1880 - Dec., 1882. 
Parliamentarv Under-secretaries. 
G. W. Hope 1841 
Lord Lyttelton 1845 
B. Hawes 184b 
Sir F. Peel 1851 
J. Ball 1855 
C. S. Fortescue 1857 
Lord Carnarvon 1858 
C. S. Fortescue 1859 
W. E. Forster 18b5 
C. B. Adderley 1866 
W. Monsell 1868 
E. H. Knatchbull-Hugessen 1871 
J. Lowther 1874 
Earl Cadogan 1878 
Sir M. E. Grant Duff 1880 
- 415 - 
Permanent Under-secretaries, 1843-1880. 
J. Stephen 1336-1847. 
H. Merivale 1847-185`9. 
Sir F. Rogers 1859-1871. 
Sir H. G. äV. Hero ert 1871-1892. 
Assistant Under-secretaries, 1843-1380. 
Sir T. F. Elliot 1849-1868. 
Sir F. R. Sandford 1868-1870. 
R. G. W. Herbert 1870-1871. 
H. T. Holland ) 1870-1874. R. H. Lieade 
W. R. i a1co1m 1874-1878. 
Sirr J. Pauncefote 1874-1876. 
Sir J. Bramston 1376-1897. 
E. Wingfield 1ý '7 _, -1897. 
0" 




(a ) Exports of Palm Oil from the Gold Coast. 
(2) 
Year To United Kingdom Price (per ton, 
(in tons, round numbers) 
inU. K. ) 
(3) 
1849 2,103 - 
1850 1,891 - 
1851 2,391 - 
1852 1,131 - 
1853 12227 - 
1854 1,410 £46 
1855 21446 43.5 
1856 1,516 43 
1857 1,870 43.72 
1858 763 35.89 
1859 810 45.05 
1860 843 44.67 
1861 12352 42p68 
1862 1,974 39.83 
1863 2,113 3b993 
1864 4,464 33g65 
1865 61237 33.32 
1866 7,500 40.21 
1867 
9781 4 38.62 1868 . 5,136 39.41 
1869 5,485 35,89 
1870 3,875 36.48 
1871 5,945 54.75 
1872 6,958 35.87 
1873 6,389 5 5.67 
1874 7, ob'2 3.07 1875 
1876 9,207 34.77 
1877 109420 ßa5.62 
1878 8,906 34.80 
1879 10,107 x50.52 
1880 13,064 23.43 
1881 8, X36 2J. 09 
1882 7,298 30.49 
1883 8,172 35.11 
(1) The largest buyer of palm oil, next to the U. A.., was the 
U. S. A., but figures for total exports from the Gold Coast are 
so unreliable as to be worthless. 
(2) Taken from Trade and Nam ion Reports (annually presented to Parliament). 
(3) 1849 is tt, e first year for which separa te Gold Coast fiLiires are available. 
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(b) ;m ports of Palm oil into the U. K. 
5-Year Period Total Imports from the 
(in' tons Gold Coast 
1849-53 27,101 6.5, 
1854-58 39,927 4.0 
1059-63 39,866 3.5 
1864-38 40,367 14.0 
1869-73 47,551 1;. 25 
1874-78 42,202 20.0 
1879-83 41,043 23.0 H 
(1) The bulk of the total came from West Africa. Figures 
taken from Trade and Navigation Repo rts. ij 
Round numbers. 
, (1) i 
(c) Volume of the Slave Trade , 1848-1864. 
ý 
year Total no. of Slaves Exported 













1860 27, boo 
1861 28,102 
1862 13, r)'04 
1863 8,947 
1864 7,124 
(1) This table is taken from P. P. V, 1865,412, App. 8. 
I do not know how accurate the figures are, but ehey Live 
some idea of the volume and decline of the trade. 
Up to 1850, Brazil was tobe largest importer of slaves, 
thereafter, Cuba. 
(2) Figures for the Gold Coast alone are not Liven. 
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ý) 
(d) Gold Coast Exports - juantities and Destination. 
5-year Total Palm Palm Gold % To % To ;Q To 
Period Value Oil Kernels Dust U. K. U. S. A. Germany 
1850-54 £174,425 36 - 58 57 27 - 
1855-59 164,697 34 - 40 59 12 - 
1860-6( 128,128 31 - 60 79 18 - 
1865-64ý 215,406 37 11 48 76 11 - 
1870-7Z 342,370 65 3 24 57 26 - 
1875-79 399,207 69 14 13 73 16 10 
1880-84 405,286 60 20 15 72 lh 10 
(e) Gold Coast 
Articles 
Imports - uantities, 




5-year Total Cotton % Spirits % From 
. 
jo From From 
Period Value Goods and Wines U. K. U. S. A. Germany i , 
1850-54 Z82,474 33 19 65 22 - 
1855-59 122,109 38 22 60 24 - 
1860- 6, P)137,712 40 26 67 30 - 
1865-6P176 , 858 57 14 77 
22 - 
l870-74254,724 35 26 56 2ý - 
1875-79 371,045 38 15 76 16 5 
1880-84 408,053 34 18 78 18 3 
Figures Taken from Statistical Tables Relating to the Colonies. 
Round numbers. Figures for earlier years are particularly 
unreliable. 
(1) 1862-3-4 missing. 
(2) 1865-6-7 missing. 
(3) 1873-4 missing. 
(4) The bulk of this item was rum, most of it from the U. S. A. 
ý. 
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(f) Revenue and Expenditure of the Gold Coast 
Government. K 
5-year Period Revenue Expenditure 
1845-49 £ 5,000 £ 5,000 
1850-54 7,809 6,765 
1855-59 9,101 8,438 
1860-64 (1) 8,697 92377 
1865-69 (2) 19,765 15,243 
1870-74 (3) 33,175 35,823 
1875-79 84,20b 82,971 
1880-84 114,469 110,096 
ic Round numbers. Figures taken from Statistical Tables 
Relating to the Colonies, annually presented to Parliament. 
(1) 1862-3-4 missing. 
(2) 1865-6-7 missing. 
(3) 1873-4 missing. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
I. IR MARY SOURCES. 
(a) . MANUSCRIPT - OFFICIAL. 
(1) Colonial Office Records - Gold Coast. 
The correspondence in the Public Records Office 
between the Colonial Office and the Gold Coast provides the 
bulk of the material for a study of official British relations 
with that territory. The Colonial Office files contain 
dispatches from the local Government (including annual reports)., 
minutes of officials in London, and draft replies from the 
Secretary of State; correspondence between other Government 
Departments and the Colonial Office; and miscellaneous 
correspondence. The minutes throughout are particularly 
important in examining the formulation of policy. Enclosures 
in dispatches often include petitions and local correspondence 
which throw light on matters other than those connected with 
political administration. The miscellaneous correspondence 
touches on a variety of topics. Many of these letters came 
from the leading merchants and are therefore of great value in 
studying questions relating to trade. The files used were: 
CO/96/2 to CO/96/133 - 1843 to 1880. 
(2) Colonial Office Records - Sierra Leone. 
Files in this series were consulted for the years 
during which the Gold Coast was a dependency of Sierra Leone. 
References to the Gold coast are so few that the central 
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government was clearly no more than a name. 
CO/267/180 to CO/267/212 - 1843-1850. 
CO/267/287 to CO/267/325 - 1866-1873. 
(3) Foreign Office Records. 
Various series were used for the different topics of 
discussion or negotiation which involved the Gold Coast. 
Nearly all these documents appear in the Colonial Office files 
and show the virtual independence of that department in con- 
ducting Gold Coast affairs. 
FO/97/250 - 1859-61) Correspondence with Holland on 
)- Exchange of Territory, 
FO/37/446 - 1864-68) West Africa 
FO/37/534 - Sumatra and Gold Coast Treaties 
FO/83/611) 
)- General and Miscellaneous 
FO/83/612) Correspondence , 1880. 
FO/84/775 - 1849) 
F0/84/816 - 1850) 
F0/84/858 - 1851) - 








Slave Trade , Africa, 
(rest Coast), Consular. 
Embassy Archives, Paris, 1884. 
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(4) Treasury Records. 
Though the Gold Coast was closely supervised by 
the Treasury, correspondence in this series does not throw 
any new light on policy. The following bundles were consulted 
(the numbers of the bundle and the top document are given): - 






57 83B/157 68 
Ti, 1853: - 
5794A/6634 
5848A/23734 












Ti, 1862: - 
6401A/18692 
Ti, 1863: - 
6462A/18163 
646513/19398 




(b) Board of Trade Records. 
Colonial questions came under two departments - 
the General Department (B. T. 1) and the Commercial Department 
(B. T. 11). Very few papers survive in either group for the 
years under consideration, and of the Gold Coast none at all 
(with the exception of three ordinances also in the CO/96/- 
series). 
(6) Admiralty Records. 
Those relating to the Gold Coast fall under three 
headings - dispatches from the Cape of Good Hope station, letters 
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from captains of the West Africa Squadron, and correspondence 
with the Colonial Office. Constant communication with the 
Colonial Office ensured that information in dispatches and 
letters reached that department. In the box numbers below, 
the Cape of Good Hope letters are given first, and the numbers 
following indicate Colonial Office correspondence, unless 
otherwise stated: - 
Admy 2/6061., 6071 - 1868 
Adrgy 1/6093,6125-6 - 1869 







6197 - 1871 




6317-8 - 1874 
(7) Gold Coast Archives. 
Very few documents of earlier date than 1875 are in 
existence, so that this material has not been very useful for 
the present study. The papers are disordered and can only be 
described generally as follows: - 
In - letters to the Secretariat, Accra, from 1875. 
District Letter Books (mainly from 1880). 
(b) 
. MANUSCRIPT - UNOFFICIAL. 
1. The G1ads tone Papers. 
These papers, to be found in the British Museum, are 
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useful for the correspondence between the Prime Minister and 
the Secretaries of State for War and the Colonies during the 
Ashanti War in 1873. The papers referred to were: 
B. M. Additional Manuscripts 44,120, vol. XXXV. 
ºº ºº 44,224, " CXXXIx. 
it it 44,225 ýº CXI,. 
it It 44,641, Cabinet papers, memoranda, 
minutes, 
2. The Kimberley Journal. 
This Journal of Events during the Gladstone Ministry, 
1868-1874 was discovered among the Kimberley Papers by Miss E. 
Drus and kindly lent me by her. The Journal was interesting 
for this study because Inrd Kimberley referred to people on 
the Coast and the policy of the British Government at the time 
of the Ashanti War in 1873. 
(3) Gold Coast Papers - Miscellaneous. 
Few documents of earlier date than the late '70's 
have survived. The following collections now in private hands 
were of particular importance: - 
(i) Freeman Papers - letters written mainly between 
1857 and 1861. 
(ii) Ocansey Papers - These belong mainly to the '80's and '90's, 
and include letters and trading accounts. 
Williams Papers- I1ostly written in the '90's, and 
relating to trade. 
I include here the verbal information I obtained 
on the Gold Coast. After careful checking, it helped to 
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elucidate a number of points. 
(c). PRINT)J - OFFICIAL. 
1. Parliamentary Papers 
(1) Accounts and Papers. 
From time to time, quantities of official correspond- 
ence were printed by order of the House of Commons. Where I 
have used the printed documents, I have checked them with the 
manuscript for omissions. Pagination in the text refers 
throughout to the sessional paper, not the volume. The 
following list gives year, volume, and number of sessional 
paper: 
ove-/-, - 
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1845, XLVI, 187. 
1850, XXXVIII, 572,11.71, 1238. 
1851, LVII, 1298. 
1852- 3, LXV, 703. 
1854- 5, XXXVI, 456. 
185b, LII, 433. 
1857, Sess. 2, XXJII, 245. 
1859, Sess. 2, XXII, 182. 
1864, XLI, 385,393, 3364,3304-1. 
1805, XXXI1, 71. 
1865, XXXVII, 170. 
1867, XLIX, 198. 
18o7, LXXIV, 3900. 
1872, LXX, (C. -474), (C. -67U). 
1873, XLIX, 171,266, 266; 1, (c. -8o1), (0, -802)5 (Co-804)) 
(C. -815). 
1874, XLVT, (C. -890), (C. -891), (C. -892), (C. -893), (C. -s94), (C. -907), (C. -921), (C 4122), (C. -962), (C. -398), (C. -1006), (C. -1007). 
1875, LIT, (C. -1139), (C. -1140), (C. -1159), (C. -1343). 
1876, LII, (C. -1402), (Cr1409). 
1878, LV, (C. -2148). 
(ii). Reports of Committees. 
1842, XI, Select Committee of Inquiry into the State of 
British Possessions on the West Coast of Africa. 
Report and Evidence. 
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4. Hansard. 
Parliamentary debates, though they rarely took place 
on Gold Coast affairs, are informative for trends in public 
opinion and Government policy. Debates and questions about 





1872 CC IX . 
1872 CCXI. 
1872 CCX III. 





1874 C cx ix . 
(d). PRINTED - UNOFFICIAL. 
Methodist Mission Papers. 
Manusciips are not available because they have not yet 
been unpacked since they were stored during the war. The 
printed papers below consist of letters written by missionaries 
in the field (showing their activities and the progress of 
evangelization) and of reports issued by the Society in London 
(giving a useful account of the policy of the central 
organisation) . 
The volumes referred to wore: - 
The-Wesleyan, isa. fona Notices . _relating, 
principally to the 
Foreign Missions ... -carried 
on under the Methodist Conference 
Ln don. New Series, vols. VIII - XXIV for the years 1838 - 
1886. 
ff 
- 425 - 
II. SECONDARY SOURCES. 
(a) CONTEMPORARY PUBLISHED NORKS. 
There are not a great many published works of value. 
This is a select list of the more important books. The most 
important are marked x: 
Alexander, J. E. : Narrative of a Voyage of Observation Among, 
the Colonies of 'Nestern Africa .. o v. Is 
cc, VI-VIII. London: Henry Colburn, 1837. 
Arthur, Sir G. (editor) : Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley 
1870-1911.2 ed. London: Heinemann, 
1923. 
A Bosman, W. :A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of 
Guinea, Divided into the Gold, the $ lave , and the Ivor Coasts. Written-originally in Dutch ... and 
now faithfully done into English. London: 1705. 
A Bowdich, T. E. Mission from Ca Coast Castle to Ashantee, 
with a Statistical Account of that Kingdom, 
and Geographical Notices of other parts of the 
Interior of Africa. London: John Murray, 1819. 
Buxton, T. F. : The African Slave Trade and its Remedy. ihndo! i. 
John Murray, 1840. 
A Cruickshank, B. : Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa, 
Includin an Account of the Native Tribes and 
Their Intercourse with Europeans, 2 v. London: 
Hurst and Bla cke tt , 1853. 
Dupuis, J. : Journal of a Residence in Ashantee. Comprising 
Notes and Researches Relative to the Gold Coast 
and the Interior of Western Africa ... London: 
Henry Colburn, 1824. 
Freeman, R. A. : Travels and Life in Ashanti and Jaman. Tondon: 
A. Constable, 1898. 
Grey, Earl: The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's 
Administration. 2 v. Inndon: R. Bentley, 1853. 
Hutchinson, T. J. : Narrative of the Niger, Tshadda, and Binud 
I xp1oration ... with Remarks on the Malaria 
and Fevers of Western Africa. cc. VIII and T'. - Lo on: Longman anu o ers , 1855. 
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c Kings ley, M. H. : Travels in 
ti u 1' 
Lon n, 1897. 
Y. Kingsley.. M. H. ; West African Studies. 2 ed., with additional 
chapters. london: Macmillan, 1901. 
c Meredith, H. : An Account of the Gold Coast of Africa: With a 
Brief History of the African Company. London: 
3Angman and others, 1812. 
x Ramseyer and K&mne, Missionaries: Four Years in Ashantee. 
'London: Nisbet, 1875. 
Robertson, G. A. : Notes on Africa ... Containing Sketches of 
the Geographical Situations, 
_ 
the Manners and 
Customs, the Trade, Commerce, & Manufactures, 
and the Government and Policy of the Various 
Nations .... london: Sherwood, 1819. 
(b) MODERN PUBLISHED WORK . 
This is also a select list of the more important 
works, the most important being marked x: 
s 
z 
Blake, J. W. : European Beginnings in West Africa. 
-1454-1578. A Survey of the First Century of White Enterprise, 
in 'Pest Africa, With Special Emphasis on the 
Rivalry of the Great Powers. London: 3ongman's, 
for the Royal Empire Society, 1937. e 
Bovi ll, E .W.: Caravans of the Old Sahara. An Introduction 
to 
the History of the Western Sudan., Inndon: O. U. P. 
for the International Institute of African 
languages and Cultures, 1933. 
Claridge, W. W. :A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti from 
the Earliest Times to the Commencement of the 
Twentieth Century. 2 v. -london. John Pllurray, f 
1915. 
Field, M. J. : Religion and Medicine of the Ga People. O. U. P. 
1937* 
Field, M. J. : Social Organization of the Ga People. Crown 
Agents for the Colonies, 1940. 
Feld, m . J. : Akim-Kotoku. An Oman of the Gold Coast. Crown 
Agents for the Colonies, 1948. 
a i 
41 
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Findley, G. G. and Holdsworth, W. W. : The History of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Societg 
v. IV, pp. 147-201. London: Epworth Press, 
1922. 
Fitzgerald, Vd. : Africa. A Social Economic and Political 
Geography of its Major Regions. 6 ed. 
Inndon: Methuen, 1948. 
34 Hancock, W. K. : Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs. 
Volume II: Problems of Economic Policy, 
1918-1939. Part II. O. U. P. for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1942. 
Hayford, M. C. : West Africa and Christianity. London: 
Baptist Society, 1903. 
Kuczynski, R. R. : Demographic Survey of the British Colonial 
Empire. Volume I. jest Africa. O. U. P. for 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1948. 
Martin, E. C. : The British crest African Settlements, 17E0-182 
A Study in local Administration, 'London: 
Longman's, for the 'soya l Colonial Institute. 
1927. 
McPhee, A. : The Economic Revolution in British 'est Africa. 
London: Routledge, 1926. 
Nadel, S. F. :A Black Byzantium. The Kingdom of Nupe in 
Nigeria. O. U. P. for the International Institute 
of African Languages and Cultures, 1942. 
Rattray, R. S. : Ashanti, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923. 
Rattray, R. S. : Ashanti Law and Constitution. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press , 1929. 
Sarbah, J. M. : Fanti Customary Taws. A Brief Introduction to 
the Principles of the Native LOv s and Customs of 
the Fant i and 'Akan Districts of the Gold 
Coast ... 2 ed. Inndon: W. 0lowes 2 
1904. 
Southon, A. E. : Gold Coast ? ethodism. Cape Coast: Methodist 
Book Depot, 1934. 
Wight, M. : The legislative Council. Tondon: Faber, 1947. 
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(c) UNPUBLISHED PA FERS . 
There are a number of interesting papers on the Gold 
Coast, most of them in District Record Offices in various parts 
of the country. These documents differ in value, and consist 
mainly of District Commissioner's reports. The most important 
(for the present study) of these unpublished sources are listed: 
Crowther, F. : Note on the History of the New Juaben Settlements. 
1914. In the District Record Book, Koforidua. ''` 
Field, M. J. ;: The Osuduku State. 1939. In the District Record 
Office, Akuse. 
Spieth, D. J. : Ewest8mme. Material zur Kunde des Eure-Volkes in 
Deutch-Togo. Berlin, 1906. A typescript trans- 
lation by Mr. J. Duncan, in the District Record 
Office, Kpandu. 
(d) UNPUBLISHED THESES. 
James, P. G. : British Policy in Relation to the Gold Coast, 
1815- 1850. 
Presented for M. A., London, 1935. 
Scotter, W. H. : International Rivalr in the Bights of Benin & 
Biafra, 1815-1855 . Presented for Ph. D., Landon, 1933. 
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